The Ontology of the Middle Way

Peter Fenner

Studies of Classical India 11

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Studies of Classical India

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Volume 11

The Ontology of the Middle Way

by

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This book is dedicated to my daughters
Tahli, Yeshe and Brooke.

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FOREWORD

This study is mainly the outcome of work completed as a Ph.D. thesis at the University of Queensland. However, it has been revised in many ways since its preparation in dissertation form.

Many people have contributed to the study and I am concerned that I may fail to mention everyone who has assisted me. My first introduction to *The Introduction to the Middle Way (Madhyamakavatara)* came through a course I attended at a Buddhist Centre in Queensland called Chenrezig Institute. The course was given by Ven. Geshe Loden, originally of Sera Monastery in India, and was translated by Ven. Zasep Tulku. Besides participating in this course I also attended a number of other courses on Madhyamika presented by these and other lamas in Australia and in Nepal. I was also fortunate to spend a semester at the University of Wisconsin - Madison studying with Professor Geshe Lhundup Sopa.

At different times I had the opportunity to discuss, in person or through correspondence, aspects of the study with a number of leading scholars. Professors J.W. de Jong, Robert Thurman, Jeffrey Hopkins and Paul Williams gave freely of their expertise although in some cases I know that I was unable to take full advantage of their suggestions. Special mention and thanks go Professor Fred Streng who supported the study and gave most graciously of his time.

In Australia I would like to thank my advisers at the University of Queensland, Drs. Ross Reat, Arvind Sharma and Richard Hutch.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge Michael Richards who went over the translation of the verses of the *Madhyamakavatara* with great care and made many suggestions which have improved the accuracy of the translation. Together we prepared the translation of the section heading of Tsong kha pa's which appears as a second appendix. I only regret that I did not have the time to refer to that text in the body of the study.

Some sections of this study have appeared in various journals and I would like to thank *Philosophy East and West, Journal of the International Association for Buddhist Studies* and the *Journal of Indian Philosophy* for permission to publish reworked versions of my essays.

ABBREVIATIONS

AK *Abhidharmakośa (Collection on the Higher Sciences)* of Vasubandhu

BCA *Bodhicaryāvatāra (Introduction to the Evolved lifestyle)* of Śāntideva

CS *Catuḥśatakaśāstrakārikā (Commentary on the Four Hundred Stanzas)* of Āryadeva

D sDe dge edition

DS *Daśabhūmika-sūtra (Ten Levels Sūtra)*

JIABS *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*

JIP *Journal of Indian Philosophy*

LS *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra (Decent into Laṅkā Sūtra)*

LMS *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India* by David Seyfort Ruegg

LSNP *Drang nges rnam 'byed legs bshad snying po (Essence of True Eloquence)* of Tsong kha pa

MA *Madhyamakāvatāra (Introduction of the Middle Way)* of Candrakīrti

MABh *Madhyamakāvatāra-bhāṣya (Commentary on the Introduction to the Middle Way)* of Candrakīrti

ME *Meditation on Emptiness* by Jeffrey Hopkins

MK *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way)* of Nāgārjuna

MN *Majjhima-nikāya (Middle Length Discourses)*

MSA *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra (Ornament of the Universal Vehicle Sūtra)* of Asaṅga

MV *Mahāvyutpatti (Great Etymology)*

N *Nikāya* (Pali *Discourses*)

P Peking edition

PEW *Philosophy East and West*

PP *Prasannapadā (Clear Words)* of Candrakīrti.

PPS *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrika-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra (Perfect Insight in Twenty-Five Thousand Stanzas Sūtra)*

PVT *Pramāṇavārttika (Compendium on Epistemology)* of Dharmakīrti

RSM *dBu ma la 'jug pai bstan bcos kyi dgongs pa rab tu gsal bai me long (Mirror of Complete Clarification)* of dGe 'dun grub

RA *Ratnāvalī (Precious Jewel)* of Nāgārjuna

SN *Saṃyutta-nikāya (Collected Discourses)*

VP Vallée Poussin's edition

VPTd *Madhyamakāvatāra, Introduction au Traite du Milieu* by Louis de la Vallée Poussin

VPV Vallée Poussin's variant

VV *Vigrahavyāvartanī (Repudiation of Criticism)* of Nāgārjuna

For full details see Bibliography

INTRODUCTION

The relationships between reason, spiritual insight or intuition, and the fuller dimensions of religiousity such as human love and social action are matters of concern to many philosophers of religion investigating many different religious traditions. In rational faiths like Buddhism and Hindu Advaita Vedanta the relationship between these different yet essential facets of each religious tradition take on a special significance, and in the case of a religio-philosophical tradition like Madhyamika Buddhism - where the faculty of reason is explicitly linked to the insight of an ultimate reality and where insight is subsumed into a more overarching religious awakening such as we see in the universal vehicle or Mahayana - the relationships and problems associated with them become particularly pronounced.

In the case of Madhyamika Buddhism, and eastern religions and philosophies in general (perhaps less so in the Semitic faiths), the issues and problems that stem from a study of these relationships are largely hermeneutical in character for they arise in the context of contemporary investigations of religio-philosophical systems that represent 'another' paradigm in terms of orientation to theory, intellectual presuppositions, standards of reasoning, and criteria of meaning, relevancy, value, and intelligibility. These differences in intellectual paradigms, issue forth in western scholarship as the posing of new questions to traditional materials that require answers and information that are oftentimes quite different from those which the traditional materials were originally designed and intended to answer.

In other words, in the task of comprehending traditional ideas from a modern framework, the contemporary cross-cultural inquiry inevitably creates new foci of attention that form genuine and legitimate areas of concern and inquiry; areas and issues which are broached in Madhyamika literature only obliquely and indirectly. Problems thus emerge as perceived areas of opaqueness, lack of detail, ambiguities, and omissions in Madhyamika texts.

Why certain areas of inquiry are neglected in the traditional materials we can only hazard a guess, but presumably their paucity of detail in certain areas, such as a lack of attention to "relationships" and "explanatory details" in general, lies no doubt in part with the practical orientation of Indian Madhyamikas. Many implied but omitted details were probably intended to be clarified through oral instruction, debate, and contemplation. Others doubtless represent a failure to see such omissions as problematic. Whatever the reasons are, Madhyamika texts by and large tend to describe only the *constituents* of their religio-philosophical system without explaining the relationships and internal

dynamics that underpin the interactions and dependences between the different aspects of the overall system of philosophy and doctrine. In the contemporary western context, on the other hand, understanding is sought through detailed explanation and clarifications of the various sorts of relationships that obtain between the *co-acting* aspects of a religious understanding, and hence it is just these above areas, which figure as the most *prominent* relationships in many religious traditions, that require an elucidation.

The above relationships are - as we have said - especially significant yet also problematic for contemporary Madhyamika scholarship. Though this is not without good reason, it is true to say that although western Madhyamika scholarship has progressed for several decades and on several fronts, utilising a variety of methods of scholarship ranging from formal textual exegesis to free interpretation carried out in the fields of phenomenology and history of religions, comparative philosophy and logical philosophy, these relationships are unclarified, and the problems associated with them unresolved. Thus, they constitute an ongoing concern for many scholars.

The aim of this study is to investigate the relationships between reason, insight, and the awakening of a fully evolved mind in the Madhyamika tradition with a view first to clarifying the issues involved in their investigation and second to offering some suggested resolutions of the problems. It seeks clarification and resolution at a philosophical and psychological level as the problems - at least in the Madhyamika - are mainly in the area of philosophical-psychology. This, of course, is not to deny that historical issues bear upon these problems, especially in relationship to the doctrinal development of the Madhyamika, or that such problems may bear on the philosophical problems. The decision here to focus on the philosophical and leave aside the historical issues is an expedient of manageability which leaves work to be done. Hopefully it helps to provide the philosophical and doctrinal basis for such needful work.

Hopefully also, the study may be valuable and useful for similar discussions being carried out in other traditions if for no other reason than that the problems are explicit, pronounced, and able to be fully exposed in the Madhyamika. Hence though this study is not linked specifically to other religious traditions it may be that it provides some insights that are helpful in resolving those issues in the cross-cultural religious context and indicate some avenues for grappling with them.

In this study we will be concerned with investigating relationships and problems associated with them that crystalise around three main areas, which we will define.

1. Problems centering on the relationships between reason (*tarka*) - as a basic faculty of rationality; analysis (*vicara*) - in the sense of logical investigation and particularly consequential (*prasanga*) analysis; emptiness (*sunyata*); reality (*tattva*); and liberation (*nirvana*). Professor de Jong has called

attention to this area and especially the relationship between reason, intuition and wisdom (*prajna*).[1] The principal problems in this area concern the place and function of consequential analysis in meditation and the extent to which such analysis plays a role in the acquisition of insight into emptiness as conceived by the Prasangika Madhyamika. The central issue that has arisen for contemporary Madhyamika scholarship is whether the Madhyamika philosophical analysis is intended as a *preparatory* exercise for meditation or whether its role is more integral, as somehow being an efficient cause for insight.

2. The next area of inquiry is concerned with the relationships between so-called technique (*upaya*) and insight. Of the three areas this is the least problematic and that which has received more attention than the others, frequently as a discussion of the relationship between the 'two realities'.

3. The third set of problems focuses on the relationship at a philosophical and doctrinal level between Madhyamika philosophy and the universal vehicle form of Buddhism in general and is specifically concerned to clarify and elucidate the relations and interactions that obtain between insight, compassion (*karuna*), and the fully evolved mind (*bodhi*).

The above problems are present in all Buddhist traditions but are particularly pronounced in the Madhyamika due to its claims that reason may be used for soteriological ends, and its distinction at the level of doctrine between liberation and full evolution (*bodhi*).

Of the problems mentioned, those in the first area, centering on the relation between analysis and insight, attract the greatest attention and hermeneutical rigour for they are the perennial concern of Madhyamika scholars. The two other areas are pursued as subsidiary to this central concern.

That the problems are genuine is demonstrated by the continued efforts of scholars like Murti, Streng, Inada, Sprung, Ichimura, Thurman and others to elucidate the problems and a clear lack of agreement and concurrence in their response to them. That they are urgent problems is evidenced by the fact that the present state of research, with the exception of some recent work by Gangadean and Ichimura, is in something of a still-water.

In approaching these problems this study focuses on a different textual basis than that used in other studies. According to the approach here, the investigation of the relationships is best accomplished by a two staged process: the first involving a textual reconstruction of relevant materials and the second, a making of reasoned inferences and extrapolations on the basis of the reconstructed material.

Given the trenchancy of the relationships in questions, and problems and unclarities that surround them, the choice of texts and hermeneutical tools is a singly important factor, and it is to these I now direct our attention.

The corpus of Madhyamika literature is vast and varied, spanning over six hundred years in India and more than that in Tibet. It includes the original

Madhyamika of Nagarjuna and its subsequent developments into the Prasangika and the two schools of Svatantrika Madhyamika. The bulk and diversity of that literature makes it important from the point of view of expediency to have a research focus, that is to say, a set of texts through which to investigate the relationships, and within these a text singled out as a bench-mark in virtue of its exemplifying a rounded and coherent expression of the Madhyamika. Given, also, that most Madhyamika texts broach these relationships only obliquely the choice of texts itself is a crucial decision.

This study draws on the works of Nagarjuna and Shantideva and spotlights on Chandrakirti's *Introduction to the Middle Way* (MA) as a natural, and arguably the best research focus. The reasons for choosing the *Introduction* [MA] as a bench-mark are several.

With respect to the original expression of the Madhyamika the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] encapsulates its central characteristics. Like the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* (*Mulamadhyamakakarika*) and *Averting Arguments* (*Vigrahavyavartani*), the *Introduction* includes statements of the pure consequential (*prasanga*) dialectic - the leitmotif of the *Principal Stanzas* [MK] - and also raises the meta-epistemological analyses of the *Averting Arguments* (VV) (albeit without analysing the variety of phenomena and *pramanas* that Nagarjuna does). *The Principal Stanzas* [MK] and *Precious Jewel* (*Ratnavali*) are Chandrakirti's own sources for the Madhyamika and both are quoted frequently in the *Introduction*. For our purposes, then, where the structural nature of reason and analysis is more significant than the variability in their deployment, the *Introduction* [MA] is equally as serviceable as the works of Nagarjuna (in fact more so, as we will see). This holds also for Chandrakirti's *Clear Words* (*Prasannapada*) which tends to duplicate the insight made earlier in the *Introduction* [MA]. There is no evidence of any fundamental change in Chandrakirti's philosophy between the *Introduction* [MA] and *Clear Words* [PP].

Hence, with respect to the first set of problems concerned with the relationship between analysis and insight, the *Introduction* [MA] tends to replicate the earlier Madhyamika texts. Thus, unless one is concerned to explore these relationships solely on the basis of the original Madhyamika of Nagarjuna, then the *Introduction* [MA] is an obvious choice of text. With respect to the relation between thought and reality and the Madhyamika theory of perception, the *Introduction* [MA] is an informative text that implicitly raises the problem through its critique of the Vijnanavada school and states a developed Madhyamika response to it.

The choice, though, becomes even more significant in view of the fact that the *Introduction* [MA] gives voice to a Madhyamika praxis where earlier texts do not. It does this in two ways: directly and indirectly. The direct way is by including information about the procedures and assumptions that underpin analysis. The analyses found in the *Introduction* [MA], for example, are more

stylised than those occurring in the *Principal Stanzas* [MK] and are a precursor in fact to a later meditative formulation of the same analyses.

Equally as significant, though, is an implied and, as it were, between the lines description of Madhyamika praxis, that can be inferred from its format and explicit contextualisation within the religio-philosophical milieu of seventh-century India. By writing in response to a wide range of philosophical viewpoints and presumed religious mentalities, Chandrakirti infuses a vibrancy and dynamism into the *Introduction* [MA] that conveys the flavour and life of the Madhyamika as a practical system of interpersonal debate and contemplation. From this one can extrapolate to the procedures and formal structures that undergird Madhyamika praxis.

In relationship to the second area, concerning the relationship between method and insight, the *Introduction* [MA] is structured around the religious practices of the perfections (*paramita*). In this respect, and also in relationship to its discussion of the two realities, it is similar to the *Introduction to the Evolved Life Style* (*Bodhicaryavatara*). It is more informative, however, in its discussions of valid conventions (*tathya-samvrti*), distribution between interpretative-definitive (*neyartha-nitartha*) and in its relating the practice to insight.

With respect to the third area of concern: the relation between the Madhyamika and the universal vehicle in general, the *Introduction* [MA] is clearly a key text for two reasons. One, it gives expression to a more formal universal vehicle doctrinal structure than any other developed Madhyamika texts, and, two, it integrates and creatively synthesizes the Madhyamika and universal vehicle into an overriding and comprehensive religious philosophy. A final point is that the *Introduction* [MA] is supplied with Chandrakirti's own extensive commentary, the *Madhyamakavatara-bhasya* [MABh].

In summary, the *Introduction* [MA], when it is studied with a cognisance of the works of Nagarjuna, is an ideal text through which to address the hermeneutical problems above. In fact, it is surprising and remiss of Madhyamika scholarship to have neglected such a significant text up till now. Had it been accorded the attention that the *Principal Stanzas* [MK] and *Clear Words* [PP] have attracted, Madhyamika scholarship and interpretation may be different today from what they are, and in part this thesis hopes to rectify what can be viewed as a fairly narrow view of the Madhyamika as described by Nagarjuna, and to enhance a broader appreciation of the system.

The selectivity with which the *Introduction* [MA] describes the Madhyamika-universal vehicle system and its general sparseness of detail in just those areas we are looking at, makes the selection of hermeneutical tools as crucial as the selection of textual materials. Considering that the hermeneutical exercise is essentially one of clarifying what the *Introduction* [MA] says and then fleshing out some details by further inferences, the hermeneutical tools should both *expose* the relationships, particularly so as to draw out the problems, and *guide*

the extrapolations and *direct* the formation of hypotheses that attempt to explain the workings and dynamics of the relationships in question.

Where in the past the hermeneutical exercise has proceeded by the methods of comparative philosophy (Murti, Thurman), phenomenology of religion (Streng), western philosophy (Sprung), and logical philosophy (Gangadean and Ichimuru), this thesis comes at the problems from a new angle. It does this by (1) introducing a different method of textual reconstruction and (2) by utilising a psycho-philosophical framework for analysis rather than the more strictly philosophical perspective that has been used in other studies. The change of approach is made with the specific intention of highlighting and explaining the relationships.

The method of reconstruction differs from the more usual one of giving a running verse by verse philosophical exegesis or gloss of the arguments and doctrines of a text, and involves, instead, structurally reorganising the *Introduction* [MA] so as to isolate and juxtapose the different sets of arguments and doctrinal positions that are important to the questions we are addressing. Hence the text as a whole as well as its arguments, are reconstructed. In some cases the reorganisation involves drawing together a common topic-matter that is scattered throughout the *Introduction* [MA] (such as, its depiction of an insight path-structure and specification of a valid world-view). In other cases it proceeds by philosophically reconstructing a set of verses that display a consistency of subject-matter (as in the case of the *Introduction's* [MA] dialectical analyses and critique of the Vijnanavada). In some cases, also, certain materials that are extraneous for our purposes here have been culled from the *Introduction's* [MA] analytical content in an effort to clarify the structure of certain arguments.

The actual arrangement of the verses in terms of their sequential appearance in the thesis is guided by the order in which we previously listed the problems, and with a view to placing the relationships in their proper perspective by seeing how the *Introduction* [MA] leads into them and places them within an overarching system. The juxtapositioning of the different sets of ideas and trains of thought that are expressed in the *Introduction* [MA] is designed to bring into full focus both the tensions and dovetailing that occurs between different aspects of the overall philosophy and doctrine.

In concluding this introduction it is useful to indicate some procedural details about the development of the chapters and also to sketch their contents.

The first two substantive chapters: *chapters two* and *three*; address themselves to the first problem area. The procedure here - which is roughly repeated in discussing the second and third sets of problems also - is to firstly present and reconstruct the *Introduction's* [MA] own arguments and doctrines relevant to the set of questions at hand, and then to take up these problems for a more systematic investigation in the following chapter. Hence *chapter two* addresses itself to the *Introduction's* [MA] analyses, and conception of insight and

liberation, and *chapter three* looks at the relationship between analysis and insight. Doing things this way gives full expression to the *Introduction's* [MA] doctrine and argument without any drastic interruption to its internal continuity and coherency.

Chapter four follows basically the same procedure. The first sections exegete and reconstruct the so-called extensive and for most part universal vehicle content of the *Introduction* [MA] and the final sections - drawing on all the preceding material in the study - address the second and third sets of problems, concerned with the relationships between method and insight, the Madhyamika and universal vehicle, and liberation (*nirvana*) and full evolution (*bodhi*).

As the chapters are fairly dense, and some issues and doctrines recurrent, it is useful to briefly sketch the content of each chapter and weave a continuity through their sequential development.

Chapter one briefly describes the content of the *Introduction* [MA] then outlines its historical context in the Indian monastic tradition and placement in the meditative discipline of knowledge yoga.

Chapter two isolates and philosophically reconstructs the theory of emptiness (*sunyavada*); the *Introduction's* [MA] dialectical analyses that purport to demonstrate the emptiness of phenomena (*dharma*) and the personality (*pudgala*); Chandrakirti's critique of Vijnanavada idealism; and the structure of the saints path *vis-a-vis* the development of insight. In so doing this chapter discusses the so-called profound (*zab po*) content of the *Introduction*, as distinguished from the extensive (*rgya che ba*) content. The profound path includes all that pertains *directly* to the insight of emptiness and correlates with the *arhat-yana* and its fruit (*phala*) of nirvana. The extensive content include all else in the *Introduction* [MA] and most significantly the altruistic feature of the bodhisattva career.

Chapter three utilises the foregoing reconstruction and attempts to tease out the *Introduction's* [MA] own explicit and implied position on the relationship between analysis and insight.

The first half of the chapter details the logical principles utilised in consequential analysis and describes the rudimentary structure of such analysis and reasons for its claimed salvific utility in halting conceptual proliferation. The second half of the chapter embeds the foregoing rudimentary structure in the *Introduction's* [MA] analyses and describes some technical features of the *Introduction's* [MA] analyses. The final sections of this chapter raise the question of the relationship between logical consequences and their supposed experiential correlates.

Chapter four is concerned with the relationship between the profound and extensive doctrines in the *Introduction* [MA]. In the first half I reconstruct the extensive content of the *Introduction* [MA] by locating certain structural distinctions and dynamic processes within that content. The procedure is to divide the extensive content into two aspects. (1) The methods (*upaya*) as they relate to the liberative or arhats path, and (2) the methods as they figure in the

bodhisattvas' and buddhas' deeds of working for the welfare of others. The first sense of the methods includes a discussion of their relationship to insight, the world-view being put forward in the *Introduction* [MA], and the factors determining the veridical perception of that world-view. The second sense in which the methods can be understood includes a discussion of altruism, the bodhisattvas' and buddhas' path of development, and their pedagogical skills and cognitive achievements.

The second half of this chapter focuses on the relationship between different aspects of the profound and extensive paths. It is divided into sections that try and get some resolution on the relationships between insight and the so-called method perfections; the relationship between the 'two realities' and the unifying role of the doctrine of 'relational origination'; the relationship between emptiness and the 'knowledge of all facets'; the relations between emptiness and altruism or universal compassion (*mahakaruna*); and lastly looks at the concept of a single vehicle.

An appendix gives a Tibetan transliteration and English translation of the *Stanzas on the Introduction to the Middle Way*.

NOTES

1. J.W. de Jong, "Emptiness", JIP, 2 (1972), 11

CHAPTER ONE

THE *INTRODUCTION TO THE MIDDLE WAY* [MA] AND ITS RELIGIOUS CONTEXT

1 CHANDRAKIRTI AND THE *INTRODUCTION TO THE MIDDLE WAY* [MA][1]

The full treatise of the *Introduction to the Middle Way* (*Madhyamakavatara*) consists of a set of verses, known as the *Madhyamakavatara* or *Madhyamakavatara-karika,* and Chandrakirti's own commentary on these known as the *Madhyamakavatara-svavrtti* or *Madhyamakavatara-bhasya*. It does not survive in its original Sanskrit, having been lost, as were so many Buddhist scriptures in the Muslim persecution of Indian Buddhism. It exists now in its Tibetan translation which was made in the first case by the Indian Tilaka-kalasha with the Tibetan Nyi ma grags, and revised and improved some time after by the Indian Kanakavarma working with the same Tibetan translator.

Its author, Chandrakirti, is known to us as a renowned Buddhist monk, yogin, and philosophical psychologist. He lived in the seventeenth century[2] and is the author of a number of works,[3] mainly commentaries to earlier Buddhist treatises of which the most famous is his *Clear Words* [PP], a text elucidating the *Principal Verses on the Middle Way* [MK] of the second-century saint Nagarjuna. According to the hagiographies of Bu ston[4] and Taranatha[5], Chandrakirti was born at Samana in the south of India. He became learned in the full corpus of Buddhist scriptures, both sutras and tantras, and was ordained as a monk (*bhiksu*). According to Taranatha[6] he subsequently became abbot (*upadhyaya*) of the great Nalanda monastery (*mahavihara*), at that time India's foremost Buddhist seat of learning[7] and was respected as a "master-scholar among scholars".[8] By contemporary western scholars, Chandrakirti is regarded as a leading expositor of Madhyamika-Buddhist thought and, alongside Buddhapalita, Aryadeva, and Shantideva, as one of the principal formulators of the Prasangika or Consequential form of Madhyamika philosophy. Contemporary Tibetan dGe lugs scholars regard the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] as the foremost

Buddhist insight text. In the Tibetan colleges (*grva tshang*) it is memorised and then studied and debated over a period of five years.[9]

The *Introduction* [MA] is based on the seminal thought of Nagarjuna, the initiator of the Madhyamika as a formal system of thought. Chandrakirti acknowledges this several times in the *Introduction* [MA]. He writes, for example (6.3): "Just as these [bodhisattvas] comprehend the highly profound teaching (*gambhira-dharma*) through scriptures (*agama*), and listening through reason (*yukti*), so I will explain from Saint Nagarjuna's texts in accordance with his system of presentation." In the concluding sections to the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: C.1] he shows his indebtedness particularly to the *Treatise of the Middle Way* (*Madhyamaka-sastra*), i.e. the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK], stating that the *Introduction to the Middle Way* "is related in accordance with that treatise." According to dGe 'dun grub (RSM, f.2b1) it is an introduction to the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK] (*Mula-prajna*). In that tradition of Madhyamika literature the *Introduction to the Middle Way* is concerned with establishing the viewpoint of emptiness as the final and ultimate reality of things, and with the salvific nature of knowing emptiness.

Even so the *Introduction* [MA] differs significantly from Nagarjuna's treatises. Whereas Nagarjuna's works[10] exclusively discuss emptiness or meta-theoretical issues pertaining to emptiness, the *Introduction* [MA] has this as just part of its subject-matter, though a substantial and crucial part at that. The *Introduction* [MA] is divided into twelve chapters. Each of the first ten chapters is devoted to one of the ten so-called steps or levels (*bhumi*) that a universal vehicle saint is said to traverse *en route* to achieving the full evolution of a buddha.[11] For this infrastructure the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] is indebted to the *Ten Levels Sutra* [DS], which it quotes frequently. These ten levels, and hence first ten chapters also, are further correlated with ten special practices that the universal vehicle saint accomplishes during his path. These are the ten perfections (*paramita*). As the perfection of insight (*prajna*) is the sixth of the ten perfections the bulk of the *Introduction's* [MA] discussion of insight andhence of emptiness, occurs in the sixth chapter. This chapter is considerably longer than any of the others and accounts for 226 of the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] 330 verses. The remainder of the subject-matter of these first ten chapters is, then, the development of the nine remaining accomplishments; namely, the perfections of giving (*dana*), good conduct (*sila*), endurance (*ksanti*), enthusiasm (*virya*), meditation (*dhyana*), therapeutic techniques means (*upaya*), powerful capacities (*bala*), resolution (*pranidhana*) and knowledge (*jnana*). In an eleventh chapter titled " The Individual Qualities of the Levels" the *Introduction* [MA] summarises the characteristics and achievements of the saints on each of the ten levels, as expounded in the previous chapters, and in a final chapter of 42 verses describes "The Qualities at the Level of Buddhas"

This additional content is collected under the rubric of "extensive content" as opposed to the "profound" and so Chandrakirti sees the *Introduction to the Middle*

Way [MABh: 409] as clarifying both the profound and extensive ways. Chandrakirti's sources for the extensive material, which for the most part is universal vehicle doctrine, comes mainly from sutras. dGe 'dun grub (RSM, f. 261-2) speaks of Chandrakirti as complementing or filling out (*kha bskang*) the profound content of the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK] with Nagarjuna's own oral teaching (*upadesa*) on the extensive path. This fact has lead Jeffrey Hopkins to render *avatara* in the title of the text as "Supplement".[12] Interestingly he does not quote from the treatises of Maitreya-Asanga, though it seems likely he must have known of them.[13] Likewise, he was probably aware of the various *Perfect Insight Sutras* (*Prajnaparamita-sutras*)[14] and the *Great Commentary on Perfect Insight* (*Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra*) which detail the various universal vehicle theories and *schemas* that the *Introduction* [MA] utilises.

In summary, these additional chapters, describing the saints' practices and levels of accomplishment make the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] a significantly different text from the earlier expositions of Madhyamika thought.[15] Effectively, in one text the *Introduction* [MA] describes the insight philosophy of the Madhyamika and important details of its method and practice. Where, for example, the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK] of Nagarjuna is textually categorised as concerned only with the insight component (*darsana-bhaga*) of Buddhist thought the *Introduction* [MA] is said to be concerned with both insight *and* the practical component (*carya-bhaga*).[16] This breadth of the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] and its incorporation of Madhyamika philosophy within a path structure make it an interesting text to reconstruct. The practical component, contributing, as it does, a diachronic element to the *Introduction* [MA] adds to the value of this work in sorting out the salvific function of logical analysis.

2 THREE SYSTEMS OF THOUGHT THAT CAN BE ISOLATED IN THE INTRODUCTION TO THE MIDDLE WAY [MA]

Given that the aim of this study is to investigate the relationships between various aspects of the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA], it is useful before beginning the actual reconstruction and inquiry to isolate the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] main doctrinal and philosophical structures for they serve to direct the method for reconstructing the text, in that certain of the structures have provided a fairly natural way of breaking up chapters and of developing them internally.

Before isolating the different doctrinal structures it is significant to note that the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] aligns itself with the universal vehicle theory of a single vehicle (*ekayana*). This holds that the Buddha personally held, and on occasions taught - in some universal vehicle sutras - that in the final analysis there is just one spiritual career leading to one final goal. The one goal is that of buddhahood (*buddhatva*) or *full* mental and physical evolution (*bodhi*) as

distinguished from the individual vehicle goal of arhatship (*arhattva*). According to the doctrine of a single vehicle the goal of arhatship (actually the two goals of the disciples (*sravaka*) and self-evolvers (*pratyekabuddha*)) is not a final terminus to the saint's career but merely a point of progress *en route* to the fully evolved state of a buddha. Hence, although the *Introduction* [MA] describes various aspects to the bodhisattvas' actions, meditations, attainments, etc. and on occasions isolates various features of the path to full evolution, it understands that these are all integrally related to the goal of achieving a fully evolved state. Thus in the final analysis they are theoretically meant to be assimilated within the overarching concept of a single spiritual career. This is important to bear in mind when it comes to studying the relationship between the different theoretical and doctrinal structures within the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA].

The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] says that the state of full mental and physical evolution is a result of three relatively distinct processes of conscious mental development. At the very beginning of the *Introduction* [MA], in making his praises, Chandrakirti says (1.1) that the buddhas arise from bodhisattvas - in the evolutionary sense that without saints following the bodhisattvas' career the goal of buddhahood couldn't be gained. In their turn the bodhisattvas are said to arise in dependence on three things, (1) the compassionate mind, (*karuna-citta*), (2) a non-dualistic intellect, (*advaya-mati*), and (3) the spirit to become evolved, (*bodhi-citta*). Compassion is defined in the *Commentary* [MABh: 6] as love and the non-dualistic intellect as "the insight that is free from the extremes [of positing] things and non-things, etc." The bodhicitta or fully evolved mind is defined by Chandrakirti (MABh: 6-7) through a quotation from an unknown sutra, the *Omnipresent Doctrine Sutra* (*Aryadharmasamgitisutra*, tib. *'Phags pa chos kun bgro bai mdo*). It says:

> The bodhisattva comprehends all phenomena (*sarva-dharma*) with the fully evolved mind (*bodhicitta*).
>
> All phenomena are equal within the sphere of truth (*dharmadhatu*). As much as he realises that all phenomena arise adventitiously and are non-abiding, the realiser will fully understand by just that much, that this is due to [their being] empty (*sunya*), and he will think thus, "Living creatures should fully understand this quality of truth (*dharmata*) like this." Having thought this, the mind thus born in the bodhisattva is referred to as the fully evolved mind of the bodhisattva.
>
> [It is] the mind that benefits and [brings] happiness to all living creatures, the superlative mind, the mind that is tender with love,

> the mind that does not avert from compassion (*karuna*), the mind that does not regret [giving] joy, the mind that is unchanging with respect to emptiness, the mind that is not obscured with respect to signlessness (*animitta*), and the mind that is non-abiding with wishlessness (*apranihita*).

Besides reiterating (MABh: 7) the aforementioned three mental qualities that are the principle causes for the bodhisattvas, the extract defines three qualities that characterise the fully evolved mind. (1) It cognises everything. This is the universal vehicle belief in the buddhas' ability to comprehend all perspectives [on reality] (*sarvakara-jnana*). (2) It knows emptiness. (3) It has produced an active compassion that is concerned and caring for the welfare of all creatures.

Thus we can make out three streams or currents of qualities within the one stream that are said to be developed by the bodhisattvas. They develop the insight into emptiness, develop an attitude of great compassion that seeks to remove the suffering of all creatures, and increase their perceptions of phenomena to the point where they are said to be aware of everything. These three aspects to the bodhisattvas development are each treated systematically in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA]. The insight of emptiness is expounded mainly in the sixth chapter. The development and types of compassion particularly in the first chapter, and the cognitive abilities of the bodhisattvas and buddhas are mainly explained in the two final chapters. The concept of a fully evolved mind (*bodhi-citta*) is different from among these qualities for it defines not only the mind of the buddhas but denote also a wish or inspiration that functions causally in the development of bodhisattvas. The evolved mind, refers *both* to a spirit of aspiration that aims or is directed towards gaining the state of a complete and perfect evolution, (*samyaksambodhi*) i.e. the state where the insight of emptiness, active compassion, and knowledge are fully developed, and to the resultant state itself. In this the evolved mind (*bodhi-citta*) is a mind that (1) is awake to the possibility of becoming perfect, (2) actually aspires to reach that state, and (3) is also the state it aspires for. In that it is a motivation to consciously develop an evolved mind and the fully evolved mind, itself, it signifies a teleological process that is bound to its own growth or development into a psychologically and cosmically perfect state. The term bodhicitta can thus be translated as the "spirit to become evolved" or the "fully evolved mind", depending on whether it is referring to a causal or a resultant mind respectively.

Within the three aspects that define the currents of development within the universal vehicle saint, not all are exclusive to the universal vehicle saint, for Chandrakirti considers that the insight of emptiness is gained by the individual vehicle saints as well. What marks the buddhas off from the disciples and self-evolvers, according to the *Commentary* [MABh: 4] is the latter saints lack of (the vastness of the bodhisattvas) collections of merit and knowledge, (*punya-jnana-sambhara*), of great compassion, and the comprehension of all perspectives on reality. The insight of emptiness is thus considered to be common to both the

individual vehicle and universal vehicle saints. The impression one gains from this is that the insight into emptiness is envisaged in the *Introduction* [MA] as a quite different spiritual realisation and process of development than either the development of compassion or the expansion *(vistara)* of cognition, and considering that it can be developed without the other two aspects, it must also be thought of as a relatively autonomous system of mental development. Further more, the motivation behind developing insight is different from the other evolving features of the bodhisattvas' development for insight could be construed (and seems to be by the universal vehicle practitioner when viewing the narrow vehicle saints) as a practice designed for self liberation. The result is thus restricted to the individual who practices and perfects insight. Thus, in the bodhisattva-vehicle, in the first instance at least, insight releases from suffering just the bodhisattvas themselves. There is more to this, though, as will be explained later.

The cultivation of compassion and the development of the bodhisattvas' cognitive skills and levels of interaction with their environment are genuinely altruistic features and can be usefully considered together in that they relate specifically to the bodhisattva-vehicle, whereas the development of insight relates to both the bodhisattva and disciple and self-evolver vehicles. The development of compassion and increased levels of cognition that the bodhisattvas are said to gain are also related to each other, for the activation of their compassion in the actual removal of creatures' suffering depends on their knowing the predispositions, psychic make-up, etc. of creatures. The maximisation of their altruism would depend in the long run on their knowing everything, and hence their concern for helping is the rationale behind their supposed acquisition of super-sensitive cognitions, and the fantastic and magical qualities of the buddhas' and bodhisattvas' behaviour. Compassion and knowledge *(jnana)*, then, relate very closely to each other, and more so, on first sight at least, than insight relates to these.

There is a third quite specifiable and very significant aspect to the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] doctrinal and philosophical fabric that I've termed the "characterised Madhyamika". This is a feature that one finds in the *developed* Madhyamika texts of philosophers like Chandrakirti and Shantideva. It accounts for the dialectic content of the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] that is directed towards refuting quite *specific* doctrinal stances taken by other Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools. It is unclear exactly how this third feature of the *Introduction* [MA] relates to the previous strands of thought although I will make some suggestions in the fourth chapter.

It is useful to briefly describe the three main currents of thought in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA]. Namely, (1) the system of thought involved with the insight into emptiness and its development. (2) The compassionate deeds, and the development of the bodhisattvas and buddha, and (3) the "characterised Madhyamika". Although these are coordinated in a creative

synthesis in the *Introduction* [MA] under the overarching idea of a single vehicle to full evolution, they display a certain degree of autonomy in terms of their definition and dynamic assumptions. They are also usefully specified individually since contemporary scholarship on the Madhyamika philosophy has in various ways confounded or failed to notice the separability of these relatively autonomous systems. Together, these three systems give a basically exhaustive account of the *Introduction's* [MA] subject-matter.

2.1 THE SYSTEM OF INSIGHT AND ITS DEVELOPMENT.

The first system of thought is described in the sixth chapter on insight. It consists of proofs for and expositions of emptiness (*sunyata*). For the main this is established by furnishing refutations against the view that phenomena (*bhava, dngos po; dharma, chos; vastu, ngo bo*) and a personality (*pudgala, gang zag; atma, bdag*) have an intrinsic nature (*svabhava*).

This is accomplished by analyses (*vicara*) based on the exposure of logical consequences (*prasanga*). The fruition of this system is perfect insight (*prajna-paramita*), this being defined as insight into emptiness. Insight into emptiness in turn gives a yogin personal liberation (*pratimoksa*) (MA: 6.117-19, 165 and 179). This system of thought can be called the private aspect or component of the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA]. This system is effectively the one described by Nagarjuna in his treatises generally and especially in the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK], with the difference that in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] Chandrakirti imposes a schematic rigour that tends to align his text with meditations on emptiness rather than postulated proofs for its facticity. The *Introduction* [MA] does this by facilitators that firstly divide objects into two categories, the person and other phenomena. He then stylises his analyses with respect to both of these. This first system is genuinely Madhyamic.

2.2 THE BODHISATTVAS' DEVELOPMENT AND THEIR DEEDS (*CARYA*)

The second system of thought we can isolate is that which is described in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] by its systematic presentation of the bodhisattva levels, from the first level up to the tenth level and culminating in the achievement of becoming a buddha. Within this system the bodhisattva, spurred on by his great resolve to see all living creatures liberated, produces the spirit to become evolved (*bodhi-citta*) as a cause for becoming a buddha (MA: 1.1cd). According to the *Introduction* [MA] (1.4cd): "Whoever has the mind of these victors' children generates the power of compassion in order to completely liberate creatures." To describe this system in terms of the bodhisattva's compassion, i.e. his motivating thought (*citta-utpada*), is to describe the affective and volitional vectors of this system. The affective and volitional components

are accompanied by a cognitive one. The cognitive component of the bodhisattva's path and final goal is described in the *Introduction* [MA] by the various cognitive capacities and powers that the bodhisattva comes to realise in his path, and which culminate in his knowledge of all perspectives [on reality] (*sarvakarajnata*) at the level of buddhahood. This capacity for knowing all facets of things is described in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 12.19-31] by a facilitator known as the "ten capacities" (*dasa-bala*). The production of a knowledge of all perspectives on reality is viewed not as a mere epiphenomenon to the condition of buddhahood but as an integral, in fact necessary condition for full evolution (*sambodhi*), for the reason that buddha-activity (*karitra*) presupposes a fully evolved cognitive capacity. This is to say that the therapeutic and pedagogical skill (*upaya-kausalya*) of buddhas, as is enjoined upon them by their vast compassion, necessitates a maximisation of their knowledge with respect to the causes within living creatures, which bind and constrict them. Thus the *Introduction* [MA: 12.10] speaks of buddhas as "knowing the higher and lower faculties [of people] and the paths which lead to all [their goals]". This is what we may term the *public* facet of a buddha's evolution. It consists of a buddha's knowledge of all perspectives on reality and the knowledge of how to impart whatever is of benefit to those who are less evolved. Consequently we have here a very dynamic system, and one that is environmentally conditioned. In many respects this system is similar to the panentheistic and process theological conceptions of a being who has unsurpassed capacities for creative expression.[17] From a cognitive viewpoint, the buddhas' knowledge and understanding contains all possible viewpoints, perspectives, and perceptions of things, and yet the buddhas are not personally committed to one view as being intrinsically more preferable, truer or better than any others.[18] K.V. Ramanan, for example, speaks of the "ultimate view" as "not any definite view exclusive of all the rest", but as "the all embracing comprehension which is inclusive of all specific views".[19]

The first system, of cognitive expansion, the extension of the scope of action and volition and the comprehension of all views of reality is not exclusively Madhyamika. Hence the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA], when describing these processes and attainments, does not distinguish itself from the religious thought of the universal vehicle generally. Nor does it distinguish itself from within the universal vehicle in regarding these as real human possibilities. It does, however, distinguish itself from some traditions within the universal vehicle in terms of the *extensiveness* with which it regards cognitive expansion and knowing everything as real rather than *ideational* possibilities. The *Introduction* [MA: 12.36d], as we have said, asserts that Buddha related a vehicle unequal and undivided (*theg pa mi mnyam dbyer med*) and thus aligns itself with the doctrine of one vehicle (*ekayana*).[20] On this view all living creatures have the propensity to become buddhas and will in fact do so. This differs from some Phenomenalists (Yogacharas) who upheld the doctrine of three paths (*triyana*).

On this view, living creatures belong to different lineages (*gotra*) such that not all have the propensities to become buddhas. Hence one has paths that terminate at arhathood (*arhattva*), namely the disciples (*sravaka*) and self-evolver vehicles (*pratyeka-buddha-yana*), and buddhahood; namely the bodhisattva vehicle.[21]

2.3 THE CHARACTERISED MADHYAMAKA

Within the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA], and alongside, in fact often interspersed and embedded within its description of the first system of thought, we can locate a third. This system expresses itself in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] with Chandrakirti - in the name of the Madhyamika philosophy - commenting upon and engaging in dialogue and disputation with various non-Madhyamika philosophical systems. The philosophies mentioned by Chandrakirti are Buddhist and non-Buddhist. They represent the religio-philosophical milieu of seventh century India. The Buddhist expounders mentioned in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] are the Vaibhashikas (Bye brag smras ba), Sautrantikas (mDo sde Pa), Sammitiyas (Mang pos bkur ba pa), and Vijnanavadins or Phenomenalists (rNam par shes pa smra ba). Non-Buddhist philosophers (*tirthika*) mentioned are the Samkhyas (Grans can pa), Vaisheshikas (Bye brag pa), Jainas (Tshig gal gnyis su smra ba) and Charvakas or Lokayatas ('Jig rten rgyang phen pa). Some of these are mentioned in passing, such as the Jaina, others like the Samkhya and Buddhist schools are the objects of sustained refutations in regard to their tenets.[22] Though the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] does not mention the Svatantrika branch of the Madhyamika by name, it distinguishes itself from this branch both by its use of consequences and rejection of Svatantrika viewpoints, a major one being its rejection of the Svatantrika view that things exist intrinsically on the conventional level of truth (*samvrti-satya*).[23] Of course, in the *Clear Words* [PP] Chandrakirti mentions Bhavaviveka by name and concertedly refutes his interpretation of Nagarjuna's *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK].

Philosophically these philosophies represent a variety of positions: materialism, realism and phenomenalism, and together they account for most of the systems of thought that were influential in India at the time of Chandrakirti. The argumentation engaged in by the Madhyamikas in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] is not merely counter-refutation of objections directed against emptiness by other philosophies but arguments by the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA], in its own right, against *specific* views of other philosophies. In some cases these views have to do with topics other than emptiness. In doing so, the *Introduction* [MA] establishes the Madhyamika, implicity and explicity, as a system with tenets or postulates (*siddhanta*). The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] makes its refutations and establishments by a variety of techniques. It uses consequential arguments (*prasanga*) selectively, inasmuch as these are applied by way of refuting specifically chosen viewpoints and tenets. This is to say that the

Introduction to the Middle Way [MA] refrains from directing consequential refutations toward particular theses that it otherwise could have refuted. Instead Chandrakirti *affirmingly negates* only key theses from various other schools, for example, the purusha of the Samkhyas, the self of the Sammitiyas, and the source-consciousness (*alaya-vijnana*) of the Phenomenalists. Such selective negations involve a 'partisan application' of consequences. This differs from the alternative procedure - and one employed in the classical Madhyamika of Nagarjuna - of directing consequential arguments against any and all theses and viewpoints, and in practice having an acknowledged policy of not excluding any formalised thesis or philosophical system as a subject for consequential analysis.[24] Besides a selective application of consequences, the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA], in the course of refuting the viewpoint of others, and in establishing and supporting its own tenets, uses self-styled (*svatantra*) arguments (e.g. 6.48-52), analogy (6.18-19, 27-29, 40, 53, 110, 113, 122, 135, 174-75), and arguments based on the common (*laukika*) views of ordinary people (6.12, 32). This third system in which the Madhyamika is specified as a system of tenets we may call the characterised Madhyamika.[25]

Between these three systems that we have just mentioned there are important dynamic relationships. From one viewpoint there are also certain tensions. Perhaps the most important dynamic is that functioning between the first two systems, and within that, the relative influences that cognitive expansion and cognitions of emptiness have on each other. The tensions, which may be obvious, obtain between the last system and the preceding two. That is, the characterised Madhyamika, with its assention to certain philosophical viewpoints, is discordant with both the omni-perspectival view of buddhas, in the first system, and the viewlessness of yogins in the second system. Both these systems are unbounded by *any one* and *any* system of tenets respectively, whereas the characterised Madhyamika is restricted in the sense that some tenets or theories are true whereas other tenets are seen as fallacious. The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] itself does not directly elucidate the dynamics or resolve these apparent tensions. For that matter it does not delineate or assimilate the systems that we have isolated. And for this reason they will become focal points in this study and areas that our reconstruction will concentrate on.

In summary to this section, what we are presented with in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] is a text purporting to describe an aeonian path of religious understanding and psychological development that has the fully evolved state of buddhahood as its result. It is a self-directed and evolving development in which consciousness is the predominant factor. Hence it is a teleological system. The causes and conditions for the eduction and propelling of this development are described together with profiles and world-views at various stages of the path of religious development. The text is operational and descriptive as it outlines both the techniques and methods for yogic development and the purported results of these procedures as the attainments are gained. The

Introduction to the Middle Way [MA], as we have mentioned, expounds mainly the (right) view (*drsti*). As such its main thrust is in delineating a system of philosophical and cognitive development and expression. Though this is its major thrust, the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] also considers affective and volitional systems and their relationships with and bearing on cognitive concerns. That is to say, the *Introduction* [MA] discusses three mutually interactive systems, the cognitive, affective and volitional, with concern and focus mainly on the cognitive system. These above foci of the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] will thus be ours also.

3 THE CONTEXT OF THE *INTRODUCTION TO THE MIDDLE WAY* [MA]

The milieu in which the *Introduction to the Middle Way*[MA] was written, of which it is a product indeed, and the context in which it was subsequently studied differ significantly, as we have said, from the methods used and aims assumed by contemporary scholarship when investigating and assessing any traditional religious literature. These differences, we have noted also, are partially responsible for certain incommensurabilities of meaning that obtain between the traditional literatures and the modern methods of studying them. These differences also account for the interpretative orientation of recent Madhyamika studies.

Some insight into the traditional context, and more specifically into the function and role of texts in that context, is useful if we are to fully appreciate the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] content, in that such insights help one to penetrate a little deeper into what the *Introduction* [MA] describes and why it uses the schemas it does and a dialogical form of presentation.

The context of relevance to a text like the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] includes not only the cultural conditions obtaining in seventh century India but the very methods for studying a literature: the accepted modes of comprehension, i.e. the epistemological and methodological presuppositions and procedures used in studying a traditional literature. In the case of the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] these presuppositions and procedures are significant in two ways. Firstly the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] itself presupposes a certain methodology as being integral to the development of the bodhisattvas that it describes. Although it formally begins its discussion of the bodhisattvas' path at the saintly (*arya*) stage - a point at which bodhisattvas have already made very substantial progress in their meditations - and so it presumes the completion of certain practices begun much earlier. It also presumes, though doesn't describe, certain other principles that undergird the bodhisattvas' practices from their beginning to end. Secondly, to whatever extent the Indian monastic communities were trying to emulate the bodhisattva ideal and follow the very same path described in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA], they

will have brought to bear those same or similar methodological procedures and techniques on the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA]. That is to say, the Indian monks who studied the *Introduction* [MA] would have done so within a framework of praxis that aimed, however feasible or otherwise, at leading them towards the universal vehicle goal of full mental and physical evolution.

In the case of a philosophical literature like the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] the ideal model of comprehension used by both the Madhyamika yogins described in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] and the scholar-monks who studied it, is the model formalised within the theory and practice of the gnostic or knowledge (*jnana*) yoga, for this, as opposed to the bhakti and karma forms of yoga, was thought to provide a method attuned to the genuinely religious and hence liberative concerns of Indian philosophy in which the *summom bonum* of all study was to realise existentially the realities, values and attitudes that the religious literatures described.

Though the compounded term jnana-yoga[26] or the delineation of a structure of different types of yoga and corresponding paths (*marga*) such as bhakti, karma, and *raja* is not found in Buddhism, as it is in Hinduism, Buddhist literature parallels exactly the procedures assumed in Hindu jnana yoga. In this the jnana yogic praxis represents a genuinely pan-Indic ideal of philosophical study.

Jnana yoga, or the yoga aimed at union with knowledge or gnosis, has its origins in the Upanishads where through rigorous yogic exercises coupled with intellectual speculation the Hindu saints gained an intuition (*darsana*)[27] of reality (Brahman). This rationalistic tradition reached its full Hindu expression in the Advaita Vedanta and in Buddhism with the universal vehicle traditions of Northern Indian monasticism.

A number of formulations and schemas - some of them common to Hinduism and Buddhism - serve to describe the general procedures of jnana yoga. The three trainings (*trisiksa*) involving the practice of good conduct (*sila*), mental integration (*samadhi*), and insight (*prajna*) is one schema common to all schools of Buddhism, and the perfections (*paramita*), which order the chapters of the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA], are another specifically universal vehicle formulation.[28] In both of these a seriation is implied with the earlier aspects being foundational to the latter.

However, the really distinctive formulation, which emphasises the epistemic nature of the jnana yoga method of investigation and comprehension, is contained in a tripartite schema that in broad details is common to both Hinduism and Buddhism. This is the method of hearing, thinking and meditation. In Hinduism these are traditionally listed as *shravana* (hearing), *manana* (pondering), and *nididhyasana* (constant meditation), [29], and in Buddhism as *shruta* (tib. *thos*), *chinta* (tib. *bsam*), and *bhavana* (tib. *sgom*).[30] According to the *Commentary* [MABh: 2] these are practised serially and for each

one there is an (MABh: 1) accompanying insight (*prajna*) with an unalloyed gnosis said to come only with the insight gained from meditation.

For the most part Hindu and Buddhist training in knowledge yoga took place in monastic institutions. In Hinduism the *ashramas* and *mathas* and in Buddhism the smaller provincial viharas and the handful of *maha-viharas* such as Nalanda, Vikramashila, and Odantapuri of Bihar and Bengal. In Buddhism it was clearly the great monasteries that were the most important institutions for scholastic study as can be gauged from the luminaries who studied and taught at them. For example, Nalanda has been home to Dignaga, Vasubandhu, Asanga, Dharmakirti, Shantideva, Kamalashila, Shantarakshita, Naropa, and of course Chandrakirti who, as we have mentioned, was at one time abbot.[31] Atisha is thought to have been ordained at Nalanda, abbot at Vikramashila, and to have attended all of the major institutions.[32]

We expect then that a jnanically inclined Buddhist would have entered a monastery, preferably one of the main ones, received his monk's ordination (firstly the shramanera, and then the bhikshu vows) thereby embarking on the practice of good conduct (*sila*) and thus beginning the first of the three trainings (*siksa*). This would consist in the observance of rules that functionally served to induce wholesome attitudes and actions. Such actions are encapsulated in a schema referred to in the *Commentary* [MABh: 42-43] called the ten wholesome action paths (*dasa-kusala-karma-patha*) and consist of modifications to motor (*kaya*), vocal (*vak*), and mental (*manas*) actions. They are to not kill, not steal, have no (illicit) sex, not lie, not slander, speak no divisive words, not to chitter-chatter, not to covet, not to hate, and to have no wrong views.[33] The rationale for inducing wholesome actions and attitudes would be to free the monks' minds from emotional entanglements that would act as hindrances to their study and meditation. They would make the monks fit vessels or receptacles (*bhajana*) for accommodating and assimilating the knowledge that their teachers imparted.[34]

The next chronological step for monks was to enter into a relationship with one or more friendly guides (*kalyana-mitra*) who would direct and guide their scholastic studies and meditative practice. Though personal preference may have had some bearing in the students' choices of teachers,[35] certain guidelines were provided to expedite their choice and ensure the location of high quality teachers. The *Ornament for the Universal Vehicle Sutras* [MSA: 18.10] advised monks that: "One adheres to a friend (*mitra*) who is disciplined, calm, appeased, superior in virtue (*guna*), diligent, rich in instruction (*agama*), fully understanding reality, skilful in speech, of kind nature, and tireless."[36]

3.1 KNOWLEDGE (*JNANA*) YOGA

Having chosen suitable teachers the students would have begun by reciting (*vacana*) and memorising (*udgrahana*)[37] the core (*mula*) texts that comprised their

curriculum. What those texts were in the great Buddhist monasteries we cannot be certain. We have every indication though to believe they were texts authored by the seminal thinkers in the different philosophical traditions: such names as we have already mentioned. No doubt the curriculi were modified and expanded at various times in the history of the great monasteries; probably becoming consolidated around the ninth or tenth centuries, i.e. some time shortly after their peak of activity and creativity. Naropa (1016-1100 A.D.) we know was abbot of Nalanda[38] and while there studied the five method texts of Maitreya-Asanga and the six insight treatises of Nagarjuna.[39] We may suppose he also studied the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA]. Atisha (980-1052 A.D.) was similarly conversant with the works of the major thinkers for he translated texts of Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Vasubandhu, Asanga, and Chandrakirti into Tibetan.[40]

The texts that we presume must have been studied would therefore have covered all aspects of universal vehicle thought: Madhyamika, Yogachara, Abhidharma, epistemology and logic (*pramana*). From these texts students were advised to rely on texts of explicit or definitive import (*nitartha*) rather than those having an equivocal or interpretative meaning (*neyartha*).[41] These distinctions, according to the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA], are made on the basis of whether or not texts teach about emptiness. We are told (6.97b-d) that:

> Sutras that expound subject matters that are not [directly about] reality (*tattva*) [i.e. emptiness] are said to have an interpretable meaning (*neyartha*), and on understanding this one should interpret them [as a provisional doctrine]. [Those sutras that] have emptiness as their subject should be understood as having a definitive meaning (*nitartha*).

If this advice was in fact followed it means that texts like the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] and Nagarjuna's treatises were studied and practised with a special emphasis and discipline, because emptiness was the liberative reality, and hence in the soteriological context it would be the most relevant and immediate concern.

At this first stage of the knowledge yoga path, students were primarily concerned with unmistakenly recognising the words (*vac, tshig*) in the texts being studied and as commented on by their teachers. Study and hearing (*sruta*), then, was based on a non-distorted apprehension of the spoken and written word. Essentially it was a linguistic achievement arrived at when students gained a full competence and mastery of phonetics, grammar, and syntax. These subjects along with etymology, poetics, metrics, etc. in fact constitute one branch of the five secular knowledges (*vidya*) studied in Hindu and Buddhist monasteries alike.[42] They prepared monks for the second step of their practice, namely thinking about what they had heard.

Whereas hearing is characterised as a discipline in linguistics, thinking (*cinta*) is essentially the study of semantics, for it involves determining the conceptual meanings that are implied by textual materials. The discovery of meaning (*artha, don*) was facilitated by receiving oral commentaries (*upadesa*) to the core texts and then exploring the intricacies of meaning by using the techniques of debate, logical analysis, and linguistic analysis. In the case of philosophical texts, thinking presumably entailed both reflecting on experience by way of imbuing the texts with meaning, and then comprehending the formal and factual logic involved in the inferential presentations that occurred in them. The *Mirror of Complete Clarification* [RSM] of dGe 'dun grub, for example, gives a clear indication of how philosophical texts were debated. The text, which is an interlinear commentary to the versified portion of the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA], is composed along the lines of a debate and is used right up to the present in Tibetan dGe lugs colleges as a facilitator for debate. The commentary structures the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] around the formal procedures used in Tibetan college debates where discussion proceeds systematically through three steps thus: 1. notification of the subject being debated (*rtsod gzhi chos*), 2. qualities of the object of establishment (*'grub bya chos*) and 3. statement of a reason (*rtags*). The reason serves to place or establish the qualities on the subject. In the *Mirror of Complete Clarification* [RSM] the sentences ending with *te*, etc. indicate 2., i.e. they state the qualities applied to a subject, and the sentences closing with ... *bal phyir* give 3., the reason. The second step can be construed as either a thesis proffered or a question depending on the content.

An assumption throughout this method is that *meaning* is empirically derived, and hence that the requisite and appropriate experiences were needed on behalf of students in order to make sense of the texts they studied. Asanga says for example that: "If the meaning were seen just by listening, then meditation would be meaningless [i.e. otiose]".[43] Hence if a meaning was not grasped or not forthcoming we can assume that a student would go about meditatively trying to gain experiences that made the text(s) intelligible. In this respect the traditional methods of study make a significant and major departure from what we are familiar with for students were expected to acquire experiential correlates to the referential terms occurring in their texts. A reliance (*pratisarana*) stipulates that students should rely on meanings (*artha*) rather than on the symbols (*vyanjana*) themselves.[44] This emphasis on meditative experience is of course consonant with the experiential nature of Buddhism as advocated by the Buddha himself when characterising his teaching as a "come see" (*ehipasyika*) philosophy, or in other words to be tested *solvitur ambulando*, that is, by practical experiment. Hence, throughout the knowledge path, even from the stage of memorisation, monks would have been engaged in those meditative practices which gave them access (in however a diluted or adulterated a form) to the religious experiences that their texts either described or assumed a prior knowledge of.

More specifically they would have practised serenity (*samatha*) and mental integration (*samadhi*) exercises as subject-neutral instruments for penetrating the inner textual meanings. The practice of tranquillity is said to remove affective and unwanted conceptual concomitants, and was viewedas the basis for achieving concentration or the collection and focus of mental attention. The *Ornament for the Universal Vehicle Sutras* [MSA: 15.11-14] speaks of nine stages in the development of serenity and mental integration, beginning at a point when a mind can first become fixed on a meditative object, this is called the stage of interiorisation or placing the mind on the object, and culminating in an effortless and prolonged mental integration. [45] With these mental powers as a foundation students of the traditional path would ideally have developed the meditative absorptions (*dhyana*). In a sense these would give them the research tools for practising meditation (*bhavana*).

In summary, the stage of thinking (*cinta*) was a bridging and transitional activity between a focus on symbols in the first stage and their referents in meditation. It was the lexical-cum-symbolic and semantic-cum-experiential work of correlating words and meanings.

The final, [46] and from a contemporary viewpoint, clearly most distinctive step within the knowledge yoga path was the supposed acquisition of a direct non-conceptual comprehension of textual referents through the practice of meditation. This last stage would be distinguished from the previous one by an increasing emphasis on meanings and a de-emphasis on symbol systems.[47] The transition from symbols to their experiential referents was presumably thought to be gradual, taking place through a number of meditative stages. The Tibetan tradition of meditation, which claims indebtedness to and a faithful accuracy with Indian Buddhism, and which attempts to replicate these Indian practices right up to the present day, distinguishes three main types of meditation. The first is glance or perusal meditation (*shar sgom*). As the name indicates, this form of meditation involves going over an entire body on instruction, written and oral, in order to become familiar with its contents. The second is examination or analytical meditation (*dpyad sgom*). This type consists of investigative contemplations which, based on reasoning and experience, produce logical and experiential consequences of a kind that confirm and consolidate the import of philosophical texts. The most important form of confirmational reasoning is that based on the functional ability (*krta-krtya*) of textual formulations to be acted upon and cause change. This involves a student checking in his or her own experience and among his contemporaries, to see if the results said to accrue from practising meditation and acting on the basis of textual formulations do in fact accrue. This form of testing is based on the criterion of the power of intentional action (*arthakriya-sakti*).[48]

Once texts have been tested to the satisfaction of students they may begin the practice of formal or cessation meditation (*'jog sgom*). This is the point at which the practice of meditation becomes truly distinguished. It is based on a

development of serenity and mental integration, and in Buddhism consists of a special discernment (*vipasyana*) meditation that claims to penetrate to the core of reality. In the case of textually based meditations with a philosophical content this would involve a repeated placing of focussed concentrations on inferentially produced conclusions, in an effort to transform those conceptual conclusions into non-conceptual ones. The final fruit of meditation, then, is stated to be a non-mediated and hence direct insight into reality or aspects of it.

Epistemically, each of the three steps in the knowledge yoga path can be correlated with a particular knowledge situation. That is to say, each is based on a particular mode of knowing (*pramana*), within which there is a claimed evolution towards epistemological certitude.

Hearing, as we have defined it, does not give rise to any meaningful information for it is only the recognition of a symbol description with no indication of its referent. It is, as it were, knowing merely an index. As such the insight of hearing (*srutamayi-prajna*) is based on presumption (*manasvicara*). Thinking or cogitation is concerned with mapping symbols to their designated referents. The student is cognisant of both the index and what is indexed, and so the insight of thinking (*cintamayi-prajna*) is conceptual and mediated by symbol denotations. It is based on inference (*anumana*) and gives rise to propositional knowledge. The extreme case of this is where a *single* syllable such as "*ah*" is referentially correlated with emptiness to the point apparently where mere reflection on the one syllable is thought to rigidly and directly induce the insight of emptiness.[49] The insight of meditation (*bhavanamayi-prajna*) is purportedly non-indexical or rather self-indexing, for meanings become known without having to make reference to any symbol or symbol system. It is also said to be self-certifying and hence incorrigible for the reason that it is direct experience that is uninterpreted. Its instrument is yogic perception (*yogic-pratyaksa*).

The epistemological evolution reads from presumptive knowledge and towards an increasing degree of certitude[50] and students of this traditional method of study and practice were advised to rely on the non-conceptual knowledge (*jnana*) in preference to conceptual understanding (*vijnana*).[51] Writing of the praiseworthy yogin, the *Ornament for the Universal Vehicle Sutras* [MSA: 14.2] says: "Then, knowing the meaning (*artha*) he understands that the whole philosophy (*dharma*) is like a ship, avoiding being satisfied with listening; it's because of this he is said to know the philosophy."[52]

3.2 THE TRANSFERENCE OF INSIGHT

The function of this tripartite schema, was to provide an efficient means for transferring religious insights between individuals, and in this context it would have formed an integral part of the teaching program in the Indian (and now Tibetan) monasteries where the principal concern was to maintain the insights of the Buddha through a continuity of transmission from teachers to students

(*guru-sisya-parampara*). From this viewpoint textual materials provided the communicable medium, the common ground or *lingua franca,* for the transmission of insight. They represent state- or aspect-specific descriptions, the function of which is to locate yogic realities. The process can be illustrated through a diagram (1.1).

The idealised procedure is that an originator of a religio-philosophical tradition would have obtained salvific insights which were then conceptualised and after that either verbalised and/or written down. The oral traditions or texts then represented the *objectification* of what was a subjective datum, i.e. the religious insight. The operational texts *described* the meditative techniques required for obtaining the insight and the descriptive texts *directed* the meditative inquiry. The latter would ideally be referentially perspicuous and unambiguous, in other words, they would rigidly designate their referents. Hence the supposed distinction of definitive (*nitartha*) literature.

The lineage of transmission was set in motion when the immediate disciples and students of the propagator attempted to mirror their teacher's route of discovery by retracing his steps. That is, they would hear or read about the insights of their teacher with a view to comprehending the words. They would then think and ponder about those words in an attempt to reduplicate the conceptualisations of their teacher and finally would attempt meditatively to replicate the original insight. The teacher would check these against his own insights in order to ensure the accuracy and depth of his students' understandings. This made for the distinction between teachings that transmitted realisations or insights (*adhigama-nirdesa*) and those which merely transmitted the text (*agama-nirdesa*).[53]

Whatever the actual procedures were in Nalanda and the other great monasteries they must have at least been *modelled on* an archetypal jnana yoga method of study and comprehension and so formed the practices envisaged *within* the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] as preparatory to and coextensive with the practices of the perfections and as forming the method for studying the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] itself, insofar as the Buddhist student himself aspired to become the saint (*arya*) described in his texts.

4 THE PROFOUND AND EXTENSIVE CONTENTS

Before proceeding into the substantive chapters of the thesis, I would just like to clarify the *range* of certain rubrical terms that we have already mentioned and will continue to use. Once these definitions are out of the way we need not worry about causing any confusion as to when and where certain terms are interchangeable.

The most basic hermeneutical device around which the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] is being recast (it divides chapters two and four) is a distinction between the profound (*gambhira*) and extensive (*udara*). This is a




Fig. 1.1 Transmission of realisation

standard universal vehicle organisational device that Chandrakirti refers to and uses (6.7b-d) and which serves to account (12.34) for all aspects and features of the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] content. The profound, deep or penetrating refers (12.34) to emptiness or (RSM: f. 43a5) the realisation of reality, and the extensive, vast, or pervasive to everything else. The extensive thus includes the technique or methods (*upaya*) such as the first five perfections, the capacities, super-sensitive cognitions, knowledges, etc. that are said to be gained by the bodhisattvas and buddhas. The terms 'profound' and 'extensive'are usually used adjectivally as qualifying the (MABh: 409.8) way (*tshul*), (RSM: f. 43a5) the path (*marga*), and the philosophy, (*dharma*).

These two rubrics relate isomorphically to the two [levels] of reality (*dvaya-satya*); the ultimate (*paramartha*) and conventional (*samvrti*) or social (*vyavahara*). Like the profound and extensive, the ultimate and conventional realities account non-residually for all the Buddhist teachings.[54] The four realities for the saint (*arya-satya*), for example, (MABh: 148) divide thus: the reality of suffering, its origin, and the path to its cessation define conventional realities while the truth of cessation is the ultimate reality. In turn these two pairs of categories; the profound and extensive, and ultimate and conventional, correlate with the epistemologically toned categories of insight (*prajna*) and techniques or methods (*upaya*).

I have chosen the categories of the profound and extensive with which to reorganise the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] as they seem to accommodate the bodhisattvas and buddhas deeds as well as their knowledge more comfortably than the other categories. I have also chosen to include the discernment (*vipasyana*) practices of the Madhyamika yogins within the profound view, (where they would not find place as an ultimate truth, though presumably would be placed in the prajnaparamita).

Where the above pairs of categories correlate isomorphically with each other they do not distinguish the arhat vehicle from the bodhisattva vehicle for (1) *both* the arhats and bodhisattvas gain insight into the profound or ultimate with (2) the difference between them being in terms of the *extensiveness* of the methods they are said to practice and conventional truths and realities they come to know. Hence, if we are thinking about what describes and constitutes the bodhisattvas' practices it is the profound and *all* of the extensive content of the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA], whereas for the arhats, i.e. both the disciples and self-evolvers, the extensive amounts, in *doctrine* at least, only to those methods and conventional realites that one needed in order to comprehend the profound.

NOTES

1. The two translations appear respectively in the D.T.Suzuki edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka as numbers 5261 in volume 98, *Tibetan Tripitaka* (Tokyo-Kyoto: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1955).

2. D.S. Ruegg writes that "For lack of external historical evidence, Chandrakirti's date has to be fixed relatively to that of his predecessor Bhavaviveka, whom he criticised by name in his *Prasannapada..*" "A Chronology...p.513. This puts Chandrakirti in the seventh century. Ruegg suggests the dates of 600-650 in LMS, p.71.

   Christian Lindtner has proposed earlier dates for Chandrakirti, namely from 500-560, on the grounds that the *Madhyamakaratnapradipa*, a text by Bhavya (i.e. Bhavaviveka), refers to a Chandrakirti. See D.S. Ruegg, "A Chronology" ...*op.cit*, pp.513-4 and p.530 for Ruegg's reason for holding to the more traditional dates.

3. See Taranatha's *rGya gar chos 'byung*, tr. by Lama Chimpa (et. al.), *History of Buddhism in India* (Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1970), Supplementary note no. 29, pp. 401-402 for a list of texts attributed to Chandrakirti in the Tibetan *bsTan 'gyur*. See LMS, pp.126 and 129-130 for modern editions of Chandrakirti's works.

4. Bu ston's *Chos 'byung*, tr. by E. Obermiller, *History of Buddhism, Pt. 2, The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet* (Heidelberg: Harrassowitz, 1931-32), pp.134-136.

5. Taranatha, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-199.

6. *Ibid.*, p 198.

7. See Sukumar Dutt, *Buddhist Monks and Monasteries of India - their history and their contribution to Indian culture* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1962), p. 331.

8. Taranatha, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

9. Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness* (London: Wisdom Publications, 1983), p. 572, writes, "When Madhyamika is studied in the Ge-luk-ba monastic colleges, it is Chandrakirti's *Supplement* that is memorized and that serves as the basis for the entire study of Madhyamika."

10. This is true of his *magnus opus*, the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK] and the *Vaidalya-sutra* (*Sutra on the Finely Woven*), *Sunyata-saptati* (*Seventy on Emptiness*), *Yukti-sastika (Sixty on Reasoning*) and *Repudiation of Criticisms* (VV). The *Precious Jewel* [RA] discusses other aspects of the universal vehicle. These six are the so-called "Collection of six logical [treatises] of the Madhyamika" *dbu mai rigs tshogs drug*). The *Friendly Letter* (*Suhrllekha*) discusses earlier practices, particularly morality and renunciation (*nges 'byung, nihsarana*).

11. These levels and their corresponding perfections describe the bodhisattva's career not from its beginning but from a well-defined transitional stage at which the bodhisattva is said to cease being just an ordinary yogin and to become truly a saint (*arya, 'phag pa*) and *bodhi- sattva qua 'bodhisattva'* (*byang chub sem pai zhes byai sgra nyid*, MA: 1.5d).

12. See *Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 868-871, n.545 for Hopkins's detailed analysis that leads him to conclude that "supplement" is the primary meaning.

13. As such the MA is not a "Madhyamika-Prajnaparamita synthesis", a phrase Ruegg confines (LMS, pp.101-102) to the synthetic works of Vimuktisena & Haribhadra.

14. The large *Prajnaparamita-sutras,* i.e. the *Astadasasahasrika, Pancavimsatisahasrika,* and *Satasahasrika,* date from the beginning of the Christian era. See E. Conze (tr.) *Selected Sayings from the Perfection of Wisdom* (London: The Buddhist Society, 1954), p. 12.

The *Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra* as K.V. Ramanan, *Nagarjuna's Philosophy as Presented in the Maha-Prajnaparamita-Sastra* (Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1971) notes (p. 14) "seems to have sunk into oblivion in India," it being hardly ever referred to in the Sanskrit *shastras.* As a commentary to the *Perfect Insight in Twenty-five Thousand Stanzas* [PPS] (and now generally agreed to be falsely attributed to Nagarjuna) it voices all the universal vehicle material that Chandrakirti uses.

15. Other texts that cover similar material and speak from the same philosophical position as the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] are the *Precious Jewel* [RA] of Nagarjuna and the *Introduction to the Evolved Lifestyle* [BCA] of Shantideva. Unlike the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] these treatises do not describe the qualities of buddhas.

16. See, for example, mKhas grub rje's *rGyud sde spyii rnam par gzag pa rgyas par brjod,* tr. by F.D. Lessing and A Wayman, *Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras* (Paris: Mouton, 1968), p. 89.

17. Lit. This buddha's son (*rgyal poi sras po 'di*).

18. This aspect of a buddha's cognition is best described in K.V. Ramanan *op. cit.* See for example pp. 38, 40, 120, 134, and 160.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 120 and 160 respectively.

20. MA: 12.36-42.

21. See E. Obermiller, "The Doctrine of Prajna-paramita as exposed in the Abhisamayalamkara of Maitreya", *Acta Orientalia,* 11 (1933), 32-33. Another explanation talks of three final vehicles and five lineages to the previous three. A fourth lineage is uncertain with respect to whether or not it will enter any of the three vehicles. Its indeterminacy is resolved in dependence on whether people of this lineage have teachers and from whether their teachers follow the universal or individual vehicle. A fifth lineage is precluded from achieving even arhathood. This lineage is cut off (*rigs bcad*) from obtaining liberation (Geshe Sopa, communication). This doctrine of three final vehicles is asserted by Phenomenalists who follow scripture (*agama*), such as Vasubandhu and Sthiramati, as opposed to Phenomenalists who rely on reason (*nyaya*), such as Dignaga and Dharmakirti. Asanga is not specified as either of these two types of Phenomenalists. The *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] view of one final vehicle that terminates at buddhahood is based on the tathagata-garbha doctrine, that all sentients are possessed of the germ or genes of buddhahood and that given the necessary conditions that germ or seed will fully mature. See, for example, the *Uttaratantra* (*rGyud bla ma*) known also as the *Ratnagotravibhaga* of Asanga.

For a discussion of one versus three vehicles see Fujita Kotatsu, "One Vehicle or Three?", JIP 3 (1975), 70-166. This article is based in the main on the *Lotus of the Good Philosophy Sutra* (*Saddharmapundarikasutra*).

22. At the time of the MA most of the Hindu wisdom systems (*darsana*) were well established. Their fundamental sutras had been written and presumably in some cases the philosophies were already vital by this time. The dates given by S. Radhakrishnan and C.A. Moore, *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy* (Princeton University Press, 1957) are: *Nyaya sutras* of Gotama - 3rd century B.C. (p. 357), *Vaisesika sutra* of Kanada - later than 300 B.C. (p. 386), *Sankhya-karika* of Ishvara Krshna - 3rd Century A.D. (p.425), and the *Yoga Sutra* of Patanjali - 2nd century B.C. (p. 453). The dates of Asanga and Vasubandhu and hence origins of a formalised Yogachara and Vaibhashika schools are 310-390 A.D. and 320-400 A.D. respectively.

The Sautrantika school was expounded by Dignaga whose dates are 480-540 A.D.

23. See LSNP, pp. 295-297 for the differences in the status of conventional reality between the Svatantrika- and Prasangika-madhyamika.

24. It is this Nagarjunian position of directing consequences, without reservation to any viewpoint that gives rise to his Madhyamika being characterised as a positionless (*apaksa*) philosophy. This allows Nagarjuna, in the RA, 1.75 for example to speak of the buddhas teaching a philosophy (*dharma*) that is without a foundation or basis (*analaya*) and having no assumptions (*nisparigraha*). See Jeffrey Hopkins et al., tr. from the Tibetan of *Precious Jewel* [RA] tib. *rGyal po la gtam bya ba rin po chei phreng ba* in *The Precious Garland and the Song of the Four Mindfulnesses* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975) p. 27. (April, 1934), 234.

25. I use the term Madhyamika here for the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] so characterises that system in the *Introduction* [MA] that engages in disputation with the Phenomenalists and so forth. The question of whether or not a "characterised" Madhyamika can really be an expression of the Madhyamika philosophy is not at issue here. Suffice it to say that, on the one hand, if Nagarjuna's exemplification of the Madhyamika is taken to be exhaustive, then the characterised Madhyamika, or at least all of it that is not concerned with analysing emptiness, is not really Madhyamika. On the other hand, within the definition of the Madhyamika as found in Tibetan *grub mtha'* (*siddhanta*) texts, the characterised Madhyamika - of which there are both Svatantrika and Prasangika forms - are properly termed Madhyamika. See, for example, Kon mchog 'jig med dbang po's, *Grub pai mthai rnam par bzag pa rin po chei phreng ba*, tr. by Geshe L. Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins as "Precious Garland of Tenets" in *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider and Company, 1976), pp. 45-152. The description given to the Prasangika Madhyamika system is on pp. 133-145. That, and other *grub mtha'* descriptions of the Madhyamika are extracted from Indian shastras such as the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA].

26. Although the term yoga of perfect insight (*prajnaparamita-yoga*) is used in the *Perfect Insight in Twenty-five Thousand Stanzas* [PPS: 3 and 60-65].

27. Other cognate terms are *saksatkara, prayoga, abhisambodha, jnana, prajna, saksatkriya*.

28. These are respectively the 2nd, 3rd and 6th perfections (*paramita*). The five forces (*panca-indriya*), a class within the aids to awakening (*bodhi-paksa*), is another schema. Its seriation is faith (*sraddha*), energy (*virya*), mindfulness (*smrti*), mental integration (*samadhi*). and insight (*prajna*). See MV, 976-981, p.75 and MSA, 18.55. The saints eight limbed path (*asta-anga-marga*) is another. A Hindu schema is Patanjali's eight-limbed yoga (*asta-anga-yoga*).

29. See Shankara (circa 8th A.D.) *Vivekacudamani* (70a) where using slightly different terminology, he writes that, "Then came hearing, reflection on that, and long, constant and unbroken meditation of the truth for the *muni*. "Tr. after Swami Madhavananda, *Vivekachudamani of Shri Shankara Shankaracharya*: Text, with English notes and index (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1970), p. 25. For an earlier and pre-Buddhist reference see the *Nyaya-sutra* 4.2.38, 47-48.

30. See for example the *Ornament for the Universal Vehicle Sutras* MSA: 1.16a-b]. Here Asanga uses a different terminology (see Bagchi, p.16). For a hinayana or individual vehicle statement see the *Collection on Phenomenology* [AK: 6.5].

31. See H.D. Sankalia, *The Nalanda University* (Delhi: Oriental Pub., 1972), chpt. 5.

32. See A. Chattopadhyaya, *Atisa and Tibet - Life and Works of Dipamkara Srijnana in relation to the History and Religion of Tibet* (Calcutta: Indian Studies - Past and Present, 1967, pp. 100-101 and 127-142, esp. 129. Also S. Dutt, *op. cit.*, p. 353.

33. See also RA: 1.8-9; MV, 1685-98, pp. 134-135; and PPS: pp. 121 and 389.

34. In the case of Madhyamika studies the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 6.4-5c] indicates there are additional requirements for being a fit vessel that include a natural propensity to understanding emptiness. We are told of the suitable disciple who when merely hearing about emptiness "great joy (*rab tu dga ba*) rises over and over and from the great joy his eyes flood (*brlan*) with tears and all the hair of his body become erect (*ldan bar*) (6.4b-d)."

35. Weighing against personal preference being a chief influence is the universal vehicle Buddhist advice that students "rely not on personalities but on [their] teaching." This is one of the four reliances (*pratisarana, rton pa*) (see MSA, 18.31-33, MV, 1545-49, p. 124, and Ramanan, *op. cit.*, p. 130 and LSNP, pp. 114-115.). It advises students not to be enamoured by a teacher's personality but to be foremostly concerned with the content and quality of their teaching.

36. Loden Nyingje (tr.), *The Ornament of the Mahayana Sutras* (Chenrizig Institute, Eudlo: mimegraph, 1979), p. 55. Sanskrit from Bagchi *op. cit.*, p. 116. For Hindu guides to teacher choice see *Vivekacudamani*, 33 and *Upadesa Sahasri*, 1.1.6. The issue of teacher credentials relates also to the question of the establishment of valid teachers (*sasin, ston pa*) as is discussed in the *Compendium on Epistemology* [PVT] of Dharmakirti. There, teachers are proved valid by the validity of their teachings. The fallacy of making recourse to unsuitable authorities or *ad verecundiam* is thus thought to be avoided.

37. These are isolated as specific stages in a methodological division called the ten dharma actions (*dasadharmacarya*). See MV, 902-12, p. 70. The earlier steps of offering and giving are also included by way of showing respect and service to teachers and perceptors.

38. S. Dutt, *op. cit.*, p. 351.

39. See H.V. Guenther's tr. of lHai bysun pa rin chen rnam gyal's *mKhas grub kun gyi gtsug rgyan pan chen Na ro pai rnam thar no mtshar rmad byung* as "The Wondrous Life of the Great Scholar Naropa Crown-Jewel of all Philosopher-Saints" in *The Life and Teaching of Naropa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 12. The five teachings of Maitreya-Asanga (*byams chos lnga*) are the *Ornament for the Universal Vehicle Sutras* [MSA], *Madhyanta-vibhanga, Dharma- dharmata-vibhanga, Abhisamayalamkara,* and *Uttara-tantra.* As a lay disciple Naropa studied the seven epistemological texts of Dharmakirti, see Guenther, *op cit.*, pp. 11-12.

40. Further information on the course of study at the *mahaviharas* can be inferred from the scholastic traditions of Tibetan Buddhism which according to Snellgrove "inherited complete the developed Indian Buddhist tradition as it was up to its final dissolution about 1200 A.D." See "Buddhist Monasticism - a brief historical survey, "*Shambhala - Occasional Papers of the Institute of Tibetan Studies*, 2 (July 1973), p. 21. We know the bKa' gdam tradition began by Atisha came to hold six shastras as core texts. These were the *Yogacaryabhumi, Ornament for the Universal Vehicle Sutras* [MSA], *Siksasamuccaya, Introduction to the Evolved Lifesytle* [BCA], *Jatakamala*, and *Udaravarga*. They also regarded the *Sunyatasaptati*, and *Precious Jewel* [RA] highly, and Atisha eloquently praised Chandrakirti's philosophy. See A. Chattapadhyaya, *op cit.*, pp. 395-96. The reformed bKa gdam school of Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), the dGe lugs, we know study the *Collection on the Higher Sciences* [AK], *Compendium on Epistemology* [PVT], *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA]. *Abhisamayalamkara*, and the *Vinaya-sutra* as root (*rtsa ba*) texts. For a general discussion of Indian studies and the Tibeto-Indian discourse see S. Dutt *op. cit.*, pp. 328-66.

41. This is another of the four reliances, see LSNP, p.116-126.

42. See MSA, 12.60; *Mundaka Upanisad*, 1.1.5; and S. Dutt, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

43. MSA, 13.3 1/2b, L. Nyingje, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

44. MV, 1546, p. 124.

45. See L. Nyingje, *op. cit.*, p. 43 and Bagchi, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

46. Whether the final insight (*prajna*) of the universal vehicle is meant to be contained within or represent a stage beyond meditation is debated. The *Uttaratantra* (31.2) of Asanga implies that the final insight is not the insight of meditation itself but a different order of knowledge. See E. Obermiller (tr.) "The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salvation", *Acta Orientalia*, 9 (1931), 249.

47. The stages in the path of knowledge presumably represent *emphases* on a continuous process of change rather than discrete intervals. This means that the alignment of "cognitive meditations" between *chinta* and *bhavana* is somewhat arbitrary. I have followed the suggestion of Geshe T. Loden and included the "cogitative meditations" under meditation, even though as he says the results or wisdoms they are said to produce would generally be those assigned to the second stage. The foregoing elaboration of three modes of meditation has benefitted from discussion with Geshe Loden. See also Alexander Berzin (tr.), *Lam rim man ngag: A Standard Intermediate Level Textbook of the Graded Course to Enlightenment* (unpub. Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1972), pp. 54-57.

48. See Dharmakirti's PVT, vv. 8 and 30-31 of the Pramana-siddha chapter for the logical test of applicability, and Masatoshi Nagatomi, "Arthakriya", *The Adyar Library Bulletin*, 31-32 (1967-68) for a discussion of *arthakriya* in PVT, see esp. pp. 56-58.

49. The claim for this ability is included in the concept of the *kshama dharani* which is defined as the adequacy of just one syllable to serve indexically for the realization of emptiness. See Ringo Tulku, "The Mahayana Concept of Dharani," in G.H. Mullins and N.Ribush (eds.), *Teachings at Tushita* (Delhi: Mahayana Publications, 1981) pp. 134-137. This article mentions a system of four types of *dharani* that give a parallel but even more idealised picture of the jnana yogic path. The four *dharani* are the *dharma dharani* which facilitates the mere but faultless memory of teachings; the *artha dharani* which actualises the meanings; the *mantra dharani* which gives the power to formulate and crystalise teachings into mantra, and the *kshama dharani*. The *kshama dharani* also gives purpose to the single syllable *Perfect Insight Sutra*.

50. Jeffrey Hopkins in his "Supplement" to Tsong ka pa, *Tantra in Tibet: The Great Exposition of Secret Mantra*, tr. and ed. by J. Hopkins (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977) traces the movement through seven stages. (1) wrong view, (2) doubt tending to the non-factual, (3) equal doubt, (4) doubt tending to the factual, (5) correct assumption, (6) inferential cognition, (7) direct perception. See pp. 189-192. No source is given. In Hinduism the gradual process traces a gradual path from a mere theoretical knowledge (*paroksa*) to a direct perception or intuitive experience (*aparoksa*) of *brahman*. See T.M.P. Mahadevan, *Outlines of Hinduism* (Bombay: Chetana Limited, 1960), p. 96. This concludes a brief discussion of Hindu jnana-yoga, for which see also S. Radhakrishnan (ed.), *The Principal Upanisads* - with intro. text, tr. and notes (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974), pp. 133-135.

51. MV, 1548, p.124.

52. MSA, 14.2, L. Nyingje, *op. cit.*, p. 39; Bagchi, *op. cit.*, p. . "Knowing the meaning" refers to the insight of meditation.

53. And the corresponding distinction between the textual (*agama-*) and realised doctrine (*adhigama-dharma*). See E.Obermiller (tr.), *History of Buddhism*, *op. cit.*, pt.I, pp. 22-22 and p. 147. nn. 164-165.

54. See MA, 6.266; MK, 24.8-10; and BCA, 9.13. According to Chandrakirti (6.79-80) the expressional truth is the means and the ultimate truth what arises from the means, and whoever doesn't comprehend the division between these, as they are defined by Nagarjuna, enters the unfortunate paths, i.e. the lower rebirths.

CHAPTER TWO

THE PROFOUND VIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to philosophically reconstruct those sections and verses of the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] that bear on the liberative path, i.e. the path that leads to nirvana. The major sections under which this is discussed are: the cognitive basis of Madhyamika soteriology; the theory of emptiness; the ways in which emptiness is expressed and communicated; the different types of emptiness; the analyses that claim to demonstrate the emptiness of the person and phenomena; certain meta-epistemological observations that the *Introduction* [MA] makes about Madhyamika philosophy; and, the path-structure implied in the *Introduction* [MA] concerning the development of the insight into emptiness.

1 THE COGNITIVE BASIS OF MADHYAMIKA SOTERIOLOGY

The profound view, as was indicated in the last chapter, circumscribes a content of the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] that focusses on the concept of emptiness and the attendant self-analytical and meditative practices that bodhisattvas employ for realising emptiness. When the profound view is gained it is understood to fulfil the personal or private requirements of a bodhisattva insofar as a knowledge of emptiness ensures a liberation from all pain and suffering.[1] The *Introduction* [MA: 6.106] says:

> [The Buddha] said that [contaminated] actions (*karma*) arise in dependence on confusion (*moha*) and that in the absence of confusion such [actions] do not arise.
>
> Certainly only those of learning understand this. Scholars, whose sun-like intellect clears away [all] dense confusion, penetrate emptiness [through this teaching], and thereby become liberated.

The reference here to action (*karma*) means specifically action that causes and arises from states of consciousness that are dominated by emotional reactions

(*klesa*). These two, action and the emotional reactions, are viewed as being responsible for the quality of experience and its necessitated perpetuation. While individuals are subject to emotional states of mind they act in ways that create dispositions and place encoded residues or traces (*vasana*), also termed impulses or drives (*samskara*), on their minds. These traces in turn have a determining effect in that they are said to create predispositions that condition the quantitative and qualitative aspects of subsequent experiences. The particularities of subsequent experiences further enjoin certain actions which in turn again place predispositions on individuals' personalities. This cyclic conditioning between actions and emotional reactions acts to ensure that actions and experience self-perpetuate to produce cyclic existence or samsara, and of the two, the emotional reactions are etiologically more fundamental for karmic actions arise on the basis of them. Compulsive or necessitated experience of this type is, according to Buddhism, always under-scored by change, pain, pleasure, or neutrality. These combine to make it essentially unsatisfactory (*duhkha*).

Confusion (*moha*) is one of the three prominent emotional reactions - the other two are anger (*dvesa*) and desire (*raga*). Confusion signifies a fundamental error individuals have in regard to themselves and the world, whereby they confound what is imaginary with what is real. It is functionally equivalent to ignorance (*avidya*) which, of all affective states, is regarded as the most basic in the sense that all others arise from and are sustained by it. It provides a foundation for all the emotional reactions in the sense that if there were no ignorance the emotional reactions would not exist. More specifically, the root affliction, from (MABh: 234) which all others such as desire (*raga*) and attachment (*lobha*), and all of the problems of existence (*dosa*) in samsara, such as birth, old age sickness, death, etc. arise, is the wrong view of individuality (*satkaya-drsti*). This is defined in the *Commentary* [MABh: 234] as an afflicted insight (*shes rab nyon mongs*) that entertains the thought of 'I' and mine'. In the context of Madhyamika philosophy this is specifically the thoughts that conceive the 'I' and what it owns to be real. If such thoughts are not forsaken, the impulses manifest and prolong the existence of samsara. It is in this sense that all the emotional reactions are rooted in and are said to have the nature of the view of individuality (*satkaya-drsti*).[2]

On the other hand, the view of individuality with respect to the 'I' and 'mine' is removed or replaced by the insight of emptiness for emptiness is said to be an absence of the 'view of individuality'. As Chandrakirti writes in the *Clear Words* [PP: 41], misbelief (*viparyasa*) and an absence of misbelief are incompatible (*bhinna*). As the view of individuality causes suffering, its removal in and through the insight of emptiness causes liberation from suffering. The idea is that when things are cognised as empty there is nothing to be lost or gained, nothing capable of causing pain or temporal pleasure.[3]

The concomitance and causal relationship between liberation and emptiness is stated more clearly when Chandrakirti (6.165cd) writes: "Therefore, having

the view that the self and its possessions are empty the yogin becomes completely free." The remedy, then, for being bound, according to the Madhyamika, is to be found in the cognition of emptiness. It is regarded as a *sine qua non* for liberation. The possibility for liberation exists because ignorance is viewed as an unfortunate adjunct of consciousness and not an essential quality of it.

2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF EMPTINESS (*SUNYAVADA*)

We see that liberation is essentially couched as a cognitive achievement in that it is a removal of ignorance and acquiring of knowledge. The knowledge that is acquired is of emptiness and emptiness is equated with what is real. Hence the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] uses two terms inter-changeably, emptiness (*sunyata*) and reality (*tattva*).[4] Yogins come to remove affective concomitants from their minds and by so doing become veridical cognisers. By obtaining veridical cognitions they become free. The cognitions of yogins cease to be mediated by conceptuality and are replaced by a yogic perception (*yogi-pratyaksa*). That is to say, they achieve a cessation of compulsive affections and conceptuality and in doing so see the profound reality. The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 6.1] says:

> Abiding with a composed mind at [the 'level of] manifesting (*abhimukhi*)' [the bodhisattvas] manifest [some] qualities of perfected buddhas, and through the perception of the reality of relational origination (*pratityasamutpada*), and by dwelling in insight (*prajna*), they obtain cessations (*nirodha*).

The bodhisattva referred to here is at the sixth level called "confronting", on which she or he obtains a final cessation to conceptuality by realising the reality of relational origination, a realisation that is synonymous with emptiness. The object of yogic perception[5] is just one, emptiness, and according to Madhyamikas that insight is first received at the path of intuition (*darsana-marga*), i.e. the point at which a yogin first cognises emptiness. Prior to this, yogins' cognitions are said to be facsimile understandings, as they are mediated by a mental picture (*snang ngo*) lit. image [acquired through] audition, and so are discursive. Soteriologically the yogin's consciousness is said to become transformed from that of a sentient creature into the essential or natural form (*svabhavika-kaya*)[6] of a buddha. This is the emptiness of a buddha's truth form (*dharma-kaya*) and is defined as being naturally pure (*svabhava-suddha*) in that it is free from all adventitious and emotional concomitants. Like the "primordial" nature of Whitehead's conception of deity the natural basis exists necessarily rather than contingently.

The realisation of emptiness, like most mystical experiences, is said to be ineffable.[7] The reasons for this are that emptiness is finally non-conceptual and hence inconceivable. It transcends mental constructs and so is beyond verbal designation. In the *Commentary* [MABh: 362.14-16] Chandrakirti says that the form (*kaya*) that is said to realise reality is regarded as being naturally serene (*zhi ba*) and as such is separate from the mind (*citta*) and mental events (*caitta*). This inexpressibility of emptiness is necessary rather than contingent, for it is not merely that appropriately descriptive predicates cannot be found, but that in principle they do not exist. In other words, there are no predicates which would describe it. The *Commentary* [MABh: 110-111] quotes the *Introduction to the Two Realities Sutra* (*Aryasatyadvayavatara-sutra*) to this effect:

> If the ultimate reality was in essence an object of the body, speech, and mind then it would have the nature of conventional reality and [so] not be countered as an "ultimate reality". However ... in fact the ultimate reality is beyond expression. It is undifferentiated, unborn, unobstructed, and separated from designata and designations, and cognisables and cognitions.

This is a statement against the temptation to describe emptiness, or at least to bear in mind that when emptiness is purportly described one is being misled, for to do so is to reduce emptiness to a mere convention, emptiness itself being beyond conventions, forms, and demarcations. As Chandrakirti writes (MA: 12.36a-c) in the context of demonstrating that one vehicle (*eka-yana*) can be taught:

> There is no way of effectively clearing away all impurities (*mala*) other than by cognising the reality [of things]. The reality of phenomena is not divisible into aspects, nor dependent [on the aspects]. The discerning, who take reality as their referent, are not to be categorised either.

Besides reiterating that cognising reality is a process of mental purification, and that emptiness is itself a purifier of impurities, the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] is asserting the non-divisive and so non-distinctive nature of emptiness.

2.1 THE DESCRIPTIONS OF EMPTINESS

Even though emptiness is non-conceptual and so propositionally inexpressible, certain devices are used, and referred to, in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] and by Madhyamikas generally, to convey what is meant by the term emptiness. The most important and informative of these is the bi-negative locution. Though this device is only used sparingly in the *Introduction*

to the Middle Way [MA][8] (and with less frequency than Nagarjuna's use of it[9]) it is an important device and a leit motif of the Perfect Insight Sutras (*Prajnaparamita-sutras*).

The bi-negative disjunction employs a logical syntax that in natural language reads as "neither A nor not A" where A is any phenomenon that is being characterised as empty. It is an eliptical device that rigidly designates emptiness. It is applied to both substances and predicates in order to indicate their empty nature.

Thus, with respect to any object A, when it is said that it neither exists nor does not exist, this is taken to designate the emptiness of A with respect to its existence. When a bi-negation is applied as a descriptive symbol to any property P of A - i.e. A is neither P nor not P - this is taken to designate that A is empty of property P. These characterisations are different from straightforward negations for rather than denying the existence of A or the attribution of P to A, the bi-negation, through its non-residual logic of exclusion, says that existential and qualitative predications cannot ultimately be made. Rigid designation is obtained with the bi-negation because it does not add information - affirmative or negative - concerning the qualities, properties, characteristics, etc. of phenomena. As phenomena account for all conventionalities, what is referred to can only be emptiness. In other words, it describes emptiness, or the emptiness of phenomena, rather than phenomena themselves because no predicates are implicated in the description. This is clear from the fact that bi-negations do not help in the demarcation of phenomena, one from the others, whereas affirmations and negations do.

The bi-negation is positioned at a linguistic junction between the ultimate and conventional truths or realities. It is applied to conventions but describes their emptiness and is as close as one can get, linguistically, to emptiness. It is more adequate than other devices because it does not ascribe properties or qualities to emptiness and so does not phenomenalise emptiness. It is also, as we will see, a logical conclusion to the Madhyamikas' analytical techniques of approaching emptiness.[10]

Even though, the foregoing linguistic device is consciously guaged to demonstrate the unpredictability of emptiness, selected predicates are applied to emptiness. Some of these we have mentioned such as undifferentiability. Others are that emptiness is permanent (*nitya*) unproduced (*asamskrta*) and uniform (*eka-rasa*). Likewise, the mind of the buddhas realising emptiness, the truth-form (*dharma-kaya*), is (MABh: 362) according the final word (*tshig bla dwags*) of the Buddha, unborn and unceasing. The "ten even [qualities] of things (*dharma-samata*)" as quoted in the *Commentary* [MABh: 80-81] from the *Ten Levels Sutra* [DS] are further predictions which, though of things (*dharma*), are intended to qualify that ultimately they are empty. According to the *Sutra* all things are signless or without marks (*animitta*), undefined (*alaksana*), without birth (*ajati*), unborn (*ajata*), solitary (*vivikta*), pure (*visuddha*) from the beginning, inactive

(*nihprapanca*), without acquisition (*avyuha*) and rejection (*nirvyuha*), are like similitudes, and are free from the duality of existence (*bhava*) and non existence.[11]

Certain metaphorical and analogical similies are also applied within the "ten even [qualities]" in order to clarify the concept of emptiness. These are that things are similar to an illusion (*maya*), a dream (*svapna*), an optical illusion (*pratibhasa*), an echo (*pratisrutka*), [the reflection of] moon in water (*adakacandra*), a mirror image (*pratibimba*), and an emanation (*nirmana*).[12] The similitudes all emphasise that things are insubstantial and in some way mere fictions.[13]

2.2 DIFFERENT TYPES OF EMPTINESS

The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] also divides emptiness into various types. This division of emptiness into different types must be seen as functioning within a strictly cognitive mode of description, for it is not that emptiness itself comes to be defined or predicated differently in the different emptinesses, but rather just that emptiness is being predicated of different things. For Madhyamikas, everything in the universe is characterised by being empty. Any class of phenomena can be defined and then described as being empty. The various divisions: into two, four and sixteen emptinesses, each account for all phenomena.

The coarsest division, and that which is procedurally the most important in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] is the two-fold division in which existents are classified as the person (*pudgala*) and phenomena (*dharma*), i.e. everything else. These correspond to the selflessness of the person (*pudgala-nairatmya*) and the selflessness of phenomena (*dharma-nairatmya*), both of which are affirmed in the Pali *Discourses* [N].[14] These two divisions form the major focus for the *Introduction's* [MA] investigation into emptiness.

The most elaborate division is into sixteen emptinesses, and the four emptinesses (the final four of the twenty) are apparently (MA: 6.80a-c) a resolution or condensation of the sixteen, though how they coalesce into those four is not clear. At this point we will just briefly examine the twenty emptinesses; for the emptinesses of the person and phenomena, and analyses gauged to demonstrate these, are discussed in length shortly.

2.3 TWENTY EMPTINESSES

These are elaborated at the conclusion of chapter six (6.181-223) after Chandrakirti has specified the analytical techniques for demonstrating the non-self of the person and phenomena. They represent a finer enumeration than the two-fold division into the person and phenomena, and have a sutric precedent in the *Perfect Insight in Twenty-five Thousand Stanzas* [PPS].[15]

The verse definitions can be easily referred to in the appendix so I'll just list the emptinesses here. The Sanskrit for the first to sixteenth emptiness is from the *Great Etymology* [MV: 934-949; 72-73).

1. The emptiness of the subject (*adhyatma-sunyata*).
2. The emptiness of externals (*bahirdha-sunyata*).
3. The emptiness of the subject and externals (*adhyatma-bahirdha-sunyata*). These first three emptinesses have direct analogues in the Pali *Discourses* [N]. The *Great Emptiness Sutra* (*Maha-sunnata-sutta*) of the *Middle-length Discourses* [MN: 122] refers to entering on and abiding in an internal emptiness (*ajjhatta sunnata*), an external emptiness (*bahiddha sunnata*), and an internal and external emptiness. The internal emptiness refers to the emptiness of a monk's own psycho-physical organism and the external emptiness, according to the commentary, refers to the emptiness of others' psycho-physical organisms.[16]
4. Emptiness of emptiness (*sunyata-sunyata*). This emptiness is presumably for countering the absolutisation and reification of emptiness that Nagarjuna warns against (MK: 13.8).
5. The great emptiness (*maha-sunyata*). (The ten directions to which this emptiness refers are the eight cardinals, nadir, and zenith.)[17]
6. The emptiness of the ultimate (*paramartha-sunyata*). For Madhyamikas' grasping at nirvana, the ultimate, would preclude one from attaining it.
7. Emptiness of the conditioned (*samskrta*).
8. Emptiness of the unconditioned (*asamskrta*).
9. Emptiness of what has surpassed boundaries (*atyanta*). Haribhadra interprets this as that which is beyond the extremes of nihilism (*uccheda*) and eternalism (*sasvata*).[18]
10. Emptiness without a beginning or an end (*anavaragra*).
11. Emptiness of that which is not rejected (*anavakara*) (of what is gained and required in the spiritual endeavour).
12. The emptiness of a thing's own nature (*prakrtisunyata*). The unmade (*akrta*) state of things referred to in this emptiness means (MABh: 199) specifically not made by disciples, self-evolvers, bodhisattvas, or the Tathagatha, i.e. by design.
13. The emptiness of all phenomena (*sarva-dharma*)
14. Emptiness of self-defining properties (*svalaksana*). This is the emptiness of the definitions or defining characteristics of all knowables and is expanded at length (6.202-215) with definitions applicable to that which is basic to existence (6.202-204), the bodhisattvas' path (6.205-207), and the liberated state (*moksa*) (6.208-215).
15. The emptiness of the unobservable (*anupalambha*).
16. The emptiness of non-things (*abhava*). This is the emptiness of non-phenomenality, rather than nonphenomena. The *Perfect Insight in Twenty-five Thousand Stanzas* [PPS] says that things have no entity because of relational origination (*pratitya-samutpada*)[19].
17. The emptiness of things (*bhava*).
18. The emptiness of non-things (*abhava*). The unproduced or permanent phenomena referred to are space and the two cessations (*nirodha*), i.e. nirvana and non-analytical stases.
19. The emptiness of own nature (*svabhava*).

20. The emptiness of the other thing (*parabhava*).

These different aspects to emptiness are not indicative of emptiness being divisible or non-uniform, rather they signify that emptiness can be predicted of different things. Hence, the basis for the various division lies with objects as they are conventionally or technically defined and not within emptiness itself.

The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] is not explicit about the function or role of this categorial breakdown but the *Commentary* [MABh: 302] does say that it is necessary to listen, understand, and meditate on the various aspects of non-self in order for people to achieve freedom. The utility of the enumeration is explained orally by Tibetan philosophers as facilitating yogins' meditations on emptiness. They say that yogins have different propensities *vis-a-vis* their attachment to the things in the world and so they find it easier and hence more economical to meditate on different objects. Also, yogins are said to vary the object of their meditation in dependence on what is meditatively efficacious at any particular time.[20] Hence the twenty entities that are empty appear to have a practical role as different things that are analysed in the context of discernment (*vipasyana*) meditation.

Haribhadra - who post-dates Chandrakirti[21] - correlates these twenty emptinesses in his *Illumination of the Ornament of the Realisations* (*Abhisamayalamkara-aloka*) with the paths (*marga*) and bodhisattva levels (*bhumi*) thus: The first three emptinesses pertain to realisations obtained on the path of accumulation (*sambhara-marga*); the fourth is cognised on the connecting path (*prayoga-marga*); the fifth to eleventh correlate respectively with the first to seventh levels (*bhumi*); the twelfth and thirteenth with the eighth level; fourteenth and fifteenth with the ninth; sixteenth and seventeenth with the tenth; and the final three emptinesses with the level of buddhas (*buddha-bhumi*). Tibetan commentators do likewise.[22] On this count the twenty emptinesses would be realised serially and perhaps were meant to be meditated on in that same order, (though not necessarily so for perhaps some were thought more difficult to gain insight into than others). The divisions between these emptinesses are made solely on the basis of different phenomena that are empty and so shouldn't be taken as meaning that there are twenty different emptinesses.[23]

2.4 INTRINSIC EXISTENCE (*SVABHAVA*) AS WHAT IS NEGATED BY EMPTINESS

The concept of emptiness is also defined in terms of the negation of its semantic opposite. The term used in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] and throughout Madhyamika literature to define the opposite of emptiness is *svabhava*, tib. *rang bzhin*, literally own-being, self existence, or intrinsic existence. Often times in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] just the term *ngo bo*, skt.

bhava, vastu, meaning entity or existence is used, with an implicit proviso, always expressly stated by dGe 'dun grub, that the technical term *svabhava* is intended. The term *bdag nyid,* skt. *atma* - which I have translated as 'self' and sometimes 'essence' - is functionally equivalent to *svabhava* also. Likewise the term *dngos po,* skt. *bhava* - translated as and meaning a '[functional] thing' - when negated, is done so in terms of it having an intrinsic existence. The term "intrinsic existence" is defined in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] through a quotation from the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK: 15.1-2] that says:

> The production of a self existent thing by a conditioning cause is not possible, [for] being produced through dependence on a cause, a self-existent thing would be "someting (sic) which is produced" *(krtaka)*. How, indeed, will a self existent thing *become* "something which is produced?" Certainly, a self-existent thing [by definition] is "not-produced" and is independent of anything else.[24]

This definition is in terms of the consequences of something being intrinsically existent. That is to say, if a thing were intrinsically existent then it would be unaffected by causes, unproduced, and in all senses independent. A *svabhava,* or the intrinsic existence of things is, then, an essential or inherent nature that they possess which is efficiently self-contained. It is the essence, substratum, or substance of things without which they would cease to be what they are. In other words, if a thing's intrinsic existence changed it would cease to be that thing. As such, an intrinsically existing thing is by definition petromorphic. Intrinsic existence is what makes things what they essentially are. Intrinsically existing things are also self-marked (*svalaksana*), meaning that they are self-defined; their definition not relying on anything outside of themselves. As J.W. de Jong writes, For Chandrakirti "the *svo bhava* and the *svalaksana,* the 'own-being' and the individual character have one and the same meaning."[25] Thus in rejecting instrinsic existence Chandrakirti also rejects that things have self-defined characteristics, and *vice versa.*

Intrinsically existent things are also necessarily permanent because they are independent of causes and conditions. Intrinsic existence is also the necessary rather than contingent aspect of things and so it relates closely to the Latin concept of *substantia* and the Greek *ousia* and *hypokeimenon*. Intrinsic existence, like the concept of aseity in classical theism,[26] defines a quality of self-sufficiency in the sense that a thing is self-moved and completely autonomous. That is to say, things so defined exist *in se,* by themselves and unrelated to anything else. They are also immutable and impassible.

As the opposite of emptiness, intrinsic existence is the object of negation in the theory and practice of emptiness. Where emptiness is the object of insight (*prajna*) intrinsic existence is the object of ignorance (*avidya*). The view of the Madhyamikas is that intrinsic existence is constructed by an ignorant consciousness and is the principle cause for the creation of (contaminating)

actions (*karma*), insofar as mental predispositions are created only with the assumption or mental attitude that things have real or essential natures rather than merely nominal ones. Because intrinsic existence is constructed by an ignorant consciousness it is viewed as an utterly fictitious creation. Hence in the theory of the Madhyamika, emptiness is a non- affirming (*med dgag*) proposition for what it negates has never had an existence.[27]

On the other hand, the denial of intrinsic existence is not a denial of existence *per se*, for it denies only the existence of independent, self-sufficient, self-designatory, self-presentational, etc. things. As Chandrakirti says in the *Commentary* [MABh: 77]: "It is a distorted conception to consider that emptiness means non-existence (*med pa*) - that [idea] gives birth to the erroneous view that negates (*skur 'debs pa*) everything." What is denied is that things have a solid core (*asarika*).[28] Whatever is dependent is not denied in either the theory or practice of emptiness. From this viewpoint, then, the practice of emptiness is the eradication of all essentialistic conceptions. The yogins' path is one of removing the [wrong] views and opinions (*drsti*) which reify experience through the projection of intrinsic existence onto what is really dependently arisen.

The term *svabhava* is also used in the *Commentary* [MABh: 305-308] in a way not mentioned here. This second usage of the term makes it a synonym for emptiness rather than its opposite, for it is countered that the absence of *svabhava* in things is their *svabhava*. This usage of the term is equated with the ultimate (*paramartha*) level of reality where its more standard use is equated with the conventional (*samvrti*) level[29].

3 MADHYAMIKA ANALYSIS

At this point I want to begin reconstructing the analytical sections of the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA]. My aim in doing this is to show the type, style and patterns involved in Chandrakirti's analyses, and to provide the material with which we can, in the next chapter, investigate more directly the relationship between logical analysis and insight.

Two points should be borne in mind when reading these analytical reconstructions. The first is that analysis is clearly central to Madhyamika *philosophy*. If it is the view of real or intrinsic existence that is at the root of ignorance, then, like Leibniz, Madhyamikas rely on a "principle of sufficient reason" whereby "no fact [is] real or existing, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason."[30] In other words, if something is real or true it is able to withstand logical analysis. If it cannot then it must relinquish the status of being real, in a substantialistic sense.

Without wanting to foreshadow the investigation in the next chapter, the second point to be aware of is that for Chandrakirti dialectical or logical analysis is thought to be an efficient force in gaining insight. He writes, for example, (6.118) that the dialectical analysis (*dpyad rtsod*) found in Madhyamika texts "is

not undertaken out of an attachment to debate. [Rather, Nagarjuna] taught about reality (*tattva*) with a view to [showing others the way to] complete liberation (*vimukti*)."

The stated position of Chandrakirti in this regard is stronger than the function accorded to dialectical analysis by many contemporary interpreters of the Madhyamika, who see it as a system designed primarily to demonstrate formal logical fallacies in all philosophical thought. On this view the consequential arguments of Madhyamikas draw out contradictions that are claimed to inhere in any philosophical theses, with the aim of showing that theory formulations are internally inconsistent, and hence fallacious. No theses are thought to be resiliant to the Madhyamika analysis, and from among all philosophers only the Madhyamikas are immune for the simple reason that they offer no theses themselves.

Yet, as Chandrakirti makes quite explicit claims for the soteriological significance of consequential analysis it is worth remembering this when reading the remainder of this chapter. The most significant fact to keep in mind is that Chandrakirti's analyses are a yogic practice in their own right, and integral to the discernment (*vipasyana*) contemplations of Madhyamikas.

The *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] analyses divide in terms of the two types of emptiness that Chandrakirti isolates. These are the emptiness or selflessness of the person (*pudgala*) and phenomena (*dharma*). The next two sections reconstruct those two sets of analyses, first considering, as does Chandrakirti, the analysis of phenomena.

4 ANALYSIS OF PHENOMENA (*DHARMA*)

From verses 6.8-119 the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] analyses phenomena (*dharma*) with a view to demonstrating their emptiness.[31] "Phenomena" in this context is all things other than the person (*pudgala*) for in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] the paired concepts of phenomena and the person comprise all knowables in the universe. As such phenomena includes corporeal and non-corporeal forms, abstract objects, concepts, definitions and yogic attainments. In so doing it includes noumenal objects. Thus, as an equivalent to dharma "phenomena" is broader than its etymology implies. Alternative equivalents are "things" and "objects" though these do not naturally demarcate from the "self" or "person".

In point of fact though, the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] analyses only a subset of phenomena. Specifically it analyses and claims to show the emptiness of produced phenomena (*samskrta-dharma*). Though Chandrakirti certainly believes that unproduced (*asamskrta*) phenomena are empty (they are included in the twenty emptinesses) these go unanalysed in the *Introduction* [MA]. The term Chandrakirti uses consistently throughout the *Introduction's* [MA] analysis of phenomena is *dngos po*, skt. *bhava*, which as we

said earlier, refers to functional things, i.e. things that find themselves in the nexi of causes and conditions, hence things that come into existence, undergo change, and disintegrate.

The analysis that Chandrakirti uses in the *Introduction* [MA] follows the same procedure of Nagarjuna's analysis in the first chapter of *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK]. Both utilise an analytical structure known as the diamond grains (*vajra-kana*).[32] In his explication of this analysis Chandrakirti is indebted to Buddhapalita.[33] In fact, his analysis is in essence a restatement of Buddhapalita's *Commentary* (*Vrtti*) on Nagarjuna's *Principal Stanzas*.

It is worth going through the arguments, for even though the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way's* [MK] analysis is well documented, Buddhapalita's arguments are less well known, and additionally, Chandrakirti's arguments and examples here are more elaborate.[34] The following treatment abstracts the arguments by removing various other ancillary arguments and dialectical exchanges that are embedded or interpolated within the basic analytical structure.

The analysis focuses on the quality of production (*jati, utapatti, utpada*), for this is the defining property (*svalaksana*) of a produced thing. The analysis adduces four possible theses for explaining how things may be produced. All four are refuted on the basis of arguments using logical consequences (*prasanga*) and incompatibilities or anomalies with the common sense empirical world. The four theses are proffered as a jointly exhaustive set of possibilities such that when all four are refuted no alternative theses remain and hence the emptiness of produced things is established. For Madhyamikas, the adherence to any of the four alternatives would preclude their gaining the insight into the emptiness of things.

The four possible theses, stated in verse 6.8ab, are that things are born or arisen from:

1. themselves;
2. another;
3. both; or
4. without a cause.

4.1 BIRTH FROM SELF[35]

The view that things arise from themselves has traditionally been held by the Hindu Samkhya[36] and Vedanta who both subscribe to the view that an effect (*karya*) is pre-existent (*sat*) in its cause. This doctrine of (pre)existent effects (*satkaryavada*) holds that effects exist in an unmanifest or latent form (*avyakta*) at the time of the cause. The effect is viewed as the actualisation of a pre-existing potential. dGe 'dun grub (RSM: f.12a2) tells us that it is the Samkhya (Grangs can) system that is being refuted here. Chandrakirti begins his refutation (6.8c-9) by writing that:

> There is no point to a thing arising from itself. Moreover, it is wrong for that which is already produced to be produced yet again. If you conceive that that which is already produced gives rise to further production, then this does not admit production of the shoots and the rest. Seeds would produce [shoots] in profusion till the end of existence. How would all those [shoots] disintegrate those [seeds]?

The argument here is that the birth of something from itself is completely unwarranted and quite unnecessary for what is to be born already exists. For example, if the sprout exists within and at the same time as its seed then there is no point in its subsequent birth. A second consequence of birth from self is that production would be affectively continuous and never-ending for things can give birth to themselves without any change or modification. Things would never cease being produced. A final point is that if seeds and sprouts are essentially the same - a consequence of birth from self - then at the time of the product, for example the mature sprout, one should also have the producer, for example the seed from which the sprout arose.

In the world this is not the case for the sprout replaces the seed. So birth from self contradicts the ways of the world in which seeds and sprouts and producers and products are temporally and spatially removed from each other. The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 6.10-12] continues:

> For you [Samkhya philosophers] the distinctions of the sprout's shape, colour, taste, capacity, and development would not be distinct from the seed's creative cause. If after the removal of its former self, that thing, it becomes a different entity, how could it be that thing at such a time? If for you the seed and sprout are not different, then like the seed, the so-called 'sprout' would not be apprehended either. Or again, because they are the same, the [seed] would be apprehended when the sprout is. This you cannot assert. Because the effect (*phala*) is seen only if the cause (*hetu*) is destroyed, not even by conventional criteria are they the same. Therefore, to impute that things arise from a 'self' is incorrect, both in reality and conventionally.

If there is birth from self, Chandrakirti reasons that we cannot distinguish between the qualities and characteristics that make the seed and sprout different. On this view any differences between producers and products are in principle unperceivable for throughout the process of eduction producers and products are one, and hence neither change. On the other hand if it were the case that the producer, e.g. the seed ceased, in the process of eduction, to be what it originally was such that it could not be found in the final product, e.g. the sprout, then the product cannot have been an essential component of the producer, as Sankhyas

must claim. That is to say, if the two, the producer and product do become different then they cannot have been one.

Chandrakirti continues that if the seed and sprout were genuinely one, then whenever the sprout is perceived so the seed must also be; or, if the seed is non-perceived at the time of the sprout, the sprout likewise must be un-perceived. This, though, is not confirmed by experience in the world, for people clearly do distinguish seeds from sprouts and so this position is unacceptable, both analytically and on empirical grounds. The point in this argument is that effects, if they are real or genuine, cannot be merely potential, and that if a thesis really only intends that the "effect in and at the time of the cause" is unmanifest, then this is not a genuine effect.[37]

In concluding his investigation of "birth from self" Chandrakirti states (6.13) the consequential objection (*prasanga*), namely that birth requires a producer and product, yet with birth from self there is no producer to be distinguished from a product and hence no birth. The contradictions are that either two distinct things are asserted to be one, in which case they are not two; or, one thing is asserted to be two in which case it is not one.[38]

4.2 BIRTH FROM OTHER

The view that things arise from phenomena which are different from themselves is traditionally the view of the Vijnanavada, Sautrantika, and Sarvastivada Buddhists and the Hindu Nyaya-Vaisheshika. These subscribe to the view that effects are non-existent [within the cause] (*asatkaryavada*).[39] These schools believe in the "newness" of the effect in relationship to the cause.

Chandrakirti opens his analysis by citing an unpalatable *empirical* consequence of birth from other. He writes (6.14) that: "If an 'other' were to arise in dependence on others, well then thick darkness would arise even from flames. And moreover, everything would be produced from everything for non-producers would all be similar in respect of being different." That is to say that as all things are equally other, i.e. not identical with all other things, if there is birth from other then anything and everything can be posited as the cause for everything else. The only limitation on possible causal or productive relationships would be that things cannot produce themselves. As neither light nor dark are identical with a flame, both are equally other and hence a flame might just as well give rise to darkness as it does to luminosity. The positing of causal relationships would be utterly haphazard, there would be no grounds for preferring any one relationship over another and so the concepts of production and causality would lose all meaning and function.

In response to Chandrakirti's argument, a proponent of "birth from other" responds (6.15) that: The definite expression 'effect' is for that which can be or does. That which is able to produce [the effect] although other is a cause. As there is birth from a producer and belonging to the one continuum (*samtana*)

therefore a rice sprout is not [produced] from a barley [seed] etc. That is, the respondent holds that cause and effect can still operate and function when there is birth from other because just that which produces something is a cause and that which it produces, though different from itself, is the effect. These causal relationships are delimited since causes and effects can only obtain within the same continuum. That is to say, what makes a cause the effect of something else is that these two, the cause and the effect, are poles at the extremes of a continuum. Things that cannot be poles of a continuum cannot be instances of a cause and its effect. To this response Chandrakirti rejoins (6.16-17):

> Just as barley, gesar and kinshuka flowers, and so on, are not judged to be producers of rice sprouts [since] they lack the ability [to produce them], do not belong to a common continuum, and are qualitatively dissimilar. Similarly, a rice seed is no [exception] because it is quite different [from a sprout]. Seed and sprout do not exist simultaneously, and if they were not different how could the seed *become* different? Therefore, you will not prove production of a sprout from a seed. Instead relinquish the position that 'there is production from another'.

The Madhyamika here calls to issue the whole notion of a continuum and its presupposing the very notion of a cause and effect that it is said by the non-Madhyamikas to substantiate. The point again is that if a product is genuinely other than the producer they are dissimilar and hence all other (hypothetical) producers are on an equal footing *vis-a-vis* their being different from the product. Further, if the respondent was to argue that the sprout is not really different from the seed his position would collapse to that of "birth from self" which Chandrakirti has already refuted. The respondent replies (6.18a-c) that producers and their products may be different from each other yet cotemporal in the same way that the two bars of a balance may be different (i.e. one higher, the other lower) and yet coexistent (at the fulcrum). This example does not pull weight for Chandrakirti who writes in reply (6.18d-19c) that:

> [The balance beams may] be simultaneous, but [producers and their products] do not exist at the same time.
>
> You assert that during production, [the product] does not exist because the production phase [is operating] and that during cessation [a product] exists though the cessation phase [is operating]. How then could these instances be equivalent to a balance?

The point being made here is that the analogy is false, for the producer and what is produced cannot exist at the same time, for were they to co-exist one would not have a case of birth from other. According to Chandrakirti (MABh:

96) the sprout exists only when it has been produced as a sprout. In any stage prior to being a sprout it is not yet a sprout. Moreover, at any stage prior to the emergence of a sprout one can only have a seed. Hence at no one time can one find a seed *and* a sprout. With respect to any transitional stage that may be posited, one can have neither a growing sprout, for this is not yet produced, not a diminishing seed, for this is already destroyed.[40] Hence a cotemporality of genuinely different causes and effects, and producers and products is impossible.

The question of the cotemporality of producers and products is finally dispensed (6.20) with for reasons adduced earlier: that if, say a visual consciousness has otherness with respect to a *simultaneous* producer, the eye, etc. and the discrimination that also arise together with it, then the eye consciousness is *already* in existence and so not needful of being produced.

The *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] refutation of "birth from other" as given in these verses is essentially that products and producers must be related via the relation of production, causation, birth, or arising and that the relation is either one in which the producer and product meet or do not meet.[41] If they do not meet then there is no interface between the producer and product, hence no causal nexus and hence no real production one from the other. As Chandrakirti writes much later in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 6.169c]: "If [cause and effect] are separate, then the cause would be no different from non-causes."

In summary to the generalised refutation of "birth from other" the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 6.21] says:

> If a producer is a cause (*hetu*) producing another, then the product is counted as an existent (*sat*), or a non-existent, both, or neither. If [the product] exists, then what need is there of a producer? Then, what has the [producer] done if [the product] is non-existent? What was done if it is both or if it was neither?

The verse draws on the characteristics of products that are genuinely or intrinsically other than their producers. If products are intrinsically existing products, as they must be in order to be really other than their producers then if they are existent they have no need of a producer, if intrinsically non-existent then nothing could bring them into being, for what could a producer produce from nothing. If it was both existent and non-existent one does not have one thing but rather two, and the previous contradictions then apply. Lastly there are no things that are neither existent nor non-existent for these are jointly exhaustive.

The contradictions that emerge from Chandrakirti's analysis are that phenomena cannot be born from other phenomena because that which is produced, "the other" would at some point have to be other than itself, i.e. both be and not be itself. Or, that "the other" at some point is "not an other"; namely, when it is what produced it.

Even though the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] makes what oftentimes read as unequivocal rejections of "birth from other", these are always implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, qualified as rejections of intrinsic or inherent "birth from other". In so doing Chandrakirti seeks not to negate that seeds give rise to sprouts, flames to light, etc. and that causes can be and are correlated with specifiable effects: rather he wishes to show that in the ultimate analysis - and hence in reality - these are not real processes. The domain of relevance and applicability for notions such as birth, causation, production, etc. is in the realm of conventional states of living. Following these verses (6.22ff) the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] introduces a discussion of the two realities and a critique of key Phenomenalist tenets. These sets of verses will be discussed shortly.

4.3 BIRTH FROM BOTH SELF AND OTHER

According to the *Commentary* [MABh: 202] "birth from both self and other" is the view of the Jainas who hold, for example, that a jug is born from itself and others. It is born from itself insofar as it is produced from its own material cause, viz. clay, and is born from others as it requires the contribution of a potter, water, etc. In rejecting this view of production Chandrakirti presumes that all cases of "birth from self and other" can be resolved without any residue remaining into "birth from self" and "birth from other". Once resolved into these two preceding possibilities, they can be dealt with as the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] has just shown. We can note also that it is contradictory to ascribe two mutually excluding qualities to the *one* thing, i.e. that it is born from itself and what is not itself.

4.4 BIRTH FROM NO CAUSE

The view that things can arise from no cause is ascribed by the *Commentary* [MABh: 205] to essentialist philosophers (*ngo bo nyid smra pa*) who say that some naturally occurring phenomena such as the shape and colour of some flowers and plants, and the colouring of certain birds arise independently of any causes. These philosophers are identified by dGe 'dun grub (RSM: f.36b5) as rGyan phan pa, the Indian materialist and hedonistic school of Charvaka[42] or Lokayata, presumably also because of their rejection of past and future lives (6.101-103). In refutation of this view, (6.99-100), which amounts to a belief in creation *ex nihilo*, the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] firstly clarifies that birth from neither self nor other is equivalent to being exclusively born from no cause and then points to an empirical consequence of birth from no cause (6.99); namely, that everything would give the appearance of arising from everything else. This would mean, for example, that farmers would not need to collect, plant and water seeds in order to obtain fruit, since if fruit arose from no cause, the planting of, or failure to plant, seeds would be quite immaterial to their arising.

Things would, as it were, pop out of thin air, and for no rhyme or reason. Causes and effects would be traceless as there are no causes, and this, Chandrakirti says, would give rise to the appearance of things being caused by all other things. He then continues (6.100) that if living creatures are genuinely uncaused, they would be on an equal ontological footing with hallucinatory and illusory objects such as the sky-flower (*utpala*). In other words, they would be uncognised and invalidated by a valid sense consciousness and so be non-existent. The converse is the case though, living creatures and inanimate objects also are vividly known by valid sense consciousness and so their existence is established.

This position, of "birth from no cause", like the preceding ones, is also internally or logically contradictory. The implicit contradiction is that being a product necessitates being produced yet in this case the produced is non-produced. In other words, production requires a product being produced by a producer. If there is no producer there is no product and hence no process of production. As such, production from no cause is fallacious. From a different angle it flouts Lucretius' principle that nothing can become out of nothing (*ex nihilo nihil fit*) by necessitating that at some *common* locus in the productive continuum the product both is and is not.[43]

The essence of these consequences for each of the four possibilities can be depicted diagrammatically (2.1). In the first case there is no *process* of production as the continuum undergoes no transformation. In case two, as there is no interface between A and B any number of different A's can be equally posited as causes of B. The third case is resolvable without residue into the two previous ones and hence there is no real or intrinsic production, and in the final case, in the absence of a producer there is no product.

After a closing rebuttal (6.101-3) to the Essentialists' view that future lives are impossible because consciousness is essentially physical and so decays at death, the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 6.104ab] concludes that because all four theses, of birth from self, other, both, and causelessly are in error, things have no intrinsic existence.

In completing his discussion of the non-self or emptiness of phenomena Chandrakirti carefully reiterates (6.107-15) that the denial of production and hence of real or intrinsic existence does not mean a blanket dismissal of production, causation, and existence *per se*, but only that these have an intrinsic reality. Analogically, the negation of intrinsic existence "is not comparable with a barren woman's son" (6.113d) which does not exist at all, but rather should be compared with (6.109a-c) a dream, (sky) city of the Gandharvas, water in a mirage, a magical deception, or a reflection which, although non-existent can still be seen. Hence (MABh: 225), although all common-sense and everyday entities are analytically unfindable, and fiction-like in nature, they exist through the force of designation (*prajnapti*).




Fig 2.1 Consequences of birth from four possibilities

5 ANALYSIS OF THE PERSON (*PUDGALA*)

Though the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] introduces its presentation of emptiness with an analysis demonstrating the non-self of phenomena (*dharma-nairatmya*) and only on completing this turns its attention to analysing the non-self of the person (*pudgala-nairatmya*), the opening verse (6.120) of this analysis indicates that the practice and realisation by the yogins of the "non-self of the person" is more important, and in a developmental context precedes the practice of meditating on the non-self of phenomena. The verse reads: "Having intellectually perceived that all the emotional reactions (*klesa*) and problems of existence (*dosa*) arise from our view of the individual (*satkaya-drsti*), and having understood the self as the object of [the egocentricity] of this [view], yogins negate the self." The idea here, repeated elsewhere in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 1.3ab and 6.164-5] is that the concept of "mine" presupposes the concept of a self, such that if the object self ceased to arise, so the grasping at phenomena as real would necessarily subside also. Hence, first people grasp the self, from which they develop a genuine attachment for things. As the notion of 'mine' *depends* etiologically and for its maintainance on the notion of 'I', when the latter is destroyed so is the former.[44] Thus the *Commentary* [MABh: 234] says that the abandonment of the wrong view of individuality (i.e. of 'I' and 'mine') is accomplished by realising the selflessness of the self.

The concept of "mine", which is raised subsequent to attachment to the self, means specifically the psycho-physical organism (*skandha*) of mental and corporeal elements that are normally taken to comprise the person. Here it is denoted by the technical equivalent of the individual (*satkaya*) lit. corruptible group. The psycho-physical organism is composed of the physical body (*rupa*), feelings (*vedana*), discriminations (*samjna*), impulses or drives (*samskara*), and consciousness (*vijnana*). The first psycho-physical constituent, the physical body or form, in Abhidharma treatises[45] includes all corporeal an non-corporeal forms, and so the organism which is grasped as "mine" in fact includes all things except for the self, though in the context of meditation the physical body figures most prominently.[46]

The primacy of the notion of 'self' in the process of karma creation and existential self-perpetuation means that from the point of view of yogic practice, the analysis of their own person is the more direct route of practice. The *Commentary* [MABh: 234] hence explains that at the beginning of their practice, yogins analyse only the self (*bdag kho na*).

5.1 THE SELF OR PERSON NEGATED

The conceptions of a self refuted in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] are non-Buddhist viewpoints and Buddhist conceptions other than the Madhyamikas. The non-Buddhist conceptions mentioned in the *Introduction's*

[MA] refutation are specifically those of the Hindu Samkhya[47] and Vaisheshika.[48] Their conceptions of the self, though different from each other, are both refuted (6.122) on the grounds that, being unborn they are on a similar ontic status to the children of barren women, i.e. are utterly non-existent. This contravenes a conventional criterion of existence.

For Chandrakirti the archetypal non-Buddhist conception appears to be the Samkhya's notion of purusha (tib. *skyes bu*) which is distinguished by five characteristics (6.121ab); namely, that it is an experiencer, or literally, consumer (*zha po*), a permanent thing, not a creator and devoid of both qualities (*yon tan*) and action.[49] From the above qualities, being a consumer means that purusha can receive experiences of objects, suffering, happiness, etc. Being a non-creator means that purusha is inactive. All of these defining characteristics of purusha are absent in the Samkhya's notion of phenomena (*prakrti*), for purusha is completely separate from prakrti. As such the conception of a person here is one of a self that is completely different and independent from both mental and corporeal factors. This conception of the self as a quite separate and independent entity from all mental and physical factors is of course not unique to the Samkhya philosophy. Hence, *mutatis mutandis*, the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] can be seen as refuting to all transcendental conceptions of the self, such as the Advaitan atman, Platonic soul, and Cartesian ego.

These non-Buddhist viewpoints are regarded by Madhyamikas as coarse or gross misconceptions. They have their basis in thought-constructs such as one finds in religious and philosophical systems. Also as devised or acquired conceptions (*abhisamskarika*) they are considered to be comparatively easy to eradicate, for their removal requires only the refutation of some formal system of thought that supports an intellectual or theoretical (*parikalpita*) egoism.

Buddhist conceptions of the self, as we have said, are also the subject of the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] refutations. Whereas (MABh: 286) the non-Buddhists consider the person to be different from the psycho-physical organism, the Buddhists (Chandrakirti uses the phrase "the Madhyamikas' own community (*svayuthya*)" which is a semantic equivalent to *nang pa* and *sang rgyas pa*) accept that it is the same as the mere psycho-physical organism, and in this the Buddhist schools are locating a non-transcendental self. This conception of a self differs in that it is claimed to describe a natural, non-intellectual, or so-called innate (*sahaja*) self-conception, rather than the Hindus' philosophical self that is a logical or rational fabrication. The innate conception is that which is located by the common-sense and spontaneous way in which people relate to themselves.[50] It is a self-concept that is said to be had by all the creatures of samsara who, though they do not realise it, are placed in samsara because of the grasping that is engendered to the 'I' and its possessions, such as the internal organs, the eye, etc. and external forms. The Madhyamika position is that this non-analytically established self is established by ignorance when in fact it does not exist in the sense of being established due to having an entity or essence of its own. In the

Commentary [MABh: 20.] it is said that the cause for not realising the non-self of this person is that the psycho-physical organism is perceived as though it were the self. Though it is the Madhyamikas' view that the referent of the term "self" is based on the psycho-physical organism, such a conception represents a conception to be negated. This differs from the Samkhya and Vaisheshika who are at pains, of course, to substantiate their transcendental conceptions of the self. Chandrakirti is out to refute both the transcendental and mundane self-conceptions. His view, even though he says that Hindus conceive transcendental selves where Buddhists locate mundane ones, must be that Hindus also function and operate in life with a mundane conception for otherwise the Hindus would be spiritually more advanced than the Buddhists *vis-a-vis* their eradication of errant conceptions, as the transcendental conceptions are purportedly more superfical and more easily eradicated than mundane conceptions.[51]

Certain specific Buddhist conceptions mentioned in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] are that the self is impermanent, and that in some way it is not exactly the same entity as the psycho-physical organism and on the other hand not entirely different from it either. The first view, that the self is not permanent,[52] is regarded by Chandrakirti (6.140) as still capable of providing a basis for self-grasping or egoism (*atma-graha*) and so it is an insufficiently refined and subtle view of the self.[53]

The reason here is that the mere apprehension of the self as changing does not preclude grasping towards such a self, for permanent and impermanent selves alike could be viewed as having an intrinsic existence (*svabhava*) and so provide bases for attachment, karma creation, etc. The realisation of the non-self or emptiness of the person is a finer and more subtle realisation than that of the impermanence of the person, and so (6.141) the latter is no substitute for the former.

The second view (6.146), that the person and the psycho-physical organism are not exactly the same or different and that the self is not really permanent or impermanent, is ascribed in the *Commentary* [MABh: 268] to the Sammitiyas, a Vaibhashika sub-school.[54] Their position here, though it uses the logical syntax so characteristic of the Madhyamikas' themselves in describing emptiness, is not saying that the self is empty, but rather that in certain ways the self behaves as though it was the psycho-physical organism and at other times as though it was not. It is an expression of a designatory equivocation and ambiguity rather than syntactical precision.

On the Sammitiyas' view, the self relates to the psycho-physical organism in much the same way that an employer is dependent on employees yet still retains autonomy and manages them. Likewise the self, though dependent on the psycho-physical organism, powers and co-ordinates it. Hence this is like a sovereign self thesis where the self or agent directs and controls the mental and corporeal person.[55]

At issue in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] is the subtlety of the Buddhist views - in other words, whether they negate all wrong conceptions of the person. The *Introduction* [MA] is especially concerned to negate that a person has an intrinsic existence and in so doing establish the emptiness of the person. From the *Introduction's* [MA] perspective only the Madhyamikas refute the intrinsic existence of the person, and all others, Buddhist and Hindu philosophers alike, either negate the self with insufficient subtlety and precision (and hence fail to remove the conception of intrinsic existence) or, in the case of Hindu philosophies, (wrongly) establish that it has an intrinsic nature.

5.2 SEVEN-SECTIONED ANALYSIS[56]

All wrong conceptions of the person - coarse, subtle, Buddhist and non-Buddhist - are claimed in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] to be negated by an analysis that comprises seven sections. In refuting these false view-points the analysis establishes the emptiness or non-self of the person. Chandrakirti's source for the analysis dates at least to Nagarjuna for it is an extension of a briefer analysis used in the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK][57] and cited in the *Commentary* [MABh].[58] Nagarjuna's analysis in turn is foreshadowed in the Pali suttas, and these may be his inspiration for in the *Suhrllekha* (*bShes pai spring yig*) (vs. 49) he quotes a passage from the *Collected Discourses* [SN] which is a summary conclusion to his own analysis.[59]

The analysis is based on refuting seven relationships that can be posited as relating the person and the psycho-physical organism. Each section of the analysis focuses on one relationship. The relationships refuted are summarised at verse 6.151. This verse instantiates a carriage and its parts as relata, as this is a substitution Chandrakirti makes for the person and the psycho-physical organism part way through the analysis.[60] This substitution is said to facilitate the exposition of the analyses[61] and the analogy is well known from Pali literature.[62] It is clearly cited as an example (6.162) and it is understood that yogins would in practice be analysing themselves. The verse reads:

> Likewise, worldly consensus also maintains that [there is] a self [designated] in dependence on the psycho-physical organism, the basic constituents (*dhatu*) and the six sense-bases (*ayatana*), and that it also is an acquirer. [There is a presentation in our system that says:] acquisition is thus, action is thus, and the agent is thus.

For the relata intended then, the seven relationships are these:

1. The self is not different (*gzhan*) from the psycho-physical organism.
2. The self is not the same as the psycho-physical organism.
3. The self does not have (*ldan*) the psycho-physical organism.

4. The self is not in (*la*) the psycho-physical organism.
5. The psycho-physical organism is not in the self.
6. The self is not the collection (*'dus* or *tshog, sangha*) of the psycho-physical constituents.
7. The self is not the shape (*dbyibs, samsthana*) of the psycho-physical constituents.

The cognate analyses in the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK] comprise five sections, the first five cited above. The relations of "being the collection", and "having the same shape" are Chandrakirti's own contribution.

Four (and perhaps five) of these wrongly conceived relationships are mentioned (though not analytically refuted) in the *Middle-length Discourses* [MN: I.300] (and *Collected Discourses* [SN: III. 114-115] as just noted). There the Buddha explains that those without any training in the dhamma view each of the psycho-physical constituents, i.e. the physical body, feelings, perceptions, impulses, and consciousness, *as* the self, the self as *having* these, these as *in* the self and self as *in* these. These, thus, account for the two relations of containment, of identity, and possession. A fifth is perhaps included as the "self as the physical body (*rupa*)" may be the same as it being the shape (*samsthana*) of the psycho-physical organism. It is through these misconceptions, the Buddha says, that one comes to have a wrong view about the body.

The first two relationships are generic as they specify the most rudimentary or fundamental ways in which the self and the psycho-physical organism could be related. The following five are each a species of relationship in that they isolate specific ways in which the self and the psycho-physical organism may be related. They are thought to be typical ways in which ordinary people misconceive a relationship between the self and the psycho-physical organism.

The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] refutes each of the seven relationships in turn. These are introduced and essentially discussed serially though in an order that differs in three places from that summarised at 6.151. The order that can best be established from the *Verses* (*karika*) is difference, sameness, collection, the two relations of containment, possession, and shape. Oftentimes verses discuss more than one relation within the one verse and Chandrakirti also moves fairly freely between the refutations relevant to each relationship. Here, though, for the sake of clarification and structure, they are presented in a more separate and serial order.

The section headings that follow state the relationships as 'what is being established' by Chandrakirti's analyses. The theses being refuted are thus the negations of what is established, e.g. in the first case that 'the self is different from the psycho-physical organism'.

5.3 THE SELF IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL ORGANISM

Writing in refutation of transcendental conceptions of the self - i.e. those which posit that the self is a completely different entity from the psycho-physical organism - the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 6.124] says:

> A self that is [intrinsically] different from the psycho-physical organism (*skandha*) cannot exist because the apprehension [of a self] cannot be established independently of [i.e. without reference to] the psycho-physical organism. We do not assert [the self] as the basis of worldly, egocentric cognitions, because [such] views are totally inappropriate.

The argument here is that if the self were not included within the psycho-physical organism it would be quite unknown, for the self is always and necessarily established only on the basis of the psycho-physical organism. (The psycho-physical organism we recall is composed of all the physical and mental constituents of the person.) For example, our knowledge of some one is necessarily made with reference to their psycho-physical being, i.e. physical appearance, affective traits, mental qualities, etc. Without such a reference the location of a person could never be made. This is also the case of first person analyses, for all knowledge about one's self is mediated by a consciousness of one's self, and consciousness (*vijnana*) is included within the psycho-physical organism.

On this point, Murti is wrong when he says that the self which is distinct from the body and its states (i.e. different from the psycho-physical organism) is a "separate reality as consciousness", its simplicity as pure awareness its immortality as not being composite..."[63] and so on, for the point is that *outside* of the mind a self cannot be known and hence one cannot with even the slightest foundation say anything about it. This is to say that Murti's "self as distinct from the body and its states..." is rightly included within the psycho-physical organism and not separate from it.

The point for Chandrakirti is that the self can only be known with reference to the psycho-physical organism viz. one's body, feelings, discriminations, drives or impulses, and mind. As a knowledge and so location of the self is mediated by and made with reference to the set or a subset of elements of the psycho-physical organism the self cannot be independent of and completely different from the psycho-physical organism.[64] Were it to be, it could be known independently of the psycho-physical organism and this is contingently and necessarily impossible. It is necessarily impossible for as we have said, knowledge is a function of the psycho-physical person. Hence the *Introduction* [MA] concludes that, though a self-conception and grasping to it can be

produced, its basis or support can not be a transcendent self for the existence of such is quite unascertainable.

Chandrakirti exemplifies his analysis with an example intended to establish the merely intellectual and speculative (*parikalpita*) nature of transcendent conceptions of a self, and to show why they cannot be the basis for an innate self-conception and self-grasping. He writes (6.125):

> Similarly, an unproduced and permanent [self] is not perceived even by those who, as animals, have become stupified for many aeons. But [animals] clearly do still have a sense of egoism, and therefore the self is not different from the psycho-physical organism.

The argument here is that an attitude of self-grasping or egoism (such as is necessarily based on a self conception) can be observed in animals. Animals, though, are unable to conceive of the permanent, independent, etc. transcendental self of the (Hindu) philosophers and so that innate conception cannot be based in or supported by the acquired view of a self.

Having refuted that the self can be an entity utterly different from the psycho-physical organism Chandrakirti turns his attention to the basis of innate conceptions of the self in which the self is identified with rather than differentiated from the psycho-physical organism.

5.4 THE SELF IS NOT THE SAME AS THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL ORGANISM

Chandrakirti begins (6.126):

> [The Vaibhashika Buddhist:] Because the self cannot be established as something different from the psycho-physical organism, the self is only the psycho-physical organism, the referential-support (*alambana*) for the view [of individuality]. Some [of the Sammitiya Buddhists] maintain that [all] five divisions of the psycho-physical organism [namely, the body, feelings, perceptions, drives, and consciousness, constitute] the basis for our view of the self, while others maintain that the mind (*citta*) alone [provides the basis].

As from the foregoing, no proof can be made for a genuine difference between the self and psycho-physical organism. As such, certain Buddhist philosophies notably here the Vaibhashikas,[65] conclude that the self must be merely the psycho-physical organism. According to Chandrakirti some Vaibhashikas considered that all five psycho-physical constituents were the self whereas others considered it was only the consciousness constituent. The latter view was held by the Avantakas.

Several logical consequences issue from this identification of the self with either all of the psycho-physical constituents or consciousness alone. The logical basis for these consequences is stated by Leibniz's "principle of the identity of indiscernibles". It says that "to suppose two things indiscernible is to suppose the same thing under two names".[66] In the case at hand then, one has two things, self and psycho-physical organism, of which it is said they are the same. Yet "to say of *two* things that they are identical is nonsense".[67] Hence the wedge the Madhyamika drives in the position of the Vaibhashikas, (and all other opponents) exposes in this case a *stated* unity of two things yet an instinctive and sometimes doctrinal separation of the two. The Madhyamika points to a confounding of qualities in which one or other of two entities may be characterised by a set of qualities, but not both.

The refutation opens (6.127):

> If the psycho-physical organism is the self, then because [the psycho-physical organism is composed of] many [parts, i.e. the body, feelings, and so on] there would also be many selves. [Also] the self would be substantial, and thus, the view of [individuality] would take a substantial thing [as its object] and would not be mistaken [given the Vaibhashika definition of the veridicalness of substance-based sense perception].

Three separate consequences are made here. The first is that if the self and the psycho-physical organism are really the same then the unity of the self will be lost for the self must necessarily bifurcate into five selves, as this is the primary number of psycho-physical constituents. In fact the self would multiply beyond five for there would be as many selves as there are distinct parts of the body, real aspects to feelings, etc. Moreover, even if the self is asserted to be just the consciousness constituent, its integrity is lost for there are visual, auditory, olfactory, etc. consciousnesses.[68] If, in the light of such consequences one were to maintain the oneness of the self, then the divisions between the psycho-physical constituents must collapse also. In other words, the unity of the self can only be maintained at the expense of denying that form, feeling, etc. are substantially different.

The second point to be made is that if the self and the psycho-physical organism are the same then just as the psycho-physical organism is (for the Vaibhashikas) substantially existent, then the self must be also. This, though, contradicts the Vaibhashikas' own philosophy which holds that the self is not substantial but exists dependent on a mental label (*savikalpa*). Finally, if the self is substantial then the self would be free from error with respect to its cognition, and moreover it would then be quite unnecessary to give up attachment to the psycho-physical organism for the purpose of achieving liberation.

Furthering his refutation Chandrakirti (6.128) writes:

> [Other consequences of the Vaibhashika identity thesis] between the self and psycho-physical organism are: (1) that when one passed beyond misery [into the arhats non-residual nirvana at death] the self would certainly be annihilated. (2) There would be, for [the self and the components of the psycho-physical organism] in the moment preceding nirvana, no decay, production or an agent, and hence no result. (3) And [karma] accumulated would be experienced by another [as the self would cease after the last pre-nirvana moment].[69]

There are four main points in this verse. The first consequence is directed towards some Vaibhashika philosophers who held that a continuum of the self passed into nirvana. (dGe'dun grub (RSM, f. 30a6) glosses this as the nirvana unaccompanied by psycho-physical organism i.e. the arhats post-mortem nirvana.)[70] To these Vaibhashikas Chandrakirti points out that what they say is surely inconsistent for if the self and psycho-physical organism are one, then once the psycho-physical organism is destroyed so is the self. (One could add a general case, that if the self is the psycho-physical organism then at the time when a person's body (*rupa*) is being cremated or buried so is his self, or at least some part of it.)

The second point is that if the self and the psycho-physical organism are one then in the pre-nirvana state the self is subject to decay and birth from moment to moment. In other words, because the Vaibhashikas hold that the psycho-physical organism decays and is renewed in its entirety from one moment to the next, the self would likewise disintegrate and be reborn from one moment to the next. Hence, there is no continuity of the self.

The third point is that a psycho-physical organism which exists only momentarily cannot provide the continuity of agency that is needed in order to produce karmic effects through intentional action mediated by the psycho-physical organism. The final consequence is that momentariness implies an intrinsic discontinuity, such that "states of being" in one continuum can be no more related to each other than states in different continua. Thus, it is not impossible for the karma created by one individual to be experienced by someone else. A further consequence in this regard of identifying the self and psycho-physical organism is stated in a later verse (6.137)[71]. Chandrakirti writes:

> It is incorrect for the acquirer (*upadatar*) [i.e. the self], and the acquisition [the psycho-physical organism] (*upadana*) to be the same. If it were so, then the doer and the deed would be the same. If you think there can be a deed without the doer, this is not so. With no doer there is no deed.

The implications of this view are that action and the results or consequences (*phala*) of action would be untraced to an agent for the motivator and intendor of an action would be no different from the action itself. The notion of causal nexi would be meaningless for want of a basis for locating causal continua. Hence in Buddhism the concept of karma, in which agents reap results, would be unfounded, for agents are indistinguishable from results. As results can no more be ascribed to one agent than to any other, this would give rise to the seeming possibility of the karma accrued by one self being experienced by another.[72]

The Vaibhashikas retort (6.129a) that they have not forfeited the concept of a continuum (*samtana*) to which the Madhyamikas (6.129b-d) refer back to a refutation (6.61) proffered earlier in the *Introduction* [MA].[73] The Madhyamikas conclude on a doctrinal note, that the psycho-physical organism cannot be the self, for the physical constituent at least has a beginning and so contradicts the Buddhist teachings of beginningless existence, etc.

The Madhyamikas continue (6.130-131):

> [If the mind or psycho-physical organism were the self] then when your yogins perceive the non-existence of a self, without question they would [also perceive] the non-existence of things. If they abandon a permanent self, then at such a time [they would see] your mind or psycho-physical organism become the self no longer. Because your yogins perceive selflessness, they would not understand the reality (*tattva*) of forms and so forth, and when they direct [their attention] to forms, they would generate attachment to them, and thus not understanding their nature.

The Madhyamika is saying that according to the Vaibhashika, when yogins achieve an insight into the truth there is an absence of self consciousness. As things (*dharma*) are identical with the self, in virtue of their inclusion within the physical form constituent (*rupa*), when the self disappears at the moment of the yogins' insight, so must conditioned things. The Vaibhashikas then clarify their position (MABh: 252) as asserting only that the yogins abandon the view that the self is permanent. The response of the Madhyamika is that if Vaibhashikas construe the term "self" to mean a permanent self, then such an apprehension of the self is unable to support the notion that the psycho-physical organism or mind is the self. (Presumably, because at times other than the time of insight, i.e. when the yogin is perceiving the self, the psycho-physical organism and mind are not permanent). The Madhyamikas then attempt to rectify (6.131) the Vaibhashikas' apparently arbitrary designation of the term "self" to the physical organism or mind by observing (6.131) that their conception of non-self in no way ensures the abandonment of emotional reactions (and hence gaining of liberation) for the abandonment of attachment and aversion, etc. require the insight of emptiness. The insight merely of impermanence still conceives that

things have an intrinsic existence and so continues to provide a basis for creating (contaminated) actions (*karma*), etc.

In some closing remarks (6.132-3) to the refutation that the self and psycho-physical organism are the same Chandrakirti interprets a sutric source that the Vaibhashikas had earlier drawn on as supporting their position of an identity between the two. On the Madhyamika interpretation a sutric statement that "the psycho-physical constituents are the self" was taught by the Bhagavan as an expedient to root out a conception that the self is different from the psycho-physical organism. Evidence for such an interpretation being that yet another sutra says that the physical form is not the self. In other words, Chandrakirti is assigning an interpretative (*neya*) status to the Vaibhashika's sutric source.

5.5 REFUTATION OF A SUBSTANTIAL SELF

At this point it seems sensible to move ahead some verses to a set of four verses (6.146-9) that in a sense form an amalgam if not a conjunction of the two relations just discussed, viz. difference and identity. These verses provide insights into the relationship between description and ontology, and the logic of Madhyamika refutation. They constitute an exposition and refutation of the Sammitiyas doctrine that the person is substantially existent (*dravyasat*). Stating the Sammitiyas theory the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 6.146] says:

> Some [specifically the Vatsiputriyas] maintain that the person (*pudgala*) cannot be expressed as identical or different [from the psycho-physical organism], as permanent or impermanent; [yet] they maintain that the personality is substantially existent (*dravya-sat*). [These philosophers] maintain that [the self] is an object that can be cognised by the six [types of] consciousness (*vijnana*), and that it is also the [genetic] basis for egoism.

According to this view the person is not different from the psycho-physical organism because outside of the psycho-physical organism no grasping or apprehension of a person can be ascertained. On the other hand, the person does not have the nature of the psycho-physical organism because it is beyond birth and destruction. Therefore the Sammitiyas concluded that one cannot say whether a person is identical with or different from the psycho-physical organism, and likewise (MABh: 268) (by parity or reasoning) one cannot say whether a person is permanent or impermanent. Even so they theorise that a person is a substantial entity because it can be perceived by the mind *and* sensory consciousness, in its functions as a worldly and spiritual agent (MABh: 268-269).

Arguing against the consistency of establishing, as substantial, something that precludes relational designation the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 6.147] says:

> [For them, the self] is [supposedly] mind rather than form, inexpressible, incomprehensible. [For them, the self] is an existent thing that is inexpressible and not to be comprehended. If the self were established in any way as a thing, then it would be just as established as the mind is and would no longer be inexpressible.

The argument here is fortified with the help of an example, the mind. Chandrakirti reasons that the mind about which one could not say that it was identical with form, or different from form would be unknowable. Being unknowable it certainly could not be a substantially existing thing. The unknowability entailed here is a necessary rather than a merely contingent unknowability for reasons adduced earlier. Namely - still with Chandrakirti's example - that if one could not look to forms or anything other than forms in an effort to find the mind it would be in principle unknowable for "form" and "not form" are jointly exhaustive and mutually excluding categories of being. Likewise, all things which cannot be predicated as different or not different from something else are unknowable. Things exist in dependence upon the distinctions that are made conceptually and in speech. If the means to distinguish (*bcad pa*) things are not utilised, or things are genuinely indistinguishable, they go unlocated and so are unknown. Conversely, Chandrakirti concludes, whatever is established as existing is not inexpressible, the mind being a case in point.

The assumption here on the part of the Madhyamika is that the same self is being referred to by the Sammitiyas when they ascribe contradictory properties, in which case one has a genuine mutual exclusion and so such a self is unknown. Whether the same self is in fact implicated in the Sammitiyas' contradiction is in a sense immaterial to the Madhyamika. From their viewpoint, if it is the same self then the analysis holds. If it is not the same then the self has been unwittingly bifurcated with the Sammitiyas giving the impression that the same self is the subject of these two contradictory properties when in fact they are simply being loose with their thought. Continuing his argument Chandrakirti (6.148) writes:

> So, for you a vase is not established as a thing and so it is inexpressibly beyond the entity of form and so forth. Hence any self becomes inexpressible - beyond the psycho-physical organism - and [yet] you believe that you have established [that the self] exists.

The verse reiterates the meaning of the previous one; namely that the existence of a designation (*prajnapti*) depends on there being a support or base on which the designation is applied. On this count non-referring designations are not designations. The point is that designations cannot be applied to objects that are purported to be neither identical with nor different from other objects, for the reason that such things cannot provide a basis or support within or on which distinctions and hence object discernments can be made. In other words, (MABh: 269) if objects' relations with other things - for example, a vase to its form, and a self to its psycho-physical constituents - cannot be specified, those "objects" are merely "putative objects" for they cannot establish either their existence or nature (*dharma*).

At first sight this may seem as though the Madhyamika are implicating themselves into a position diametrically opposed to their stated view in which the expressibility of things is indicative of their being empty of an intrinsic existence. For Madhyamikas, intrinsically existing things could not be related to names. The implication (from 6.148cd) would be that a self whose relations *can* be known is an object "established as existing by itself (*rang gyis yod par grub pa*)". The point though is that "inexpressible objects" are "unrelated objects" and objects unrelated to other things cannot be established as having the nature they may be purported to have, for the very discernment of their nature depends on their comparison with other objects. If those comparisons are not made then objects fail to establish their nature and hence themselves. When comparisons are made they established things not as possessed of an intrinsic existence but as nominal bases suitable for nominal designations. Chandrakirti concludes his refutation of the Sammitiyas errant view (6.149):

> For you, one does not maintain that consciousness (*vijnana*) is different from one's own self. You maintain it is a different thing from the physical body, and so forth. [Thus, you do in fact] see these two aspects (*akara*) [of identity and difference] to the thing. Thus [such] a self does not exist because it is not related to the phenomena of things.

The final argument is made first with the example of consciousness (*vijnana*). If consciousness is not different from its own self (i.e. is the same as itself) then it must be a different entity from what is not itself, e.g. form, etc. In that case the relations of identity and difference do apply, and so consciousness is not substantially existing. Likewise, the self if it is substantial cannot be other than its own self, in which case it is different from that which it is not. Hence, it is not inexpressible *vis-a-vis* the two aspects of identity and difference and so on the Sammitiyas' own criterion cannot substantially exist. The final sentence of the verse just repeats the earlier conclusion, that a self apart from the two aspects is a no self for want of a location for its properties.

There are two points worth making about these four verses. The first point is that the Madhyamikas do not query the *analytical* ascertainments of the self as neither one with or different from the psycho-physical organism, for they establish that conclusion themselves. It is the conclusions that follow from conjoining the first two sections of the seven-sectioned analysis: viz, that self is not different from the psycho-physical organism and that it is not the same either. The query and concern of the Madhyamikas lies in an errant *conclusion* drawn by the Sammitiyas: that a self so described does substantially exist. The second point is that in drawing his own Madhyamika conclusion Chandrakirti gives an implicit recognition and utilisation of the "three principles of thought": viz, those of identity, the excluded middle, and contradiction.[74]

5.6 THE SELF IS NOT THE SAME AS THE COLLECTION

The remaining five sections of the seven-sectioned analysis are, as we have said, aimed at refuting more specific relationships that are commonly conceived to describe the relationship between the self and psycho-physical organism. The first of the specific relationships considered is that of "being the collection". The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA], speaking for the Vaibhashikas, gives this definition (6.134ab): "[When we] say 'psycho-physical organism' [we mean] the collection of the psycho-physical constituents, not the [individual] constituents of the psycho-physical organism." The term "collection" is a translation of "*tshogs*". Other equivalents are: set, group, class, composite, assemblage. The term in this context signifies the collection of parts rather than the parts themselves.[75] It is not concerned with the arrangements of parts within some collection, just with the collection itself. The concept of a set is, in fact, particularly apposite here for the membership of sets is unordered. That is to say the arrangement or placement of elements within a set does not affect the identity criteria for sets. Hence different orderings of the same membership constitute the same set. Hence, here the collection which corresponds to the notion of a set rather than its membership (i.e. the elements which make it up), is distinguished from the concepts of 'shape' or arrangement (i.e. order of the parts) which is analysed later.

The Vaibhashikas' definition, then, is that the collection is the psycho-physical organism as a unit rather than each component individually. The Madhyamikas' response is (6.134cd) that the collection is not the lord, discipliner or witness and as it is not these, the collection of them is also not the self. The argument given in the *Commentary* [MABh: 256-257] is that Buddha said that the self is the lord, discipliner, etc. of the self, yet this cannot be said of the collection of psycho-physical constituents.

In other words, with respect to the self one can understand and make sense of the notions that it protects its interests, achieves its goals, witnesses its actions,

etc. Such sense cannot be made for the parts or constituents of the self. Therefore, as they are not bearers of the self's qualities they cannot be the self.

The Madhyamikas continue (6.135):

> When a carriage becomes the collection of its parts, the carriage would be equivalent to the self. The sutras say [the self is designated] in dependence on the psycho-physical organism. Therefore, the mere assembly of the psycho-physical constituents is *not* the self.

This verse introduces the substitution of a carriage and its collected parts for the self and psycho-physical organism respectively. A definition is introduced that the carriage becomes a carriage when the parts of the carriage collect in place. This does not imply a collection in spatial terms, for the *Commentary* [MABh: 258] indicates that the designation (*prajnapti*) "carriage" can only be made when the parts of the carriage are *considered* as a collection. Prior to that one does not have a "carriage" for the individual parts are uncollected and so cannot be parts of the one carriage. That is to say, the separate or diversified parts, e.g. wheels, etc. are not carriage parts but rather just wheels, etc. Hence the only suitable base on which to designate "carriage" is the collection of carriage parts. Likewise, the only suitable base for receiving the designation "self" is the collection of the psycho-physical constituents, for prior to their being collected one has form, feelings, etc. but not parts or constituents suitable for the singular designation "self". That is to say, as individual parts one could not unify them as all parts of the one self, for all being parts of one thing implies one haver of the parts. But, the Madhyamikas object (MABh: 258-259), if the designation is the collection, e.g. the carriage the collection of carriage parts and the self the psycho-physical constituents, then the collections can have no parts, e.g. the carriage no wheels, etc. and the self no form, feelings, etc. for the carriage and self are unit concepts. That is to say, the composites like the designations would be singular notions and so not partake of divisions. A consequence of this view is that each and every part of the collection would be the collection. This occurs because one places *all* emphasis on the unifying role of the concept of a "collection" to the point where one is just talking about one thing. The wheels of a carriage would each be the carriage and each of the psycho-physical constituents would be the self.

At this point, the refutation that the self is not the collection of psycho-physical constituents is recognisably reduced to the consequences inhering in the earlier view that the self is the psycho-physical organism. Namely, that the psycho-physical organism and the self are one, then as the self is one so is the psycho-physical organism and hence it is not a composite of constituents for it cannot be divided into parts.

Verse 6.136 makes a point with respect to the refutation of the self being the shape of the physical organism.[76] Verse 6.137, which we have quoted earlier,[77]

is introduced as a refutation of "the self as the same as a composite of the psycho-physical constituents". It resolves the analysis into the earlier one of *simple* identity between the self and psycho-physical organism, drawing the conclusions that one has a dissolution of the concepts of agency and action, etc.

Verse 6.152a-c also considers singular designations as the collection of their components. The verse reads:

> If the carriage was simply the collection [of the parts], one would have carriage *qua* carriage, [when the carriage was] in the disassembled [parts]. And, further, when there is no bearer of parts, there can be no parts.

This verse takes a different tack from the previous refutation.[78] Where the earlier refutation (6.136) resolves the notion of "collection" into the "notion" of a unit concept, so placing it on a par with singular designations, this verse resolves the term "collection" in the opposite direction. Where, in the earlier verse the concept of a "collection" was abandoned for want of losing its membership, here the "collection" is construed as a "collection of parts" on the grounds that without parts there is no collection. As a collection of parts, a collection partakes of the nature and properties of parts. That is, the properties of parts are necessary properties of a collection. As the notion "parts" is necessarily a plural notion (to talk of one part implies there is at least one other) the collection also will be plural. If the collection of parts is multiple then the carriage is also multiple. There will in fact be as many collections as there are parts and so the term "collection" is abandoned again, this time for want of a possessor or collector of the parts. Thus, if one reckons that in one collection the wheels constitute four parts, the axles two parts, and the body one part then one has seven carriages.

In both analyses (at 6.135 and 6.152a-c) the distinctions between agents and action, etc. are analytically dissolved. In both cases one is left with *in vacuo* concepts. In the first case of "designata" and in the second of "designatum".

In summary, the analysis of the relationship of "being the collection of the psycho-physical constituents" is accomplished through clarification of the concept of a "collection". The concept is serially resolved in favour of two possible interpretations, i.e. one in which the characteristic of "being a collector" is prime, the other in which the concept of "containing parts" is prime. In other words "collection" is reduced to its qualities as a "designata" and "designatum". The qualities inhering in these are mutually excluding, e.g. one and many. Hence a clarification in terms of either one is at the expense of forfeiting the qualities of the other. Consequently the three notions of a "designation", "collection" and "part" are mutually incompatible. More precisely, "collection" is a mobile term in this analysis, resolved into the mutually contradicting notions of "singular designation" and "members or parts". Hence when "collection" is reduced to "designation" it is consistent with "designation" and inconsistent with "members". When it is reduced to "members" it is consistent with "members"

and inconsistent with "designation". Nor can it be a genuinely third term with a different meaning, for then it would relate to neither "designation" nor "members".

The conclusion to this section of the analysis is that the self cannot coherently be the collection of the psycho-physical components.

5.7 THE SELF IS NOT IN THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL ORGANISM AND VICE VERSA

The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 6.142] says:

> The self is not within the psycho-physical organism, nor is the psycho-physical organism within the self because they could only be conceived as [one within the other] if they were different. They are not different and so they should be conceived [as has been explained].

The relationship in question in these two sections of the analysis is one of containment, basis or support (*rten*). The *Commentary* [MABh: 265] gives a readily discernible example of curd in a plate. The refutation refutes the containment of the self in the psycho-physical organism, and the psycho-physical organism in the self simultaneously. The analysis is straightforwardly reductive. Chandrakirti (MABh: 265) reasons that the properties of containing (*rten*) and being a container (*brten pa*) are possible only where otherness or difference prevails between these two. Just as all relata and relationships collapse in the refutation of the relation of "otherness" so do notions of the self being based on or contained within the psycho-physical organism and *vice versa*.

5.8 THE SELF DOES NOT HAVE THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL ORGANISM

The sixth relationship refuted is that of having or possession, and in a stronger sense ownership. The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 6.143] says:

> It cannot be maintained that the self [intrinsically] possesses the physical body (*rupa*) since the self does not exist [as either identified with or different from the physical component of the psycho-physical organism]. As such, the notion of 'possessing' cannot be applied [to the relationship between the self and the physical component]. Further, since [the self's] possession of form is not like possessing [something different like] cattle or something not different [like one's body], the self doesn't exist as either identical or different from the physical body.

In Tibetan the relationship is given by the postpositive former "*ldan*"[79]. The analysis here is reductive. The first point is that the self is a mere designation and so cannot be said to have possessions, such as form, etc. The second point is philological. In the *Commentary* [MABh: 265-266] Chandrakirti notes a dual usage of the term "having" (*ldan*). On the one hand it is used in constructions such as "Devadatta has a form (*lhas byin gzugs dan ldan*)" which indicate that Devadatta is a form or body. In other words, Devadatta is identified with his body. On the other hand it is also used in constructions like "X has a cow (*ba lan dan ldan*)" in which a differentiation between possessor and possession is implied. This dual usage indicates that the self is ambivalent and ambiguous *vis-a-vis* its relation to form and so cannot be said to possess form.

Though Chandrakirti's analysis stops at this grammatical analysis the same conclusion can be drawn via a consequential analysis by noting that possession cannot obtain between things that are inherently other. On the other hand, if the things are the same the notion of possession collapses for there is no possessor distinguished from a possession.[80]

5.9 THE SELF IS NOT THE SHAPE OF THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL ORGANISM

Finally the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] considers a modal definition of the self; namely that it is its shape (*samsthana*). The common-sense meaning of the term, as the spatial displacement assumed by material form, is analysed as a suitable base for designations. With respect to "parts" the shape is their arrangement. In the case of the self and psycho-physical organism, the shape necessarily means the form (*rupa*) aggregate as all others are formless.

The first and obvious point that Chandrakirti makes is that if the self were the shape then all composities of the psycho-physical organism other than form, i.e. feelings, perceptions, etc. would not be the self. In response to a Vaibhashika suggestion that the self is nothing but the shape Chandrakirti responds (MA: 6.136cd) straight forwardly that "the collection of mental constituents could not be [a part of the self] because these have no shape."

The consequential analysis of "shape" is introduced at the completion of verse 6.152. Chandrakirti writes (6.152d-153):

> It is illogical that [the carriage] is simply the shape [or configuration of the parts]. For you, just as each part has a shape prior [to their assembly as a carriage], so [their disassembled state] also contains the carriage. Just as when they are disassembled, there is also no carriage [likewise when they are assembled, there would be no carriage].

There are two alternative ways in which the carriage may be the shape. It may be the shape of the parts (*yan lag*) or the shape of the composite (*tshog*) of the parts. This verse considers and refutes the first alternative. The Madhyamika objection (MABh: 274) is that if the carriage is imputed to the disassembled parts, these are not the carriage but just a wheel, etc. here and there, and so the assembled parts are not a carriage either. The basis of the objection is that when shape is the only criterion for the determination of a carriage then the arrangement of the parts is immaterial to their being a carriage. Hence if one agrees that the unassembled parts are not a carriage then necessarily, the assembled parts are not a carriage for assembly is an immaterial factor.

Alternatively one may regard the shape of the assembled parts to be a carriage. That is, when the parts are arranged in the shape of a carriage they become a carriage. The Madhyamikas object also to this view, stating (6.154) that:

> If when the carriage [is assembled] the axel and so on had a different shape [from their disassembled state] it would be apprehended, but it is not. Therefore, the carriage is not the mere shape [of the carriage parts].

The argument, which is unpacked in the *Commentary* [MABh: 274] is that if the carriage is viewed strictly in terms of its shape without regard for the collection or aggregation of parts, i.e. sub-shapes, then the carriage shape would be perceivable independently of their being collected or uncollected. In which case the carriage at the time of its being assembled is *visually* identical with its shape at an earlier time when it is unassembled. Hence, if the carriage is its assembled shape, assembly drops out and the unassembled shape is still the same shape as the assembled shape. The unassembled parts of the carriage therefore assume the shape of the carriage. This is not the case, though, so the carriage is not the shape when collected.

Verse 6.155 makes the point that the collection as a suitable basis for the identification of the "I" is already refuted and so "shape" must necessarily be understood here as having nothing to do with the collection of members. But without a notion of collection the concept of shape is undetermined and cannot by itself provide a basis for the designation of a carriage or self in the case of the shape of the physical constituent of the psycho-physical organism.

The assumption in these verses is that "shape" is a different concept from "collection". Hence matters of assemblage are immaterial when considering whether things have the same shape. The consequences accrue because depending on where one begins (with unassembled shapes that are not carriages or assembled shapes that are), one can argue that redistributions or rearrangements of the shapes makes no difference to their status as carriages or non-carriages.

The establishment of a self as identified with shape *and* collection is also theoretically subject to a consequential analysis, and like the analysis of "birth from both" would conjoin two analyses, one refuting the notion of shape as a basis, the other the collection. If the basis for identification were a mixture of two, a consequential analysis would resolve it into one or the other, or both, and refute them separately.

A series of closing verses (6.158-62) concludes the establishment of the non-self of the person *via* the refutations through seven sections. These concluding verses reiterate a recurring theme in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] that consequential analysis does not preclude the nominal existence of entities and processes and that selves, carriages and other worldly conventions should not be abandoned.

6 CRITIQUE OF BUDDHIST PHENOMENALISM (VIJNANAVADA)

In the context of refuting the position of "birth from other" - one of the four possibilities within the diamond grains (*vajrakana*) analysis which we discussed earlier - the *Introduction* [MA] enters into disputation with (6.45-77), and an assessment of (6.78-97) the Buddhist Vijnanavadas or Phenomenalists.[81] At this point we are concerned just with the disputation.[82]

The placement of the critique in the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] analysis of "birth from other" indicates that the Phenomenalist view- point is based on what has proved to be an errant view and signifies also that the Madhyamikas' refutation invokes logical consequences issuing from that view. The refutation though, is aimed at specific tenets within the Phenomenalist philosophy, and with their denial rather than their inapplicability, in the sense of failure to refer to reality (*tattva*). Hence the refutations are implicitly affirming and so represent the "characterised Madhyamikas" as defined in the first chapter. That is to say they make a selective and partial application of consequences (*prasanga*) and so establish as valid the doctrinal opposites of what they refute. That is to say, they use affirming (*paryudasa*) negations.

The critique is illuminating for its clarification of the Madhyamikas' emptiness as contrasted with the Phenomenalist's conception of the same, and in clarifying the relations between mind, perception, and phenomena as envisaged in Chandrakirti's developments of the Madhyamikas as a system that embodies a theory of sense-perception. I am reconstructing the arguments here and metaphysics of the Phenomenalists and Madhyamikas that underpin them, for their intrinsic interest and also to draw on these later when raising the issue of the sense and content of so-called interpretative teachings (*neyartha*).

The basis of the dispute is the Phenomenalist conception of reality. The central issue in the critique is their thesis that dependent (*paratantra*) phenomena (really) exist. The Phenomenalists support that thesis with the doctrines of the (real) existence of consciousness, the non-externality of sense-objects, the

heuristic device of potentials (*sakti*) as the cause of sense-experience, and a self-reflexive consciousness (*svasamvedana*). It is these doctrines that Chandrakirti criticises.

According to the Phenomenalists all objects of knowledge (*jneya*) have three natures: an imaginary (*parikalpita*), dependent (*paratantra*), and perfected or fully established (*parinispanna*) nature.[83] The imaginary nature arises through the force of mental imputation, the principal one being a mental construction which bifurcates subjects from objects. People are thought to fabricate a division between themselves and the world such that the two appear to be really distinct. In the case of sense-perceptions, a process of extrojection takes place wherein phenomena appear to exist externally to the consciousness perceiving them. This extra-mental quality to sense-data is thought to occur habitually and unconsciously, presumably in much the same way that Berkeley held that the judgments of externality and distance were acquired perceptions based on a rapid and unconscious inference.[84] By this, one mistakes what is actually a mental conception or imaginary construct for a mode of perceptual representation.

As mere imputations, the Phenomenalists hold that the imaginary or dualistic nature of experience is quite unreal. Dependent natures form the basis on which or within which the bifurcation of experience occurs. They are defined intensionally as those things which arises in dependence on others, i.e. literally "other-powered (*paratantra*)". The absence of bifurcation or duality in experience is the perfected nature of phenomena. According to the Phenomenalists, yogins achieve liberation by ceasing to impute imaginary qualities, especially that of duality.[85] In so doing they realise that the perceiver and its object of perception are not different entities or substances (*dravya*). In this realisation one knows the perfected nature. Hence, emptiness for the Phenomenalists means empty of being dual (*gnyis stong*) rather than an absence of intrinsic existence as it does for the Madhyamikas. Some semantic equivalents they use for the perfected nature are ultimate truth, suchness (*tathata*) and the sphere of truth (*dharma-dhatu*). As such the concept of perfected nature, is in the context of metaphysical systems, a counterpart to the Madhyamikas emptiness.

As a corollary to this conception of reality the Phenomenalist maintain that objects of perception are esentially mental and so uphold a doctrine of idealism.[86] Hence the other names by which the school goes, the Cittamatra and Vijnaptimatra.[87] The adjectival qualifier *-matra*, tib. *tsam (du)* denotes exclusion and so the only- or merely-mind school. There is some recent controversy as to whether or not Buddhist Phenomenalism or Vijnanavada is a genuine idealism, phenomenalism or even a representational theory of perception.[88] It is clear, though, that Chandrakirti interprets the Vijnanavada as "idealism" in that they hold *all* causes for the arising of perception to be located within consciousness. To do otherwise - i.e. permit the externality and extra-mental existence of perceivables as final or real - would on their tenets, preclude a realisation of their

own emptiness as so bar yogins from liberation. To handle the explanation for the interiority of causes the Phenomenalists posit a source consciousness (*alaya-vijnana*).[89]

According to the Phenomenalists, dependent and perfected natures have a true existence (*satya-siddha*), the latter because they are known independently of mental constructions and hence veridically, and the former because they both arise dependently and form the basis for perfected natures. They is to say, dependent natures are what may be known either dualistically or non-dualistically. As the basis of perception their non-existence would preclude the possibility of the existence of perfected natures. For Madhyamikas, on the other hand, the (intrinsic) existence of dependent natures precludes the possibility of liberation as it runs counter to their idea of emptiness (*sunyata*) in which all phenomena lack an intrinsic existence (*svabhava*). The Phenomenalist then, is concerned to establish the existence of dependent phenomena where the Madhyamikas wish to refute their true existence.

In refuting Phenomenalism Chandrakirti sees himself as rectifying a *realist* tendency on behalf of the Phenomenalists: as breaking down a reified view in which the characteristic of dependency is mistakenly taken as a sign that things exist independently of their being imputed.[90] Such a realist reification of consciousness and final reality would, for Chandrakirti, present barriers to yogins' progress and so Chandrakirti attempts to move the Phenomenalists to a higher point of view. The Phenomenalists themselves, on the other hand, feel that only they specify the middle path for the Madhyamikas fall to the extreme of nihilism with their negation of intrinsic existence and Vaibhashikas succumb to realism by their maintenance of those habits which project the externality of objects and their substantial separation from consciousness.

The critique, as we have said, is based on refuting the doctrines that undergird true existence. The procedure in the *Introduction* [MA] is to serially refute the non-externality of sense-objects, the explanatory device of seeds or potentials of experience, and self-reflexive consciousness.

6.1 REFUTING THE NON-EXTERNALITY OF SENSE-OBJECTS

The *Introduction* [MA] begins its critique with a summary statement (6.45-7) of the Phenomenalist's world-view according to which the bodhisattva who has attained insight (*prajna*) perceives all of reality to be nothing but consciousness (*vijnana*) and sees that the subject (*graha*) and object (*grahya*) are in substance the same for the object is non-material. Dependent phenomena are cited as the cause (*hetu*) for the perception of imaginaries such as the externality of appearance yet are defined by three qualities; namely, that they (6.47cd) "arise without there being an external object, they exist; and have the nature of not being an object of conceptual elaboration (*prapanca*)". That is to say, (MABh: 139-140) they exist independently of mental imputation and are strictly ineffable.

The source consciousness is introduced (6.46) as a repository containing the seeds from which arise consciousness and appearances in much the same way that the movement of wind (the seeds or potentials) on the ocean (the mind base) gives rise to waves (consciousness and its appearances).

The Madhyamikas begin their critique (6.48) by asking the Phenomenalists for supporting evidence. They undercut a Phenomenalist response though by raising the case of dreams themselves, and then pointing out unwanted consequences. The Phenomenalists held that dreams evidence the true existence of consciousness and the merely apparent externality of objects in the so-called waking state.

Taking the first point, they argue that consciousness truly exists because it can produce dream images, thoughts, etc. and hold them for subsequent recall in the waking state. The capacities for production, containment, and continuity through time would not be possible, they argue, if consciousness did not truly exist. The Madhyamika object (6.49) that if their criterion of existence is the phenomenon of recall or memory, then external objects are likewise real for they also are perceived and subsequently recalled in the waking state. This, though, runs counter to the Phenomenalist thesis that external phenomena are merely imaginary.

The Phenomenalists then change tack (6.50) and proffer what is a standard idealist argument for the non-externality of objects based on phenomenological similarities between the dream and waking states. They point out especially that dream objects produce affective responses in just the same way that external objects do.

The phenomenological similarities between the two states leads them to conclude that waking objects likewise have no external reality. The Madhyamikas in response (6.51-3) offer a physiological basis for discriminating between the two states. Their Buddhist explanation is that during veridical waking perception all six consciousnesses (i.e. mental and sensory ones) and their corresponding faculties (*indriya*) function and make contact (*sparsa*) with their respect objects (*viseya*) whereas in dreams only the mind-consciousness (*manovijnana*) operates and the sense-organs and other consciousnesses are inactive.

Changing tack again the Phenomenalists leave the example of dreams and introduce (6.54) the situation in which a consciousness receives its visual impressions through an eye organ stricken by a disease (*timira*), such as opthalmia, which causes hair-lines to appear in front of the eyes. They reason that the perceived reality of the hairs and consciousness of them by the person afflicted with the disease evidences the real existence of consciousness. If it were not real, the appearance of hair-lines, and hallucinations generally could not be presented to consciousness. Hence the example shows the real existence of consciousness and the fictitious or apparitional nature of sense-objects. In responding to this example the Madhyamikas point to a consequence of

consciousness being real in the realist sense of being intrinsically existent. Chandrakirti writes (6.55):

> If a cognition exists without there being objects of cognition (*jneya*), then an object where hair-lines [were seen] would influence the eye. Thus, someone without opthalmia would also cognise hair-lines there [where the person with opthalmia saw hair-lines]. However, this is not the case, and thus there is no [intrinsically] existent [cognition].

The argument here is that if a mind perceiving objects that have no external referents truly or intrinsically exists then those apparitional objects will also appear to all other minds. Hence in the case above, hair-lines would appear to a healthy visual sense faculty just as they do to the diseased one. The reason stated in the argument is that a consciousness perceiving hair-lines must have hair-lines present for it to be a real consciousness of hair-lines. If the hair-lines are not present there is no real "consciousness of hair-lines". But, the Madhyamikas reason, if the consciousness is real in your sense, the hair-lines are necessarily and intrinsically related to the consciousness, in which case conditions such as the mere presence or absence of a visual defect is irrelevant and so the hair-lines would appear to any consciousnesses having the same focus as the one to which hair-lines appear. In other words, all consciousness looking in the same direction, or at the same object would perceive the visual distortion.[91]

6.2 THE FAILURE OF MENTAL POTENTIALS TO ACCOUNT FOR SENSORY EXPERIENCE

In order to give a causal account for sense experience and its vicissitudes and variations, and to avoid consequences such as the foregoing one pointed out by the Madhyamikas, the Phenomenalists introduce the explanatory device of mental potentials (*mati-sakti*) located in a source consciousness (*alaya-vijnana*). As the potentials within a source consciousness ripen serially they give rise to a continuum of consciousness and the appearance of sense objects to consciousness. The potentials account fully for the arising of sense-experience and so there is no need to posit external objects as a cause or necessary condition. Instanciating a visual consciousness Chandrakirti states the Phenomenalist thesis (6.62-3) thus:

> The production of a visual cognition (*caksurdhi*) arises entirely from its own potential and immediately [after the ripening of] that [potential]. [Ordinary people erroneously] understand the basis of the [visual] consciousness to be 'the physical organ, the eye' instead of the potential [in the source consciousness]. Here,

ordinary people accept that the mind apprehends external objects because they do not realise the cognitions that arise through a sense-faculty - of a blue sense-datum, for example - arise from their own seeds (*bija*) [ripening in the source consciousness], and not through apprehending something external.

The differences between the experience of individuals is explained in terms of continua of source consciousnesses containing different sets and orderings of potentials. When potentials ripen they produce differences in experience that are qualitatively commensurate with the differences between potentials.

The preceding dilemma is thus resolved (6.55ac) by saying that the individual who has the sensation of hair-lines in front of his or her eyes has potentials within his or her source consciousness that fructify as the appearance of hair-lines whereas the individual without diseased eyes has no such potentials. (The very concept of diseased and healthy organs is likewise just a matter of different patterns of consistency within sets of potentials.)

The Madhyamikas are unhappy with this notion of potentials, at least when proffered as the sole cause of sensory experience. Their refutation notes firstly (6.56d) that instincts, on the Phenomenalists' account, are in need of some proof and then proceeds (6.57-61) to refute their real existence. The refutation is based on rejecting the existence of potentials as causes of past (6.59-61), present (6.57a) or future (6.57b-58) consciousnesses.[92] The analysis itself follows essentially the same structure that Chandrakirti employs (MA: 6.18d-19)[93] in repudiating "birth from other" in the past, present or future. The arguments - explicit and implied - are these:

1. A potential cannot be a cause for a presently existing consciousness because causes must precede their effects. If the two were simultaneous, cause and effect would be indistinguishable from each other and hence the same, in which case potentials would not be potentials for they could not act as the cause of consciousness. Hence present potentials are non-existent and consciousness must be self-born.

2. The potential for a future consciousness is non-existent because the potential as a cause must make contact with its effect, the consciousness. If there is no contact the two cannot function as cause and effect. The future consciousness, though, is non-existent and therefore the potential also. (If the potential were existing then contact with its effect would require that the consciousness also existed, in which case it would be a present rather than a future consciousness). Moreover (6.57cd), a future consciousness cannot exist because distinguishables (*visesana*) (i.e. a future consciousness) exist in dependence on their having characteristics or distinctions (*visesya*) and a future consciousness is as yet uncharacterised. Hence, the positing of potentials for an uncharacterised consciousness is on a par with talking about the children of a barren woman. A final point made by Chandrakirti (6.58cd) is that the Phenomenalists have their reasoning with respect to true or intrinsic

existence quite inverted. For the Phenomenalists dependent phenomena truly exist, whereas the Madhyamikas hold that things established through dependence on each other (*pan tshun don la brten pa*) such as potentials and consciousness are (ultimately) non-existent. Hence, from the same data, they draw a conclusion that is diametrically opposite.

3. Finally, a consciousness cannot arise as the fructifying potential of a potency already ceased for this view produces the consequences inhering in the situation of "birth from other". The *Commentary* [MABh: 152-153] explains that the continuum of production (from a potential to a consciousness) within a mind-stream would be discontinuous and so incapable of acting as causes and effects. In other words, the continuums' parts would be displaced from each other and so fail to be parts within the one continuum. As different moments (*ksana*) within the stream they would be intrinsically different from each other and therefore unrelated. Because they are unrelated they could not be said to be members of the one continuum (*samtana*). Chandrakirti gives the example (6.61) of two consciousness' qualities, love and aggression, which if intrinsically individuated from each other, cannot be part of one continuum. The consequences are that all would seemingly give rise to all. (A potential within any "one" continuum, for example, would be no more likely to ripen in the continuum as in any others).

The conclusion for Chandrakirti is that these three temporal analyses disprove the Phenomenalists thesis that potentials are the sole cause of sense consciousnesses.

6.3 COUNTER-EXAMPLES

After a restatement of the Phenomenalists theses (6.62-4) about potentials and the non-externality of sense-objects (quoted in part earlier) Chandrakirti resumes his refutation by supplying two counter-examples to their view. The Madhyamikas contend (6.65) that if the Phenomenalists are right, that objects appear to a mind-consciousness just as in a dream where there is no active sense-organ, then blind people should see sense-objects when they are awake just as they do while asleep and dreaming for in both cases (MABh: 157) nothing more is required than the ripening of instinctual traces (*bag chag*). The Phenomenalists are not in a position to object (6.66ab), saying that blind people are unaware of sense-objects while awake because the mind consciousness is deactivated in the waking state, for on their own grounds, potentials not sense-organs are responsible for sense-perception. As such there is no necessary connection between sense-organs and a mental consciousness (nor even the need of organs for mental perceptions of objects) and the activation or deactivation of the sense-organs (if there is such a process) is quite irrelevant to the functioning of a mental consciousness.

Consequently, the activity or inactivity of a mind consciousness is quite independent of whether a person is asleep and dreaming or awake. If the mind-consciousness of a blind person were to become inactive once he or she was perceived to wake, and similarly become active once he or she went to sleep, it would be nothing more than a coincidence. On the Phenomenalists' thesis then, there is nothing to stop blind people having sensory experiences, qualitatively comparable to those had while dreaming, when they are awake. Chandrakirti concludes (6.68) that the Phenomenalists typically fail to respond to the Madhyamikas' analyses, being content to merely uncritically restate their theses. In other words, they forsake an analytical mentality.

The second counter-example is intended to refute the true existence of consciousness and is based on a yogic phenomenon known to the Phenomenalists (6.69) in which yogins achieve a mental integration (*samadhi*) or concentration on a visualised image of skeletons. The purpose of the meditation (6.70b) is to develop a mind of aversion (*asubha*) to worldly affairs. For the Phenomenalists, the efficacy of such a meditation in producing a detached consciousness is evidence for the true existence of consciousness. The Madhyamikas' objection is the same as that raised in the earlier examples of hair-lines appearing to a distorted visual consciousness. If the yogins' consciousness of skeletons truly exists it is quite independent of causes and conditions, such as instructions from a guru, the development of concentration, etc. and so will appear to any mind directed (*blo gtad*) to where the yogin is facing. This is fallacious though, and so the mind does not really exist.

This series of verses concludes (6.71ab) with the Madhyamikas acknowledging what is the idealists' "argument of variability". Where Berkeley used the example of a coin being perceived from various angles, Chandrakirti uses a somewhat dramatic mythological image and talks of spirits (*preta*) perceiving water as though it were pus where humans see the same as water, According to the Phenomenalists the fact that a variety of different perceptions can be had evidences the mental-nature of sense-objects and the fact that the perceptions can satiate their respective subjects evidences the true existence of the consciousnesses produced. In reply the Madhyamikas note the likeness of this example to that of diseased sense-faculties and return the Phenomenalists to their earlier refutation. A summary point (6.71cd) is that knowables are not truly existent and therefore the mind which they produce is likewise unreal.

6.4 REFUTATION OF A SELF-REFLEXIVE CONSCIOUSNESS (*SVASAMVEDANA*)94

In concluding his critique Chandrakirti (6.72) questions the very knowability and hence existence (*sat*) of dependent things (*paratantra-bhava*) by arguing that the subject-object distinction (and hence cogniser-cognised also) is dissolved

when the Phenomenalists empty (*stong pa*) the two of being separate (and composed of different substances).

To obviate such a difficulty in their tenets the Phenomenalists propose (6.73ab) that consciousness can experience (*anubhava*) itself and cite the phenomenon of memory (*smrti*) as evidence. They say that all sense-consciousnesses are accompanied by a function or capacity of consciousness that perceives not the sense-object but the sensory consciousness itself. In its own right it is neither a mind (*citta*) nor mental event (*caitta*). It is not an additional consciousness to the eight reckoned on by the Phenomenalists but a cognitive instrument, more particularly a mode of perception (*pratyaksa*).95 Nor is it just a conceptual (*kalpana*) recognition or perception. Without such an apperceptive faculty, the Phenomenalists reason (MABh: 167) that memory or recall would be impossible, for consciousness must be non-referentially aware of itself - in other words, aware of itself independently of referents - in order to have memories when the referents are past and finished. If it were aware of itself only referentially then the sense-consciousnesses generated could not be recalled in the absence of their referents (i.e. sense-data or objects).

If it is right that the Madhyamikas' foremost concern is the rectification of realist and nihilist viewpoints then the issue here is not so much a bifurcation of consciousness or its functions but the use of such bifurcations to support the true existence of consciousness. Hence in this context as elsewhere the Madhyamikas must be seen in its self-assigned role of clarifying what are otherwise opaque and/or ambiguous concepts and distinctions. The Madhyamikas, it would seem, are concerned not so much with the bifurcation of the functions of consciousness as with the invoking of properties to establish its true existence. Where the source consciousness *could* likewise be viewed as an ontologically neutral or uncommitted explanatory devise, the objection is specially to its supporting the thesis of true existence. In the case here, Phenomenalists assert that consciousness and its objects are of the same substance (*dravya*), and there are no external objects. It seems they could utilise, as phenomenalists do, a device such as sense-data, so maintaining perceived objects as distinct from a perceiver, and thus avoid the Madhyamikas objection (6.72) that they collapse the subject-object distinction. The point for Madhyamikas is that the notion of "being a common substance" is unclear. They resolve the notion into one of a genuine identity and note the logical consequences. If it is resolved as a genuine difference between consciousness and objects of consciousness then the Phenomenalists would forsake their thesis of the non-externality of sense-objects.

The Madhyamikas reject the notion of self-reflexive consciousness (*svasamvedana*) and claim that recall is quite explicable on the basis of a non-self-reflexive mind-consciousness alone. They argue (6.75ab) that the experience of objects (*visaya*) itself is a sufficient cause for a recollection. They note (6.75d) that this also accords with the common-sense view of recollection.

The Madhyamikas' critique is two-pronged. Their first point (6.74) is that a self-reflexive consciousness cannot be considered a cause or necessary condition for the arising of memory as both of these, according to the Phenomenalists, are truly existent and so unable to be causally related in the one continuum. Moreover (6.74d) in basing their thesis on real "birth from another" they remove (*'zoms*) the distinctions between raw experience and memories of it. The second consequence (6.76) is the contradiction that in an instance of self-reflexive awareness the subject, object, and perception become one and so fail in fact to be subject, object, etc. In other words, if consciousness is the object of cognition it is undistinguished from the cognising consciousness, and so not an *object* of cognition. (Conversely, if consciousness does know or perceive it must know an object as distinct from itself, and so cannot know itself.)[96] In the *Commentary* [MABh: 172] Chandrakirti gives the analogical examples of a sword blade's inability to cut itself, and the finger's ability to touch itself. Hence a self-conscious cognition is unknown and so non-existent. Consequently, the purported validation of the existence of a dependent (*paratantra*) consciousness via a self-reflexive cognition is ungrounded.

The various refutations involved in Chandrakirti's critique of the Phenomenalists coalesce in the common conclusion (6.77) that their naturally dependent phenomena do not exist. They thereby (6.78) destroy all worldly notions and are (6.79cd) imperfect with respect to the two levels of truth,[97] and so do not obtain liberation.

7 SOME META-LOGICAL OBSERVATIONS[98]

At the conclusion of the analytical and dialogical sections of chapter six Chandrakirti considers (6.171-177) two meta-analytical queries that are raised by the Sarvastivada. One problem concerns the consistency of the Madhyamika arguing from a positionless (*phyogs med pa*) philosophy and the second concerns the *efficacy* of the Madhyamika arguments in the light of their refutation of causation. The queries are both meta-analytical in the sense that they raise problems about the status of the Madhyamika analytic and its consistency within the broader theory of emptiness that the Madhyamikas expound. The queries and the Madhyamika responses are in the same genre as Nagarjuna's *Averting the Arguments* [VV][99] and the sixteenth chapter of Aryadeva's *Four Hundred* [CS]. Chandrakirti is clearly recalling those texts and he quotes from the *Four Hundred* [CS].

Chandrakirti has just refuted (6.169) the Sarvastivada theory of intrinsic causal relationships in the two cases where there is an interface or connection between a cause and effect and where there is not. Briefly recalling those arguments, Chandrakirti claims that (1) if a cause and effect actually meet each other then at the point of their contact they would be a single potential (*nus pa*

gcig) and hence would be undifferentiable from each other, and (2) if they do not meet each other then the cause cannot be distinquished from non-causes.

In the light of this refutation of real or intrinsic production the Sarvastivada realist is quick off the mark in questioning the ability of the Madhyamika dialectic to establish emptiness via refuting intrinsic existence. What the Sarvastivada does is to reroute the same problematical consequences that the Madhyamika has exposed in the tenability of intrinsic causation by pointing out a deemed internal consistency in the Madhyamikas' own claim for the efficacy of their arguments. The purported implications for the Madhyamika analytic are stated in verses 6.171-172 and the *Commentary* [MABh: 292-293]. Verses 6.171-2b say:

> In your refutation, you refute the objects being repudiated [i.e. the cause and effect] if they contact, yet if [one says] 'they do not contact', this is also a fallacy. Doesn't [the fallacy] apply to you as well? When you say these things, you only demolish your own position. And then your refutation is unable to refute [our thesis]. You illogically disparage the existence of everything with your deviant arguments (*jati*) the consequences (*prasanga*) of which [apply] equally to your own words.

In other words, the realist claims that there is a precisely parallel situation in the Madhyamika analytic with regard to the Madhyamika assumption that their refutations are able, through their force of reason, to refute what is to be refuted; namely, intrinsically existent entities.

The question can be posed thus: is the Madhyamika refutation effected by contacting or not making contact with the object to be refuted (*dusya*)? The implications - though they are not spelled out in the *Commentary* [MABh] - are that if the Madhyamika refutation refutes by *meeting* the object to be refuted then there is a *union* between these two, in which case the Madhyamika refutation must be intrinsically existent for the object of refutation, as the intrinsic existence or intrinsic identifiability of things, clearly is. (The causal analogue that the Madhyamika had pointed out was [6.169] that at the point at which the cause and effect meet they are a single potential, and hence undifferentiable from each other.) If this is so the Madhyamika contradicts his thesis that *all* things (and this obviously includes logical refutations) are non-intrinsically existent.

On the other hand, if the refutation does not make contact with the object to be refuted, then clearly no refutation can be claimed. Even if the object of refutation is refuted the refutation can claim no part in this for causes cannot be distinquished from non-causes. Thus, whether the refutation meets or does not meet the object of refutation, the realists thesis of the intrinsic existence of entities stands immune and safe from the Madhyamika polemics.

The realist also objects (6.172) that it is inconsistent to proffer refutations when one has no position of one's own, and he reproaches the Madhyamika for

his sophistry and polemics in advancing deviant arguments that are themselves open to the very consequences they purport to expose in the theses of their opponents. These are the two major objections.

The Madhyamika responds through verses 6.173-178 (and *Commentary* [MABh: 294-301]). Chandrakirti writes (6.173) that the faults involved in the meeting or separation of the refutation and object of refutation only accrue to those who have a definite position (*nges par phyogs yod*). The Madhyamika does not have a definite position and so the consequences of the problematic do not apply to him. The *Commentary* [MABh: 294-295] furthers the reply by explaining that the Madhyamikas' own words and own position avoids the consequences pointed out by the realist because the ability for their refutation to refute the object of refutation is not contingent upon the refutation and the object of refutation either meeting or not meeting. And the reason for this is that both the refutation and the object of refutation are not intrinsically existent.[100] The *Commentary* [MABh: 296] continues, that although the object of refutation and the refutation cannot (ultimately) be said to contact each other, still conventionally the refutation does refute the object of refutation.

The first significant point to note in this explanation is that Chandrakirti is *not* saying that the Madhyamika has *no* position, rather he has qualified the Madhyamika as having no *definite* position, and by this he means that its arguments are not intrinsically existent. Secondly, and in response to the other major criticism, he claims (1) that the efficacy of the Madhyamika refutations derives from the nominal and non-intrinsic nature of their refutations, and (2) that the refutations function at a conventional level. Earlier (6.170 and MABh: 292) Chandrakirti explains that the question of "making contact or not making contact" is a point of analysis only for those who posit that a product and a producer have a self-defined identity (*rang gi mtshan nyid*). For the Madhyamikas, though, who consider that all entities are like an illusion, in virtue of their arising through an erroneous conception, the question of a real contact or separation between cause and effect doesn't arise. The Madhyamika doesn't buy into the argument for its consequences only apply to those who uphold the self-identifiability and intrinsic existence of entities.

Chandrakirti (6.174-175 and MABh: 296-297) then proceeds to liken the Madhyamika refutation to a reflection such as a mirror image which although it doesn't have even the slightest existence (*cung zad kyang yod pa ma yin pa*) is functional and servicable for utilitarian concerns such as cleansing one's face. The Madhyamika refutation is servicable in this same way for refuting the theses of others even though it doesn't have an intrinsic existence. In other words, one can establish a valid proof via a reason that lacks an intrinsic existence. And further, because the consequences of such a merely nominal refutation do not necessitate a commitment to bifurcated positions (i.e. either/or pairs of theses and contrapositive theses) it is not possible for the realist to reflexively apply the Madhyamikas' own consequences to the Madhyamikas own refutations. The

implication is that through positing merely designatory existence the Madhyamika avoids the traps of dualistic theorising in the sense that the Madhyamika consequences apply only to the polarised positions (such as existence and non-existence and contact and separation) that are necessitated by affirming real or intrinsic existence.

Thus (6.177) the Madhyamikas say they are easily able to induce the perception of the emptiness of things, whereas proponents of intrinsic existence necessarily find it difficult to appreciate this.

Near the end of the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 12.3-4], Chandrakirti briefly considers another meta-epistemological qualm. The query is raised (12.2) that the purported cognition of objects by buddhas - such as is assumed in the claim for their knowledge of all perspectives on reality - is invalid as reality is not an object but rather merely a state of serenity (*santi*). In this case reality cannot be cognitively known, and concommitantly the mind cannot be the subject of knowledge for it fails to entertain objects of knowledge. Hence there is no cognitive act and it is contradictory for Madhyamikas to talk of buddhas knowing anything.

The Madhyamikas respond (12.4) that though both reality and what cognises it are (ultimately) unborn; i.e. not intrinsically existent, the mind can conventionally be said to contact aspects and so know reality. Hence talk of a cognitive act and buddhas as cognisers of all aspects of reality is possible, dependent on conventions in the world, and (MABh: 358) although knowledge is unborn still it is not impossible that reality can be taught for the benefit of the world.

8 THE MIDDLE PATH AND RELATIONAL ORIGINATION

The *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] interpretation of the middle path (*madhyama-pratipat*) and relational origination (*pratitya-samutpada*) does not differ from Nagarjuna's understanding. As Nagarjuna'a interpretation is documented[101] only a few summary words are needed here. Chandrakirti quotes the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way's* [MK] well known verse, 24.18[102] in which relational origination and the middle path are equated with emptiness. On this interpretation both the middle path and relational origination are essentially ontological doctrines. The middle path refers to a perspective which views reality as neither something nor nothing. Doctrinally it avoids the positions of nihilism (*uccheda*) on the one hand and eternalism or realism (*sasvata*) on the other.[103] The understanding of relational origination relates to, and in fact specifies the middle path since things do arise or originate and hence are not non-entities, yet do so in dependence on other things and so are not permanent. So Chandrakirti (6.114) says: "Because things (*bhava*) are not produced without a cause (*hetu*), from a creator God (*isvara*), from themselves, another or both, they are always produced in dependence [on conditions].."

The extreme conceptions refer (6.114) to four views with respect to birth. The harmful views which relational origination eradicates are nihilism and realism or eternalism. The rejection of nihilism is singled out in 6.113.

The interpretation of relational origination is synchronic in this context, as it says that "things" *qua* "things" exist in dependence on their being related to other things.[104] This makes all things other-defined rather than self-defined and so the doctrine specifies the interidentifiability of phenomena. When so defined they are nominal rather than substantial in the technical sense of self-existent and this specifies the middle view (*madhyamadrsti*). This middle view, in which phenomena are merely nominal entities, is elaborated in three verses (6.34 and 37-38).

9 THE PROFOUND PATH STRUCTURE

With respect to the path structure that is said to be traversed by yogins in their analytical meditations on emptiness, the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] makes some observations. We will draw these together by way of concluding our presentation of the profound content.

The path structure delineated by the *Introduction* [MA] begins, as we have said, at a point where yogins have their first unadulterated cognition of emptiness. This occurs at the so-called path of intuition (*darsana-marga*) when (MABh: 16) they have an intuition of reality[105] and signifies that yogins have reached the first rung of the ten bodhisattva levels and entered the saints' (*arya*) path. Prior to this arya path (MABh: 229.18-20) they do not see reality. At this point also they become truly deserving of the name "bodhisattva" in virtue of this intuition of reality. The *Mirror of Complete Clarification* [RSM] (f. 4a1) calls this first level bodhisattva the ultimate bodhisattva because they have gained the ultimate arising mind i.e. the insight into emptiness. Prior to this they are understood to have completed two earlier paths, the paths of accumulation (*sambhara*) and connecting (*prayoga*)[106] during which they gain the non-analytical cessations or equipoises which fruit from their meditations on serenity. Their meditations on emptiness have also begun during the path of reaching and first fruit at the completion of that path as their first analytical or investigational cessation.[107]. This gives them their first real taste of nirvana.

Having become saints at the path of intuition the bodhisattvas go on to traverse a path of meditation (*bhavana*) which lasts all the while that they develop through the ten levels. On this path they remove emotional afflictions (*klesa*) and the traces (*vasana*) of these. At the completion of the path of meditation they have gained the realisations appropriate to all of the ten bodhisattva levels and become buddhas. This is a point at which there is no more knowledge to be gained and is signified by a fifth path (which in fact is just a terminus, it having no duration) called the path of completion (*asaiksa*).[108]

From their initial insight into emptiness at the first level the saints cultivate their meditation (*bhavana*) up to the tenth level. They consolidate their insight into emptiness which is completed at the end of the seventh level. At this point they have fully perfected the profound path and in this respect become the equal of the disciples and self-evolved *arhats*. In the *Commentary* [MABh: 18-19] Chandrakirti likens the first level bodhisattva to a newly born prince who by virtue of his caste has an authority invested in him that will sublate the authority of his ministers, a sublation which is achieved (MABh:19) by the bodhisattva situated at the seventh level who surpasses all the actions of the arhats due to the greatness of the object he knows. Verse 6.225 likewise says that the (seventh level) bodhisattvas sublate (*pam par byed*) by their intellect or (MABh: 342.1) insight the two types of individual vehicle arhats. At this point, also, their cessation is continuous. Hence from the completion of the seventh level, bodhisattvas are liberated with the subsequent levels (eight to ten) being known as pure levels because of this. These seventh level bodhisattvas are said in fact to *surpass* the two types of arhats for not only do they have their insight but have compassion as well. MA, 1.8 says that even the first level bodhisattva can be called greater than the arhats on account of this subsequent attainment of enlightenment rather than a mere self-liberation.[109]

The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] specifies two stages of irreversability (*anivartana-carya*) in the bodhisattvas' path. These stages correspond to the preceeding two levels, the first and seventh. These stages of irreversability are points on the bodhisattvas' path at which the bodhisattvas' attainments become guaranteed in the sense that they can never again regress below certain levels on the path. That is to say, they cannot backslide to earlier stages. The thresholds to their possible regression are obtained by reaching certain levels of insight, and through collecting meritorious actions.

The first stage of irreversability occurs at the first level. When that level is entered (MA: 1.7) life as an ordinary person, i.e. non-saint (*arya*) has been exhausted and from that point we are told that "all the paths that go to unfortunate [states] will cease". The unfortunate states refers to all sub-human modes of existence, and the understanding is that yogins have freed themselves from such faults or defects that would lead them to lower realms. In other words, they have abandoned all karmic propensities and emotional reactions that cause a return to the lower states of existence. They become so-called stream-winners (*srotaapanna*). The second specified level of irreversability (8.2) occurs when bodhisattvas enter the eighth level, called immovability (*acala*). On reaching this level *all* (8.3) the emotional reactions are exhausted, and as the name of the level implies, the bodhisattvas can never again be embroiled in suffering (8.4) for samsara comes to a halt.

There is to my mind some unclarity in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] as to whether the bodhisttva is thought to achieve liberation at the completion of the sixth or seventh level. Verses 8.2-4 lead one (unequivocally) to

the view that liberation is gained at the completion of the seventh level whereas the gaining of perfect insight (*prajna-paramita*), if it is meant to imply a full and continuous cognition of emptiness, would lead to the view that the bodhisattva at the end of the sixth level (the *prajna-bhumi*) is liberated, given the definition of insight into emptiness as constituting liberation. The *Commentary* [MABh: 74] says, for example, that the perception of relational origination (*pratitya-samutpada*), which is equivalent to the view of reality, is had by bodhisattvas of the sixth level onwards but not by earlier ones. Though in the *Commentary* [MABh: 76] Chandrakirti goes on to concede that there is a point of textual interpretation of the Mahayana sutras as to whether the bodhisattva who has reached the perfection of insight has the perception of the reality of relational origination or not. Chandrakirti sides with the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way's* [MK] interpretation: that the bodhisattva who gains perfect insight does (MABh: 76.2) see the essence of things (*chos rnams kyi bdag nyid*), defined as (MABh: 76.5) the absence of intrinsic existence.

The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] also eludes to a procedure implicit in the yogins' meditations on emptiness. Chandrakirti writes (6.82):

> If [hypothetically, the conventional sense-world] did not exist for the common [person], in the same way that it does not exist for arhats who have abandoned the psycho-physical organism (*skandha*) and entered into serenity, then we *would not* state that it also exists from a conventional [view-point], in just the same way [that we would be compelled to deny its existence for the arhat].

And (6.91):

> For those who reside in the common-sense view of reality the five primary constituents of the psycho-physical organism (*skandha*) exist through common consensus. But for the yogin who yearns for the dawning knowledge of reality, these five [psycho-physical constituents] do not arise.

Though the first verse has as its main point an analogical reason for the applicability of non-intrinsic existence on both levels of reality, the conventional and ultimate,[110] the relevance of the verse here is in its reference to the experience of a non-residual emptiness. According to Madhyamikas there are two modes wherein emptiness can be cognised. That referred to here is an experience of emptiness in which there is no sense-experience present. Verse 6.91 states this more explicitly. The other mode of cognition is one in which the presence of sense-experience may accompany the cognition of emptiness. Though it is not mentioned in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA], these two modes correspond to a distinction made in the context of meditations on emptiness between space (*akasa*) and illusion-like (*mayopama*) meditations on

emptiness. The former occurs in a yogin's meditations during which they concentrate on emptiness itself to the point where they become non-cognisant of what their emptiness is an emptiness of (i.e., the conventional basis of their emptiness). This is the meditation on emptiness while in equipoise (*mnan bzag gi skabs su*). The latter occurs in the yogins' ante- and post-meditative experience during which they are cognisant of appearances and view them in terms of the similitudes of emptiness mentioned before.[111] The realisation gained here is the emptiness obtained after [meditation] (*stong pa nyid rjes su thob pa*).

Within this post-meditative practice Chandrakirti appears to advise that the distinction between it and the results accruing from analytical contemplation should be carefully maintained when he writes (6.35): "If one analyses things in detail [in terms of being self- or other produced] one cannot locate within them anything except their essential reality. Therefore, one should not make a detailed analysis of the worldly social reality (*laukika-vyavahara-satya*).

The bodhisattvas practice of these two types of meditation on emptiness should apparantly also be *balanced* and spread evenly save their falling either to the extreme of realism (in the *mayopama* practice) or nihilism (in the *akasa* meditation) for the *Commentary* [MABh: 344-345] records that even eighth level bodhisattvas can become preoccupied with a cessation (*nirodha*), (RSM. f. 43b) such that would make them lapse into the nihilistic extreme, and for this reason the buddhas make them rise from their meditation.

NOTES

1. Hence, for example, the term *prati-moksa* (tib. *so sor thar pa*) as applied to the sets of monastic vows that monks receive. The term *prati-moksa* means literally individual liberation or freedom and indicates that these monastic vows assist in the monks' own quest for salvation.

2. For a comparison of Buddhist and western "cognitive theories of the emotions" see P. Fenner "A Therapeutic Contexualisation of Buddhist Consequential Analysis" in *Religions and Comparative Thought - Essays in Honour of the Late Dr. Ian Kesarcodi-Watson* (Eds. P. Bilimoria and P. Fenner), Delhi: Sri Satguru Publication, 1988, pp. 319-352.

3. See BCA, 9.152-156, that not seeing things as empty is the cause of all the pain and evil of samsara. And vs. 9.56, that emptiness is the antidote for the emotional problems (*klesa*).

4. *De nyid*, skt. *tattva*, means literally thatness and hence signifies the *being* of things. It is commonly translated as ultimate reality. The *Commentary* is sometimes more unequivocally explicit using *de kho na nyid* and dGe 'dun grub likewise glosses *de nyid* as *de kho na nid* whenever reality *per se* is meant.

5. This is one of four species of perception that are delineated in Dignaga and Dharmakirti's epistemology. Three of these are accepted by Madhyamikas with a self-reflexive consciousness being rejected.

6. The translation of this term poses a problem here and throughout. It is traditionally translated as body, a rendering that is appropriate for the two formed bases that buddhas are said to produce; namely the manifest body (*nirmana-kaya, sprul sku*) and

utility body (*sambhoga- kaya, longs sku*). It is inappropriate, though for the two mental bases (*nama-kaya*) as these are not formed, that is, they have no shape or colour. Basis or mode is relatively non-anthropocentric and at least less implicitive of possessing form (*rupa*). For a useful discussion of Chinese equivalents and English meanings see Nagao Gadjin, "On the theory of the Buddha-Body (*Buddha-kaya*)", *Eastern Buddhist*, (N.S.) 6.1 (May 1973), 31, n.8. See also H.V. Guenther's "The experience of Being: The Trikaya Idea in Its Tibetan Interpretation", in Roy C. Amore (ed.), *Developments in Buddhist Thought: Canadian Contributions to Buddhist Studies* (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1979), pp. 38-58. This essay is interesting for the sharp break it makes from anthropomorphic equivalents. According to Guenther *kaya* represents embodiments of value that are best described as existential patterns.

7. Cf. BCA, 9.2, that *paramartha* is not an object of the intellect. Also, PPS, p. 410 and p. 646, that the inexpressible realm exists by way of the ultimate reality.

8. E.g. MABh, 111 for a set of bi-negations similar to the dedicatory verse of MK, and p. 308 that *paramartha* is neither a thing nor a non-thing.

9. For example, MK, 5.7, 18.8, 25.3 (wrt. nirvana); RA, 1.36 (wrt. phenomena), 1.57.

Bi-negative disjunctions are also used by Phenomenalists such as Maitreya-Asanga in texts like the *Ornament for the Universal Vehicle Sutras* [MSA]. Their use in these texts is quite different from that of Madhyamikas, for the terms on either side of the disjuctions are not the same. The context in which they are employed is in an elaboration of the three natures *(trisvabhava)*; viz. imaginary (*parikalpita, kun btags*), dependent (*paratantra, gzhan dbang*), and perfected (*parinispanna, yongs grub*) phenomena. Thus, when the Phenomenalists says that X is neither empty nor non-empty the qualification "empty" is predicated of the dependent and perfected natures while being "not empty" is predicated of the imaginary nature. For the Phenomenalists "empty" typically means empty of duality. As one does not have the same nature appearing on either side of the disjunction these are not genuine bi-negative disjunctions. For a discussion see D. Seyfort Ruegg, "The Uses of the Four Positions of the *Catuskoti* and the Problem of the Description of Reality in Mahayana Buddhism", JIP, 5 (1977), 25-32.

Bi-negations are also used in Hinduism, for example, in the *Bhagavad Gita* (13.12b) where brahman is characterised as "not being nor is it not-being, R.C.Zaehner, *The Bhagavad-Gita* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969), p 337. Also, Sankara's ontological specification of *maya* - the Hindu equivalent of the Buddhist *samvrti* - as neither being nor non-being.

10. The bi-negation is also included in the four cornered (negation) (*catuskoti*) where it is the fourth corner. The interpretation and use of this device is varied. As Mervyn Sprung has correctly observed, its importance in the expression of emptiness and its role in the Madhyamika generally is less crucial than that of the bi-negation in isolation. See M. Sprung, *Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way The Essential Chapters from the Prasannapada of Chandrakirti* (Boulder: Prajna Press, 1979) p.7. For a very thorough discussion of the four corners see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *op. cit*.

11. Cf. also the dedicatory verse of the MK which specifies eight negations. Interestingly some of these (like the final "evenness") are bi-negations and so from that level deny some of the foregoing ascriptions. MK 18.9 ascribes to reality (*tattva*) the characteristics of, "not caused by something else", "peaceful", "not elaborated by discursive thought", "indeterminate", and "undifferentiated". Streng, *Emptiness*, p. 204.

12. Cf. PPS, pp. 38, 91, 130, 140, 179, *et passim*.

13. See Charles Crittenden, "Everyday Reality as Fiction - A Madhyamika Interpretation, "JIP, 9 (1981), 323-332 for a philosophical treatment of the Madhyamika theory of the fictional character of phenomenal reality.

14. The *dharma-nairatmya* is affirmed, for example, in the MN, I. 228, p. 281, which says that all phenomena (*dhamma*) are without self (*anatta*).

15. PPS, pp. 144-148.

16. See MN, III. 111-112, pp. 154-155 and MN, 2 and 3. And Robert Chalmer's (ed.) *Majjhima-nikaya*, (London: Pali Text Society, 1977, vol. III, p. 112. The PPS (p. 144) says the internal emptiness refers to the emptiness of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind and the external emptiness to forms, sounds, smells, tastes, touch objects, and mind objects.

17. In the *Yogacarabhumi* the great emptiness apparently refers to the *pudgala-* and *dharma-nairatmya*. See Isshi Yamada, "Premises and Implications of Interdependence," in S. Balasooriya, et al (eds.), *Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula* (London: Gordon Fraser, 1980), p. 290, n. 61.

18. These are referred to later, *infra*, p

19. PPS, pp. 183-184.

20. Oral communication from Geshe T. Loden.

21. E. Conze, *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies* (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer 1967), p. 158 gives a date of "about A.D. 800".

22. See E. Obermiller, "A Study of the Twenty Aspects", pp. 172-187. The PPS does not give this explanation.

23. As the PPS says (p. 185), emptiness isn't multiple.

24. Streng, *Emptiness*, p. 199. Here and elsewhere lines have been run together with appropriate orthographical changes. For the Tibetan see MABh, 305.

25. J.W. de Jong, "The Problem of the Absolute.." *op.cit.*, p.3.

26. See, for example, John Hick, *Arguments for the Existence of God* (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 86.

27. This is to say that a lack or absence of intrinsic existence does not imply the affirmation of something else.

28. PSS, p. 462.

29. The dual usage is fully exposed in Willian L. Ames, "The Notion of *Svabhava* in the Thought of Chandrakirti", JIP, 10 (1982), 161-177. For this latter use see MABh, 305-8.

30. Leibniz, *The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings* (tr, with intro. and notes by Robert Latta) (London: Oxford University Press, 1925, 2nd ed.), Monadology 31, p 235.

31. See BCA, 9.117-149 for Shantideva's analysis of *dharmanairatmya*.

32. See ME, 131-150 for Hopkins' account of this analysis.

33. See LMS, 60.

34. See PP, 36-37 and 42-43 for the analysis.

35. For Buddhapalita's arguments see ME, 441-443 and 455-498.

36. See ME, 321-326 for a summary of Samkhya tenets.

37. St. Thomas Aquinas reasons likewise when he writes: "Now the same thing cannot at the same time be both actually x and potentially x, though it can be actually x and potentially y: the actually hot cannot at the same time be potentially hot, though it can be potentially cold. Consequently a thing in process of change cannot itself cause that same change; it cannot change itself;" *Summa Theoloqiae* (ed. and tr. with Latin text by Timothy McDermott) (London: Blackfriars, 1964), vol. 2. Q1, Art. 3, p. 13.

38. "Birth from self" also involves the contradiction of a thing existing (as a product) prior to its being born, i.e. prior to its existing, for as Aquinas observes: "In the observable world causes are found to be ordered in series; we never observe, nor ever could, something causing itself, for this would mean it preceded itself, and this is not possible." T. Aquinas. *op. cit.*, p. 15.

39. For Nyaya-Vaisheshikas this is the theory of a new beginning (*arambhavada*), that when the cause (*upadana*) produces an effect then the latter results in the creation of an utterly and uniquely new product.

40. Cf. MK's analysis of "going to", chpt. 2. The MA is technically unclear on the consistency of positing the non-existence of a product once it is transformed for it accepts the future existence of destroyed phenomena (*zig pa*). Presumably at future times only destroyed and not actual phenomena exist and so the analysis as given is sound. The MK in chpt. 2 does not display this ambiguity and so is quite consistent.

41. Elsewhere (MABh, 293-294;) it is said that the realists position is that a cause and effect *do not need* to meet for the cause to produce an effect. The realists cite the examples of a magnet's influence on a metallic object and the phenomenon of visual perception in which the eye sees appropriate objects of sight without the eye touching those objects.

42. See ME, 327-330 for a summary of Charvaka tenets.

43. On causeless production, cf. BCA, 9.118-119 and 142.

In the above alternatives it is not necessary that one producer produce only one product. It is possible that more than one producer may produce one product and that one producer may produce more than one product. In these cases of production of one from many and many from one the analyses may be applied the required number of times to exhaust the number of elements in the relations, and contradictions be produced for each analysis and conjoined.

44. The same is repeated in the PP (1979: 169) at MK 18.2a.

45. See, for example, AK, 1.9 that *rupa* includes external sense-objects (*artha*).

46. See ME, pp. 678-681 and pp.888-890 and n.739 for the Tibetan dGe lugs debate on the pervasiveness of "mine".

47. Shantideva's also refutes the Samkhya purusha (BCA, 9.61-68) in its characteristic role as an eternal consciousness that witnesses prakrti.

48. Cf. BCA, 9.69ff for Shantideva's refutation of the Vaisheshika atman on the grounds that such a self would be non-consciousness and unable to perform its designated role.

49. The characteristics of purusha and division of phenomena or nature (*prakrti, rang bzhin*) are defined at length MABh; 235-239.

50. See LSNP, p. 297.

51. See Tsong kha pa in LSNP (p. 302) that the eradication of the non-Buddhist self does nothing to reduce the afflictions such as desire.

52. RSM, f.32b2 adds to this the view of the self as lacking its own power (*rang dbang*) and glosses that such selves provide a basis for fabricating innate (*lhan skye*) graspings to a self. The MABh does not ascribe this view to any one particular Buddhist school, though from the context it is presumably meant to be the view of all or some Vaibhashikas.

53. The PPS, p. 264 calls the doctrine of impermanence, (along with the teaching that all is ill, not-self, and repulsive) a counterfeit perfection of insight. The non-counterfeit perfection of insight does not describe forms, etc. as permanent or impermanent.

54. For a detailed account of the Sammitiya's *pudgala* thesis see N. Dutt, *Buddhist Sects in India* (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1970), pp. 194-223.

55. The AK-*vyakhya* chapter 9 uses a simile of the relationship between fuel and fire in describing the *pudgalavada* view of relationship between the self and psycho-physical organism.

56. See ME, 48-51 and 178-193 for Hopkins' account of this analysis.

57. See verses 10.14 and 22.1

58. The MABh, 267 quotes vs. 22.1 following 6.144.

59. See Leslie Kawamura, *Golden Zephyr* (tr. of *Suhrllekha* with a Tibetan comm. by Mi pham) (Emeryville: Calif.: Dharma Publishing, 1975), p. 46, n. 58.

60. The MK instantiates its analyses with fire and wood (chpt. 10) and the Tathagata (chpt. 22). And like the MA, the MK (10.15) indicates that substitutions of the self (*atma*) and its acquiring (*upadana* - a functional equivalent of the psycho-physical organism) are to be made for fire and wood. F.J. Streng, *Emptiness*, 195-196.

61. J. Hopkins writes (ME, 179) that the analysis is "applied to an example ('chariot') which is familiar in world, since an example is easier to understand than the actual thesis. It is not that the emptiness of a chariot is to be realized before realizing the emptiness of a person, but it is important first to see how the mode of analysis works through an example which is easier than the actual subject."

62. See e.g. SN, 1.135 where a human person is said to be like a 'carriage' in that it comes to be when the parts are assembled.

63. T.R.V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1960), p.39.

64. Cf. RA; 1.33 Moreover, as Nagarjuna points out (MK, 18.1b), if the self is completely different from the psycho-physical organism it would be impossible for the self to have any of the characteristics of the psycho-physical person. A *person*, for example, could not be young, old, happy, sad, etc. because all physical and mental attributes would apply only to the psycho-physical organism and never to the self.

65. See ME, 337-343 for a summary of Vaibhashika tenets.

66. H.G. Alexander (ed.), *The Leibniz-Clark Correspondence* (New York: Manchester Univ. Press, 1956) (letter 4, para. 4), p. 37. Another statement is: "There is no such thing as two

individuals indiscernible from each." (Alexander, p.36), also see pp. 61-63. In *The Monadology* the principle is stated thus: "In nature there are never two beings which are perfectly alike and in which it is not possible to find an internal difference, or at least a difference founded upon an intrinsic quality (denomination)." In Leibniz *The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings* op. cit., p. 222.

67. L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 105.

68. The six consciousnesses asserted in the Vaibhashika Abhidharma and with which the Madhyamika agree are: eye (*caksur*), ear (*srotra*), nose (*ghrana*), tongue (*jihva*), body (*kaya*), and mind (*manas*) consciousness (*vijnana*). They make up the consciousness constituent (*vijnanaskandha*). See AK, 1.16-7.

69. This verse (6.128) is quoted in the PP but again without being explained.

70. See PP: 247-248 for the orthodox definitions of the residual (*sopadhisesa*) and non-residual (*nirupadhisesa*) nirvanas.

71. This verse, in fact, is stated as a consequence of the self being the collection of the psycho-physical constituents. "If the self is just but the collection (*tshogs*) of form etc., at that time the agent and action would become one." At MABh, 259, Chandrakirti gives the example of a potter and pot becoming indistinguishable.

72. In the case of karmic continuity between lives, if the self and psycho-physical organism are one, then the psycho-physical organism alone would come into existence at birth and cease at death. Though new psycho-physical organisms would arise subsequent to the destruction of old ones there would be no means for locating ante- and post-mortem psycho-physical organisms as belonging to the same continuum, for want of having something related to but different from the psycho-physical organisms themselves, viz, a self.

73. The brunt of that refutation is that continua do not exist instrisically (as both the Vaibhashika and Phenomenalists claim) and that were they to, causal nexi would be completely reified such that causal relation- ships between and within continua would be impossible.

74. A third point that could be mentioned is the fact that these verses make apparent a seeming inconsistency in the Madhyamika philosophy. The inconsistency rises here because emptiness and intrinsic existence though opposite, in fact purportedly mutually excluding notions, are both finally beyond designation. How then can they be different? The analytical solution, and one to be expected just because these notions are mutually defining, is that emptiness and intrinsic existence are finally neither the same nor different, the difference is nominal and not real. This mutual definition of mutually excluding terms is the basis for the construal elsewhere in the MABh, of *svabhava* as a synonym of *sunyata*.

75. The refutation that the self is not the parts of the psycho-physical organism was made in the context of refuting that the self and psycho-physical constituents are identical. The refutation in that case was that the self cannot be the individual parts, i.e. the constituents, for then there would be many selves.

76. Here and 6.152 Chandrakirti analyses the relations of "shape" and "collection" cross-referentially. Particularly he draws on conclusions produced in the analysis of the collection when analysing shape.

77. *Supra.* p

78. In an effort to separate this analysis from that of the subsequent analysis of "shape", the following commentary does not always follow Chandrakirti.

79. Cf. MK's analyses of "having". The corresponding locutions are: "*tathagatah skandhavan* (22.1)" and "*nagnir indhanavan* (10.14)" See K. Inada, *Nagarjuna: A Translation of his Mulamadhyamakakarika* (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1970), pp. 132 and 84.

80. In summarising the conclusions of the last three sections verse 6.144 proliferates these four misconceived relationships into "twenty [wrong] views of the self". The twenty are arrived at by applying the four misconceived relationships to each of the five psycho-physical constituents.

81. See BCA, 9.15-32 for a later and analogous critique of Buddhist Phenomenalism.

82. For Hopkins' analysis of the critique see ME, 374-397.

83. See, for example, *Madhyantavibhaga*, 1.5, and ME, 388-392.

84. See J.S. Mill, "Berkeley's Life and Writings" in *Essays on Philosophy and the Classics*, vol. 11 of the Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 451-452, quote, p. 459

85. The perception of duality is the most pervasive and entrenched imputation. Others are phenomena like the off-spring of barren women and horns of a rabbit. All these are non-existent imaginaries. Phenomena like space, numbers, and notions of generality and particulars are also imaginaries as they exist through mental imputation but can be established through valid epistemics (*pramana*) and are so categorised as existent imaginaries.

86. See LSNP, pp. 273-277 for the Vijnanavadas sources for the mind-only thesis.

87. The term preferred by Tibetan commentators and used throughout the RSM's glosses is Cittamatra, tib. Sems tsam pa.

88. The issues have been recently discussed by Alex Wayman, "Yogacara and the Buddhist Logicians", JIABS, 2.1 (1979), 65-78; and Janice Dean Willis, *On Knowing Reality: The Tattvartha Chapter of Asanga's Bodhisattvabhumi* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); both of whom side with a phenomenalist interpretation of the Vijnanavada theory of perception. Such interpretations are selective, I think, and also present just one perspective on the Vijnanavada for many Vijnanavada works, especially Vasubandhu's treatises, seem clearly idealistic in tone.

89. This device is not much used by Vijnanavadas who rely on logic (*rig pa*), such as Dharmakirti. What are sometimes called the Vijnanavada-Sautrantika. They, like others, limit the number of consciousnesses to six. The MA's rebuttals are directed towards the Vijnanavadas who follow scripture (*agama, lung*), and posit eight conscious- nesses: the usual six, plus the *alaya*, and *klista-manas* which is responsible for the imputing of duality and externality. The logical Vijnanavadas also reject a self reflexive consciousness (*svasamvedana*) which is accepted by the Vijnanavadas here to be refuted by Chandrakirti.

90. See MABh, 139-140 that dependent phenomena cannot be known as objects of the intellect as they exist independently of mental and verbal (RSM, f.19a4) elaboration.

91. The fully ramified consequences of this assumption, not mentioned in the MA, would be that consciousnesses share all or none of their experiences. If they partake of no common aspects, i.e. are quite unrelated, the position would be solopsistic with respect to each consciousness. If they share all their experiences the individuations between

consciousnesses would disappear and one would have just one rather than a multitude of consciousnesses.

For more on the Madhyamika thesis of the externality of sense-phenomena see LSNP, pp. 270-271.

92. This breakdown into the three times follows RSM, f. 30b1-32a5.

93. *Supra*, pp. 112-13. Also MK, chpt.2.

94. See LSNP, pp. 317-321 for Tsong kha pa's comments on this critique.

95. See Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, vol.1 (New York: Dover Publications (reprint 1962)), pp. 163-169.

96. BCA, 9.18-19.

97. Also MA, 6.92-3

98. Supra.

99. Cf. VV for a similar debate between the Madhyamikas and Hindu Naiyayikas. The issue in question is the same, viz., the consistency and efficacy of the Madhyamika propositions and logic, though the arguments are not exactly parallel, as the VV does not focus its critique on the question of an interface between refutation and what is refuted. The objections in the VV (1-4) are that (vs.1) if the Madhyamikas are consistent then their propositions have no self-existence, in which case those propositions are powerless to refute self-existence. On the other hand (vs.2), if the propositions do have a self-existence the Madhyamikas are inconsistent with their assertion that all things are empty. The Madhyamikas' reply (vss. 21-99) is that they are consistent as their propositions do not have a self- nature. Their efficacy is in their being causally conditioned. For a reconstruction and appraisal of the arguments in the VV see Mark Siderits, "The Madhyamaka Critique of Epistomology 11, "JIP, 9 (1981), 121-160. Cf. also BCA, 112-113 that there can be no relation between a cognition and its object of comprehension for one who upholds the intrinsic existence of these.

100. These arguments for the non-intrinsic existence of inference parallel ones made for perceptual knowledge. In the perceptual situation, perceptions are possible only if consciousness, organs, and sense objects do not intrinsically exist. If they did intrinsically exist they would be unrelated, hence would not meet and there would be no perceptions. For the parallel analyses see MK, chpt. 1, esp. 1.8; chpt. 3; BCA, 9.93-9, 104-6, 113-5; and VV which denies the reality of all Nyaya sources of knowledge (*pramana*).

101. See, for example, F.J. Streng, "The Significance of Pratityasamutpada for Understanding the Relationship between Samvrti and Paramarthasatya in Nagarjuna", in M. Sprung (ed), *Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedanta* (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1973), pp. 27-39; D. Seyfort Ruegg, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-13; and David J. Kalupahana, *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1975), pp. 156-62.

102. MABh, 228.

103. Cf. RA, 1.42, 46ff.; 2.11-13.

This sense of the middle-path can also be found in the MN, I. 8, p. 11, with respect to the self, where the Buddha enumerates (and rejects) six wrong views about the self, of which two are that 'There is for me a self (the externalist extreme)' and 'There is not for me a self' (the nihilist extreme). It may be, though, that the *same* self is not implicated in both

views (as with the Vijnanavada bi-negations), for example, the *continuum* of consciousness in one and a permanent entity in the other.

104. The non-Madhyamika interpretation is diachronic in character rather than synchronic, and is expressed in the variously numbered (twelve being the most famous) links (*anga*) in what is a *sequential* process of dependent origination that purports to describe *karmic* perpetuation.

For a full account of the Pali interpretations see Mahathera Nyanatiloka, *Guide Through the Abhidhammapitaka* (Kandy: Buddhist Pub. Soc., 1971), Appendix, pp. 153-173.

A. Wayman, in "Buddhist dependent Origination", *History of Religions*, 10.3 (Feb., 1971), 185-203 gives tantric interpretations of the doctrine.

105. See MSA, 15.28-36 for the 'path of intuition' as gaining a non-dualistic perception.

106. Presumably for Chandrakirti all adversaries (Hindus and Buddhists alike) are on the path of accumulation, for they would be engaged in yogic exercises such as ethics, concentration, etc. yet would not be using special insight (*vipasyana*) techniques in their meditations. Geshe Trinlay tells me that Madhyamika Buddhists mainly hear about emptiness on the path of accumulation, and think and meditate on it on the path of reaching.

107. These are different from the AK (1.6) *nirodhas*.

108. The path structures and path structure literatures in Buddhism are many and complex, and deserve a study in their own right. Besides different structures being given for the paths traversed by arhats, *pratyekabuddhas*, and bodhisattvas, variations occur between the various philosophical schools. Both Madhyamika schools, the Svatantrika and Prasangika, describe different paths for all three *yanas*. They are agreed though on the significance of the path of seeing as the yogin's first genuine knowledge of emptiness and the traversing of ten levels prior to the buddha-level. The Svatantrika path structure for all three *yanas* is the subject matter of the *Abhisamayalamkara*. For studies see E. Bastian, *op. cit.*, pp , and E. Obermiller, "The Doctrine of Prajna-paramita...". See H.V. Guenther, *Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma* (Berkeley: Shambhala, 1974), chpt. 5 for description of the Theravada, Vaibhashika, and Vijnanavada paths.

109. The stage at which bodhisattvas achieve liberation (*nirvana*) is a significant point of difference between the Svatantrika and Prasangika path structures. Where Prasangikas assert that liberation occurs at the completion of the seventh level, Svatantikas hold that the profound and extensive paths are co-terminal and hence that liberation is achieved at the completion of the tenth level.

110. The analogical argument is that the yogin who has become an arhat and then abandoned the psycho-physical body has a cognition of emptiness wherein there are no appearances. This non-existence of appearances is then likened to the status of objects on the conventional (*samvrti*) level. The argument or at least analogy seems weak if not misplaced for it confounds a distinction upheld elsewhere in the MA between non-existence and non-intrinsic existence. Appearances for the arhat in a non-residual nirvana are utterly non-present, yet appearances for the world are just non-intrinsically existent. If one was given to interpreting the analogy more strictly one would be right in assuming that appearances do not arise for the world either.

The concept of a non-residual nirvana is interpreted differently by Madhyamika and other Buddhist schools. Non-madhyamika schools interpret it as referring to the experience of arhats when they have died and so abandoned the psycho-physical organism. Madhyamikas do not interpret it as being necessarily a post-mortem experience, but rather as the experience of emptiness had while meditating. In this case a residual nirvana is a cognition of emptiness that is had while outside of a meditative

context. Madhyamikas further say that the first cognition of emptiness had by yogins is always a non residual one.

111. Chandrakirti (MABh: 108) also talks of saints who are and are not cognisant of appearances (*snang ba*) which the RSM f.16a5-6 takes as a reference to the meditative versus post-attainment state (*rjes thob*).

A. Gangadean in his paper "Formal ontology and the dialectical transformation of consciousness," PEW, 29.1 (Jan. 1979) has some interesting observations that seem to accord with the dynamic that might be implied by this distinction. He says that the student of the Madhyamika analysis is taken to the point where the "world begins to collapse and dissolve and static consciousness begins to be dislodged" ... "with the collapse of predicate structure, the world becomes an unintelligible flux." "Discourse, rationality, and judgment become silenced." (p. 39). This would seem to be what is meant by the space-like attainment of emptiness. Gangadean continues that subsequently the world is regained by reconstituting the predicative structure. He writes that: "At this state of instinction the utterances of natural language are seen to be figurative and metaphoric rather than literal, univocal, statis." (p. 39). This perhaps is what is meant by the post-attainment state.

CHAPTER THREE

ANALYSIS AND INSIGHT

Chapter two reconstructed the theory of emptiness (*sunyavada*), and some related arguments and doctrines, as these are exposed in the *Introduction* [MA]. It argues that it is true to Chandrakirti to suggest that the analytical content of the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] is integrally tied to the arising of insight and to that extent, that analysis represents an essential religious activity of Madhyamika philosophers.

This chapter investigates the relationship between analysis (*vicara*) and the insight into emptiness. More specifically it presents Chandrakirti's view - which in this respect is characteristic and typical of Madhyamika thought generally - that analysis is meant to be a direct and efficient cause for producing the insight into emptiness. In the course of supporting this interpretation I will develop a structural model of Madhyamika analysis by way of proffering a reasoned explanation for why Madhyamikas thought it appropriate to use analysis as a tool for gaining insight.

The chapter will be divided into three main sections. The first set of sections will attempt to specify an elementary logical structure to the analyses used in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] and Madhyamika texts generally. The structure outlined is common to all consequential (*prasanga*) analyses and elementary in that all analyses hinge on a common basic structure and can be converted or resolved into that structure. In turn it will be argued that that same elementary structure provides a framework for Madhyamikas believing in the salvific efficacy of analysis.

The second half of the chapter takes the elementary structure of consequential analysis and relates this to the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] analyses. The sections attempt to show that the *Introduction*'s [MA] analyses do conform to certain cognitive and logical structures within which Chandrakirti can claim - with a degree of internal consistency - that consequential analysis has the effect of slowing and ultimately putting a halt to conceptual elaboration. These latter sections also point out some technical features of the logic of the *Introduction*'s [MA] analyses and make some brief observations about the relationship between logical and experiential

consequences, and briefly address the question of whether there is a contingent or necessary relation between analysis and insight.

1 WESTERN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PROBLEM

The position of western interpreters of the Madhyamika on the general question of the relationship between analysis and insight, and the more specific issue of whether or not consequential analysis structures thought in such a way that gives rise to insight is unresolved: if a variety of divergent views is indicative of such.

The problem at issue is essentially one of the *strength* of the relationship between analysis and insight, for it is difficult not to infer - given the prominent and extensive utilisation of analysis in Madhyamika texts and their placement of this in a genuine religious tradition - that analysis must have some bearing on at least some aspects of the Madhyamikas' quest for spiritual liberation. Hence, the opinions being expressed by Madhyamika scholars vary in terms of the centrality that is accorded to analysis within the soteriological concerns of Madhyamikas.

As I see the leading contemporary interpreters, K.K. Inada holds to the weakest interpretation of the relationship. He writes that "the Buddhist truth, if forthcoming at all, is not the result of logic or dialectics."[1] J.W. de Jong similarly views the relationship as fairly weak or rather indirect for he feels that the negative dialectic can act only as a preparatory exercise for true insight.[2] T.R.V. Murti (along with S. Schayer) is judged by F.J. Streng[3] as similarly holding that the dialectic is just a preparatory exercise, though I think one can also read a stronger and *effective* interpretation of the relationship into Murti.[4] Streng's own views are interesting for, on the one hand, he supports a very strong and *efficient* relationship, yet on the other he says that insight *can* arise quite independently of any analytical activity.[5] Though he doesn't explicitly say so, it is clear from M. Sprung's discernment of the function of Madhyamika logic and its place in the removal of views, that he holds a strong interpretation of the relationship. Ashok Gangadean holds the same, writing convincingly of the "radical transformation [from ordinary to *sunya* consciousness that] is effected through analytical meditation."[6] And of the "transformational dialectic" which "purports to move consciousness beyond any and all conceptual structures".[7] The current generation of Madhyamika scholars such as Jeffrey Hopkins and Robert Thurman understand that logical analysis is an essential technique in the practice of discernment meditation and that it gives rise to the insight of emptiness.

This study continues a general chronological trend towards seeing the relationship between analysis and insight as strong. This trend is due in my opinion to an increasing appreciation of the structure of Madhyamika analysis. Hence, if the current interpretations are informed it is significant of coming to

understand the causes, conditions, parameters, etc. that determine, bear on, and are brought into play in the relationship. The earlier and weaker interpretations of the relationship stem, I believe, from two causes. One, a pan-Indic judgement, perhaps coming from the situation obtaining in rational yet non-consequential (*prasanga*) religio-mystical traditions, such as Advaita Vedanta in which rational analysis is acknowledged to give out some time before religious intuition, and, two, a belief that *all* conceptual activity is elaborative, or more strictly leads to further conceptual elaboration.

2 CHANDRAKIRTI'S STATEMENT ON THE RELATIONSHIP

Chandrakirti's own position on the relationship is most clearly stated in a set of four verses at the conclusion of his analysis of phenomena and prior to taking up the analysis of the person. The first verse (6.116) says:

> When things are [conceived to intrinsically] exist, then conceptuality (*kalpana*) is produced. But a thorough analysis shows how things are [in fact] not [intrinsically] existent. [When it is realised that] there are no [intrinsically] existent things, the conceptualisations do not arise, just as for example, there is no fire without fuel.

rTog (pa) is translating *kalpana* for the Sanskrit verse is cited in the *Subhasitasamgraha*.[9] I am translating *kalpana* as conceptuality. Other terms that are used in a similar context re indicating "what is removed" in the Madhyamika soteriology are *vikalpa* and *prapanca*.[10] The three terms *kalpana, vikalpa,* and *prapanca* are different though and as we will indicate shortly seem to represent a genesis of ideational proliferation or *degrees* of elaboration.

This verse is quite unequivocal and clear: that conceptuality arises on the basis of perceiving things to be real and that when such false perception is eradicated, conceptuality ceases also. The rationale behind the cognition of the emptiness of entities and the cessation of conceptualisation is that when the referents to thought are not presented to consciousness, thought or conceptualisation itself has no basis, nothing to rest on and work with (i.e. is unfueled) and so ceases also.[11] Shantideva in the *Introduction to the Evolved Lifestyle* [BCA: 9.34-35] writes:

> When one asserts that nothing exists [and there is] no perception of the things that are the object of investigation, then how can existence, being separate from a basis, stay before the intellect? When neither things nor non-things are placed before the intellect, then there is no other route, it lacks any support [and achieves] the supernatural peace.[12]

We will return again to this verse of Shantideva for it states a central assumption for Madhyamika analysis.

The *Commentary* [MABh: 229-230] to this verse does not add significantly to the dynamic that is implied, but says that saintly yogins gain the realisation of reality due to analysing things with the logic (that all four theses re production are fallacious). It also instances that (latent) impulses (*'du byed, samskara*) to the conceptions such as virtue, non-virtue, things, non-things, and (with respect to) form and feelings are removed.

The points that the *Commentary* [MABh] makes are that the disappearance of conceptuality comes as a direct result of analysis, and such dissipation of conceptuality is concomitant with the onset of the insight into reality (*tattva*). This last point accords also with the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] path-structure where for example, (11.6) the bodhisattvas at the *acala-bhumi* (i.e. eighth level) - the point at which henceforward they cognise emptiness uninterruptedly - are free from conceptuality (*rnam rtog, vikalpana*). Likewise the buddhas' minds are non-conceptualising (*rnam mi rtog*) and (12.9) their serene form (*zhi sku*) is free from mental elaboration (*spros*). Very likely the absence of conceptuality that is talked about here should not be taken at face value as the removal of all thought and ideation for example, but as the eradication of some cognitive substratum that is responsible for *ontologising* types of conceptions.[13]

The purported efficacy of analysis in the quiescence of conceptuality becomes clearer still in the next verse (6.117) which says: "Ordinary people are bound by their concepts, but non-conceptualising yogins [who realise the nature of things (*dharmata*)] become liberated. The learned have said that the result of analysis (*vicara*) is the reversal of conceptualisation." In this context *log pa* has the sense of involution or inversion. The *Commentary* [MABh: 230] on this cites Nagarjuna also as explaining that the exclusion itself (*bkag pa nyid*) of all conceptions is the fruit of full analysis. The *Mirror of Complete Clarification* [RSM] (f. 38b1) glosses the conceptions as those that grasp at the extremes (*mthar 'dzin*). Hence, *all* extreme conceptions become involuted via conceptual analysis.[14]

Shantideva in his *Introduction to the Evolved Lifestyle* [BCA] likewise claims a soteriological import for the Madhyamika analysis. In reply to a query that analysis may get bogged down in an infinite regress with no natural terminus he writes (9.111) that: "Once the object of investigation has been investigated, there is no basis for investigation. Since there is no basis [further analysis] does not arise, and that is called nirvana."[15]

Vicara is a technical term in all the schools of Buddhism. In the *Collection on Phenomenology* [AK:2.33] it ranks as one of the variable or indeterminant mental factors and functions in pair with *vitarka*. The *Collection on Phenomenology's* [AK] definition of *vicara* is the same as in the Pali where it means a sustained application of a mind towards an object, possessing a degree of scrutiny that is lacking in *vitakka* (skt. *vitarka*). Where *vitarka* is best rendered as mental notification or the initial or cursory attention to an entity, *vicara* signifies a close

scrutiny examination, investigation, inspection or analysis of some meditative entity.[16]

In the Madhyamika "*vicara*" carries this same sense of investigation except that it specifically means a rational or ratiocinative investigation, a conceptual analysis (*rtog par dpyod*) as opposed to say to a *perceptual* examination of some entity that may result in an increased attention to its behaviour and detail. The rational flavour of the Madhyamika usage is captured best by "analysis" rather than examination or investigation. Nor does the term *vicara* in the foregoing verses mean all types and varieties of rational analysis for Chandrakirti links it to reversing conceptuality. Hence it is a type of analysis that tends not to proliferate and perpetuate itself, but rather which does the converse and ameliorates and is meant finally to result in a complete attrition of conceptuality. Such an attrition of conceptuality is coterminum with the insight of emptiness and so the analysis meant in this context is rational investigation that aims at inducing the insight of emptiness by exposing in some existential sense the insubstantiality or non-intrinsic existence of entities.

This interpretation is more far-reaching than many estimates of the Madhyamika dialectic for it credits the dialectic with more than an intellectual establishment of the *sunyavada*. Rather, analysis induces the very realisations which are understood to free yogins from the bonds of samsara. The procedure is one of searching for intrinsically existent entities and failing to find them. Though Madhyamika texts do not specifically mark this sort of analysis off from the rational analysis that characterises the philosophical investigations of non-Madhyamika philosophers we can introduce a term ultimacy analysis (*paramartha-vicara*), what Gangadean calls the transformational dialect. Such analysis would be distinguished from conventional analysis (*samvrti-vicara*) (Gangadean's categorial analysis) such as would characterise (among other sorts of analyses) the Abhidharma *vicara* which is concerned to investigate the details and characteristics of entities, their properties, relationships, etc. The difference here is that between a *genuine* ontological inquiry in the case of ultimacy analysis: where entities are said to be neutrally and presuppositionlessly investigated with a view to determining their ontic status (whatever that may be) and with a logical- phenomenological mode of investigation in the case of conventional analysis: where entities are either (1) non- neutrally examined with a view to confirming or defending a *presupposed* ontic status (generally that they exist or nonexist) or (2) with accurately discerning the *appearance* of entities, events, etc.

Though there is probably a graduated continuum between conventional and ultimacy analysis in the *Introduction* [MA] and conceivably in the meditative context also, ultimacy analysis in its pure form involves scrutinising theses for a logical consistency. The theses that the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] examines in this way are those which support the intrinsic existence of the personality and phenomena. The analyses made by Chandrakirti (and

Nagarjuna) are conducted in the material mode, and though the logical axioms around which theses are tested are not stated as *formal* axioms in Madhyamika texts, they are stated nonetheless and it is clear that the "laws of thought" i.e. the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle, are included within their axioms as basic to ultimacy analyses.

Analysis employs the *prasanga,* tib. *thal 'gyur,* form of argumentation, a purportedly deductive form of argument that exposes absurd consequences by drawing out logical contradictions (*rigs paị 'gal pa*) that are thought to naturally and necessarily inhere in *all* theses.

The rationale for exposing logical contradictions is that what is real cannot be self-contradictory, or conversely, what is self-contradictory cannot be real. From the viewpoint of Madhyamikas, all theses are self refuting if they are examined with sufficient thoroughness, and the Madhyamikas act not as a protagonist with their own position but as a catalyst and prompt for the analytical exercise, i.e. they invoke an analysing mentality in themselves and others. One is reminded here of Wittgenstein when he writes that the aim of his investigations is "to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense."[17] In the case where theses manipulate non-self-existent entities, the arguments, though still formally valid would be viewed as inconsequential for the entities occurring in such theses would be mere designations (*prajnapti-matra*) and so unrestricted with respect to their criteria of identification. That is to say, the entities in such theses would not be self-marked and so able to freely change their designation.

The remaining two verses (6.118-119) of the set we started with claim genuineness and an absence of sophistry on behalf of Madhyamika analysts. Chandrakirti assures his readers that soteriology is the sole consideration in the deployment of analysis and that when the analysis is applied to the theses of others with a concern only for their spiritual welfare, that this is a valid and genuine use of analysis.

In summary, Chandrakirti claims that the Madhyamika analysis is an *actual* epistemology in that it comprises a *method* for comprehending reality. Given Chandrakirti's assertion that analysis is a causal agent for the salvific insight, and an apparently necessary cause also, how are we to interpret and understand those claims in light of the seeming distance between conceptual analysis and a purportedly non-conceptual insight?[18] Ashok Gangadean[19] has gone some way towards a solution by showing the structural foundations that underpin Madhyamika analysis, and to him some of the ideas in the first few sections are indebted. Still, his explanation does not adequately account for the analyses that Madhyamika's put forward in their texts, and nor does it extend the explanation into a diachronic framework that attempts to relate 'analytical activity' to the progressive insights that are said to be gained by saints on a spiritual path. Hence it is these lacunae to a holistic explanation and one that dovetails into the Madhyamika literature that we will be trying to cover here.

3 THE STRUCTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF ANALYSIS

How are we to explain the purported soteriological significance of conceptual analysis? Can we legitimately read into it more than the mere logical refutation of philosophical theses? Clearly, *if* analysis is a technique for reversing the flow of thought, or at least excluding certain types of thought, its structural foundations must be involved with the principles (assuming there are such) governing the very formation of conceptuality (*kalpana*) and its elaboration (*prapanca*), and hence the maintenance and dissolution of these too.

3.1 ENTITY DISCRIMINATION (*SAMJNA*) AND PREDICATION

According to Gangadean, Nagarjuna's dialectic is best understood in terms of the classical (i.e. Aristotelian) model of intensional-categorial predication.[20] *Mutatis mutandis* the same is true of Chandrakirti's analyses. On the classical model, predication is the key to thought formation because thought arises in dependence on entity identification, and entity identification depends on the ascription of predicate(s) to an entity, such that define it, in the sense of giving it boundaries that mark it off from other entities. In the absence of predication there are no entities, at least for thought, and hence no basis for mental elaboration.

Such a view accords entirely with Buddhist theory: that recognition or discrimination (*samjna, du shes*) is predicative in form. According to the *Collection on Phenomenology* [AK: 1.14b], *samjna* is apprehending the features (*nimitta, mtshan ma*) and this is echoed exactly by Chandrakirti in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 6.202]. Under this definition entity recognition depends on a conceptual (pre-verbal and perhaps frequently unconscious) location and ascription of features to an entity (*vastu*) that leads to class inclusion. As Paul Williams writes: "The *samjna* "x (is) blue"...verbalises the membership of this blue patch in the class of blue. The *nimitta* is thereby a sign of class membership and the articulation of a perception is only possible on the basis of class inclusion."[21] Thus entities are abstracted from the field of experience in dependence on their perceived possession of predicates appropriate to entities comprising different classes of entities. This structure of recognition is thus propositional and predicative for it depends on the linking of features (predicates) to entities (subjects).

There are some complications to this account, intrinsic not just to Buddhist theory but to the genesis of entity identification. For example, though entity identification via predication (i.e. the ascription of features to entities) is necessary in order to conceive of and think about experience it is not clear whether it is necessary for the having of experience as such. The experience of infants one thinks would tell against it being necessary. According to the *Collection on Phenomenology* [AK: 1.44] consciousness (*vijnana*) apprehends just

the bare object (*vastumatra*) while recognition (*samjna*) takes the process further by apprehending the features. On this count it seems that an entity can become an object of experience *prior* to the recognition of its features and hence that raw perception (*vijnana*) does not depend on the mental recognition of entities. On the other hand, Nagarjuna says in the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK: 5.2a], "In no case has anything existed without a defining characteristic."[22] And Chandrakirti (MA: 6.57cd) that distinguishables (*visesana*) exist in dependence on their having distinctions (*visesya*), i.e. features. These statements would lead to the view that perception itself, insofar as it is aware of things, is dependent on recognition. The problems here are reminiscent of those intrinsic to the Kantian thesis of the categorial nature of experience. The complication for Buddhist theory is that *samjna* tends to functionally bridge and lexically float on a continuum between sense-recognition at one pole (evidenced by the use of English language equivalents such as sensation, perception and impressions) and cognitive or conceptual recognition at the other (emphasised by those using equivalents like ideas, concepts, and constructive thought). The real question is: can sense-discriminations be had independently of discriminations in thought, and if not then how and to what extent are sense-discriminations dependent on conceptual or thought distinctions.

Related to this is a further problem as to the relationship in terms of dependency between concept formation and entity discrimination both structurally and in terms of whether they form serially, and in which order, or synchronically with both being dependent on each other. The textual ground work for these problems has been done in an exemplary fashion by Paul Williams and we will return to them at the end of this chapter.

The significant and uncontentious point in our explanation at this stage is that the conceptual pole of discrimination at least depends on predication, i.e., on things being defined through their possession of qualities or characteristics (*nimitta, (sva-)laksana, dharma, akara, visesya,* etc.).

When entities are undefined, i.e. unpredicated, they are inconceivable, i.e. cannot be thought about, and hence are unable to provide a basis for conceptual discernment and thought construction. Hence, discrimination creates entities through a categorial abstraction. Once there is a conceptual discernment of entities, conceptuality (*kalpana*) is established and from this the full gamut of elaboration (*prapanca*) takes off, weaving a dense and complex web of beliefs, judgements, inferences, etc. some of which may be verbalised.[23] Consciousness ceases to be strictly phenomenological in its activity but engages in ontologising and evaluative activities that lead to proliferation. As Williams writes: ""*Prapanca*"...designates the tendency and activity of the mind, weakly anchored to a (falsely constructed) perceptual situation, to proliferate conceptualisation beyond its experiential basis and therefore further and further removed from the foundation which could lead to a correct perception via impermanence."[24] In other words, once entities have been distinguished by the process of predicate

ascription, conceptuality complexifies and becomes progressively more removed from its perceptual basis.

Still, at root, conceptual proliferation and elaboration depends on and is subsequent to discriminations (*samjna*) which can be analysed in terms of subject-predicate propositions.[25] The soteriological significance of this is that nirvana is the reversal of elaboration accomplished by a ceasing of discriminations.[26]

3.2 THE PRINCIPLE OF DEFINITION THROUGH LOGICAL OPPOSITES

Given that concepts and hence thought formation depend on predication, the next question in tracing the logic evolution and involution of conceptuality is: On what does predication depend? The insight of the Madhyamikas, among others (for example, the Taoists, Saussure, Levi Strauss, P. Winch, G.A. Kelly, Gangadean) is that predication arises out of an oppositional structure.[27] This insight, which has its weak and strong formulations, says in its general form that predicates "arise in and through a formal oppositional relation."[28] Or as Williams writes, "the referent of a *vikalpa* exists only as the negative of what it is not and *vice versa*."[29] This means that all terms are *necessarily* defined (and hence gain their meaning) with reference to what they are logically not (i.e. their logical opposite). Likewise the logical opposite is defined only on the basis of the affirmed term. A logical opposite in this context, and contra Gangadean,[30] may be either a non categorial (i.e. category unrestricted) negation or categorial (i.e. category restricted) negation. In both cases A and -A are *logically* and *reciprocally* dependent on each other. Each is defined, and so comes into being, in mutual dependence (*parasparapeksa*) on the other. Entity- characteristics are thus "other-defined" and not "self-defined". This is a principle of definition via logical opposites: that concepts are formed in the context of pairs of logical opposites. The concept of A is formed if and only if the concept of -A is formed and *vice versa*. In its predicative form this is that an entity A is defined and hence identified by some predicate P, where P is defined in relation to -P. Gangadean calls the pair P and -P an "absolute term or category".[31] This then is the Madhyamika's *pratityasamutpada*, namely the insight that all entities *depend* ontologically on their logical opposites, i.e. *all* that comprises the class of what they are not. Hence the *Commentary* [MABh: 228] definition of *pratityasamutpada* that "this arises from dependence on this (*'di la brten nas 'di 'byung ngo*)" the two demonstratives must be referring to logical opposites, for example, (MABh: 227) permanence and impermanence, things and non-things.[33]

Though, in its weak interpretation, there is nothing particularly contentious in this we can go into it a little more by way of supporting its facticity. (Its strong interpretation, the rationale for which I will give soon, is more contentious.) Logical contrariety says that any entity A can only be defined in

terms of its logical opposite -A. Let us suppose that this is not the case. If it is not, there seem to be two possible ways in which entities may come to be defined. (1) A might be defined with reference *just* to itself,[33] or (2) A may be defined with reference to some other entity(s) B, C, etc.

We will take the second option first. This is in essence an *apoha* or exclusion theory of definition: that A is known, i.e. identified, in terms of being -B, -C, etc. The problem here is that entity A can only be so identified by such a procedure if *all* things other than A are included, for if they are not, A may be the very thing(s) that are not included. Yet, if *by definition* all things other than A must be included, we have returned to a principle of definition via logical contrariety.

As to the first option: that A may be self-defined. The presupposition here, speaking figuratively, is that a boundary of A (i.e., that which delimits it and so gives it an identity) can be found without reference to anything other than or outside of A. In other words, that A may be defined recursively.

For Madhyamikas, though, an entity A can only be defined in virtue of having some boundary (*de-finire*). Were an entity to be without boundaries yet of the *one* constituency or medium (as would be required by it being genuinely *one* rather than several things) it would, I think, be uncharacterisable, according to Madhyamikas. For Madhyamikas, a boundary, as is required for something to be defined, could not be found within an entity, for by definition that would be internal to its boundary. A boundary or point where an entity A ceases to be A could only be located where and when A encounters (i.e. comes to possess properties or predicates intrinsic to) some non-A. Hence its definition requires a reference to something other than itself.

The idea that one can define A, not actually by encountering (or directly referring to) some -A, but rather by defining a limit or boundary from some point internal to A fares no better. An entity capable of being self-defined would have a *svabhava,* under the Madhyamika definition of *svabhava,* and its definition would be a definition of its *svabhava.* The point is, though, that for a *single* entity its *svabhava,* which would be its defining property (*svalaksana*), would be uniform within or across the entity. If the *svabhava,* i.e. what made the entity itself, were not uniform, if it *naturally* partook of divisions or internal modification, Madhyamikas reason that one would have two or several entities depending on the number of divisions.[34] The point of this in relationship to the possibility of an entity being defined by itself is that there would be no mark internal to a *svabhava* (given its uniform nature) that could provide a *reference point* from which one could define a boundary (i.e. a place where A would cease to be A). All points, facets, aspects, etc. of a single *svabhava,* or we may prefer, the *svabhava* of a single entity, would be identical *vis-a-vis* their defining the *svabhava* and hence could not provide a grid or texture, as it were, on or within which to discern one aspect of the *svabhava* as being spatially and/or qualitatively closer to the boundary of that *svabhava.* The only information that could provide a datum, as it were, as to where A would cease to be A would be where it

encountered something other than itself, where it ceased to have properties or predicates deemed intrinsic to A. Hence recursive definitions do, always, include specified limits in order to obtain a category restriction.

3.3 DICHOTOMISATION

The creation of terms or concepts - and hence entity identification - comes about, as we have noted, via a bifurcating or *vikalpa*-type of conceptuality. As Williams writes, the prefix "*vi-*" in *vikalpa* emphasises "the creation of a referent through the ability of language to partition and create opposition, to divide a domain into mutually exclusive and contradictory categories."[35] That is to say, entities gain their identity only within an act of dichotomisation in which the defining characteristics of an entity are located in terms of *not* being their logical opposite, i.e. not being logically *other* than what they are. Though predicates arise in the context of and in dependence on their logical opposites the two mutually defining predicates that constitute the pair, P and -P, become bifurcated in the act of ascribing *one* predicate to an entity. The two contrary predicates which naturally arise together, in a relationship of reciprocity, are pared apart in order to gain a degree of predicative consistency such as is necessary if there is to be discourse and thought about experience. There is a progressive distancing of the two contrary predicates that is artificially maintained at the expense of psychological effort (and pain) and Madhyamikas would say logical deception also. The reciprocal dependency or relational origination (*pratityasamutpada*) of predicates is lost sight of, P and -P come to function independently of each other, as though they were self defined, and their referents take on an independent existence of their own, i.e. appear to have a *svabhava.* In contemporary terminology P and -P come to be conceived as externally rather than internally related.

In summary, where predicates first arise in the context of two mutually defining contraries -

$$\overset{\longleftarrow}{\underset{\longrightarrow}{P\text{-}P}}$$

-the dichotomising faculty (*vikalpa*) bifurcates the two predicates and latches onto one of them in an effort to gain an entity that is serviceable as a conceptual referent.

$$P \longleftrightarrow -P$$

Entity identification is hence forward dogmatically rather than logically based.

Such bifurcation and creation of seemingly independently defined referents is *drawn out* and reinforced by elaboration (*prapanca*) in the sense that the

dynamic of elaborative thought feeds on an input of concepts which become embedded in a conceptual framework by the functional role they continue to play. Hence *vikalpa* provides the concepts that can be conceptually synthesised and woven by *parikalpa* into a self- perpetuating stream of elaboration via the addition, attrition, modification, deepening, etc. of the relationships between concepts. Here then is the real *locus* for the creation of samsara: dichotomisation providing the referents for elaboration and in turn elaboration feeding back to provide the concepts that are necessary for the creation of "absolute categories" in the first place. This spiral of mutual reinforcement between dichotomisation and elaboration being broken for Madhyamikas by the tool of logical analysis.

This concludes the explanation of the genesis of conceptuality to the level of elaboration (*prapanca*). To summarise the etiology involved. (1) Conceptuality depends on entity recognition which in turn (2) is dependent on the ascription of predicates to entities such that define them. Such predicates are (3) created in dependence on their logical opposities and (4) predicative consistency (such as is necessary for recognition) is gained by hypostatising two contrary predicates so that they can be definitionally separated and made autonomous from each other, thus conceptually isolated, this making each serviceable as predicates for different things.

The fact that concepts arise through logical contrariety would go unnoticed for a pre-analytical consciousness and the act of dichotomisation wherein the predicates which make up a pair of concepts are latched onto and reified would occur at a subliminal level. Only the fruition state in this process would be discerned, where concepts had gained an autonomous identity, i.e. at a point where concepts have been reified and able to enter into the flux of elaboration at the level of naming and verbalisation. The subliminal or unconscious nature of concept formation would contribute to the innate (*sahaja*) quality of delusion as would the *habitual* way in which concepts are reified. A whole network of concepts would seem to be maintained in their hypostatised state, representing a continuous under-current of fixation that would be relatively uniform in nature given the quantity of concepts that are entertained by people and the complexity of the relationships between concepts. Any changes and vicissitudes in thought would appear as relatively minor and superficial when compared to a dense background of conceptuality. Hence the claimed trenchancy and deep-seatedness of ignorance.

Within the above etiological account of conceptuality (*kalpana*) and mental elaboration one can explain why Madhyamikas thought it appropriate to utilise logical analysis in the soteriological task of attenuating conceptuality. Hence this explanation or a variant of it likely represents a general schema of assumptions that were tacitly assumed to be true by Madhyamikas.

There are some problems in this account which I will mention and though they may be telling I do not want to dwell on them. If the problems are telling it's because a *structural* description of the Madhyamika analysis is open to both

analytical critiques (for example, cognitive-psychological and logico-philosophical critiques) and meta-analytical critiques based on the Madhyamika analysis itself. The latter are a real problem, I think, for any account of how the Madhyamika analysis is meant to work can be critiqued in terms of the Madhyamika analysis. And *if* the Madhyamika analysis does work, it can expose contradictions in *any* structural examination of the analysis. The best that can be looked for in this case is not logical infallibility but a structural account that has an overall semblance of coherency and explanatory worth.

The first problem is that if concepts are created in reciprocal dependence on their logical opposites, i.e. are not self-defined, then how can the two terms or classes that define a pair of logical opposites, Gangadean's "absolute category", be pared apart and become (seemingly and apparently) self-defined? The problem is another way of asking the highly trenchant and problematic question of how a *svabhava* can arise even as a fiction if *in fact* there is not a trace of *svabhava* to be really had anywhere? To invoke a creation *ex nihilo* is obviously non-Madhyamic for at the *samvrti* level Madhyamikas give credence just to "birth from other." This problem has an analogue in the Advaita Vedanta with the origination of *maya*. A problem related to this is the sense in which concept formation (and maintenance) is *necessarily* dependent on an oppositional structure if and when concepts are maintained *as though* they were independent. In other words, how do entities *retain* their identity after their bifurcation given that identity is said to be dependent on reciprocity?

A second problem is that of how an absolute or paired term comes to be created in the first place. That is to say, given that two logical opposites arise in dependence on each other from what do the two arise? Certainly not from *prapanca* (even though we have said *vikalpa* and *prapanca* are mutually dependent) for elaboration requires the very terms that arise in an oppositional structure. And presumably not from nothing.

The answer to these questions and hence to the foundations of samsara will be in explaining the *structures* that *maintain* and *support* the seeming self-definition and independence of entities and allow the formation of even utterly false designations (*prajnapti*). Such problems as these are of course tolerable to some degree by Madhyamikas as unavoidable in any *samvrtic* account of reality, and perhaps we must content ourselves also with at least some degree of tolerance to those problems.

3.4 THE PARADOXICAL STRUCTURE OF PREDICATION

The contention of the Madhyamika philosophers, and assumption on which the consequential (*prasanga*) analysis hinges is that predication is logically paradoxical in virtue of being embedded within a structure of logical opposites. The notion of identifiability via predication is inconsistent and without any sanction in logical thought because the reciprocal dependence of terms on their

logical opposites means that the two terms that make up any oppositional structure must *both* be present in order for either one to be present. This is a *strong* interpretation of the principle of logical opposites in which reciprocal dependence means that one cannot have single terms, in isolation with respect to their opposites: either both or neither are present. The paradox of predication then, is that in any instance of predication there must be a simultaneous ascription of logically contradictory predicates to the *one* entity. Hence, in the very act of gaining their identity entities lose it as the presence of any attribute entails its absence. The affirmation of any predicate logically entails the affirmation of its negation (and *vice versa*). Wittgenstein seems to be making this last point from one angle when he speaks of a feeling "as if the negation of a proposition had to make it true in a certain sense in order to negate it."[36] And conversely, an affirmation is simultaneously a negation, meaning that an entity must be cognised as *not* what it is in order for it to be known as what it is. Thus contrary to its aims, entity identification is lost at the expense of predications, rather than gained. (On this interpretation the insight of *pratityasamutpada* as the dependency of terms on their logical opposites serves to negate the intrinsic identifiability of entities and in this explains the Madhyamika equivalence that is drawn between emptiness and *pratityasamutpada*.[37])

The obvious query to this, assuming that terms are in fact defined in an oppositional structure, is that it is not necessary that predicates be coaligned, i.e. *both* placed or located on the same entity, it being sufficient that the two terms comprising any pair of logical opposites be at different *cognitive* loci. This is the weak interpretation of the principle. (We should remember that we are talking here about concepts and not the premediated features of objects, if such can be talked about, and hence that it is not a question here of assigning mutually contradicatory features to entities *themselves*.) The reason for the Madhyamikas' stipulation of the copresence of two mutually negating predicates is an adherence to the letter of the principle of definition via logical opposites: that the concept -P has to be *present whenever and wherever* the concept of P is present for otherwise P could not be sustained and vice versa. If they did not occupy a common spatio-temporal locus the two opposing terms would be separate from each other and so unable to define each other. In other words, P can only be defined *where* -P is defined (and vice versa). The Madhyamika philosophers presumably felt that the copresence of opposites is logically entailed by the reciprocity of concepts involved in definition.

The aim of analysis is to clarify and expose the formally paradoxical structure of predication. In the pre-analysis situation conceptual bifurcation (*vikalpa*) is operative, Madhyamikas would probably say rampant. It is a state where entities are identified through a process of attribute fixation. That is to say, the features of entities are fixed and assume a seemingly autonomous existence, and there is no knowledge or recognition of the principle that predicates imply their opposites. If there is an awareness of predicates *and* their

negations, these are resident at different cognitive loci, at different levels of awareness and accessibility. This way predicates are isolated from their opposites and consistency of predication is maintained. Or alternatively it may be that the paradoxical structure of predication surfaces as an unconscious (or even conscious) toleration of a certain degree of predicative ambiguity that manifests as an equivocation at different points in time and/or with respect to different aspects of an entity as to its defining features. Such an ambiguity is perceived, for example, in Chandrakirti's estimation of the Sammitiya conception of a self, the Samkhya notion of self-birth, and the Vijnanavada construal of the relationship between consciousness and its percepts as being different, by way of being divisible into a subject and objects of cognition, yet substantially the same.

Analysis is intended to demonstrate a paradox of predication that is opaque for a non-analytical intellect. If the structure of the subject-predicate relation is basic to analysis, it seems that any opinion, viewpoint or cognitive perspective (*drsti*) can become an object of analysis once such a viewpoint reaches a sufficient degree of articulation and formed precision, i.e. once it becomes a thesis (*pratijna*). Presumably, also, it is expected that some commitment to a thesis is required of whoever holds it. Constructed theses are fairly formal from the outset. Natural viewpoints, by which I mean, innate cognitive and effective responses, presumably require a fair degree of investigation before they can be formalised with sufficient precision to make analysis appropriate. Various sorts of theses are able to be accommodated within the subject-predicate arrangement. The basic structure would accommodate *simple* theses - where single or multiple conjunctively joined predicates are attributed is a subject. It also accommodates *substantive* theses involving nominative or substantial identifications or differentiations between entities and *complex* theses involving descriptions of the behavioural characteristics of entities.

In any instance the paradoxical structure of views is said to be clarified and made transparent by deriving a contrapositive thesis from any thesis that is being advanced. (The notions of thesis and contrapositive thesis here, are, of course, entirely relative, and the proposition that negates a predicate with respect to some subject may be advanced as a thesis, in which case Madhyamikas would claim to derive an *affirmative* or positive rather than a negative contrapositive thesis.) The presumed paradox is that a thesis can be *only* affirmed at the expense of affirming the contrapositive thesis. In terms of the subject-predicate structure consequential analysis claims, then, to generate antilogisms, i.e. the simultaneous affirmation of Pa and -Pa.

The basis for deriving contrapositive theses from any thesis, and so generating logical contradictions, rests on the fact that the copula itself, such as figures in *any* stated thesis taking the form of A *is* P or A *is* not P, is embedded in an oppositional structure of is/is not. The two existential or ontological qualifiers mutually define each other and hence for Madhyamikas also mutually

negate each other. Any affirmation such as is captured by the copula "is" (in either nominative or adjectival constructions) in linking predicates to a subject, derives its *affirmative import* in opposition to the denial "is not". And likewise a denial of the form "A *is not* P" derives its import from the thesis "A *is* P". Hence the existential category: "is *and* is not", is comprised of terms that must be mutually present for either one to be present. And on this basis Madhyamikas draw out contrapositive theses that they could claim are logically entailed in the affirmation of any theses.

In Madhyamika texts the logical contradictions typically turn on a paradox thought to inhere in the *function* that the copula plays as *relating* the subject and predicate(s). The copula serves to *identify* some predicate substantively (as in the self-psycho-physical organism analysis) or attributively (as in the things (*bhava*) re their mode of production analysis) with a subject. (Given these substantive and attributive uses of "is" we may prefer to think of the relationship generically as one of *joining* rather than identifying which has a substantive ring to it.) The negation of the copula, on the other hand, serves to differentiate (or we may prefer, divide) either substantively or attributively some predicate(s) with respect to a subject. Hence the copula and its negation function *relationally* to identify and differentiate respectively. But Madhyamikas claim that identity and differential relationships mutually imply each other, and hence as logical opposites mutually contradict (*pun tshun 'gal ba*) each other, and thus that the whole notion of a relationship is nonsensical.[38] A relationship of difference logically implies a relationship of identity or sameness, at least under the definition of *svabhava* in which intrinsically or genuinely different things are necessarily *unrelated*, in that different things have no characteristics that are in common, and hence have no provision of a basis for any interrelationships at all, including that of difference. On this line of reasoning it is only where there is a similarity in the strongest sense of an identity that there can be a difference. Otherwise there is no point of commonality, and hence no *basis for a comparison* whereby things can be judged to be different. Hence Madhyamikas have argued that whenever and wherever a relationship of difference is affirmed so a relationship of identity must be affirmed, as the notion of a difference implies a point of commonality where relata must be the same. Conversely, Madhyamikas have also argued that a relationship of identity implies a differential relation, as relationships exist, by definition, in dependence on relata that are differentiable, i.e. that are different. Hence wherever there is a relationship there must be a difference. In the case where relata are the same they cease to function as relata and so there is no relationship. In summary then, for Madhyamikas relata are the same *where and to the extent* that they are different and vice versa. Any relationship is paradoxical as it simultaneously affirms an identity *and* difference between the relata. Hence, in the context of their analyses the relation within a subject-predicate structure that is governed

by the copula implies its converse relationship, and on this basis it is considered that a contrapositive thesis can always be derived from any thesis.

3.5 THE DESTRUCTURING OF CONCEPTUALITY

The simultaneous affirmation of a thesis and its negation is the logical fruit of the Madhyamika analysis and it is here that the destructuring of conceptuality will be thought to occur.

The process of consequential analysis, where theses and their contrapositives mutually entail each other, can be thought of figuratively as a series of logical steps that serve to cause or induce logical opposites, theses and contrapositives (i.e. a predicate(s) and its negation with respect to the same entity) to *coalesce* at a common spatio-temporal locus. As Ichimura writes: "the predicament created by this dialectic is due to the unexpected contradiction which our convention implies, and this feature is suddenly disclosed by the particular context in which two contrary entities are juxtaposed over the same sphere and moment of illumination."[39]

A thesis and its contrapositive, which have previously become reified in relationship to each other and achieved an *artificial* autonomy, collapse into each other (as the affirmation of either is seen to imply the other) and mutually negate each other (as they are logical opposites).

P>————————<-P

On this interpretation the bifurcating activity (*vikalpa*) of the intellect would be opposed or countered by analysis, in the sense that analysis would act to show that the separation of logical opposites is constructed and artificial and that intrinsic- as opposed to inter- identifiability is a reification that is mentally imposed on experience.

Intrinsic identification would be negated because the only point at which there could be a real or analytically credible entity identification would be at an *interface* between P and -P but at an interface they would also mutually negate each other, (on the Madhyamika assumption that P and -P, in order to define each other, are logical opposites). The real cutting edge of analysis, then, occurs at the cognitive interface between P and -P, at a *coincidentia oppositorum* where P and -P negate each other.

The interface where P and -P meet and negate each other is also the point where the two truths (*dravya-satya*) meet and divide, for there are two ways of interpreting the bi-negation that describes the state-of-affairs at the interface where P and -P mutually negate other (i.e. where there is neither P nor -P). If the bi-negation is viewed as a *consistent* description then its referent is an emptiness for it is not describing any *thing*. It expresses that which is indefinable and hence refers to emptiness. From this angle the bi-negation expresses an ultimate truth

(*paramartha-satya*). On the other hand, if it is viewed as referring to some*thing*, it is expressing a conventional truth for things (i.e. the bases of emptinesses) which can be designated are conventions, and yet can be designated in the final analysis only at the expense of expressing a logically contradiction. Hence, the bi-negation that expresses the impossibility of a mutual affirmation and negation of a predicate represents the *linguistic junction* between the two truths. If it is taken as a consistent expression it refers to emptiness, if viewed as inconsistent it refers to *that* which is empty, and shows that conventional designations are contradictory.

Madhyamikas, one could guess, would say that though effort and application is required in order for an analyst to counteract the bifurcating tendency, in fact bifurcation, being an artificial condition, is maintained only at the continual investment of effort and that when such effort is relaxed that conceptuality would tend to naturally fold in on itself and dissipate. This at least would make some sense of the notion that emptiness is a natural, effortless, and primordial condition of consciousness and that samsara if not simply the *need* to expend effort at least is characterised by an expenditure of effort.

This explanation for the destructuring of conceptuality by the Madhyamika analysis assumes as we have said that terms arise in dependence on their logical opposites: the principle of terminological reciprocity. The explanation also assumes that the structure, formation, and development of conceptuality in the analytical context conforms to the three aristotelian principles of thought, viz. contradiction, identity, and the excluded middle, or in their predicative form -

Contradiction (x)-(Fx & -Fx),
Identity (x)(Fx = Fx), and
Excluded middle (x)(Fx v -Fx).

These principles are implicated by the Madhyamikas not simply as logical axioms but also it seems as principles of thought that are *descriptive* of the thought activity encountered in analysis. That is, they describe certain structures that govern the train and development of an analyst's thought at the time of debate and meditation, and so are *psychological* principles as well as formal axioms. And insofar as analysis is thought to have a liberative effect, they are also *prescriptive* principles, in that they represent an advocated structural basis for guiding the course of conceptuality. Madhyamikas presumably felt that the structure of thought could be made to approximate to these principles in varying degrees and that it was in the pure form of their analysis that thought was guided by them. As these principles were approached in a process of intellectual development that culminated in their critical analysis it would also stand to reason that conceptuality would come to be governed by the principles at least in the sense that thought would become *law-like* in its development. I will return

to this point when I raise the question of contingency and necessity in analysis a little later.

It is useful to examine how these three principles function in the analytical context as logical axioms that are modelled or replicated within the conceptual development of an analyst, and how they constitute *conditions* for the *formation* of thought and, when *infused* with the principle of terminological reciprocity, a condition for its dissolution.

The principle of noncontradiction states that for any subject A, any given predicate P cannot be both affirmed and denied at the same time and in the same respect. The principle is stated formally[40] and used materially[41] by Nagarjuna on a number of occasions, and is axiomatic for consequential analysis. Chandrakirti in the *Commentary* [MABh: 100] quotes the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK: 25.14 and 8.7] where Nagarjuna states and uses the principle - and says himself that something that partakes of the dual nature (*gnyis kyi dngos po*) of existence and non-existence cannot exist.

In the context of consequential analysis the principle of noncontradiction is used as a structure for dichotomising the possible positions that can be assumed with respect to any matter into two contradictory and mutually excluding theses, i.e. A is P and A is not P, and in doing this the principle is structurally identical with the principle of definition via logical opposites except for the crucial fact that the principle of non-contradiction holds that A cannot be P and -P, where the principle of definition via logical opposites holds that A must be P and -P.

The principle of non-contradiction is utilised in the analytical context as serving to commit someone to a thesis at the expense and in terms of rejecting its logical opposite. In other words, a commitment to the truth of some thesis is gained in parallel fashion to the identification of entities, by assigning a false truth-value to a contrapositive thesis. And vice versa, the assignment of a false truth-value to a contrapositive thesis is possible only on affirming the truth of a thesis. The principle of non-contradiction is thus a *precondition* for the formation of theses and in a *pre-analytical* situation serves to (seemingly) provide a basis for theory validation.

In the analytical context, on the other hand, the principle of non-contradiction comes to fruition in *conjunction* with the principle of definition via logical opposites in its *strong* interpretation by the Madhyamikas. This latter principle functions as a *condition* for analysis rather than as a precondition, though the principle of non-contradiction rightly acts as a condition *for* analysis also. The difference is that the principle of non-contradiction is at work in the non-analytical state-of-affairs in the sense that it is a tacit (and in logic a formal) assumption where the principle of definition via logical opposites is not. Together these two principles account for the destructuring of conceptuality.

These two principles force a dilemma upon the mind of an analyst. On the one hand, the principle of definition via logical opposites structures conceptuality *in the direction* of simultaneously affirming a thesis and its negation

(i.e. simultaneously affirming the presence *and* absence of predicate(s) with respect to the one entity: that A is and is not P). And, on the other hand, the principle of noncontradiction structures conceptuality in a way that formally and prescriptively (and perhaps also psychologically) precludes consciousness from simultaneously affirming a thesis and its negation (i.e. it disallows that predicate(s) can simultaneously be affirmed and denied of the same entity in the same respect: that a is not both P and not P).

When conceptuality is formed by both these principles its structure is forced in the direction of assuming two mutually contradicting and excluding states to which there would seem to be two possible avenues of resolution. One, a non-analytical (and for Madhyamikas regressive) resolution which is to retain the structure formed by one principle at the expense of revoking the other principle, *or* alternatively, an analytical (and soteriologically progressive) solution that adopts neither structure (given an analyst's commitment to the validity of both principles). The resultant effect of this last solution would be to introduce a stasis within a stream of conceptuality. In other words, the tension between the two principles can be relieved either by an analyst backtracking as it were to a non-critical standpoint where one or other of the principles lapses from its role as a structural former of conceptual development (one guesses that the principle of definition via logical opposites would be discarded) or by a dissolution of conceptuality. This last solution would take place, as we have said, at an interface between two mutually contradictory conceptual structures where conceptuality would cease as the only logically forthright response to the dilemma of having to simultaneously identify and differentiate P and -P. The attempt to resolve these two opposed structures can perhaps be metaphorically likened to forcing a material into the apex of a conical tube with the difference that matter cannot destructure.

The principle of non-contradiction is revoked in this interpretation, on the insight that two logical opposites are not contradictories of which one is true at the expense of the falsity of the other, but rather are logical contraries in which both are false. In other words, the pre-analytical assumption that P and -P are contradictories is analytically rejected on the discernment - propelled by a strong interpretation of the principle of definition via logical opposites - that the two opposites mutually negate each other.

Though any central-state materialist assumptions and implications would be abhorrent to Madhyamikas it is interesting to note in passing that the mathematician Ludvik Bass has hypothesised that the *reductio ad absurdum* method of proof may have "a radically distinct structure at the neural level"[42] when compared with constructive methods of proof. Where with the latter, neural modes may be characterised as achieving a point of stabilisation or a lack of conflict, in the case of *reductio* arguments he suggests that the conflict between premises may have a neural analogue as a "persisting conflict between modes".[43] If the conflict between premises is mirrored at the neural level we

could further speculate that this would involve a tendency for one neural structure to be formed or activated into two mutually excluding states, a tendency which could be responded to by assuming one state and relinquishing the other (this would be the Madhyamikas regressive option, and would be exhibited as a failure to conclude a proof) or by a destructuring of the neural state due to its being formed into an impossible condition (this would manifest as a conclusion to a proof).

The significance of conceptuality becoming unstructured is that it cannot be identified with a concept in either its positive or negative formulation and so becomes vacuous with respect to that concept. The dissolution of conceptuality that such a vacuity of reference amounts to I would interpret as an insight into the emptiness of the concepts being analysised and so to their putative referents also. In other words the confluence of logical opposites and its resultant conceptual stasis would be the insight of emptiness. The notion of identifiability is inconsistent, and when it is seen that entities lack an intrinsic identity conceptuality dissipates. The doctrinal distinction made by Tibetans between certified and inferential cognitions of emptiness I will raise later.

An assumption in this explanation is that the logical falsity in simultaneously affirming a thesis and its negation also reflects a psychological impossibility, such that two logically contradictory concepts cannot be *held* within a unity of consciousness. David Armstrong[44] (among others) has questioned the impossibility of the cotemporal entertaining of contradictory beliefs and it is worthwhile briefly considering what he says as it helps to highlight the Madhyamika's position.

Armstrong's first observation en route to his final position is that a person can hold contradictory beliefs but fail to discern the contradiction. He writes: "It [the mind] is a large and untidy place, and we may believe 'p' and '-p' simultaneously but fail to bring the two beliefs together, perhaps for emotional reasons."[45] The Madhyamikas would agree with this as a description of a non-analytical intellect, where in order to maintain predicative consistency, perhaps so as support cathexis towards some object, any indication of a possible predicative inconsistency would be unconsciously or consciously repressed. An individual may decide that the emotional attachment (or aversion) to be lost (or gained) or at least attenuated, on realising an inconsistency is not worth forsaking and so prefer to remain oblivious of any inconsistency, save such an awareness destabilising and undermining an affective response. A difference, on this point, between Armstrong and the Madhyamikas is that Madhyamikas would say that *all* rather than just some beliefs may be contradicted within an individuals fabric of beliefs.

Armstrong goes on to suggest that "it seems possible to become aware that we hold incompatible beliefs."[46] The (apparently) contentious part of Armstrong's claim (it seems) is that such an awareness need *not* result in any structural or categorial change to the belief situation. (He agrees that in some

cases it would result in some modification in the situation, such as the revoking of one belief.) The point for Armstrong, though, is that the logically incompatible beliefs represent *two different states,* and hence the copresence of beliefs in the one mind is not their *coalignment.* Hence, there is no real conflict in his account with what Madhyamikas would say. He is not proffering the "confusing situation" where two states are *actually* coaligned, but rather has described two or three situations of contradictory beliefs that Madhyamikas would see as stages either prior to analysis or at some point within an analysing context but prior to the coalignment (and concomitant destructuring) of contradictory structures. There is still to explain the roles that the principles of identity and the excluded middle play in consequential analysis.

A principle of identity is presupposed in the other two aristotelian principles and in the principle of definition via logical opposites. The principle figures as a *precondition* for analysis, and serves to guarantee predicative consistency with regard to an entity being analysed. Though it is not formally stated in Madhyamika texts as a precondition the notion of a *svabhava* itself as the "object to be negated" in an analysis states a tacit if not formal assention to the principle of identity, as *ex hypothesi* whatever has a *svabhava* cannot change its identity, i.e. cannot become something else without losing its *svabhava.* In the meditative manuals of the Tibetans that outline stylised procedures for the private contemplation of emptiness (as opposed to analysis through the medium of debate) an initial procedure is "ascertaining the mode of appearance of what is negated"[47] which in part amounts to an analyst *committing* him or herself to the identity criteria for an entity being investigated, for example, that a certain configuration of forms, percepts, affections, etc. is a self and *regarding* that configuration to be just that self. It is reasonable also to suppose that dialecticians in the course of their debates would likewise try to irrevocably commit an opponent at the very outset to specific identity criteria for the entity(s) figuring in an investigation. The rationale behind this extraction of identity criteria is clearly an *attempt* on behalf of an analyst to *guarantee* a fruitful result to an analysis by ensuring that there is no equivocation on what is being analysed at some point during an analysis, and to forestall the invoking of changed identity criteria, either of which would act to *dilute* an analysis to the qualitative extent of any changes in identity criteria (given the stability of other conditions for analysis). In other words, were the identity of an entity that is being analyzed to be revoked in any degree *subsequent* to being established as an object to be refuted but *prior* to it being refuted, a conclusion would fail to bear on the changed entity with its revised identity criteria to whatever *extent* it was a *new* entity. So we see Chandrakirti, for example, being uncompromising with his opponents who proffer potentially ambiguous identity criteria or introduce mobile concepts, the definitions of which vacillate, and so undermine the full force of a Madhyamika's analysis.

The principle of the excluded middle was upheld by Madhyamikas, it seems, in order to account for the *complete* dissolution of conceptuality and so substantiate the possibility of a thoroughly pure or unalloyed nirvana. The principle says that any entity A, is either predicated by P or not predicated by P; that there is no other, third alternative. The principle is very clearly stated by Nagarjuna (for example, MK: 2.8b[48] and 2.21). Chandrakirti says *Commentary* [MABh: 100.16-17] that "through the pervasion [by existence and non-existence] there will not be even the slightest particularisation[49] [remaining] (*bkag pas cung zad kyang khyad par du mi 'gyur ro*)[50]". He also invokes the principle at various points, for example (MABh: 85.17-20) in the analysis of birth from other, the two views that a product and producer are identical or other are the only possibilities and likewise (MA: 6.169d), when the two possibilities of meeting and not meeting between a cause and affect are relinquished there is nothing else to consider. Shantideva writes in the *Introduction to the Evolved Lifestyle* [BCA: 9.35] that "When neither things nor non-things are placed before the intellect then there is no other route [51] [for the mind to take], it lacks any support [and so achieves] the supernal peace." In the Tibetan meditative manuals[52] the principle is included as a second essential step (after the commitment to the predicative configuration and consistency of any entity that is to be analysed). It is called "ascertaining invariable concomitance" and is a commitment to the principle that outside of two mutually contradictory modes of existence there is no third mode; or what is the same thing, two logical opposites pervade all modes of predication.

The principle, as Shantideva clearly shows above, is utilised to rule out the possibility that a residuum of conceptuality remains after the dissolution of two logically opposed concepts. Were, for example, there to be a third conceptual position outside of a concept's positive and negative formulations then that third position would still be retained after the positive and negative forms were analytically dissolved. It would mean that some remnants of conceptuality would fall outside the compass of consequential analysis in the sense that they could not be analytically removed. Hence, the ascription of contradictory attributes to the one entity jointly exhausts all possible modes of predication with respect to that attribute. Thus when the paradox of predication is exposed an entity is unpredicated (positively or negatively) with respect to that predicate.

It may be useful briefly to summarise what has been a fairly elaborate explanation up to this point. I have attempted to (1) isolate certain assumptions that seem to be intrinsic to Madhyamika analysis, and (2) describe an infrastructure to their form of analysis within which the Madhyamikas can (in terms of its assumptions) claim with some measure of internal coherency that logical analysis is a technique appropriate to their practical endeavours of gaining a religious insight.

The assumptions that undergird the Madhyamika analysis are these: (1) That conceptuality depends on the *consistent* ascription of predicates to an entity.

(2) That predicates arise in the context of their logical opposites, which in its strong interpretation, as is required by the Madhyamikas, means that the presence of a predicate implies its absence (and vice versa). This principle assumes a status equal to the aristotelian principles and its significance is that analysis is effective to the *extent* that this principle is structurally formative (*in its strong interpretation*) for conceptuality. (3) The logical validity and formative influence and role of the three aristotelian principles of thought in structuring the development of conceptuality.

Given these assumptions, consequential analysis can be viewed as a technique for taking a stream of conceptuality that is (artificially) structured by a principle of non-contradiction (and loosely also by the principles of identity and the excluded middle) and introducing within that an awareness of a purported paradox inhering in conceptuality (on the assumption that concept formation is paradoxical). A stream of conceptuality, in other words, is redirected by consequential analysis into becoming aware of an inherent paradox in predication that, by its tendency to compel consciousness to assume the psychologically impossible (or at least structurally unstable) condition of forming two mutually contradictory structures, results in a failure in the ability to predicate, and in consequence a destructuring and dissolution of conceptuality that can be interpreted as the insight into emptiness.

4 PATTERNS OF ANALYSIS IN THE *INTRODUCTION TO THE MIDDLE WAY* [MA]

The above explanation, when considered alongside the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] analyses, gives weight to its claim to accuracy as a structural description of consequential analysis. This explanation provides a sound basis for some speculative extensions that I am presently working on that link the role of analysis into the notion of a progressive liberation that accords roughly with the Madhyamika path-structure.

4.1 THE *INTRODUCTION TO THE MIDDLE WAY'S* [MA] PROOFS AND CATEGORIES OF ANALYSIS

Let us begin by schematising the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] analyses. The *Introduction's* [MA] schema of analysis, as we said in the last chapter, does not exhaust all entities (existents and non-existents) that make up the universe. Persons (*pudgala*) and phenomena (*dharma*) comprise the universal set, whatever is not a person is a phenomenon and whatever is not a phenomenon is a person.[53] Chandrakirti analyses persons and [functional] things (*bhava*), which are a subclass within the class of phenomena. He doesn't analyse non-products (*asamskrta*).[54] These, though, are analysed by Nagarjuna, from whom we can pick out an analytical format so as to gain a full coverage of

analyses here. (Person-conceptions, as I'll explain, can be both products and non-products.)

In the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] the two basic classes of persons and things are respectively analysed by the seven-section proof based on the theses of a substantive identity or difference between the self (=person) and psycho-physical organism, and the four theses that proffer four modes of production; namely, from self, other, both, or neither.

Leaving aside the structure of the proofs (*upapatti, gtan tshigs*) for the moment, these categories within which Chandrakirti analyses entities are clearly rubrics from the stock and trade of the ancient Indian philosophical traditions. The person-phenomena distinction is part of the earliest Buddhist abhidharma, as is that between products and non-products. The distinction between the self as one with or different from the aggregation captures the differences between the Buddhist versus Hindu Samkhya and Vaisheshika selves and between innate versus intellectual conceptions of the person. Likewise, "birth from self" serves to characteristically distinguish the Samkhya causal thesis; "birth from other", the Buddhist and Nyaya-Vaisheshika theory of causation; "birth from both" the Jaina view, and "birth from no cause" that of the Charvakas.

Hence, though these categories, as I'll show, serve certain crucial *analytical requirements* by exhausting fields of discourse and conforming to the analytical structures outlined earlier (requirements that are quite independent of any *specific* categories), they are also conditioned by and speak to the Indian philosophical tradition in its own Buddhist and Hindu categories.[55] It seems that Chandrakirti (and Nagarjuna before him) settled on their categories with both these reasons in mind, and thus that the categories reflect certain logical necessities and a historical conditioning. Our interest now, though, is with the logical reasons behind these category choices and with the proofs utilised to demonstrate the emptiness of these categories and their class members.

At this point we can usefully introduce a figure (3.1) that encapsulates these various categories and correlates them with the formats of analysis used with each category in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] (and in extension from other sources).

The information above the horizontal broken line summarises the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] analyses, i.e. its categories and modes of proof. Though the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] doesn't analyse non-products (*asamskrta*) we can fill in below that line, though not without a little uncertainty. For Chandrakirti (and here he follows the abhidharma categories[56]) there are three types of non-produced phenomena, space (*akasa*), and two types of stases or cessations, a so-called noninvestigational stasis (*apratisamkhya-nirodha*) and an investigational stasis (*pratisamkhya-nirodha*) which is the same thing as nirvana. It is a little unclear whether there is one mode of proof that Madhyamikas consider can be utilised with all three types of non-products or whether each, or at least space and the two stases are thought to




Fig 3.1 A flow diagram of the *Introduction's* [MA] analyses

require different types of proofs. In the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK: 7.33] Nagarjuna gives, as it were, one generic proof that applies to the entire class of non- products. He reasons that the refutation of products (*samskrta*) implicitly refutes non-products for "if a composite product is not proved, how can a non-composite product (*asamskrta*) be proved?"[57] This is what I call a substantive proof rather than a modal proof for it doesn't analyse an entity in terms of its predicates. Instead it draws *directly* and nonconsequentially on a principle of the interpenetration or transference of characteristics between logical opposites and in this it differs from all of the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] and many of the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way's* [MK] other analyses. Also, it doesn't follow the structure I've outlined. I will elaborate more in this type of proof a little later.

Whether the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way's* [MK] analysis of nirvana (chpt. 25) can be taken as paradigmatic for analysing all the non-products, specifically space, is unclear. Further, the proof itself is rather loosely structured and relies on incompatibilities between certain definitions rather than on consequences issuing from the more stylised proofs that we are accustomed to in other Madhyamika analyses.[58] As such, this proof doesn't accord with the analytical infrastructure I have abstracted.

Chapter five of the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK] analyses space as one of the five base elements (*dhatu*). The analysis is consequential in form and temporal in structure. Space exists in dependence on a defining property (*laksana*). There are two possibilities, either space exists before its defining property, or the defining property exists prior to that which it defines. (This last posulate is logically equivalent to space coming into existence after the existence of its defining property.) The first posulate leads to the contradiction (5.1b) that space would be uncharacterised as space and hence would not be space, and the second posulate leads to the contradiction that space would exist before it existed as (5.4b) there cannot be a defining property where there is no subject of characterisation (*laksya*). Though this analysis is (PP: 103) only stated to be paradigmatic for the other base elements of earth, water, fire, air, and consciousness it could certainly be applied to the two stases.

Finally we can mention that bsTan pai nyi ma (who like Chandrakirti works with the three primary classes of persons, products, and non-products) takes space as an example of a non-product and suggests that it be analysed in terms of whether it be one with or different from its parts, i.e. directions.[59]
It is unclear to me how the two stases could be analysed in terms of their identity or differences with their parts for the notion of a stasis, such as nirvana, doesn't readily lend itself to the idea that it may partake of being conceptually divisible, and so perhaps this method of analysing space is not meant to be a paradigm for the other non-products.

In summary, there is a lack of clarity and consensus in how non-products are analysed, and for that reason the figure with respect to those details is only tentative.

Returning to the figure, we should note that there is no *logical compulsion* behind the correlations or alignments of modes of proof and the entities that they analyse. There are some *logical restrictions,* of course, for example, a production based analysis could not be used with a conception of the person that is characterised as being uncompounded or un-produced (i.e. most if not all transcendental conception of the person), nor, of course, with any other non-products.

Outside of these restrictions, though, when one goes beyond the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] and considers other Madhyamika works, there is a considerable degree of variability as to how entities are analyzed and which proofs are aligned with which categories. The analysis based on refuting the theses of a substantial identity and difference between an entity and its constituent parts, for example, (as underpins the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] analysis of the person) is also applied to phenomena (*dharma*). For example, the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK: chpt. 10] uses a five-sectioned analysis in examining the fuel-fire relationship, and bsTan pai nyi ma advocates its use in analysing both products and non-products, Shantideva (BCA: 9.80-83) analyses the body (*kaya*) around these postulates, and Chandrakirti witnesses its use also in the investigation of phenomena by his heuristic instantiation of a carriage when describing the personality analysis. On the other hand, the analysis via the four theses of production that Chandrakirti and Nagarjuna (MK: chpt. 1) both use with things (*bhava*) is used in the *Precious Jewel* [RA: 1.37] for analysing the person (presumably a non- transcendental conception of the person, i.e. one in which the person is putatively a product). Besides a flexible utilisation of the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] analyses there are also many alternative analytical formats exemplified in the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK], for example the temporal analysis with which Nagarjuna investigates, among other things, (chpt. 7) produced phenomena.[60]

Perhaps these textual variations represent an element of individual preference and a degree of flexibility on the part of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamika analysts with regard to which proofs were matched to which classes of entities. Nor can we rule out that the correlations in *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA], which appear as fairly standardised, represent a *natural alignment* between entities and proofs that became apparent to Madhyamikas in the course of several centuries of analytical meditation and debate.[61] It is not impossible, for example, that the alignments in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] represent a pairing of proofs and entities that Madhyamikas came to believe were analytically efficient and expeditious.

A final point to note with respect to the figure is that the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] takes the person-phenomena distinction to be the initial way of

dividing up the universal set of concepts through choice and not necessity. In theory a primary distinction needs only to exhaust the universal set and would also be satisfied by the products versus non-products distinction. In the instance of the products and non-products distinction being the initial bifurcation, concepts of the self or person would have to be divided into produced and non-produced person conceptions and analysed with the *different* analyses appropriate to each. This is possible for as we just noted the *Precious Jewel* [RA] analyses produced self-conceptions with the tetralemma proof. Chandrakirti, though, decided for some reason not to do this, but to analyse *all* self conceptions with the seven-sections. There is no way of telling whether he decided first to bifurcate the universe of discourse around the person-phenomena distinction, and from this to align the seven-sections with all self- conceptions, or whether he had in mind that the seven- section should be applied to self-conceptions (perhaps because of the neatness and simplicity in using one method of refutation for all self-conceptions) and draw the person-phenomena distinction in dependence on his wish to utilise the seven-sections with self-conceptions.

4.2 THE *INTRODUCTION'S* [MA] ANALYSES AND THE CORE STRUCTURE

The first point to observe in aligning the structural model with the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] is that the first two theses in both the seven-section analysis of the person and the tetralemma for analysing things represent a thesis and its logical negation. Thus the contrasting relationship in the personality analysis is between a substantive identity between the self and the psycho-physical organism and a logical negation of that identity. In other words, to say that the self is *other than* the psycho-physical organism is logically equivalent to saying that the self *is not identical* with the psycho-physical organism. And likewise, the second thesis in the tetralemma that structures the analysis of things is a logical negation of the first thesis: "that a thing is born from itself", for the thesis that "a thing is born *from another*" is logically equivalent to "it *not* being born *from itself*". Thus the adjectival terms "other (than)", "(from) another", "different (from)", tib. *gzhan*, skt. *anya, para, vyatirikta*, signify a difference or contrast that is between logical opposites.[62]

When we interpret the term "*gzhan*" thus, we see that the first two theses in the analyses of the person and things embody the oppositional structure of contrasting a thesis and its contrapositive. At the linguistic level these two pairs of theses embody the "is/is not" structure, whereby a predicate is affirmed and denied with respect to an entity. In other words in the case of persons (*pudgala*) they *are* or *are not* the psycho-physical organism, and in the case of things (*bhava*) they *are* or *are not* produced from themselves.

The analysis in terms of an entity being one thing or many things, likewise, embodies the same structure for "being many" is logically equivalent to "not

being one". The same holds, for the more general patterns of analysis, (on which the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] analysis of the person is based), that an entity is either the same as or different from its parts, for "being different form its parts" is equivalent to "being not the same as its parts".

The function of the term "*gzhan*" in marking off a logical opposite also guarantees that these pairs of theses exhaust a universal or appropriate category domain. (I will comment on the differences between categorial and non-categorial analyses shortly.) The analytical requirements that conceptuality is structured by the principles of contradiction and the excluded middle is thus fulfilled through the creation of two logically opposed theses that exhaust a universe or category.

The second significant observation in reducing the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] analyses to a core analytical structure is that the five final sections to the seven-section analysis of the person and the two final theses to the tetralemma proof of things *rely* on the first two sections of each analysis, and more significantly, that the analyses of the selflessness of persons and things can be *completed* within the first two theses of each of these sets of theses.

In the case of the seven-section analysis the last five relationships are structurally dependent for their refutation on the first two theses positing a sameness or difference (*tattvanyatva-paksa*) between the self and the psycho-physical organism. That is to say, the refutation of these additional relations hinges on the earlier refutations of the relations of identity and difference. As we explained earlier, the five additional relations are thought to be common ways in which the self and the psycho-physical organism may be related. The theses that the self is the collection or shape are analysed in parallel fashion to the identity of the self and psycho-physical organism, and refuted on similar grounds, namely that the collection (6.135) doesn't partake of the unitary characteristics of a self, nor (6.152a-c) the self of the plural character of a collection. Likewise the self is not the shape (i.e. form constituent) due to similar contradictions based on the incommensurability between unitary and plural concepts. The two relations of containment and the relation of possession, on the other hand, are refuted on the basis that the relation of otherness is refutable. This is stated explicitly (6.142) for the two containment relations, and the relationship of possession is clearly dependent on the self and the psycho-physical organism being different.

In summary, if the self and psycho-physical organism are the same then the psycho-physical organism cannot be *in* the self, nor the self *in* the psycho-physical organism. Likewise, if the self and the psycho-physical organism are not the same then the self cannot *be* the collection or shape of the psycho-physical constituents. Hence, when the first two theses are refuted, *ipso facto* the other five theses lapse also (and any others specifying a relationship between the self and psycho-physical organism that could be conceived of).

The presuppositional role of the relationship of identity and difference, and derivative or subsidiary nature of the others is acknowledged by Chandrakirti in the *Clear Words* [PP: 194] where containment and possession are reduced to their presupposing a relation of difference, and is exemplified in the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK: 18.1] where the self is analyzed in terms of the two alternatives of identity and difference, according to Chandrakirti (PP: 166) for the sake of brevity. bsTan pai nyi ma in his meditative contextualisation of Tsong kha pa's *Three Principal Aspects of the Path* (*Lam gyi gtso bo rnam pa gsum*) likewise ascertains the personal selflessness through a procedure based just on the first two of Chandrakirti's seven sections.[63] Hence, the logical consequences required for precluding possible views about the mode of being of the person, and thus the demonstration of its emptiness, are completed within the first two theses.

Likewise the analysis of things (*bhava*) through the logic of the four can be completed - in the sense of gaining a full consequential proof for the emptiness of things - by refuting just the first two theses, that things are produced from themselves or others. This requires a little explanation. The third thesis in the tetralemma is that things are produced from a combination of self and other. In the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] (6.98) this thesis is refuted by referring back to the earlier separate refutations of production from self and other. The assumption is that any mixture can be conceptually resolved into its constituents which are then refuted individually. In some instances this seems obvious, for example, in the case where production form self and other occurs serially, such as a sprout first being born from itself and then later from another. Or, where one thing is actually composed of two developmental continua (perhaps developing in unison), where one continuum is born from itself and the other from another. What does seem problematic, though, is the instance of one thing being produced from self and other simultaneously and with respect to identical aspects of the object. This last requirement is simply the definition of an object being singular, i.e. having just one defining facet. Madhyamikas obviously do not find this last case problematic and in so doing must be saying that there are no *real* mixtures, i.e. no compound processes that exist as a new mode of production outside of production from self and other. The problem is ameliorated, though, for in Madhyamika philosophy the notion of production is mental imputation (as in Humean causation) and hence it is enough that any mixture can be *conceptually* resolved into the two modes of self- and other-production. Another way of seeing the Madhyamika's position on this (and this applies to the next thesis of production without a cause as well) is that self- and other-production jointly exhaust the possible modes of production and so production from both (or from no cause) as *novel modes* are excluded on this count.

The fourth thesis, that things can arise from no cause is excluded not only on the grounds of a joint pervasion by the first two but through a category error. As

I've explained, the class of things (*bhava*) is identical with the class of products (*samskrti-dharma*), and so this last thesis in fact falls outside theses that explain the arising of things. That is to say it does not provide an alternative at all, for it denies that very concept of a thing=product that it purports to explain. Hence, this final thesis is improperly included. The third thesis, then, is resolved into the first two, and the fourth is wrongly included in the first place.

Thus, with respect to the logical requirements of analysis (though apparently not for the psychological requirements) the five additional theses in the seven-section analysis are strictly unnecessary as are the two final lemmas of the tetralemma proof.

Given that we can discover the structure of two logically opposed theses as basic to the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] analyses it is informative to recapsulate from the last chapter on how the consequences (*prasanga*), or exposure of contradictions are created in these two analyses for they show the reliance on the deployment of the principle of definition via logically opposed theses. This principle states, we recall, that a thesis can be affirmed only at the expense of its denial (i.e. at the expense of affirming a contrapositive thesis). The principle accounts for the Madhyamika generation of logical contradictions.

The logical contradictions sought in consequential analysis involve a simultaneous affirmation of two mutually opposed theses. From an analyst's viewpoint it is necessary that a contrapositive thesis is *seen* to be entailed by a thesis. With respect to the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] analyses this means that the first two theses in each of the sets of theses making up the analyses of persons and things, the first thesis of each set must be seen to imply the second and vice versa, the second thesis of each set must imply the first. In other words, an affirmation of either of the first two theses of each set must imply the negation of those thesis.

4.3 THE *INTRODUCTION'S* [MA] CONTRADICTIONS

This pattern, whereby theses and contrapositive theses mutually affirm each other is to be found in the key analyses of the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA].

In the analysis of things through their possible modes of production the two essential and jointly exhaustive modes are production from self and other. In the case of production or birth from self the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] raises two jointly exhaustive alternatives as to how there could be birth from self. These are that the product retains the nature of a producer or adopts a new nature. If (MA: 6.11 and MABh: 85) the product doesn't assume a nature different from that of the producer (which is viewable as either the product being the same as the producer, or vice versa) then as there are no perceivable differences between the producer and product, one doesn't have an instance of production or birth, for *ex hypothesi* this requires a product that can be discerned

from a producer. Thus, here there is no birth or production *qua* production and so no production from self. The other option is (MA: 6.10cd and MABh: 84-85) that the product does lose its former nature thus fulfilling the requirement that products are different from their producers. But here the product ceases to be identical with itself as a producer and hence is an "other" with respect to the producer. As such, production from self (insofar as one is talking about production) requires that products and producers differ and so all production is production from another, including production from self if one wishes to confirm the presence of a *productive* process. The first option, then, ensures that the notion of production is retained in the thesis of birth from other by ruling out the case that the product and producer are the same, on the grounds that it forfeits the notion of production. The second option draws the consequence (*prasanga*) that production from self implies production from another. Thus the thesis demonstrably implies the contrapositive thesis.

The analysis of the thesis of birth from other proceeds likewise by raising two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities; namely, that a producer or cause is separate or not separate from a product or effect. The *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] analysis is not as crisp here as with the thesis of birth from self. The connection is taken in two ways, in a temporal sense and in terms of an interface between a producer and product within the continuum of a productive process. In the temporal sense the options are between whether a producer decays and product arises (or more simply, a cause and effect occur), simultaneously (tib. *dus mnam, dus gcig, gcig tshe, cig car du,* skt. *samakala, ekakala*) or non- simultaneously. In the sense of an interface it is a question of whether or not a cause and effect or producer and product meet (*phrad, milana*) or fail to meet. The arguments are these. The first arguments reject the option that causes and effects or producers and products can be separate from each other, on the grounds that such an option forfeits the notion of production or causation. The claim (6.169cd) is that if the two are separate then the producer or cause cannot be distinguished from non-causes, in which case they cease to be causes or producers. The idea is that the notion of "otherness" doesn't partake of degrees or graduations, things are either the same or different. If they are different they are equally different, as it were. This makes nonsense out of the notion of production as (6.14) *any* "other" could be posited with equal reason as the cause of anything else. There would be no restriction on what can cause what, outside of the requirement that causes and their effects be different. If there *is* birth from another then (MABh: 90.1-12) everything would cause everything. Thus, from this angle the notion of production or causation would be unspecified in the extreme and for this reason effectively forfeited. This conclusion can be obtained from another angle. Production, if it is to be at all meaningful has to be a specified relationship in the sense that some "others" have to be precluded from being causes or effects in instances of causation or production. For example in the production of a sprout

only seeds can be causes not elephants though both are "other" or different than sprouts, and for Madhyamikas, other to the same degree. When the Madhyamikas work with an assumption that things are either the same or different, and that there is no basis in conceptuality for the notions that things may be more or less different from each other, it is bogus to call on the fact of "otherness" as a means for precluding *some* others from being producers and products with respect to each other. In other words, the productive relationship cannot be delimited and so gain some specification by calling on the "otherness" between things, for if some "others" are precluded from being causally related on the grounds of their "otherness" then *all* "others" should be precluded, including producers and products that one would normally see as being related in a productive or causal continuum, such as rice seeds and rice sprouts. Hence a difference between producers and products renders the productive relationship meaningless. So far there is no consequence (*prasanga*), rather one option has been excluded on the grounds that it forfeits the notion of production *qua* production, and hence of production from another.

As there is no production in the first case, the only viable position for production from another would be where the producer and product are non-separate. The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] considers a lack of separation between the producer and product in terms of their simultaneity and their meeting. The refutation of a simultaneity between the two (6.20) argues that the notions of producers and products requires that the two do not exist simultaneously, for if they did, a producer could not *give rise* to a product, in that for as long as a producer has existed so one would have a product. In other words, the product that exists contemporaneously with and for the duration of its producer could not be distinguished from its producer, for when they are simultaneous there would be no duality between a product as opposed to a producer (given that products by definition arise from, and so subsequently to, their producers). Hence (MABh: 98) it is impossible for there to be a duality within a productive continuum or process of birth. A product could not be different from its producer and hence if there is said to be a process of birth at all then in the case of a simultaneity between a producer and product the process would be one of birth from self.

The argument seems clearer when considering the characteristics of an interface between causes and their effects. If there is to be a genuine meeting between causes and their effects, then at the point where they meet one must merge with the other. Were they not to be so connected, one could not become the other. In other words, at the point where the producer is becoming the product (the seed the sprout) the two must be one. As Chandrakirti writes (6.169ab): "If the cause [that you posit] produces an effect due to [their being] a contact [between the two], then at the time [and place that they are in contact with each other] they would be a single potential (*sakyatra*), and therefore the producer would not be different from the effect." And because the producer and

product are identical in this case one has an instance of "birth from self". Hence, the thesis of "birth from another" is claimed to imply its negation.

In both of these cases of refuting birth from self and birth from another, one alternative is rejected on the grounds that it forfeits the notion of production, and hence could not be what is meant by *birth* or *production* from self or other. A consequence is then drawn out on the assumption that the only viable alternative (i.e. the one that retains a meaningful notion of birth or production) is correct. If it is affirmed it is claimed that it negates itself and so establishes its opposite.

The analysis of persons proceeds in much the same way. The first alternative from among the two that are essential to the analysis is that the self is different from the psycho-physical organism or what is the same thing, is *not* the psycho-physical organism. Two possibilities are adduced in this case. Such a self can be known or not known. If it is not known it cannot be known as an "other" with respect to the psycho-physical organism, so this option drops out straight away. The other option, and one from which the consequence is derived, is that a self that is different from the psycho-physical organism can be known. Madhyamikas argue though, that if that self is known, which it must be in order for it to be known as "different from the psycho-physical organism, it must be the psycho-physical organism for the psycho-physical organism defines the limits of knowledge in the sense that what ever can be experienced is experienced in terms of the psycho-physical organism, specifically feelings, discriminations and consciousness. An assumption (6.124 and MABh: 242) is that if the self is not included in (*ma gtogs*) the psycho-physical organism then it can be known, located, and described, etc. independently of and without reference to the psycho-physical organism, and that if this is not possible then the self is included within, and so is not different from the psycho-physical organism. If the self is different it is unrelated to the psycho-physical organism and hence cannot be known through the psycho-physical apparatus. Given, though, that the psycho-physical organism takes compass of *all* cognition through the sense and mental consciousnesses and all cognisables through the physical constituent (*rupa-skandha*), a self outside of the psycho-physical organism cannot be known and hence a self cannot be different from it. Thus the thesis that the self and psycho-physical organism are different is seen to imply its negation.

The second basic alternative, that exhausts the modes in which the self could exist, is that the self is the same as the psycho-physical organism. This is a negation of the foregoing thesis. The refutation of this thesis hinges on whether the self and the psycho-physical organism are individually discernable in the instance of their being the same thing. They either are both discernable or they *both* aren't.

If they are not discernable, one from each other, as the thesis seems to imply, then one could not say that the self is the same as the psycho-physical organism

for this supposes that there are *two* things which are one. There could be a self *or* a psycho-physical organism, but if both of them are in fact just one thing then there can't be the two of them. This thesis collapses because for Madhyamikas there is no such things as a genuine identity relationship; for relationships require at least two discernable relata. Thus, this interpretation of the thesis is not consistently formulated, and in fact describes a logical impossibility.

Hence, the thesis must be taken to mean that though the referent of the term "self" and referent of the term "psycho-physical organism" are the same, the referents can be distinguished from each other. On this interpretation, though, the identity relationship is forsaken for if things can be genuinely distinguished from each other by having different properties (such as being divisible in the case of the psycho-physical organism and indivisible into parts in the case of the self) then they are different. Thus, when a relationship is *retained* rather than forsaken as in the first interpretation, the thesis that the self and the psycho-physical organism are the same, implies that they are different.

Thus, in the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] key analyses of the person and things we find pairs of consequential arguments that purport to logically derive a negation of a thesis from its affirmation. This works for both the thesis and its negation and so the first two theses from each of the two sets mutually negate each other.

Though I'll not trace it now, a similar pattern is operative in the temporal analyses in the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK] and the generic analysis based on an entity's unity or separation from its parts, of which the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] person analysis is an example.

4.4 CATEGORY RESTRICTED AND UNRESTRICTED ANALYSES

One small point worth noting - as a correction to Gangadean's account of the dialectical logic - is that analyses can proceed (and do in the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK] and *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA]) through both restricted and unrestricted categories of analysis. According to Gangadean,[64] a critical formal condition of the transformational dialectic is that the opposites involved are logical contraries, by which Gangadean means intentional opposites as opposed to logical complements (which by implication are extensional opposites). The difference here is that logical contraries exhaust a well-defined category within the universal set of categories whereas logical complements exhaust the universal set of categories.

In the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] it is standard (if anything more so) to analyse through logical complements and it is only when analysing things (*bhava*) that Chandrakirti analyses through logical contraries as Gangadean understands that term. The internal structures of the analyses are different depending on whether the categories of analysis are restricted or unrestricted.

In the case of category restricted analyses it is necessary that the predicate in terms of which a concept is analysed is its defining predicate or property (*svalaksana*). Thus, for example, in analysing things (*bhava*), Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti analyse their defining characteristic of "being produced" and adduce two primary possibilities that are opposites and which exhaust *only* the ways in which things can be produced, viz. from themselves or others. In the case of non-category analyses, on the other hand, the actual predicate(s) within which an entity is analysed are immaterial, though it is necessary that the predicate exhaust the entire field of discourse. Thus, the analysis of the person could, hypothetically, be carried out not only in terms of its identity or difference with respect to the *psycho-physical organism*, but for any predicate at all. The five-fold division of the psycho-physical organism (*skandha*) is obviously chosen as it is a stock rubric for Buddhism. Theoretically, though, any predicate would suffice to prove the non-predicability of the person, so long as it is affirmed and denied of the person, and that the denial or negation of the predicate extensionally includes everything else in the universe. In other words, any P is suitable, so long as P and -P comprise the universal set.

4.5 ABSTRACT AND INSTANTIATED ANALYSES

The procedure for analysis is again different depending on whether an analysis investigates a member of one of the basic categories or the class circumscribed by the category itself. This is the difference between an instantiated analysis that, for example, investigates the status of a sprout, carriage, purusha, etc. and an abstract analysis that investigates a class of concepts such as things (*bhava*), person-conceptions, etc. The former analyses purport to demonstrate the emptiness of the concept or instance in question, and the latter claim to prove the emptiness of an entire *class*, i.e. show that the class is void of any members.

The analysis proceeds a little differently in both cases due to the structural differences that we noted between category-restricted and category unrestricted analyses. In the case of analysing a class of concepts it is sufficient that an analysis is confined to the two theses that make up a pair of logically opposed theses, even when they exhaust the modal characteristics of just one category, such as in the analysis of things (*bhava*). Using this example, if the object of refutation is the class of *bhavas* then a refutation of the *svalaksana* of "being produced" serves to prove that the class of *bhavas* is empty of any members because there are no produced things. And the analysis is complete with no other category option needing to be considered for the object of analysis was the class of *bhavas*. On the other hand, if an instance of a produced thing, such as a sprout, chair, etc. were being analysed it would be analytically incomplete to merely refute its failure to have been produced from itself or other, for though "being produced" is the *svalaksana* of the class of *bhavas* it is not the *svalaksana* of

any instance of a *bhava*. For any individual *bhava* "being produced" is one among many characteristics. Its *svalaksana* is whatever makes the individual *bhava* that particular *bhava* and clearly, "being produced" doesn't demarcate it from other produced things. Thus, if an analysis takes as its object of negation an individual that is proffered as a *bhava*, an analysis that refutes the characteristic of "being produced" serves only to show that the object is not a *bhava*. It doesn't negate the individual as such for "being produced" is not its *svalaksana*. At most, such a restricted analysis shows that it is *empty of being a product*. To show that the individual in question is *empty of any real existence* the logical opposite to its being a *bhava* would have to be considered.[65] Once it was shown to be neither a product nor non-product its emptiness would be ascertained. Hence, in instantiated analyses it seems necessary that the theses within which a concept is analysed exhaust *all* the categories, i.e. that they are extensional opposites. Whereas with an abstract analysis that takes a *svalaksana* as the predicate in a thesis, an analysis can be completed, i.e. show a class to be empty, just by analysing within category restricted opposites, or what Gangadean has called logical contraries. In conclusion, as a complete analysis, the category restricted analyses are applicable, in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] at least, only to the *class* of products.

4.6 INTERPRETATION OF DIAGRAM 3.1 AS A FLOW-CHART

As hinted at in the diagram heading of the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] schema of analysis, the schema I've presented can be construed as a flow-diagram that traces the procedures or routes that it seems are meant to be followed by an analyst both in the course of his own private contemplations where he analytically processes his conceptual structures, and in the case of his acting as an analyst for some analysand, such as a non-Buddhist Samkhya or Vaisheshika philosopher, or Buddhist Vijnanavada, Sammitiyas, Svatantrika Madhyamika etc. or any philosopher displaying these philosophical mentalities. Perhaps Madhyamikas also acted in the roles of analysts and analysands within their own Madhyamika fraternity. This is what happens in contemporary Tibetan colleges where Madhyamika philosophers feign a commitment in debate to non-Madhyamika tenets, presumably to facilitate their comprehension of those tenets, and perhaps with a view to eradicating traces of those tenets from their own philosophical viewpoint.

Interpreting the diagram in this way it reads from left to right. As an analyst works through, or *directs* his analysand to work through the procedure, he is confronted with a series of alternative categories that are logical opposites and which exhaust a universe of conceptuality or some well defined category structure within that (if the principle of the excluded middle is a structural *former* of conceptuality). He is confronted, as it were, with a series of Y intersections, at which he decides which route to take in dependence upon the

definition of the concept being analysed and the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] categories. One route or another is traced out which leads to a terminus which is a Madhyamika method of proof that is appropriate to the concept being analysed, for example the seven-sections or tetralemma (or strictly the first two theses within these.) The proof, which consists of refuting a thesis and its negation that purport to define the concept in question, is applied to the concept and theoretically it is shown to be void of any intrinsic or self-referential identity. In other words, each route leads finally to a consequential proof for the emptiness of the concepts in question. *All* branches for *all* concepts that comprise the universe of discourse are in theory closed by the Madhyamika analysis. The different routes serve to *locate* the thesis within which the intrinsic existence of a concept will be refuted.

If an analyst were analytically processing his own conceptual make-up the procedure would theoretically be fairly straight forward. If he knew well the definitions of the conceptual categories that are used in Madhyamika texts and *thought* in those same categories himself, then any concept would be allocated to its appropriate category and analyzed in terms of the analytical structure appropriate to that category. If the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] schema were used as a guide then concepts would be allocated as person-conceptions or phenomenal-conceptions, etc. and analysed with the designated method of refutation. Thus, rather than working through a route on the flow diagram from its very beginning at the person-phenomena distinction until locating the appropriate category and its method of refutation the knowledgeable Madhyamika would be able to go directly to the appropriate category and refutation.

On the other hand, in the case where the Madhyamika was unclear about the alignment of some concept within the Madhyamika categories of analysis he would begin at the start of the schema with the person- phenomena distinction or at some subsequent distinction where he was sure, or able to easily ascertain, which category his concept was included within.

In fact the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] schema here, is probably misleading in its simplicity for two reasons.

(1) Analysts would probably have at their disposal the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way's* [MK] battery of analyses, this giving them a significantly more extensive array of both categories and methods of consequential analysis than the *Introduction's* [MA]. We have indicated just a few of the analytical additions and alternatives from the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK] before. The *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way's* [MK] categories are more elaborate than the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] and come mainly from the Sarvastivada abhidharma, and I guess its most significant difference from the *Introduction* [MA] is that it analyses *processes* such as movement (chpt. 2), action (chaps. 8 and 17), time (chpt. 19), and the twelve linked relational origination (chpt. 20). Perhaps analysts devised their own hybrid schemas that drew on both the

Introduction [MA] and *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK] and also used proofs culled from other texts such as the *Seventy on Emptiness (Sunyatasaptati), Sixty on Logic (Yuktisastika), Precious Jewel* [RA] and *Four Hundred* [CS].

(2) If, as we have suggested, the twenty emptinesses represent categories that were analysed in their own right in order to empty en bloc the entire membership of a particular class, or were categories within which instances of concepts were analysed, for example, a particular phenomenon (*dharma*) as a thing (*bhava*), non-thing (*abhava*), external (*bahirdha*) entity, etc. then an additional complexity would be introduced into the routines employed by an analyst. (In the cases of unit categories that have just one member, such as great=space, and perhaps the ultimate=nirvana, etc. the abstract category and its instantiation are the same.)

Two procedures are possible with these twenty emptinesses. They could be allocated to one or other of the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] three primary categories of persons, products, and non-products, and analysed with the analyses suggested for these in the *Introduction* [MA] (and *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK] for non- products). Or, alternatively, they could be analysed with any one of the many analyses to be found in the many Madhyamika texts that are suitable for the category in question. If the former course were followed the allocations seem to be these. The category of person is roughly coextensive with 1. the internal (*adhyatma*). The category of produced phenomena (*samskrta-dharma*) or things (*bhava*) would seem to include 7. products, 11. non-rejection (*anavakara*), 14. defining properties (*svalaksana*), 17. things (*bhava*), 19. own nature (*svabhava*), 20. the other thing (*parabhava*). The category of non-products (*asamskrta*) would seem to include 4. emptinesses, 6. the ultimate (*paramartha*), 8. non-products, 9. what has surpassed boundaries (*atyanta*), 10. what is temporal (*anavaragra*), 12. the (unmade) nature (*prakrti*), 15. the unobservable (*anupalambha*), 16. non-things (*abhava*), 18. non-things (*abhava*). These allocations are fairly straightforward. There are some complications, though, with several of the bases for they bridge more than one of the *Introduction's* [MA] three basic categories. For example, 2. the external (*bahirdha*) and 13. all phenomena (*sarva-dharma*) bridge products and non-products, and 3. the internal and external bridges all of the *Introduction's* [MA] three categories. At least in the case of these dual-natured categories one can hazardaguess that the problems involved in making *abstract* analyses (though probably not instantiated ones) of those categories means that they were not slotted into the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] schema, for this would require a simultaneous application of different patterns of analysis, and perhaps means that these categories were not even used as classes to be analysed in the context of debate and contemplation, their memberships being analytically captured by using two or more of the simpler categories.

In summary, is seems likely that Madhyamika analysts would not have used the *Introduction* [MA] schema alone. They may either have used the

Introduction's [MA] infrastructure as a basic guide which was modified and expanded to accommodate other Buddhist categories such as the abhidharma and bases to the twenty emptinesses, or have used it just as a supplement to some other schema, perhaps based on the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK].

Even if the twenty emptinesses, abhidharma categories, etc. were used by Madhyamikas in their private practice and in debate with their contemporaries in something like the way I've suggested, the procedure would necessarily be quite different when a Madhyamika was trying to engage in an analysis an opponent who held a different set of theses (*siddhanta*). The most significant difference is that the analyses could not presuppose the Madhyamikas' categories. At the start of an analysis, at least, they must assume the phenomenological details of the opponent's categories. That is to say, the Madhyamika would have to agree (if there were to be any point to an analysis at all) that what was being committed in an analysis were the entities defined by the theses of their opponents. Thus, for example, if they are refuting a mind-only (*citta-matra*) thesis or a self-reflexive consciousness (*svasamvedana*), in the first instance at least, the Madhyamikas are refuting these *as they are understood* by their opponent, here the Phenomenalists.

In terms of the distinction between abstract and instantiated analyses, the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] for the most part takes the theses of other philosophical schools to be instantiations of its own primary categories. Thus, for example, the Samkhya concept of purusha and the Vaisheshika atman are taken to be instances of the transcendental theories of the person, and so are allocated to the category of transcendental self-conceptions for analysis. The Vijnanavada theses of phenomenalism or mind-only and apperception exemplify 'birth from self' presuppositions and so are allocated to that generic thesis of the Madhyamika. Likewise, the Sarvastivada thesis *against* the efficacy of the Madhyamika analysis is viewed as being based on the assumption of 'real or inherent birth from another'. It seems that the abstract analyses in the *Introduction* [MA] of non-Madhyamika philosophical viewpoints already correspond to the *Introduction's* [MA] basic categories, for example, the Samkhya theory or 'birth from self' and the Jaina theory of 'birth from both self and other'. I am not sure whether the thesis that entities substantially exist (*dravya- sat*) is an abstract category. Where it is purportedly refuted in the *Introduction* [MA] it is specific concepts whose referent is claimed to substantially exist, namely the self for the Sammitiyas and consciousness (*vijnana*) for the Phenomenalists.

The procedure of the Madhyamika generally is that *any thesis* establishing any concept, be it referring to an entity or process, can be allocated to one or other of a pair of categories that exhaust the universe or a well defined domain of concepts. The pervasion of all possibilities by a pair of concepts, such as the self and phenomena, self-born and otherborn, etc. ensures that no concept of an opponent can fall outside the Madhyamika's categories, and means that all

theses are accommodated within the *Introduction's* [MA] schema. It is not really clear from the *Introduction* [MA] who actually assigns an opponent's thesis to one or other of the Madhyamikas' generic theses. In theory at least, there is no need for the Madhyamikas themselves to assign an opponent's thesis to one of its own generic formulations. It is valid for an opponent to make an assignment himself (and one would think most skilful for the Madhyamika to do it this way, for then there is presumably no question of coersion on the part of the Madhyamika). In theory, also, this allocation to one of the Madhyamika's categories is an innocuous exercise for an opponent as it doesn't require any modification at all in the identity criteria for a concept.

If the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] reflects the real climate and action of Indian inter-religious philosophical debate[66] it seems (and is quite to be expected) that there were real problems when it came to the practice of analysis between Madhyamikas and holders of other Buddhist and Hindu philosophies. The Madhyamika analyses demand (and require) a rigid designation of whatever concepts are analysed. Madhyamikas speak in blacks and whites, of things existing or not existing, being one or many, etc. for the reasons I mentioned earlier when detailing the role of the principle of identity. The analyses also demand a rigour of logical development.

The impression one gains from the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] is that an opponent to the Madhyamikas' analysis may not wish to be directed through the various decisions that need to be made en route to a final consequential refutation of a thesis. At the least he may *hesitate* at the various intersections on the flow-chart or at worst, from the Madhyamikas' viewpoint, may refuse to proceed. He may *resist* in various ways the Madhyamikas' efforts to analytically process his theses. For example, by moves such as failing to commit himself to a sufficiently rigorous and syntactically precise elaboration of his thesis, i.e. by obscuring his philosophical commitments, as it were, and by *refusing* to clarify opaque concepts when asked to by the Madhyamikas. Finally, an opponent may change the definitions or identity criteria of the concepts being analysed part way through an analysis (presumably when he feels that he is getting on tenuous ground with respect to the integrity of his concept(s)). Any of these moves serves to avoid the Madhyamika logic.

We see these efforts to avoid the Madhyamika logic and the Madhyamika's own treatment of such moves in Chandrakirti's treatment of the Samkhya's 'self-birth' thesis and Phenomenalist thesis of the substantial existence (*dravya-sat*) of consciousness (*vijnana*). In the first case Chandrakirti makes short shrift of the Samkhya view that the effect exists in an unmanifest form at the time of the cause. In this case Chandrakirti requires the Samkhya to commit itself to a *genuine* identification of causes and effects rather than to speak in terms of a non-manifest existence. The implication for Chandrakirti is that if they don't mean a genuine identification then they must mean a genuine difference, as this is the only option left. And if this is not what they mean then the Madhyamikas have

every right to classify their thesis as implying a *genuine* identification (even if this is not what the Samkhyas mean) for this is the only option left once they have rejected the interpretation that they mean a genuine difference between causes and effects.

Chandrakirti repeats his seemingly harsh treatment of an opponent's views, and alignment of an opponent's categories with his own, in his treatment of the Phenomenalist's concept of the substantial existence of consciousness. Consciousness either exists or it doesn't. If it doesn't exist the Phenomenalists violate their tenet of the existence of consciousness. If it exists in anyway other than as a nominality it exists under the Madhyamika definition of intrinsic existence (*svabhava*). Here we see Chandrakirti construing a substantial existent (*dravya-sat*) to be functionally the same as an intrinsic existence even though the Phenomenalists could hardly agree with that alignment. That is to say, Chandrakirti ascribes the same properties to substantial existence as he does to intrinsic existence, for example, that things so characterised are unable to enter into causal (*hetu*) or conditional (*pratyaya*) relationships with other entities, and refutes their thesis on the basis of those properties (for example, that a consciousness so characterised could not be modified by factors such as the quality of sense-organs) even though the Phenomenalists themselves ascribe contrary properties to their notion of substantial existence, for example, that it is dependent on other things. The rationale behind Chandrakirti's distortion here is of course highly questionable, and must be that a functional distinction between substantial and intrinsic existence must be bogus for in the analytical context at least there is only existence and non-existence.[67]

In summary, then, the schema as presented in the figure applies to analysis conducted within the Madhyamikas' own school and also *guides* the dialogical exchanges between the Madhyamikas and other philosophers, as these are reported in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA]. For Madhyamika philosophers, who would have been religiously committed to the worth and validity of consequential analysis, the procedures were presumably followed in a step-wise and fairly methodical fashion. For non-Madhyamikas the assumptions and logic underlying consequential analysis would have been at variance with their own epistemologies with the tension between the two meaning that analysis would naturally be laboured, and from a Madhyamika perspective perhaps oftentimes incomplete, i.e. inconsequential.

4.7 MODAL ANALYSIS AND SUBSTANTIVE BI-NEGATIVE CONCLUSIONS

Before turning to the final section of this chapter it is useful to make some brief remarks about the ontological ramifications of analysis and look at the question of implicative (*paryudasa*) versus non-affirming negations (*prasajya-pratisedha*).

The two key analyses in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] (and temporal and "one versus many" analyses also) are modal in structure for they analyse an entity in terms of its modalities or characteristics. That is to say, the consequences refute theses that establish an entity as having certain modal properties such as being born from themselves, different from some other entity, etc. In doing so they reflect the predicative structure of conceptuality. Though the analyses are modal in structure their conclusions have a substantive import. That is to say, though the analyses *directly* take up the question of the presence or absence of the characteristics or properties of entities the conclusions made with respect to their properties bear on the ontological status of the entities themselves. This is because for Madhyamikas there is an ontologically reciprocal dependence (*parasparapeksa*) between the status of the subject of properties (*laksya*) and properties (*laksana*) themselves. The dependency at work in the case of claiming a substantive import to these analyses is that the existence of entities depends on the ascription of defining characteristics to them.[68] Thus, the event of a modality being simultaneously neither affirmed nor denied of an entity takes it outside the realm of predication (with respect to the modalities in question) and so beyond findability or knowability in the *samvrtic* sense.

The important point to see is that non-predicability is different from a negative predication. Where as the absence of a predicate tells one *something* about an entity (it gives information that can help in the identification of an entity), non-predicability, as expressed in the logical syntax of the bi-negative disjunction, doesn't help in the identification of an entity. In other words, it doesn't give one *any* information that could help in ascertaining whether or not an entity exists. Thus the bi-negation leaves the ontic status of a concept undetermined.

The substantive conclusion is derived differently depending on whether an analysis is category restricted or unrestricted. In the case of a category restricted analyses the predicate or modality chosen to be analysed is the defining property (*svalaksana*) of some entity. The conclusion to a category restricted analysis is that the defining property of some entity is neither present with nor absent from the entity in question. The substantive import of this conclusion derives from the fact that if the defining property is not present the entity *cannot* be affirmed to exist. If the defining characteristic is present the entity *must* be affirmed to exist. Thus, if the defining property is neither present nor not present the entity which is identified by the property neither exists nor doesn't exist. This amounts to saying that the entity is empty of an intrinsic identity.

In non-category restricted analyses an entity is shown to be empty rather than non-existent through the exclusion of *all* possible predicates as being inapplicable to an entity. The entity A is neither a P nor not a P where P and not P exhaust the universal set of modalities. The nihilistic conclusion that A doesn't exist would be errantly drawn from the modal conclusion for the non-existence of something presupposes the applicability of predicates to an entity which are

in actuality absent. In other words, in order to determine that A is non- existent one would have to know what A is, such that one could know that it didn't exist. If A goes uncharacterised because all predicates are inapplicable to it, its existence or non- existence is unascertainable as the entity itself would be unidentifiable. In other words, A couldn't be a non-existent entity for it wouldn't be an entity at all.

The bi-negative conclusion is also arrived at more directly, it seems, by reflecting directly on the dependency of concepts on their logical opposites. Thus, when it is ascertained that there is no existence, no non-existence is also ascertained for in the absence of existence there is nothing to be negated. Thus, the negation of existence in Madhyamika logic implies the negation of non-existence.

Reflecting directly in this way, from a negation of existence (or an existent) to the bi-negative conclusion that there is neither existence nor non-existence, (or neither an existent nor a non-existent) is what I would call a substantive analysis for it goes directly to the bi-negative conclusion without analysing the modality involved in *analytically* ascertaining the *lack* of non-existence. (It relies on the fact that the concept of non-existence logically implies "existence" insofar as a negative implies the concept that is negated.) A substantive conclusion is tacked onto one prong of a consequential (or partitive) analysis[69] that establishes non-existence *qua* existence, or the non-existence of the proffered existent.

Nagarjuna analyses directly to the bi-negative conclusion from one half of an ultimacy analysis on several occasion in the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK].[70] Perhaps this method of analysis represents an insider's technique for it *presupposes* a commitment to an awareness of the principles of the reciprocal dependence of concepts and their logical opposites and the transference of characteristics or properties between logical opposites. Thus, when existence is negated so is non-existence. On the other hand, a modal analysis (which is genuinely consequential in structure) doesn't presuppose an appreciation of these two principles even though they are integral to the consequential method of proof.

4.8 IMPLICATIVE AND NON-AFFIRMING NEGATIONS

As we are reading certain practical aspects of the Madhyamika logic into the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] it is appropriate to make some basic observations about the applicability of the distinction between implicative (*parudāsa*) and non-affirming negations (*prasajya- pratisedha*) in the context of Madhyamika praxis.

The distinction between these two types of negations in Madhyamika logic is well defined. An implicative negation implies the affirmation of a contrapositive thesis by the negation of a thesis. A non-affirming negation negates a thesis without implying the affirmation of a contrapositive thesis. In other words, it is

a pure and simple negation that doesn't establish anything positive. It may be difficult at first to see how the negation of a thesis can fail but to affirm the negative of the thesis. The idea of a non-affirming negation, though, is that it *removes* the thesis but does not affirm the contrapositive thesis. This is purportedly achieved because in the non-affirming negation both the thesis and contrapositive thesis are affirmed in the conclusion, to which an appreciation of the principle of contradiction and mutual dependency between thesis and contrapositive thesis negates both, whereas in an implicative negation the contrapositive thesis is affirmed at the expense of forsaking the thesis (and in this the mutual dependency between the thesis and its opposite is lost sight of). A non-affirming negation of either a thesis or contrapositive thesis would establish the middle-view in that it avoided affirming either the thesis or contrapositive thesis. In other words, the non-affirming negation states a mere absence or vacuity of a thesis formulation.

The *doctrinal* position of the Prasangika- madhyamika is that its own negations are non-affirming. Chandrakirti states this quite clearly in the *Clear Words* [PP][71] as a point that distinguishes him from the Svatantrika philosophy of Bhavaviveka.[72] The point is also made in the *Commentary* [MABh: 81] where Chandrakirti characterises the negations (*ma yin*) involved in the refutation of all four theses of the tetralemma comprising the productive analysis as having no affirmative import because they mean a prohibition or exclusion (*dgag pa*).[73] This means, for example, that when Chandrakirti negates the thesis of "birth from self" he does not mean to imply that the negation affirms that things are born from another. Although Chandrakirti specifies only that the negations in the analysis of things (*bhava*) are non-affirming we can assume with consistency that the negations in the analysis of the person are likewise non-affirming and that from the viewpoint of Madhyamika theory the refutation that the self is identical with the psycho-physical organism doesn't entail that it is different from the psycho-physical organism and *vice versa*.

The most significant observation that can be glossed from the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] - where theses and contrapositive thesis are *serially* refuted - is that the theoretical position of Chandrakirti: that his negations are non-affirming, is unlikely to always have been borne out in the context of practice. There seem to be two reasons for a serial refutation. By a serial refutation I mean the *connected* refutation of a thesis and its negation, not the occurrence of refuting one thesis and then a subsequent but *unrelated* refutation of its negation as seems to be the case when, for example, Chandrakirti refutes the Samkhya conception of self-birth and then the Buddhist conception of other-birth. Firstly we can note that Chandrakirti uses two consequential arguments refuting both a thesis and its negation in his refutation of the Sammitiya's conception of the self. In this case Chandrakirti needn't be deviating from his claimed theoretical stance of furnishing only non-affirming negations. To refute the Sammitiya conception of a self Chandrakirti must refute both a thesis: that the self is the psycho-physical

organism, and its negation: that the two are different, even where both refutations are non-affirming, for if only one of the positions is refuted a residuum to the Sammitiya's self would remain. The meditative contextualisation of consequential analysis where *both* theses: that the self is the same and different are refuted, can be interpreted like this also. Thus the one meditator (even in the one meditation) may refute both theses because his *natural* and hence relevant conception of the self is formalised as a combination of the two theses, much as the Sammitiyas describe it.

Even so, from the viewpoint of praxis it seems that the Madhyamikas' negations may not always be non-affirming, and that the non-affirming aspect of their negation is a statement of *intention* and not something intrinsic to their style of logic.[74] From this perspective, the mere intention by Madhyamikas that their refutation of a thesis doesn't affirm a contrapositive thesis need not pre-empt the possibility (even likelihood!) that an opponent may, subsequent to a convincing refutation of his thesis, *slide* in his viewpoint so as to affirm, however moderately or tentatively, the negation of his initial thesis. And in such a case the Madhyamikas - realising that an opponent may slide in his viewpoint, and wishing also to bring him to the point of rejecting all viewpoints - would have to frame refutations to a thesis and its negation. Hence, another interpretation of the serial refutation of theses and contrapositive theses in both the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] and in the meditative contextualisation is that Madhyamikas were wise to a tendency among their adversaries (and perhaps within their own thought also) to construe their negations as implicative.[75] Hence when Chandrakirti caps his refutations with an affirmation of a negation he may be meaning to vocalise and bring to consciousness what he believes to be a conclusion in the thought of his analysand.

Disregarding a case such as the Sammitiya's amalgamed self-conception, these two different types of negation, the implicative and non-affirming, respectively make for a conjunctive and disjunctive use of consequences. If negations are affirming then both a thesis and its negation must be refuted in order to exclude the possible views that can be adopted. If the negations are intended and more importantly are *taken* as non-affirming then the middle-view that precludes all viewpoints can be gained by the refutation of a single thesis in isolation from the refutation of its contrapositive thesis, for in forsaking a thesis a philosopher does not take up the contrapositive thesis.

With respect to the confluting or coincidence of opposites that we talked about earlier, the conflution would seem to take place naturally and as integral to analysis in the case of non-implicative negations, as the basis for refuting a thesis is by the derivation of its negation or opposite. On the other hand, the conflution would seem artificial, and a separate exercise to analysis itself in the case of affirming negations as two contradictory conclusions are generated *serially* within a mind-stream and would have to be temporally aligned as an act

separate and subsequent to the derivation of those two appropriately juxtaposed consequences.

5 LOGICAL AND EXPERIENTIAL CONSEQUENCES

If analysis was thought to have a liberative result, as has been argued, it is clear that the procedures of analysis must have been thought to produce not only a logical conclusion, or conclusion in reason, such as are expressed in the bi-negative disjunctions that summarise the conclusion to consequential analyses, but also to have produced an experiential conclusion, or, we may prefer, a factual conclusion (following the Leibnisian distinction).

How is it then that the analytical processing of conceptuality could affect something more than a mere change in thought? How could conceptual analysis ultimately have been thought to introduce a radical and liberative transformation of a saint's entire experience and world-view. The transformative effects of analysis can be explained by speculating on the meditative utilisation of analysis. There, it seems, experiential effects can be accounted for through two related factors. Namely, (1) through a perception of the ramifications of a concept on and within affective reactions, and (2) via a discernment of the depth levels and structures of the concepts that are analysed.

The first factor would involve a recognition of the structural role that any particular concept being analysed played in the arising and constellation of emotional reactions (*klesa*) to cognitions. We expect that saints, when they were establishing the concept to be analysed, i.e. ascertaining the object of negation (*dgag bya*), in the first step of their analytical contemplations, would survey their affective mental states and tendencies with a view to ascertaining which emotions were dependent on the concept under analysis. They would be concerned with the functional dependencies between concepts and different sets of affections and would explore the nexus in which concepts were placed with respect to other concepts. They would become conscious of structural dependencies wherein affections were dependent on misconceptions, and in so doing they would involve those affections in an analysis and bind, in a sense, those affections to the outcome of an analysis. Thus, when the misconceptions were reversed this would also serve to undermine the structural basis of the affective responses. So, although it is only a concept that is being analysed, its influence within the entire psyche of a saint would be investigated prior to, or rather as the first step in any analysis so as to ensure that an analysis did have some effect in attenuating and countering affective responses such as hatred, aggression, desire, lust, pride, etc. More specifically, as the conceptual bases to the afflictive emotions were destructured, this would have an impact on the afflictive emotions that *corresponded in degree* to the dependencies that were ascertained at the beginning of any analysis. These dependencies, one presumes, would become apparent to saints only through deep contemplation and how

much of a saint's psyche was invested in an analysis would depend on the thoroughness with which the dependencies were seen. In this way, for example, analysis of the view of individuality (*satkaya-drsti*) would involve not only an ascertainment of the *concept* of a real self but also an appreciation of its influence on the formation of the personality and particularly on neuroses and stultifying emotions that develop on the basis of that view. These investigations of affective responses and their correlation with false modes of conceptuality might have been facilitated by the abhidharmas and, for Tibetan philosophers, the mental typologies (*blo rigs*) literature.[76]

The second and partially overlayered way of explaining the purported experiential effects of analysis is to consider that the concepts themselves that are analysed, exist and can be ascertained, according to Madhyamikas, at varying degrees of depth and subtlety. This view is affirmed in the distinction that has been mentioned earlier between intellectual (*parikalpita*) and innate (*sahaja*) concepts, where the intellectual conceptualisations are more superficial and less deeply ingrained and entrenched than innate ones.

It seems that while the surface aspects or components of conceptuality exist at the level of conscious experience, (in fact, presumably they are identified with conscious thought) the depth aspects exist at an unconscious level, at least for ordinary folk. Indeed, concepts must be so constituted for the Madhyamika. This is apparent if we take the self-concept as an example, for were the self-concept merely the *conscious* thought of 'I' or 'me' it would mean that whenever the thought of 'I' or 'me' was absent within a stream of thought one would be realising selflessness. *We*, for a great (and probably greater) part of our waking, and all or our deep sleep, experience, would be realising the selflessness that *only* the saints realise. So clearly the concept of a self is established by a mode of conceiving that operates at a subconscious level. And Madhyamikas would say this applies to other concepts as well. These subconscious, and hence, unmanifest modes of conceiving were probably thought to be more stable and continuous than the ever changing perturbations of conscious conceptuality. In the meditative context we can suppose that when saints were ascertaining the object to be negated, they were concerned with fathoming the deeper, more subtle and more entrenched modes of conceptuality; modes that could only be penetrated through deep and quiet meditation. And, given that there are deeper and structurally more significant modes of conceiving than conscious thought, and that a saint could plum these and in fact take these as the concepts to be analysed, then by realising the emptiness of these structurally and affectively more significant aspects of conceptuality they could reasonably have been thought to gain experiences that likewise had deeper effects that the mere manipulation of conscious thought. It seems, in fact, that the emptiness of a concept could only be realised in dependence on a saint knowing precisely and in detail what it was that he was analysing. Thus, for example, the more fully and deeply that the errant view of a self, as permanent, intrinsically existent, etc.,

could be ascertained, the fuller (and more freeing also) would be the insight gained in realising that *that* deeper and more entrenched self was empty. Tibetan philosophers quote a line from Shantideva's *Introduction to the Evolved Lifestyle* [BCA: 9.140a] in this regard which says that "Without contacting the thing that is imagined there is no ascertainment of its non-existence."[77] The import of this line is that the saint must know the false cognition, the falsely established status of things, in order to be able to refute and negate it.

By realising the pervasive structure of conceptuality and its role in supporting the emotional reactions (*klesa*) and through locating and analysing the deeper flows and features of conceptuality, saints could have expected to gain profound and existentially far-reaching results from their analyses. Exactly how experientially profound a logical consequence might be expected to be would be dependent on how thoroughly the connections and dynamic dependencies between concepts and affects were ascertained and to what extent the deeper levels of conceptuality were penetrated. These psychological explorations and ascertainments conducted in the context of meditation presumably also made for a difference that Madhyamikas would no doubt have highlighted between the scholar and the practitioner of the Madhyamika, for while the former might have a sympathy and intellectual appreciation of consequential logic, i.e. gain an understanding at the level of thought, presumably only the disciplined meditator was thought to be able to realise any soteriologically significant effects.

6 CONTINGENCY AND NECESSITY IN CONSEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS

In concluding this chapter it may be of interest to briefly address the question of whether insight is contingently or necessarily related to analysis, or represented in a more sharply focused form: is the realisation of a logical conclusion to a consequential analysis necessarily productive of some measure of insight into emptiness? Answering these questions involves determining the *extent* to which consequential analysis models deductive forms of reasoning, for if it could be shown that indeed the Madhyamika *logic* is deductively valid then there are some grounds for thinking that insightful conclusions necessarily follow if analyses do conform to sound deductive thought-processes. The problem is complicated, though, for the logic of the Madhyamika is not a pen-and-paper logic but a logic embedded in the *experience* of Madhyamika philosophers - as has just been shown. Hence, while logical necessities might function at a *formal level* in Madhyamika analysis, the empirical contextualisation of Madhyamika logic weighs against the necessity of insight arising from analysis. That is to say, the grounding of Madhyamika analysis in the experience of saints introduces contingencies into the relationship between analysis and insight. And the introduction of contingencies would mean that it

wouldn't be imperative that insight arose from analysis. *If* they are contingently related, any logical compulsion is ameliorated and insight may or may not arise at the completion of any analysis.

Firstly I'll talk about the types of contingencies that might exist in Madhyamika analysis and then show that the procedures of Madhyamika analysis seem to (perhaps are designed to) preclude the entry of contingencies into the relationship between analysis and insight and in so doing point to an *ideal* form and structure of analysis in which insight necessarily follows from analysis.

The first contingency, though one may not really wish to call it such, is that an analysis fails to be followed to its logical completion and so stops at a non-conclusive and hence non-insightful terminus. Even given that a conclusion is realised, other genuine contingencies would act to ameliorate the quality and strength of any insight gained. Two significant factors would be changes to the identity criteria of the concept being analysed and a failure to perceive the need for refuting *both* thesis and contrapositive thesis in order to exclude *all* views. As I'll explain in more detail soon, these two factors revoke the first and second steps respectively of the meditative contextualisation of analysis into four steps, that has been referred to earlier. Contingencies such as the above could occur for any number of reasons, for example, being interrupted or being ignorant of, or forgetting, analytical procedures. The most interesting case - and one that throws light on the dynamic between analytical and non-analytical mentalities within a single continuum - is where the concept as originally specified, is modified in the course of an analysis so that it is not implicated in a conclusion. A likely occurrence in such a case - and this relates to the previous section also - would be a diminution in what constituted the concept, this being caused by a relinquishing of the deep and subtle aspects of a concept and/or a failure to retain the emotional reactions that were originally implicated in an analysis. That is to say, the concept would be narrowed down through a spilling out of the deeper more entrenched levels of the concept so that only the more superficial aspects were retained within the conclusion. A more obvious revoking of identity criteria would occur where the identifying characteristics of a concept were changed part way through an analysis.

Even though various contingencies can and obviously would enter into a saints' analytical contemplations, the procedures and guidelines used in directing analytical contemplations appear to be designed to reduce the *occurrence* and *strength and influence* of contingent factors. The procedures do this by (1) ensuring predicative coherence and consistency, (2) by acknowledging the principles of contradiction and joint exhaustion of a class or universal domain by logical opposites and (3) by pre-empting a slide to an opposing viewpoint. Although some of these features of the Madhyamika analysis have been mentioned before the context of discussion is different here.

The first step in the meditative contextualisation of analysis appears to require not only a location of errant conceptions but their specification via a coherent and consistent predicate. Thus, the concept that is analyzed is *rigidly designated* in an effort to remove all referential opacity. The saint presumably gains a clear and distinct perception (*clara et distincta perceptio*) of the concept to be analyzed, and attempts to ensure that the very same concept is implicated in the conclusion. This structurally models and forms thought in terms of the principle of identity and ensures (1) that the same concept is analysed throughout a contemplation and (2) that the same concept is affirmed and denied in the conclusion. The first step is thus a commitment to the identity of a concept though predicating it coherently and consistently.

The second step, as explained earlier, psychologically commits a saint to two jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive possibilities that serve to prescribe two alternative and well defined sequences of thought. This aligns his/her thought with the principle's of the excluded middle and contradiction.

As argued earlier, consequential analysis aims, via *reductio ad absurdum* arguments, to bring a thesis and a contrapositive thesis into a cospatial and cotemporal alignment which *necessitates* the destructuring of a concept. A psychological necessity flows from the fact of the logical impossibility of such a coalignment. The cospatial and cotemporal alignment of logical opposites constitutes the sufficient and a necessary condition for the destructuring of a concept and hence, on the interpretation given earlier, for an insight into the emptiness of the concept. With respect to the third and fourth steps in the four step format of meditation, these last two steps each follow up an argument that in essence constitutes a sequence of thoughts. When the negation implied in an analysis is implicative or affirmative (*parudasa*) the third *and* fourth steps *together* pre-empt a slide in viewpoint and hence off-set the establishment of a convention (for example, that there *is* a transcendental or non-transcendently self) rather than an emptiness. The structure of non-affirming negations seems to guarantee a cotemporal affirmation of thesis and contrapositive thesis through *either* of the last two steps. In this case the two options contained in the third and fourth steps serve to bridge the heuristic contingency that saints may be inclined to different views of the self and other concepts.

Thus, it seems that there are certain structural features to the techniques of Madhyamika analysis that serve to remove the entry of contingent factors into analysis and so increasingly ensure that appropriately insightful conclusions do follow from analysis. It seems that Madhyamikas would consciously and gradually have honed down and refined their analyses so that their conceptual trajectories as specified by the analytical procedures became integrated, controlled, specific, firm, focused and stable. In this way it seems that they could feel that they meditations were more likely to be fruitful.

In conclusion to this chapter, it seems that a cogent case can be developed that Madhyamikas believed that consequential analysis was integrally related to their search for insight.

NOTES

1. K.K. Inada, *Nagarjuna,* p. 18. He also writes with more caution (p. 34, n. 23) that "whether *prasanga* is really a method for educing truth or only a method of criticism is a moot question."

2. J.W. de Jong, "Emptiness," p. 14 writes that the "negative dialect does not lead to the understanding of the Ultimate Truth but prepares the ground for the true insight to be gained through concentration." De Jong's observation that concentration is thought to be necessary and integral to insight is obviously correct, witness the doctrine of *samatha-vipasyana- yuganaddha.* On this see Geshe Sopa, "Samathavipasyanayuganaddha" in Minoru Kiyota (ed.), *Mahayana Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1978), pp. 46-65. De Jong seems to imply that dialectical analysis is a necessary condition for insight.

3. F.J. Streng, *Emptiness,* p. 76.

4. See T.R.V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism,* for example pp. 160 and 219.

5. He writes, for example, *Emptiness,* p. 148, that "the dialectic is itself a means of knowing" and (p.149) that in "Nagarjuna's negative dialectic the power of reason is an efficient force for realizing Ultimate Truth." Yet (p. 94) that the ultimate truth (*paramarthata*) may "manifest itself through logical reasoning as well as intuition." Streng has confirmed this view with me in conversation.

6. Ashok Gangadean, "Formal ontology and the dialectical transformation of consciousness", 37.

7. *Ibid.,* p. 22.

8. Both *kalpana* and *vikalpa* were translated by Tibetan translators as *rto gpa,* though *vikalpa* often as *rnam par rtog pa* as well.

9. See VPTd. p. 280.

10. MK 25.24 speaks of nirvana being gained by the halting of *prapanca* (Inada, *Nagarjuna,* p. 159) and the MSA, 10.44a of *vikalpa* being reversed (*paravrtta*) (Bagchi, p. 44).

11. See PP on MK 18.7 (Sprung. p. 179.)

12. Sanskrit and Tibetan in V. Bhattacharya (ed.) ... p. 194. The Tibetan verses here are out of step by one line. M.J. Sweet's translation *Santideva and the Madhyamika: The Prajnaparamita- pariccheda of the Bodhicaryavatara,* p. 82.

13. Of the PP, Sprung, in the introduction to *Lucid Exposition..,* p.20, writes that "Beatitude - *nirvana* - is understood in terms of two criteria: (1) the coming to rest of all ways of taking things (or of all ways of perceiving things); (2) the coming to rest of all named things [*prapanca*] (or of language as a naming activity). These two criteria are in Chandrakirti's application virtually one, though the second is the preferred formulation." A more elaborate account of what ceases (at PP 25.24) are (Sprung, p.20) "(1) assertive

verbal statements, (2) discursive thought, (3) the basic afflictions, (4) innate modes of thought (*vasana*), (5) objects of knowledge, (6) knowing".

14. MA (6.160a-c) likewise relates that reality is easily entered by the seven-sectioned analysis of the person due to its showing that the person is unfindable.

15. M.J. Sweet, *op. cit.*, p. 129. For the Sanskrit see V. Bhattacharya, p. 214.

16. See *Milinda Panha*, T.W. Rhys Davids (tr.), *The Questions of King Milinda* (New York: (Dover reprint), 1980), Pt. 1, pp. 95-96.

17. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (tr. G.E.M. Anscombe) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), p. 133.

18. The extent to which analysis is an integral meditative technique in Buddhist traditions other than the Madhyamika is a complex question. Certainly all Buddhist traditions use *vipasyana* meditations but only the Prasangika-madhyamikas *say* that consequential analysis is a necessary condition for liberation. According to Hopkins, Prasangikas hold that they and individual vehicle Buddhists alike cognise emptiness through the use of consequences with the only difference being that universal vehicle Buddhists have a larger variety of logical approaches at their disposal, for example, the many establishments in the MK. See J. Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 488. Though at first sight Ch'an and Zen Buddhists would not appear to use consequences - they have a reputation for the repudiation of all logical and rational thought - their employment of paradox and *non sequitur* may indicate otherwise. See Shohei Ichimura, "Buddhist dialectical methods and their structural identity", unpub., n.d., mimeograph. Richard Chi also has some comments on the logical content and procedures in Ch'an in "Topic on being and logical reasoning", PEW, 24.3 (July 1974) 298-99. It is possible that they do analyse, but only privately and in the advanced and closing stages of their meditations. If so they would by-pass dialectical debate. Also see the *inter alia* comments by Dale S. Wright in "The significance of paradoxical language in Hua-yen Buddhism," PEW, 32.3 (July 1982), 325-338.

19. Ashok Gangadean, *op. cit.*

20. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

21. Paul Williams, "Some Aspects of Language and Construction in the Madhyamika," JIP, 8 (1980), 16.

22. Streng, *Emptiness*. p. 188.

23. The term *prapanca* is often used to mean just verbal elaboration or even to denote elaboration, as in an exposition, yet clearly it must refer to mental or conceptual elaboration as well. The RSM, f. 19a4, for example, glosses *spros pa* as *sgra rtog gi spros pa*. Also were it just verbal elaboration then people would absurdly gain nirvana whenever they were silent.

24. Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

25. See Gangadean, *op. cit.*, p. 24 that "any well formed or significant thought may be analyzed into a relation between a logical subject and predicate."

26. Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 24-25.

27. The principle is recognised by Nagarjuna, for example, MK, 23.10-11 and Chandrakirti, PP, 220.

In Taoism it is the deeply rooted principle of terminological reciprocity. See for example, chapter two of the *Tao te ching*. Their existence suggests nonexistence, beauty-ugliness, goodness- evil, short-long, etc.

See Antonio S. Cua, "Opposites as complements: Reflections on the significance of *Tao*," PEW, 31.2 (April 1981), 123-140.

There is an interesting book by Paul Roubiczek called *Thinking in Opposites - an investigation of the nature of man as revealed by the nature of thinking* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1952) that treats oppositional definitions lightly and in a non-rigorous way. Basically Roubiczek reduces various scientific, philosophical, and religious concepts to their existence in virtue of being defined through their conceptual opposites. Thoughts, percepts, and feelings, he shows, all arise through their opposites; e.g. good and bad (-good), light and dark (-light), inner and outer (-inner), pride and humility (-pride), pleasure and pain (-pleasure), etc. He also (pp. 170-171) indicates a spiritual efficacy in the practice of what he calls "interconnected opposites".

28. Gangadean, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

29. Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

30. See *infra*, p.

I prefer to use the term logical opposites rather than logical contraries, as Gangadean does, for the later is usually to be contrasted with logical contradiction, irrespective of whether the opposites involved are category restricted or not. Gangadean's contrasting of contraries and complements is borrowing on logical and set theoretic definitions respectively.

31. Gangadean, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

32. Tsong kha pa in the LSNP confirms such an interpretation of the notion of *pratityasamutpada* where he defines the logic of relatively (i.e. reasoning by way of being relationally originated as 286 and n. 65 the perception of the contradictory opposite (*'gol zla dmigs pa*).

33. This is, for example, G.E. Moore's non-naturalist position on the concept of "good" which cannot be analysed in terms of properties, relationships, etc. Rather "good" just is what is "good" and cannot be defined or analysed any further.

34. See MK, 14.3 that *one* entity cannot have two selfcharacterizing natures.

35. Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

36. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations, op. cit.*, p. 131. He elaborates that: "If I say I did *not* dream last night, still I must know where to look for a dream; that is, the proposition 'I dreamt', applied to this actual situation, may be false, but mustn't be senseless." - Does that mean, then, that you did after all feel something, as it were the hint of a dream, which made you aware of the place which a dream would have occupied?

"The mind of Wigner's friend," *Hermathena*, 112 (1971), p. 65.

43. *Idem*.

Bass himself has noted the soteriological import of absurdities in Nicholas Cusanus and made the interesting suggestion (p. 65) that "a persisting conflict of neural modes might itself exert an evolutionary pressure" and that it may be actually modified by mystics.

44. D.M. Armstrong, *Belief Truth and Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 104-106.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

47. For example, see bsTan pai nyi ma's (fourth Panchen Lama) *gSung rab kun gyi snying po lam gyi gtso bo rnam pa gsum gyi khrid yig gzhan phan snying po* translated as *Instructions on the Three Principle Aspects of the Path* by Geshe L. Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins in *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider and Company, 1976), pp. 38-39.

48. This verse (Streng, *Emptiness*, p. 185) says: "What third [possibility] goes other than the "goer" and "non-goer"?

49. VPTd, "ne donne aucune determinination." p. 298

50. Chandrakirti also says (MABh: 100.12) that "there isn't an existent separate from the two (*gnyis ka dang bral ba yod pa ... ma yin*) [of existence and non-existence]."

51. Tibetan has *rnam pa,* i.e. no other mode. For the Tibetan and and Sanskrit or the verse see n. 12, p.

52. See G. Sopa and J. Hopkins, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

53. The origin for the two-fold division as a basic *analytical* schema seems to be with Chandrakirti, though the division has been made earlier in Asanga's *Bodhisattvabhumi* and *Yogacarabhumi*. See Isshi Yamada, "Premises and Implications of Interdependence," in S. Balasooriya, et al. (eds.), *Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula*. London: Gordon Fraser, 1980, p. 290, nn. 60 and 61.

54. This requires a little explanation. For Chandrakirti (and all Buddhists except for the Vaibhashikas) the class of *bhavas* is coextensive with the class of produced phenomena (*samskrta-dharma*). (For Vaibhashikas, space (*akasa*) which is a non- product is a *bhava* for it can perform a function such as failing to obstruct and thereby allow the movement of obstructibles. See the gloss by Geshe Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, *op. cit.*, p. 71.) The MA brings this out implicitly. *Bhavas* are only defined extensionally in the MA (6.219) as the five aggregates. (They are *implicitly* defined, though, through being analyzed in the MA in terms of the characteristic of being born (*jati*) or produced (*utpada*).) Non-things (*dngos pa med pa, abhava*), though, which are the logical opposite of things, are defined (6.220) as unproduced phenomena (*'dus ma bya chos, asamskrta-dharma*). Products (*samskrta*) are defined (6.191) as what *arises* from conditions (*rkyen, pratyaya*) and non-products are unborn (*skye med, ajati*). Therefore, by deduction, *bhavas* are *samskrta-dharmas* and a defining characteristic (*svalaksana*) of both classes is that their members are produced (*skye, jati*) from conditions. The equivalences are stated explicitly in the MK where (26.5) Nagarjuna says that if nirvana is a *bhava* then it is a *samskrta* and that *bhavas* are never *asamskrta*. These equivalences mean, incidentally, that there is a certain degree of overlap and duplication in the typology of twenty emptinesses. Hence, as *bhavas* and *samskrtas* are identical, then, Chandrakirti has analytically accounted for all classes of entities except unproduced phenomena (*asamskrta-dharma*).

55. Cf. the MABh (120.17) quote (of the *Catuhsataka*? VPTd. p. 344, n.2) that at the level of *samvrti* one talks the language of ones opponents, which for Madhyamikas includes refuting opponents within their own categories.

56. See, for example, AK, 1.5. The MABh (339) mentions just space (*nam mkha', akasa*) and nirvana as unproduced phenomena.

57. Streng, *Emptiness*, p. 192.

58. The argument is framed around a tetralemma (*catuskoti*) that refutes the theses that nirvana is a thing, a non-thing, both or neither.

(1) Nirvana is not a thing (26.4-6)as this would make it a product and things are never non-products. Also, if nirvana where existent it couldn't be independent. These arguments are definitional in character.

(2) The argument that nirvana is not a non-thing (26.7-9) draws on the transference of characteristics between logical opposites. If nirvana is not a thing (as just proved) then neither is it a non-thing. Additionally it couldn't be characterised as independent (or anything else) if it were a non-thing.

(3) Nirvana is not both a thing and non-thing (26.11-14) for being both would contradict its nature as an *asamskrta*. Also, and this is the first genuine consequence, it could not have two mutually opposed natures. (4) Nor is nirvana neither a thing nor non-thing for if it can't be both (as just proved) it cannot not be both. This, like the proof at 2. is based on the transference of characteristics.

59. G. Sopa and J. Hopkins, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

60. The MK's second chapter analysis of motion is the paradigmatic temporal analysis.

61. Hopkins in *Meditation on Emptiness*, writes (p. 490) that "the two sets of reasonings [as found in the MA] are divided not because they *exclusively* prove either the person or other phenomena to be selfless but because the various Madhyamika teaches have *mainly* used them this way."

62. MK, 4.6 (Streng, p. 188) supports this interpretation saying that it doesn't obtain that the product is the same as the cause or is *not* the same as the cause.

63. G. Sopa and J. Hopkins *op. cit.*, pp. 39-41.

64. Gangadean, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29

65. This is perhaps the only theoretical requirement, for one can hazard a guess that for Buddhists anything other than the three types of *asamskrta- dharmas* would in all likelihood not even been considered as unproduced. It would go without saying (and without analysis) that a sprout, chair, etc. were not non-products and thus when the postulate of their being a product was ruled out the universe of discourse may be thought for practical purposes to have been exhausted.

66. The MA is not clear as to whether these are theoretical exchanges, i.e. hypothetical fabrications created by Madhyamikas, or reports of typical interchanges that actually took place. Although it is to be expected that the MA would report the exchanges with an unquestioned bias to the superiority of their own system, it is my feeling that Chandrakirti is reporting exchanges that were historical. Several reasons lead one to this conclusion. (1) Debate was a very central business in the Indian philosophical arena as evidenced by the manuals on debating procedures, and a serious matter also if we are to believe at least the sentiments expressed in the numerous hagiographical reports of inter-religious debates and loss of face and even religious adherence on the part of losers in debate. (2) We have no reason to believe that all the philosophers in the large viharas were of the same philosophical commitment. The histories report that the seminal thinkers of many and varied Buddhist schools were influential and active in the large viharas. (3) Perhaps the most telling sign is the very devices that the MA uses in relaying its philosophy such as interjection (e.g. 6.129) *ad hominem* arguments (e.g. 6.141) and the

distortion of opponents theses. These various devices were probably spawned in and mirror the spirit of interpersonal debate.

67. In such analyses as these the Madhyamikas do not seem willing to bifurcate an opponent's thesis into a combination of two theses, as one sees, for example, in the third tetralemma of the productive proof. Such would be another way of trying to allocate an opponent thesis within the Madhyamika's categories. In the case of an abstract analysis, for example, the opponent's categories, rather than being envisaged as a subclass within one Madhyamika class would *bridge* two categories and be analysed in a two pronged refutation. *Prima facie* this might seem to be a more honest way for the Madhyamika to accommodate certain theses of their opponents, though it is questionable (and unlikely) that a thesis of "self and other birth" would be acceptable to the Samkhya or a thesis of the "existence yet non-existence" of consciousness" to the Phenomenalist.

68. Cf. MK, 5.4a (Streng, p. 188) that there is no object of characterisation (*laksya*) in the absence of any functional characteristic.

69. A partitive analysis is non-consequential and involves ascertaining the non-existence of an *entity* through a failure to find it in and among its parts.

In the case of a 'partitive analysis of the self' a self is searched for *within the* psycho-physical organism dividing the constituents of the latter into coarse and then finer parts. Such forms of analysis establish that the self is not the latter but fail to exclude the possibility that the self is separate from the aggregation. They thus establish the non-phenomenality of the self but not its emptiness. See BCA, 9.58ff and RA, 2.2 for this type of analysis.

70. For example, MK, 5.6: that if something *is* not at all of what will there be non-existence. Also 15.5 and 25.7. And BCA, 9.34.

71. See Sprung, *Lucid Exposition*, p. 36: that "this negation [of birth from self] is not intended to imply an affirmation."

72. Bhavaviveka proffers a thesis at the close of a consequence by way of drawing a conclusion. He claims that it is an analytical necessity that the Madhyamika arguments expose and *affirm* the negations of a thesis rather than merely exposing an absurdity, which Prasangika claims is sufficient. In fact Bhavaviveka takes the Prasangika Buddhapalita to task for asserting the opposite as a conclusion to his consequences and that Buddhapalita therefore goes against the Prasangika proclamation that the negations issuing from their consequences are non-affirming. The point, though, for Prasangikas is that Buddhapalita is not at fault for when he asserts the opposite of the thesis being analyzed this is not in the *context* of the consequential argument itself but rather is a summary statement of the thesis being refuted. See Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 156. As Chandrakirti sometimes affirms his conclusions the same rationale is applicable to him.

73. VPTd. p. 279. "purement negatif."

74. Even so, perhaps the non-affirming character of Prasangika-madhyamika negations is a formal condition for their logic as it would seem that a logically generated non-affirming negation could only be derived through a consequence or *reductio ad absurdum* where the logical affirmation of the negation of a thesis could be derived through a syllogistic inference or what I've called a partitive analysis. Where both a thesis and contrapositive thesis are negated and their opposites affirmed through these affirming negations it is feasible that a coincidence of opposites, and hence demonstration of emptiness, could be gained through non-consequential analyses, which would go against Prasangika tenets. These are just some thoughts and I'm not sure whether there is a genuine distinction to be made here between the affirming character of consequential and partitive analyses.

75. Perhaps there is a greater propensity to slide to an opposite viewpoint in the case of a self-conception given the janus-like nature of the self. In the case though of refuting say "birth from another" it seems that such a negation would in practice (as well as theory) be non-affirming for it is unlikely that its refutation would result in the adoption of the "birth from self" thesis. This is born out by Jam dbyangs bzhad pa who says that of the four alternatives re production only the second need by refuted, presumably because all other are so unreasonable as not to be ascribed to in practice. (Communication from Jeffrey Hopkins.) On the other hand, a slide couldn't be ruled out in the case of a refutation of the "birth from self" thesis, given the common-sense plausibility of the thesis of "birth from another".

76. An example in translation is H.V. Guenther and L.S. Kawamura's *Mind in Buddhist Psychology* (a trs. of Ye shes rgyal mtshan's *Sems dang sems byung gi tshul gsal par ston pa bol gsal mgul rgyan*), Emeryville, Calif.: Dharma Publishing, 1975.

77. Bhattacharya, p. 221. Sweet's translation, *op. cit.* p.144.

CHAPTER FOUR

INSIGHT AND THE EXTENSIVE DEEDS

The final chapter of this study investigates the ways in which the insight into emptiness, or what is called the profound view (*gambhira-drsti*), is related to various doctrinal structures that are included within the rubric of the extensive deeds (*udara-gocara*). In particular it examines the relationship between insight and the universal vehicle concept of full evolution (*bodhi*) that the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] subscribes to.

The first half of the chapter reconstructs the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] exposition of the extensive content and briefly details the schemas it uses for organising and describing this content. The reconstruction shows how many facets of the extensive practices directly relate to the concept of the buddhas' full evolution. For Chandrakirti, in fact, all phenomena and processes are in one way or another related - through the concept of a single vehicle (*eka-yana*) - either to the gaining of full evolution or to its expression. The second half of the chapter investigates the interrelationships between insight and various aspects and features of the extensive content.

The extensive deeds and extensive doctrines (*dharma*), as explained in the first chapter, include all the practices and doctrines that Chandrakirti expounds that are not concerned, in the most direct sense, with the insight into emptiness. Some notions that are functionally cognate or at least similar to the extensive, though not necessarily equivalent, in meaning or domain, are conventional truth (*samvrti-satya*), inter-personal or social truth (*vyavahara-satya*), interpretative subject matter (*neyartha*), appearance (*khyati*), therapeutic techniques (*upaya*), and therapeutic skill (*upaya-kausalya*). As the extensive content envisaged by Chandrakirti is, for the most part, just that assented to by universal vehicle Buddhism, this treatment can be fairly summary in details and afford to locate that content which is pertinent to this study. With the exception of its interpretation and distribution of the interpretative-definitive distinction, the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] is effectively a precis of the Perfect Insight (*Prajna-paramita*) literature and the Asanga[1] corpus of texts, even though it does not refer to them. It parallels the presentations given in the *Ornament for the Realisations* (*Abhisamayalamkara*), *Ornament for the Universal Vehicle Sutras* [MSA],

and *Levels of Yoga Practice* (*Yogacara-bhumi*) when these texts have been culled of their Phenomenalist content and/or had that content Madhyamically rectified.

There are three areas in which the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] specifies extensive subject-matter. These are, (1) conventionalities as they apply to ordinary people, (2) the world-views, practices, and attainments of yogins and bodhisattvas, and (3) the attainments and expressions of buddhas. These are natural divisions and they correspond, of course, to conventions and conventional truths and falsities as they apply prior to, while on, and at a terminus to the bodhisattvas' path. The terminus is the state of full evolution and the bodhisattvas' path is in essence the gradual development to that state. We will discuss the extensive content following the above divisions and sequence.

1 COMMON-SENSE WORLD-VIEW

From the viewpoint of buddhas (6.230) all the cognitions of ordinary people are fictitious (*mitya*) as they fail to see the real - i.e. non-intrinsic - nature of things. Analogically these cognitions are like those of children. Even so they are categorised as conventional or, more literally, obscured truths (*samvrti-satya*). Explaining the definition Chandrakirti writes (6.28): "Delusion (*moha*) is conventional (*samvrti*) because its nature is to cover. Whatever appears conventionally is as if an artificial truth, and the Sage has called this a 'conventional reality (*samvrti-satya*)'. The things that are artificialities are conventionalities (*samvrti*)." The sutra source for the doctrine of the two realities (*dvaya-satya*) is the *Introduction to the Two Realities Sutra* (*Aryasatyadvayavatara-sutra*) - which was quoted from the *Commentary* [MABh] earlier[2] - and the *Meeting of the Father and Son Sutra* (*Pitaputrasamagama-sutra*) - also quoted on the two realities in the *Commentary* [MABh: 70].

The cognition of such conventions by ordinary people are false because they are underscored by the fabrication of intrinsic existence. Even so, the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] introduces criteria for distinguishing between veridical and illusory world-views. The criteria for such a distinction is made from three different foci, which correspond to the three components of the cognitive act; namely, cognition, and its subject and objects. Hence the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA], in an *ad hoc* manner, stipulates valid and invalid instruments of cognition (*pramana*), conditions inhering in the cogniser (*pramata*) which bear on the veracity of cognitions, and certified and uncertified objects of cognition (*prameya*).

1.1 INSTRUMENTS OF VALID CONVENTIONAL COGNITION

The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] certifies, implicitly or explicitly, four instruments capable of furnishing veridical knowledge of a worldly or mundane

nature. These are perception (*pratyaksa*), inference (*amunana*), authoritative tradition (*agama*), and analogy (*upamana*).[3]

According to Màdhyamikas[4] - and here they follow the higher sciences (*adhidharma*) - perceptions of sense-objects arise in dependence on four conditions (*pratyaya*). These are: (1) an object support (*alambana*), or presence of an object of cognition, (2) an immediately preceding (*anantara*), condition which is a prior moment of consciousness, (3) a dominant (*adhipati*), condition which is the various sensory organs, and (4) a cause (*hetu*) which is the efficient energy for having a percept. Cognitions can arise only when all four are present and contact (*sparsa*) occurs between an object, organ, and consciousness. Anomalies in the sense-objects and malfunctions in sensory faculties cause sense-perceptions to be non-veridical. Hence, in the case of perceptions veracity is defined in terms of the qualities of sense-organs. Chandrakirti writes (6.24-25):

> Further, we assert that deceptive perceptions have two modes: one having a clear sense-faculty [the other] a defective sense-faculty. We assert that knowledge from defective sense-faculties is wrong (*mithya*) compared with knowledge derived from good sense faculties. From a conventional standpoint anything which is apprehended through the six undamaged sense-faculties is - for the world - reality (*satya*). Everything else is deemed to be wrong from a conventional standpoint.

A clear organ is defined in the *Commentary [Introduction to the Middle Way* [MABh: 104] as one free from a defect, damage, or injury such as ophthalmia, jaundice, or modification caused by the ingestion of drugs. All of these produce false perceptions of external objects. A consciousness that arises in dependence on these faculties is likewise veridical or fallacious dependent on the qualities of the organ. The external causes for sensory defects are cited in the *Commentary* [MABh: 104] as reflections, echos, sounds from caves, atmospheric anomalies such as mirages, and illusions produced by magicians and the effects of medicines.[5]

At verse 6.25 mention is made of fallacious inferences (*anumana-abhasa*), so we can assume that there are also non-fallacious inferences acceptable to the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA].[6] They are presumably the inferential patterns based on the syllogistic forms explicated in the Dignaga tradition of Buddhist logic.[7]

We can reasonably guess that the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] also certifies both authoritative tradition and analogy as instruments of knowledge, for the *Clear Words* [PP][8] formally does. Certainly Chandrakirti uses these very extensively in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA], with authority in this context being the citation of sutras of the Buddha and the commentarial traditions. Usually, in fact, these last two criteria - authority and analogy -

inform not on the common-sense world but on phenomena that are reputedly perceivable by buddhas, but outside of the scope of ordinary peoples' cognition.

1.2 SUBJECTIVE DETERMINANTS OF COGNITION

Subjective determinants are those located in the subject, i.e. the cogniser, this being the consciousness having or receiving objects of cognition. This consciousness is the mental consciousness or the immediately preceding condition from among the above four conditions for perception.[9] As with the other conditions the presence of a mental consciousness, actually the subsiding of a prior moment of a mental consciousness, is a *condition sine quibus non* for perception, and like with the sense-faculties the qualities, characteristics, or concomitants of the mental consciousness bear on the accurancy and hence veracity of cognitions. The particularities of a mental consciousness differ, though, for they affect both sensory and conceptual or constructed cognitions where sense-faculties can modify only sensory cognitions.

According to Chandrakirti (6.25), the mental concomitants which damage cognitions by the mind (*manas*) are the systems or tenets (*siddhanta*), devised by others, that are not real (i.e. fail to describe conventions), and fallacious inferences. By false systems of philosophy and description, Chandrakirti has in mind (6.26) the non-Buddhist philosophers. Whatever they imagine, such as the notion of a transcendental self, or [MABh: 105] the three qualities (*guna*) of the Samkhyas are invalid from the perspective of worldly conventions and so, like illusions and mirages, are non-existent.[10] (The damage to sense-organs and environmental anomalies mentioned before are also regarded as indirect causes for mental defects insofar as the mental consciousness cognises whatever is reported or given to it by the other consciousnesses.)

The conceptual concomitants are presumably manifestations of the distorting and contaminating mental events (*caitta*); the emotional reactions and unwholesome (*akusala*) concomitants detailed in the higher sciences (*adhidharma*).[11]

1.3 THE COMMON-SENSE WORLD

A world-view cannot be described extensionally and so the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] must be satisfied to give just some *examples* from the inventory which it sees as making up the list of things and relations in the world. For the most part the world consists of whatever is asserted to exist by common people. Working with an ostensive definition Chandrakirti writes, (6.166) for example that: "Anything - vases, blankets, tents, armies, forests, garlands, trees, houses, small carriages, hostels, and so on, should be understood as people describe them, since the mighty Lord [Buddha] has no quarrel with the world."[12] As Shantideva says in the *Introduction to the Evolved Lifestyle* [BCA: 9.26]: it is not the

ways in which things are seen, heard, and known in the world that is rejected by Madhyamikas, but only the conception of them as real (*sat*).

Object discernment is specified through labels being imputed to ojects (6.158, 159d) in dependence on their parts. That is to say, a collection of parts provides a suitable basis for asserting the conventional existence of a part's possessor.[13] The central and crucial notion of a 'self' is hence correlated with the composite of the psycho-physical constituents, i.e. to individuated psycho-physical collections. As Chandrakirti writes (6.162):

> Likewise, worldly consensus also maintains that [there is] a self [designated] in dependence on the psycho-physical organism, the basic constituents (*dhatu*) and the six sense-bases (*ayatana*), and that it also is an acquirer. [There is a presentation in our system that says:] acquisition is thus, action is thus, and the agent is thus.

The last line here also designates the self in dependence on its functions as an agent. Chandrakirti explains it like this (6.159a-c).

> Thus [the carriage] has parts and pieces and so the carriage can be called an 'agent'. For ordinary people, this proves that there is an acquirer (*updatar*).

This designation in terms of function is important for the Madhyamika and Buddhism generally as it embodies the idea that ontological claims must take into account the ability of objects to enter into casual relationships appropriate to the objects. That is to say, objects must be able to perform their designated functions and activities via placement in causal nexi if they are to be designated as valid worldly conventions (*loka-samvrti*). Hence a carriage must be capable of carrying people, etc. and a self be able to achieve ends such as intending action, etc.

This sanctioning by the Madhyamika of an empiricalrationalist epistemology and the everyday reality it cuts out is indicative of a Lockean approach to knowledge in which action or more specifically proper conduct is tied to the concept of knowledge.[14] By establishing *notiones communes* the Madhyamika ensures the efficient and successful expedition of worldly concerns and affairs, and in this sense is advocating something like the Confucian "reification of names".[15]

Besides these strictly utilitarian and pedestrian reasons, the Madhyamika's epistemological sanctioning of the common-sense world and continued assention to it by buddhas and yogins serves to provide a *communicative medium* between the enlightened and ordinary folk. By refraining from debating with the world and ensuring that what they say conforms with the terms, locutions, etc. of the community of speakers, a *lingua franca* is created for the buddhas to communicate in the only language that the *masse parlante* understands.[16]

Presumably the location of common-sense notions also serves to locate and demarcate the phenomena and processes that yogins subsequently learn to recognise as the causes of their suffering, and in the context of their meditations on emptiness, the prior establishment of conventionalities would ensure their retainment as nominally existent subsequent the insight that they are empty. It counters their blanket negation such as is warned against repeatedly in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA].[17]

2 THE YOGIN'S PRACTICES

Transitional between the world-views of ordinary people - which are strictly mundane and lacking any religio-philosophical content - and the perspectives and perceptions of saints (*arya*), are base-line religions and philosophical practices and doctrines. These would be world-views encountered on the accumulation (*sambhara*) and connecting (*prayoga*) paths. Some of the concepts introduced at these levels of the yogins' practice are pan-Buddhistic and sometimes pan-Indic. They are the concepts of cyclic existence (*samsara*), moral action (*karma*), meditative practices, liberation, and in this context emptiness, two realities, four truths, etc. The *Instruction on Mental Integration into Reality Sutra* (*Tattvanirdesasamadhi-sutra*) (quoted at MABh: 175-177) includes all the standard doctrines about different realms of existence, types of human existence, and other abhidharma cosmologies within the conventional reality. The world-views located by the non-Madhyamika Buddhist schools, with their doctrines of intrinsic existence, a source consciousness, etc.[18] and the subsequent Madhyamika negation of these must also be located at this post-mundane but pre-saintly stage, for they represent a pre-intuition (*darsana*) understanding within the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] path structure.

The doctrine of karma, which is referred to in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 6.38-42] but not explicated, says that actions bear on subsequent experiences and goes on to specify the relations or action paths (*karma-patha*) that obtain between particular action patterns and ensuing experiences. Moral precepts are essentially a codification of actions which are conducive to creating karmas that produce freeing experiences.

Such doctrines as the above and the meditative practices of tranquillity and mental integration are not uniquely related to the bodhisttvas' path and the gaining of full evolution, for though the bodhisattvas must surely be understood to complete these practices, *evolve* through the non-Madhyamika systems of philosophy, and work with the psycho-cosmological doctrines of samsara, karma, etc. these are just as much a part of the disciple and self-evolver vehicles that are said to be impelled largely by a self-interested motivation towards the (alternative) goal of liberation or nirvana.[19]

3 THE BODHISATTVAS' PATH

The bodhisattvas' path differs from the disciple and self-evolver vehicles in that it has full evolution (*bodhi*) as its goal rather than a non-residual nirvana or what Chandrakirti also calls (12.41 and 42) a thorough peace.[20] The difference in these goals comes about as a result of a difference in the spiritual motivations or intentions of the bodhisattvas of the universal vehicle and the saints of the two individual vehicles, the latter being concerned primarily just with benefits for themselves (*rang phan*) while the former are intent more than anything else with bringing benefits to others (*gzhan phan*). This difference in their spiritual ideal is thought to account for the individual vehicle saints conceiving of a private or solitary liberation as the highest religious goal, and universal vehicle saints conceiving of an activated and expressive liberation in which the concern for others' welfare and the ability to help them was thought to be brought to a maximum. The fully evolved mind is thus inimical to the disciples' and self-evolver mentalities[21] and the *Perfect Insight in Twenty-five thousand Stanzas* [PPS] tells that the bodhisattvas are wary of the demonic forces (*mara*), in the guise of the disciples and self-evolved saints, dissuading them from training in the knowledge of all perspectives, and encouraging them to seek after the arhats self-satisfying nirvana.[22]

In the universal vehicle this conception of an altruistic evolution is taken to its logical limit in the fully fledged ideal of the bodhisattva who is the exemplar of the altruistic motivation and in the buddhas who are the supreme worldly and spiritual therapists, able to bring relief, comfort, and guidance to innumerable creatures.

According to the doctrine of a single vehicle (*eka-yana*) - which actually doesn't mean one vehicle, but rather that there is ultimately only the one spiritual goal of the buddhas' full evolution, that all creatures will finally gain - the individual vehicle saints, even though they may gain a solitary nirvana, will, at some point in their career, *necessarily* enter the bodhisattva vehicle and begin their development to the goal of full evolution. The Madhyamika of Chandrakirti seems to advocate that saints entered the universal vehicle at the very start of their spiritual careers, rather than first embarking on either of the two individual vehicle careers, perhaps because it is thought that some efficency and economy was to be gained by striking out for full awakening at the very beginning of their spiritual career; so avoiding the need for making a change in aspiration and course part way through their career. Perhaps more importantly, though, if the saint were to enter the bodhisattva vehicle even as a fledgling, still he would be able to bring some measure of comfort and ease to other creatures. Thus, in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] it is assumed that the yogin practises the perfections prior to gaining the first intuition of emptiness that makes him a bodhisattva saint (*arya*).

It seems that for those first entering the path the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 3.12] suggests that they practise the earlier perfections of giving, good

conduct, and endurance, the first of these (1.10-12) being especially fitting for ordinary people. By practising those essentially physical perfections yogins are said (3.12) to accrue merits (*punya*) that result in the attainment of a buddha's form or body. The higher perfections of enthusiasm, meditation, and insight add to the accumulation of intelligence[23] (*mati*) and produce the truth form (*dharma-kaya*) or mental qualities of buddhas. Enthusiasm (*virya*) contributes to both accumulations (4.1). Prior to entering the bodhisattva levels (1.16cd, 2.3ab, 9a-c, 3.106) these perfections are practised and cultivated by bodhisattvas, but with attachment to the selfexistence of the triad involved in these actions; namely the subject, action, and object of the action. As the perfections are not underscored by an insight of their emptiness, they are not yet pure practices, and are termed worldly perfections (*laukika-paramita*).

The six perfections are defined with sufficient brevity in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 6.205-6b] that we may quote:

> [The defining properties of phenomena that occur while on the path are these (6.205-209):] Perfect giving (*dana*) is [defined as] giving away. The property of good conduct (*sila*) is not tormenting [others]. The property of endurance (*ksanti*) is the absence of anger and enthusiasm (*virya*) is the absence of negativity. Meditation (*dhyana*) has the property of integration, and the property of insight (*prajna*) is a lack of attachment.

The first five perfections are method or technique (*upaya*) practices that culminate in the sixth, insight.

Once yogins cognise emptiness for the first time, they enter the bodhisattvas' path and begin traversing the ten levels. They continue to practise the perfections though as trans-worldly or supra-mundane (*lokottara*) disciplines. The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] is a little unclear as to whether the saint-bodhisattvas' practices of the perfections are *all* supramundane. Verse 2.3cd says that the bodhisattva "is always perfectly free of the vacillation of dualistic thought regarding the three components." In other words she or he regards them as separate from the notions of their existing or not existing. Verses 2.3ab and 3.10 are constructed around conditionals, and so can be read as implying that they may or not practise the perfections as trans-worldly actions. Certainly the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] implies that they are capable of practising trans-worldly perfections and (MABh: 1) that non-saints cannot know the trans-worldly practices. Even so, it seems one can query that the bodhisattva saints are able to practise trans-worldly perfections for these are defined as the perfections underscored by a discernment of their non-intrinsic existence, i.e. their emptiness, and this is not obtained in the post-meditative or active context until the completion of the sixth level. First they practise the six perfections in a serial order. This takes them to the completion of the sixth level, when their insight (*prajna*) is perfect. They then practice four more perfections: therapeutic

methods (*upaya*), the capacities (*bala*), resolution (*pranidhana*), and knowledge (*jnana*). When these are completed they have become buddhas.

Herein we confront an ideational system the most striking features of which are the increases envisaged in the cognitive capacities and volitional activities of bodhisattvas as they reach from level to level.

3.1 THE BODHISATTVAS' COMPASSION

In contradistinction to the arhat, for whom it is sufficient to cultivate only insight, the bodhisattva arises through the combination of (*Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 1.1cd] a "compassionate mind (*karuna-citta*), a non-dualistic intellect [i.e., cognition of emptiness] and the fully evolved mind (*bodhi-citta*)." Of these three Chandrakirti says in the *Commentary* [MABh: 7] that compassion is the principle cause of the bodhisattva. The importance of compassion is further highlighted by Chandrakirti at the very beginning of the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 1.2d] where he gives praise to compassion rather than following the usual practice of paying homage to the buddha or a tutelary deity, and says (1.16) that although the disciples and self-evolvers are born from the buddhas, the buddhas are born from the bodhisattva. By this he means that the buddhas grow out of the continua of bodhisattvas that are propelled by compassion.[24] In the *Commentary* [MABh: 8-9] Chandrakirti says that compassion is essential in all the stages of the bodhisattvas' career. Like the grain required for a crop, compassion is an absolute necessity at the beginning. In the middle, like water as the nutrient for the growing crop, compassion sustains the bodhisattva on the path. And finally, at the completion, compassion is necessary for were there no compassion the buddhas wouldn't remain bringing bounty and benefit to innumerable creatures, just as the ripened crop brings enduring sustanence for a multitude of people. In the universal vehicle compassion is viewed as a precondition, as a seed, for all the other qualities of the buddhas.

In the *Commentary* [MABh: 9-10] Chandrakirti distinguishes three types of compassion in dependence on their having different foci of attention.

The first type of compassion is called the compassion that focusses just on sentient creatures (*sems can tsam la dmigs pai snying rje*). This is a compassion that is attentive to the samsaric condition of creatures, who uncontrolably experience all the sufferings to be had in samsara from the peaks of existence (*bhavagra*) to the depths of the lowest hell just like (1.3d) the whirling of a waterwheel. In describing the sufferings, Chandrakirti mentions the suffering of suffering itself (*sdug bsngal ba nyid gyi sdug bsngal*) and the sufferings incurred through having to undergo change (*'gyur bai sdug gsngal*). A third type of suffering not mentioned in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] but usually included alongside these two is the suffering of impulsion (*'du byed kyi sdug*

bsngal) which refers to the fact that suffering is the intrinsic nature of samsaric embodiment.

The second compassion is called the compassion that focuses on phenomena (*chos la dmigs pai snying rje*). This is defined as the compassion that focusses on the momentary impermanence (*skad cig re re la mi rtag pa nyid*) of sentient creatures, seeing them (1.4a) like the moon stirred in moving water.

The third compassion is the compassion that focusses on focuslessness (*dmigs pa med pa la dmigs pai snying rje*), which is defined (1.4b) as the compassion that perceives sentient creatures to be empty of an intrinsic existence. The orthodox Tibetan interpretation of these different compassions is that they represent a development of compassion graded in dependence on the depth of insight of the bodhisattvas.[25] The first compassion can be practiced by those who have realised neither impermanence nor emptiness, the second is practiced by those bodhisattvas who have realised impermance and the last by those who have gained the insight into emptiness.

Consonant with their altruism and role as beneficiaries for the world, the bodhisattvas train in the four infinitudes (*apramana*). They generated (MA: 6.211c-212) great love (*maha-maitri*), which is concerned at benefitting creatures; great compassion, concerned at alleviating and protecting creatures from suffering; rejoicing (*mudita*) in their happiness; and equanimity or impartiality (*upeksa*) which ensues that they care for all creatures equally, not holding some as close and others as distant.[26]

The altruistic attitude affected by the bodhisattvas' compassion transforms their therapy (*upaya*) from being essentially self-centred to being increasingly concerned with others' suffering, and ultimately with the suffering of all creatures. Their therapy takes on a new significance as it becomes other-orientated and changes to therapeutic techniques (*upaya-kausalya*) for the liberation of others.[27] In order to actualise the aspiration to free all creatures the bodhisattvas progressively acquire all sorts of truly siderial knowledges and abilities to help them in their task.[28] In the final analysis, as buddhas, they achieve the knowledge of all perspectives [on reality] (*sarva-akara-jnata*). This is not to say that the disciples and self-evolved arhats are completely lacking the breadth of vision of the buddhas. Largely it seems that the arhats were thought to have *varying* degrees of insight into the phenomenal world. According to the universal vehicle, though, a complete knowledge of all perspectives on reality is the perogative only of buddhas.[29]

The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 11] describes this inspirational system with an exhuberance that is characteristic of the universal vehicle, with the edifying image of the bodhisattvas developing all sorts of magical qualities. These various attainments and abilities develop through the levels and are formally described by a number of schemata. At the third level (3.11) the bodhisattvas (begin to) acquire a new set of cognitive instruments, the higher knowledges or super-sensitive cognitions (*abhijna*).[30] At the fourth level they

are receiving results from their practice of the thirty seven directions to full evolution (*bodhipaksa*).[31] At the eighth level (8.4) they have nearly developed the ten capacities (*dasa-bala*)[32] and at the ninth level (9.1b) the bodhisattvas with good intelligence (*sadhumati*) appropriately gain the individuating knowledges (*pratisamvid*).[33]

The phenomenon of cognitive dilation (*vistara*) is explained by recourse to a device that draws a distinction between emotional obstructions (*klesa-avarana*) and cognitive-coverings (*jneya-avarana*).[34] The emotional or afflictive obstructions preclude a consciousness from becoming liberated, and hence when the afflications (and karma) are removed nirvana is obtained. A knowledge of all perspectives on reality on the other hand is precluded by cognitive coverings, such that as these are eradicated a consciousness can cognise more features of phenomena.[35] The *Commentary* [MABh: 393-394] explains the cognitive coverings through the cognate concept of the traces of ignorance (*ma rig pai bag chags, avidya-vasana*). The traces of ignorance, which exist as the potencies for greed, etc. and also as the cause for manifesting these types of afflicted motor and vocal actions, are said to be an obstruction to the thorough discrimination (*gcod pa*) of knowables. And further, these traces are only elminiated by the buddhas and whoever has gained all knowledge, and not by anyone else.[36] Thus, a knowledge of all perspectives on reality is thought to be obtained when all the cognitive coverings have been removed and we are told that (MABh: 30) only the buddhas have abandoned both types of covering. Cognitive coverings were regarded as much more subtle and difficult to remove than the emotional obstructions as they are the impressions or traces (*vasana*) left behind after the obstructions have been removed.[37] Hence the comparative ease with which nirvana was thought to be gained when in comparison with the effort required for gaining full evolution. The mind so cleansed of all obstructions to knowing all knowables is (MABh: 361) the form having the nature of knowledge (*ye shes kyi rang bzhin can gyi sku*), i.e. the knowing truth form (*jnanadharmakaya*) which sees everything.

The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] is vague as to when the cognitive coverings are removed. Verse 3.1ab says that: "Because light comes from the fire that burns all the fuel [that obscures] what can be known, this third level is [called] the Illuminator." The reference here is presumably to cognitive coverings though it is not entirely clear.[38] In this case cognitive obscurations begin to be removed at the third level, at the same time that the super-sensitive cognitions (*abhijna*) are obtained. Verse 8.3 says that:

> Their minds, being without greed (*raga*), do not remain at one with the problems of existence (*dosa*) and therefore at the eighth level both stains (*mala*) and their roots (*mula*) are thoroughly pacified. The emotional reactions (*klesa*) are exhausted and although [these bodhisattvas] have become spiritual masters (*guru*) to [creatures in]

> the three ranges of existence they are not [yet] able to gain all the buddhas' treasures, which are as limitless as space.

If the stains refers to the cognitive coverings, and again it is not clear that they do, then at some time on the eighth level the obscurations to a knowledge of all perspectives on reality have become nearly eradicated. If the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] does mean to imply that cognitive coverings are removed from the third level onwards (as would seem to make some sense given the fruition of super-sensitive knowledges on the third level) then its position is at variance with the usual Prasangika position and accords more closely with the path-structure envisaged by the Svatantrika. According to Prasangikas, emotional obstructions and cognitive coverings are removed serially. The emotional obstructions are removed first, the cognitive coverings being removed only after *all* emotional obstructions are eradicated. This, they say, occurs at the transition between the seventh and eighth level (hence the achievement of liberation at that point also). The cognitive coverings are removed from the eighth through to the end of the tenth levels.[39] Svatantrika Buddhists on the other hand are of the opinion that the emotional obstructions and cognitive coverings are removed simultaneously rather than consecutively. A consequence of this view is the coterminus achievement of both liberation and awakening at the end of the tenth level.[40] Their notion of a cognitive covering is also different.

One can see from this idea of the emotional reactions and their traces as being mere obstructions or coverings (*avarana*) to consciousness, how universal vehicle Buddhism can consider - in theories like the genes of a buddha (*tathagata-garbha*) - that the potential for achieving full evolution resides in an embrionic form in all creatures (something like Descarte's dictum that the "seeds of knowledge are in us"), and that *except* for the contingent fact that creatures are mentally defiled, all are by nature actually evolved.

4 THE BUDDHA-NATURE

The bodhisattvas' path reaches a terminus at the end of the tenth level. At that point bodhisattvas enter the path of completion (*asaiksa-marga*) and are fully evolved or buddhas. According to the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 8.3 and 12.32) the buddhas' qualities and breadth of action (*gocara*) are so vast and unparalleled (12.1) as to be quite inconceivable, not only for ordinary people (12.37) but even for bodhisattvas, who are precluded from knowing the *real* buddha-nature through a doctrine of *docta ignorantia.* The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 12.32] uses an image of bodhisattvas and disciples finding the buddhas' qualities unplumbable in the way that birds return from flight, not because they run out of space in which to fly but because they run out of strength. Even (11.8a) the tenth level bodhisattvas' qualities are beyond being objects of verbal expression (*ngag gi spyod yul*).

Even so the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] describes the notion of buddhahood. The accumulations of merit, or positive potentials, and knowledge become complete and these collections respectively produce the buddha's manifest or interactional characteristics and their cognitive qualities. Their accumulation of knowledge produces the truth form (*dharma-kaya*) and the accumulation of positive potentials in the cause for the two physical forms (*rupa-kaya*) of enjoyment (*sambhoga*) and manifestation (*nirmana*). Chandrakirti says in the *Commentary* [MABh: 362] that although the truth form is naturally quiescent it undertakes the deeds appropriate to benefitting creatures, and that (362-363) although it is completely non-conceptual it is said to be like a perpetually fruiting tree or wish-granting jewel that give one all that one can desire. Presumably the actions are via the formed-basis, for the truth form is formless. (dGe 'dun grub [RSM: f. 47a3-6] glosses verses 12.8cd and 12.9 as referring to manifest actions made by the enjoyment form.)

In the context of the doctrine of the four forms of a buddha, all barring the natural form (*svabhavikakaya*) are developed for the sake of other beings' requirements. Hence in terms also of the five knowledges that buddhas are said to acquire, all except for the pure sphere of truth (*dharma-dhatu-visuddhi*), which is the buddhas' cognition of emptiness, are directly or indirectly for fulfilling the needs of others.[41] In summary, it is only the natural form and the correlated pure sphere of truth that fulfill, via the cognition of emptiness, the private or self- liberative requirements of buddhas. The existence of the other bases or forms is contingent upon the presence of creatures in samsara. This is like Whitehead's conception of deity in which the "consequent" nature exists contingently. The "primordial" nature, like the natural form (*svabhavikakaya*) exists necessarily. In fact this general conception of bodhisattvas and buddhas is strikingly similar to Hartshorne's notion of divine perfection as embodied in his dipolar theism, in which love rather than aseity is the root aspect. On the one hand Deity is immutable, impassible, etc. (the *dharma-kaya*), yet at the same time is it supremely relative (the *rupakaya*, i.e. *nirmana* and *sambhoga-kayas*); able to interact with the whole universe and having an "unsurpassable capacity to move to creative and new expressions of its being".[42]

Not all the buddhas' activities are accessible to ordinary creatures and it is part of the three or four form (*kaya*) doctrine that the different forms represent a continuum of manifestations with the manifest form being the coursest and most accessible, able to be perceived by ordinary people. On the other hand (MABh: 363) the body that is adorned with the characteristics of a hundred merits (the *sambhoga-kaya*) appears as existent only for those who have gained the mirror of the stainless insight. It doesn't appear for those who are fixed to mental elabortation.[43]

Thus the buddhas' great compassion leads them to forego a private nirvana (12.40-2) and to work extensively and unceasingly for the temporal and spiritual concerns of all creatures. Chandrakirti eulogises (12.40):

> For as long as all the world has not gone to the most supreme serenity and space has not decayed, you who were borne of the mother of insight will act like a wet nurse [to all beings] through your love. Therefore how [can it be thought that you] have risen to the thorough [or isolated] serenity [i.e. a non-abiding nirvana].

Their functions or activities (*karitra*) require (12.9) no (pre-) conceptions (*kalpana*) and (12.6-7) unfold effortlessly under the perpetual momentum of their earlier exertions. Chandrakirti (12.6-7b) paints the image of the potter who has striven long to put his wheel in motion, which, once done, continues under its own (effortless) momentum while pots and so forth are produced.[44] Thus, their speech and other activities are extemporaneous and continue for the world's gain up to end of samsara. Their criteria for action and determination of valid knowledge are purely altuistic and their skilful therapy has become fully expressed. Therapeutic consideration (*upaya*) is their sole criterion of valid knowledge as they are personally uncommitted to any world-view. Hence whatever they assent to, and their decision to so assent, is based only on a consideration for the welfare of others.[45] They act out the traditional twelve deeds (12.35) of buddhas,[46] and convey the dharma (12.5) by various verbal, non-verbal, and significatory means.

Their perfection of both insight and compassion makes them faultless in regard to the help and assistance they give to creatures and guarantees that they never cause any harm. Their knowledge of all perspectives on reality can be seen as one guarantee of the efficacy of their therapeutic skills. Their psychic abilities and powers ensure that any inabilities to help creatures issue solely from the karmic impoverishment of those creatures, and not from any deficency or limitation from their own side.[47]

In the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] these qualities are specified in the standard schemas[48] for describing buddhas, viz. in terms of the (12.19-31) ten capacities (*balani*),[49] the (6.210cd) four certitudes (*vaisaradya*)),[50] and (6.213) eighteen unique buddha qualities (*avenika-buddhaguna*).[51] The ten capacities describe different aspects of buddhas' knowledge of all perspectives on reality, the unique qualities do the same as well as specifying intentional, affective, and volutional aspects to their cognition and action. The certitudes indicate the buddhas' self-assessment of and confidence in their own attainment and teaching. The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] (nor any other text that I am aware of) does not go into the physiology, as it were, of buddhas' knowledge of all perspectives of reality, i.e. the perception of all objects of knowledge in the past, present, and future. Even though the *Commentary* [MABh: 362] says that the objects of the buddhas' knowledge comprises all aspects of reality and thus cannot be penetrated by the mind or mental events, it being posited as being realised by way of the truth form, still the idea of knowledge of all perspectives on reality and cognitive dilation (*mentis dilatatio*) in the bodhisattvas seems to be based on a particular concept of the mind in which it is defined as being strictly

non-material and having the capacity to know objects immediately. This notion of mental perception permits the non-organic perception of objects, i.e. ummediated by physical organs. The more fantastic qualities to buddhas' cognition, such as its synesthetic qualities, presumably become possible because of this non-organic conception of perception also. The idea that the mind is non-material somehow facilitates the notion that the spatial distance or proximity of any object is immaterial to its being cognised, for the mind has no spatial location and hence no spatial limitations, and in this respect is seems very like Newton's concept of space as the *divine sensorium* of God.[52] The only metaphor used in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 6.224] is that the bodhisattvas perceive all the three ranger of existence with just the same clarity of appearance [with which they would see] a clean olive sitting in their own hand". The doctrines of the non-obstruction of all phenomena, and a non-linear conception of space, such as are described in the Hwa Yen doctrines of the interpenetration and containment of all things in the sphere of truth (*dharma-dhatu*), are also obviously related to the notion of the buddhas' knowledge of all perspectives on reality.[53]

4.1 INTERPRETATIVE TEACHING

As peerless pedagogues the buddhas are said to teach from various perspectives and viewpoints so as to accommodate the differences in aptitude and comprehension among their disciples. This teaching of and/or assention to various world-views and philosophies is captured in the concept of two types of discourse, the definitive (*nitartha*) and interpretative (*neyartha*). Definitive discourse, we recall,[54] has reality or emptiness rather than phenomena as its subject-matter. It is all discourse, and perhaps non-verbal communication also, that directly locates emptiness. The *King of Mental Integrations Sutra* (*Samadhiraja-sutra* [cited MABh: 200-201]) says that the definitive sutras are those about emptiness whereas those that teach about the self, beings, and all the dharmas are interpretative.[55] The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] and hermeneutical literature such as Tsong kha pa's *Essense of the Eloquent* [LSNP] in fact apply the distinction only to Buddha's discourses (*sutra*) but there is no reason why it doesn't have utility as a hermeneutical device in the description of non-sutric literature and even non-verbal systems of signification.[56] To the extent that definitive discourse describes the emptiness of phenomena rather than phenomena themselves, it is considered categorical, literal, incontravertable and univocal, i.e. referentially unambiguous.

The question of what is and is not directly about emptiness, and what constitutes "locating or pointing directly to reality" is very problematic. Questionably there is no definitive *discourse* as even the pithiest talk about emptiness is subject to interpretation, and definitive truths are nothing other than cognising emptiness non-conceptually. At least it is important to recognise

that the distinction between definitive and interpretative is an interpretable teaching itself (for it is not just about emptiness) and so the point where the distinction is drawn is mobile.

Interpretative discourse, on the other hand, describes phenomena and offers *putative* descriptions of reality.[57] Phenomena are described with a view to regulating a religious life. The various *phenomenalised* descriptions of reality represent a serial (*krama*)[58] approach to the location of emptiness by specifying a number of representative images. These have a provisional but not final validity. In other words, some interpretative literature amounts to phenomenological description whereas other literature makes ontological claims. The former is interpretative simply because it describes phenomena. The latter is interpretative because it claims to describe reality when in fact it doesn't, or does so only *via* some image, and so requires additional information to account for the disparity. As heuristic devices (*upaya*), the provisional validity of an interpretative teaching would depend on its value and relevancy in the religious life and evolution of the buddhas' disciples.[59] Such a contextual determination makes interpretative discourse conditional, contravertible, and equivocal, i.e. comprehensible in more than one sense. Validity is local and contingent rather than universal, and like in logical languages depends on locutions being supplied with an interpretation within which they are true. In this context the interpretation is a *Sitz im Leben* which would take cognisance of disciples' predispositional characteristics, level of spiritual evolution, speech situation, and environmental context.[60] Hence, the buddhas' teaching, assention to, and subsequent refutation of provisional philosophies (and replacement of them by definitive ones) is thought to take place as an expression of their compassion and kindness, and with a view to the spiritual well-being and development of their students. The details of the context sensitivity of assertions, i.e. when, where, to whom, how, and to what extent world-views are presented and subsequently refuted, is not described in any detail save that it is incorporated within and guaranteed by the buddhas' skilful techniques and knowledge of all perspectives on reality.[61]

The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] relegates a number of Buddhist concepts and philosophical systems to the status of expressing a provisional or interpretative topic. Chandrakirti considers them all to have been taught by the Buddha, yet to be contraverted by Madhyamika analysis.

Common-sense notions are not only assented to but said to have been actually taught by buddhas. Chandrakirti (6.44b-d) says they "teach [and use the concepts of] 'I' and 'mine'", and the existence of things that in reality have no intrinsic existence,[62] all as an interpretative meaning. Likewise (6.43) for those unable to comprehend the profound topics they teach the existence of a source of all (*alaya*), the person, and simple (i.e. non-provisional) existence (*'ba' zhig nyid yod*) of the psycho-physical organism. The *Perfect Insight in Twenty-five Thousand Stanzas* [PPS] goes so far as to suggest that the buddhas are responsible for the

designations applied to phenomena. In the *Perfect Insight in Twenty-five Thousand Stanzas* [PPS] the Lord explains that although all dharmas are the same, the Tathagata "nevertheless brings about a distinctive determination of dharmas", such as constitute and describe samsara, and nirvana, and buddhahood.[63]

So, at one level of interaction - with those who have been accustomed to the non-Buddhist' views and so are unable to immediately penetrate the philosophy of emptiness - buddhas teach, assent to, and give an apparent sanction to the common-sense world and certain primitive philosophical concepts. The rationale for doing so is that (6.31cd) if one denies worldly objects the world would contradict one. Hence, in order not to place prospective buddhist yogins off-side from the very start, buddhas provisionally concur with a common-sense world-view. Were they to do otherwise they would be refuted dogmatically, in other words, by a non-analytical intellect. The assention to realism and alignment with common- notions is, for Chandrakirti, a tenet that characterises the Madhyamika. At 6.12 Chandrakirti even uses worldly opinion as an argumentative force, and at 6.83 actually uses it against the Phenomenalist rejection of external objects. In any other circumstance the invoking of a worldly view-point to counter a Phenomenalist tenet would be unexpected and strange, for the philosopher and yogin of any Buddhist school would be credited with a more evolved world-view than that of the ordinary person. Here it shows just how firmly the characterised Madhyamika wishes to retain the naive notion of sense-perceptibles existing externally and independently of the perceiver. Such a notion makes for coherence and continuity in the world, and so best serves the interests of people.

Likewise the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] teaches that the Buddha taught, refuted, and reinterpreted the Phenomenalist philosophy. The most central Phenomenalist tenet is the thesis of "mind-only" and rejection of external objects, and this according to Chandrakirti (MABh: 99) was taught for those of meritorious actions who can easily enter the real teaching (*chos nyid, dharmata*). Hence, for Chandrakirti, the Phenomenalist world-view is transitional between the everyday conception of things and the Madhyamika philosophy.

The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] explains the context, value, and reinterpretation of the "mind-only" thesis in some detail. The context in which the mind-only thesis was taught was for those exposed and receptive to the non-Buddhist philosophies (6.85) and intended particularly (6.84) to counter and offset the non-Buddhist philosophers conception of a permanent self or deity as the creator of the manifest universe. So as to oppose those views, and (6.86) not seeing any real referents to the conceptions of the non-Buddhist philosophers, Buddha taught in sutras like the *Descent into Lanka* [LS] and *Ten Levels* [DS] that the mind alone is the creator of the world.

Even so, (6.87) such is not the final sense or meaning of these sutras, for their refutation of materiality is only apparent and stems from a relatively crude interpretation of those sutras. Evidence for this, according to the *Introduction to*

the Middle Way [MA] (6.88) is that the *Ten Levels* [DS] (a purportedly "mind-only" sutra) teaches, alongside its denial of material form, that the mind is born from confusion and (contaminated) actions (*karma*). Hence, according to the Madhyamika, what is really meant by the "mind-only" thesis is (6.89) that action and emotional reactions are causally responsible for the embodiment and extra-dermal environment of all creatures. In this sense the world and its inhabitants are projected (*'god*) by the mind through its creation of various sorts of karmas. Hence "mind-only" does not mean that there are no extra-mental objects but rather that the mind is foremost in the creation of karma, such as gives particularity to experience. Such a view (6.90) rejects a creator god but does not reject material form. The difference here, between the Phenomenalist and Madhyamika account of corporality and the world seems very problematic, perhaps more so for the Madhyamika who have to explain the presence of an extra-mental and so material universe from an essentially mental cause. Their view presumably is a sort of emergent physicalism, that matter emerges from mental phenomena whenever the latter is karmically obscured.

Besides its helping Buddhist yogins steer clear of the non-Buddhist philosophies, the unrectified, i.e. Phenomenalist, interpretation of "mind-only" is intended (6.94) to help counteract an attachment to forms. That is to say, a changed status of percepts, from "externally existent" to "mental projection" serves to reduce a passionate attachment and grasping for them. The negation of external objects (6.96) also facilitates the entry by yogins into the views of selflessness and so is a stepping stone to the Madhyamika philosophy. The changed ontological status of objects helps yogins to cognise their selflessness and this in turn eases their discernment of the emptiness of the cogniser "since, if there are no objects of knowledge the establishment of consciousness [as real] is hindered."

Other tenets of the Phenomenalist philosophy that the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] regards as interpretative are the existence of a source-consciousness (*alaya-vijnana*), the status of the 'genes of a buddha' theory (*tathagata-garbha*), the status and function of the three natures (*tri-svabhava*), and teaching of vehicles (*yana*) to more than one final goal.

The rejection or at least explanatory superfluousness of the source-consciousness is stated in the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] general critique of Buddhist phenomenalism. The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] does not say whether it has an interpretative value. If it does it is presumably linked to the provisional validity of the "mind-only" thesis. The *Commentary* [MABh: 131] reinterprets the source-consciousness, though, to mean emptiness.

The "genes of a buddha theory" is the notion of a naturally pure and eternal matrix of buddhahood existing as a potential in all creatures, and which has various qualities and attributes, such as the symbolic marks of a fully evolved one. The *Commentary* [MABh: 195-196] quotes the *Decent into Lanka Sutra* [LS] itself to the effect that the "genes of a buddha" really means emptiness yet it is

taught as a phenomenalised notion so that the spiritually immature might avoid fearing the more direct presentation of non-self.

The three natures are reinterpreted in the *Commentary* [MABh: 201-202], seemingly like this. The imaginary (*parikalpita*) nature is no longer the duality of subject and object but the conception of intrinsic existence superimposed on the dependent (*paratantra*) nature. What is not imagined is the perfected (*parinispanna*) nature. As imaginaries are the conception of intrinsic existence, this means that the perfected nature is the emptiness of things. The bases of both of these natures is the dependent nature, and it can no longer be truly existent if it is interpreted to refer to relationally originated things.

Though it upholds a doctrine of only one final spiritual goal itself, the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA: 12.37-39] explains why Buddha taught a number of distinct and final *termini* on the path to full evolution, such as the liberative states obtained by disciples and self-evolved arhats. According to Chandrakirti, though, there is only the one goal of full evolution (*bodhi*), lesser goals were specified and taught as final goals in their own right for disciples of a lesser calibre who, lacking the necessary discipline and stamina to strike out directly for full evolution, needed, as it were, (12.38) an *en route* stopover (proffered as the final destination) in order to remove their fatigue. Thus nirvana is a pseudo-terminus for Chandrakirti.

The relationship between the wholesale rejection of the constructs of non-Madhyamika schools and the Madhyamika re-interpretation of these constructs is not explained in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA]. Perhaps it is that re-interpreting a tenet so that it is no longer at variance with the notion of emptiness is an *intermediate step* between an initial acceptance and what would be a rejection once the *Introduction to the Middle Way's* [MA] viewpoint is adopted. Hence Madhyamikas may first communicate the notion of emptiness by *embodying* it within constructs familiar to the Phenomenalists, i.e., the Phenomenalists own constructs. Then at some subsequent stage - when the notion of emptiness has been infused into their constructs and in so doing reduced the Phenomenalists' grasping at them - a new set of constructs, the Madhyamikas', are argued for or even just offered on pragmatic grounds, in their place.

This brings us also to the point of where the characterised Madhyamika stands in the schema of interpretative and definitive philosophy. The characterised Madhyamika is that system explicitly stated in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] or implicitly established by its rejection of specific tenets of other schools. The Madhyamika that is so located accepts, for example, six consciousnesses (*vijnana*) (it rejects the source-consciousness and afflicted mind (*klista-manas*) of the Phenomenalists, three modes of perception (*pratyaksa*) (it rejects a self-reflexive consciousness (*svasamvedana*)), the externality of forms, four conditions (*pratyaya*) for perception, etc.

Though Chandrakirti does not label these constructs as interpretative, clearly they are, for they concern matters of convention rather than emptiness. The tenets of the characterised Madhyamika are also interpretable for the reason that they are contravertible by consequential analyses even though Chandrakirti doesn't show this. Their *potential* refutation, or refutability in principle, by consequential arguments demonstrates that the characterised Madhyamika's theses are conventions, and insofar as consequential analysis is a thesis- or topic-neutral form of argumentation, they are equally as vulnerable to being refuted as the Phenomenalists tenets. As an example, had Chandrakirti wished to refute realism in place of (or in addition to) idealism, he could have done so by resolving realism into a thesis that radically bifurcates a subject from its objects (save it being a monistic idealism) and then, by invoking the refutational consequences that issue from the thesis of 'birth from other', concluded that the cognition of extra-mental objects is impossible. In other words, instead of resolving the Phenomenalists' idealism into a monism between subject and object and refuting cognition between similars through the untenable thesis of 'birth from self', he could have gone an opposite tact and refuted realism. This is implicitly what the Tibetan Total Fulfilment (rDzogs chen) philosophers do when they reject in *both* the waking and dream state that sense-appearances have their source independently or within the mind.[64]

In the *Introduction to the Evolved Lifestyle* [BCA: 9.97-99] Shantideva recognises and raises the issue though doesn't really proceed with it when he questions how there can be a penetration or real contact between a sense-organ (*indriya*), object (*viseya*), or consciousness (*vijnana*) when these are characterised by different natures. For example, consciousness is non-material where matter is non-conscious. The reason for Chandrakirti's selectivity and decision not to refute realism inheres not in limitations or biases inherent in ultimacy analyses, but presumably in a pragmatic and utilitarian decision that realism is the more suited of the two perceptual theories to the concerns of humans and the cultivation and expression of emptiness. That his realism is nominal would also be supported by the phantasmagorical nature of the bodhisattvas' world-view. Hence, although no criteria are given for their interpretative validity we must assume that Chandrakirti means them to represent another level of constructions that have a provisional and particularly (perhaps more generalised) contextual validity. Presumably, also, they are meant to be a more adequate interpretative framework than that depicted by the Phenomenalists or other Buddhist schools.

If, as Chandrakirti appears to believe, the Buddha taught various world-views and philosophies that were meant to be graded in a step-wise progression leading from the mundane philosophies to the most evolved world-view as expressed in the Madhyamika, one can query why the Buddha would teach what seems to be a comparatively small number of world-views and systems of tenets (three or four), rather than having filled in the gaps, as it were, with a *continually* evolving world-view, considering that the last course would seem to

be more attuned to the idea that the buddhas respond to the precise requirements of their disciples, taking note of a *whole range* of philosophical predispositions.

Leaving aside the historially conditioned fact that all the various Buddhist philosophies that have developed seem to have become polarised around a quite small number of *fundamentally* different systems of thought, one reason why Chandrakirti, and the latter Madhyamika hermeneuticians who produced the philosophical systems (*siddhanta*) literature, could have thought that the Buddha satisfied himself with teaching *only* Vaibhashika, Phenomenalist, and the Madhyamika philosophy (in the form of the *Perfect Insight Sutras* (*Prajnaparamita-sutras*) is that a handful of *discrete* philosophies was considered to be more expeditious to his disciples' spiritual development than a continuum of very finely graded philosophies. Such a suggestion gains some sense and support from an hypothesis of H.A. Simon, mentioned by E. Laszlo. Simon's suggests that "complex systems evolve from simple systems much more rapidly if there are *stable intermediate forms* than if there are not."[65] The idea is that where heirarchically evolving processes and structures are punctuated in their development by structurally stable forms, those forms can disintegrate in part without the total dismantling of a structure, and that even in the case where a disruption to some structure brings about its wholesale dissolution, a regression would take place only to the immediately preceding structure in the heirarchy. Without any intermediate forms any change could result in a regression back to the beginning of a developmental process. For a heirarchical ranking of philosophical systems this would mean, for example, that by propounding *well-formed* and even artifically exact philosophies a yogin could experiment with a philosophy with the knowledge that even if its infrastructure was disputed (refuted) there could be no wholesale disintergration of a world-view but at most a reversion to an earlier philosophy. The yogin would always have some solid conceptual ground-work to fall back on, as it were. It may be that the systems (*siddhanta*) theorists had some such thinking in mind.

This completes our discussion of the extensive content.

5 THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PROFOUND AND EXTENSIVE CONTENTS

The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] has no sustained discussion or formal doctrines about the relations between insight and the extensive paths and goals. Even so, I will draw together what it does say and we can infer a certain amount more based on its observations. I will use three main headings to elucidate three basic relationships. All have emptiness as one of the two relata. At the other pole of the relations we will look the epistemological category of valid (*tathya*) conventions, a non-qualified notion of conventional appearances, and the concept of the buddhas' full evolution.

5.1 EMPTINESS AND CONVENTIONS

The relation between emptiness and conventions, or appearances as such, is partially specified by the doctrine of the inseparability of insight and means (*prajna-upaya*). This asserts a bi-directional dependency between these two. The dependency of insight on the means is such that the conventional or social truths (*vyavahara-satya*) and particularly the doctrinal and practical infra-structures of karma and the perfections (*paramita*) are necessary conditions for obtaining (6.224) the meditative equipoises (*samapatti*) and (6.80) the final insight of the ultimate truth. The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] here just echoes Nagarjuna's verse from the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK: 24.10a] that: "The highest sense [of the truth] is not taught apart from practical behaviour."[66] The rationale for this dependency is twofold. Firstly, insight is *causally* dependent on the means for it arises as a product that stems from a chain of causes beginning with the yogins' motor modification in their practice of conduct etc. followed by their mental discipline of tranquillity (*samatha*) and finally with mental integration (*samadhi*) as a penultimate to insight. Chandrakirti spells out some links in this chain. The Commentary [MABh: 78-79] explains that karmic fruits of pure conduct ensures that the bodhisattva can listen continuously to the viewpoint of emptiness by creating the causes for avoiding rebirth in the unfortunate states. By conduct and offering the bodhisattvas are born into happy states and by the latter they gain the conditions such as food, medicines, robes, etc., i.e. the necessities of life (*'tso bai yo byad*) such as are required in order to be in a position to hear about emptiness. Compassion is practised as buddhahood is approached only when the view of emptiness is combined with compassion, and in no other way. Endurance or patience is practised because anger is said to lead to the unfortunate states and to an ugly appearance. Resolve or dedication serves to make the other qualities causes for the gaining of buddhahood.

Secondly, insight cannot be presented, demonstrated, or directly referred to as the ultimate truth is by definition not an object of cognition.[67] The *Commentary* [MABh: 120 and 133] quotes Aryadeva to the effect that the evolutionary philosophy (*dharma*) must be communicated in ones own tongue, i.e. in terms of what one can comprehend. Hence the social truth - and particularly the ontologies that give phenomenalised or imaginal versions of the concept of emptiness, and the analytical formats and procedures for structuring ultimacy meditations - are necessary from the point of leading and directing yogins towards the realisation of emptiness.[68]

The *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] is more informative - uniquely so from among cognate texts - as to the dependency of the method perfections and means generally on insight. In relation to the perfections Chandrakirti (6.2) writes: "Just as one person with sight easily leads a group of blind people to the place they desire, the intellect (*mati*) here has taken on the manner of eyes and goes toward the victory." The intellect here refers (MABh: 74) to perfect insight.

It takes the qualities of the other perfections because it has the nature of being able to discern the correct path from the misleading ones. Presumably all nine perfections are given their focus, control, and lead[69] by insight. In other words, without the insight of emptiness, the method perfections are fettered because they themselves lack a guidance and directionality, without which they cannot become fully perfected, and for which they depend on insight. As the *Perfect Insight in Twenty-five Thousand Stanzas* [PPS] says: "without an eye the five perfections are as if born blind, without the perfection of wisdom they are unable to ascent the path to enlightenment, and still less can they enter into the city of the knowledge of all modes."[70]

A dependence in this direction is also made explicit by the distinction we have noted earlier between mundane or worldly (*laukika*) and supra-mundane or transworldly (*lokotara*) perfections. The former are the perfections of giving, etc. practised without an insight that the actions are empty of an intrinsic nature, and they are presumably karma accumulating for that reason. The latter are the same practices when underscored by the realisation of their emptiness. These are perfect actions for they are unhindered by the conception of intrinsic existence. This presumably makes them more powerful and expressive actions as they are guided by insight, hence non-confused, and liberative as they do not accrue karma.

This idea of mundane and supra-mundane perfections comes from the *Perfect Insight Sutras (Prajnaparamita-sutras)*. The *Perfect Insight in Twenty-five Thousand Stanzas* [PPS] speaks of the three-fold purity (*triksti-parisuddhi*)[71] of giving in which the gift, giver, and receiver are not taken as a basis.[72] The bodhisattva gives without apprehending a self, a recipient, or a gift and also with no reward for his giving.[73] Such giving causes the bodhisattvas to swerve away from the world. On the other hand, worldly giving, which is "tied by three ties" of the notions if self, other, and gift doesn't help the bodhisattva to pass beyond the world.[74]

Chandrakirti elaborates a little further saying (6.5cd) that "they should be taught ultimate reality, for they will thereby receive the qualities." The qualities are (6.6) conduct, giving, compassion, endurance, resolve, and devotion to the perfect bodhisattvas, without whom the bodhisattvas would not be able to hear about relational origination. The *Commentary* [MABh] doesn't really pick up on how the means follow from insight except indicate that once the bodhisattvas have heard about emptiness that they will practice the perfection to ensure that they can continue to hear about it. In other words, there is an incentive added to their practice once the bodhisattvas have tasted the doctrine of emptiness. The implication, though, is that the insight into emptiness not only facilitates the development of the means, but is a necessary condition for their *complete* development. Theoretically it seems that the interdependencies between the two become ever more necessary as yogins approach the perfection of *either*. Ultimately, in fact, insight and the means become identical. As Chandrakirti

says in the annoyingly short "therapeutic methods" chapter (MABh: 343): "While investigating reality it is called perfect insight but it is not different from the perfection of therapeutic methods."

The interdependence between emptiness and the therapeutic techniques is also implicitly recognised in the inclusion of the bodhisattvas' activities (6.205-7) and various meditative achievements (6.207), such as the meditative trances (*dhyana*), and infinitudes (*apramana*) thoughts, and in the detailed breakdown of the emptiness of defining qualities (*svalaksana-sunyata*). If, as seems the case[75], these emptinesses are all objects of contemplation, then a part of the yogins' meditative training is to recognise the emptiness of their own practices and accomplishments. Besides ensuring that these phenomena were cognised as empty, such a practice would also have an accelerating effect on the development of the methods by freeing the practices from the reifying stricture that they were substantial.[76] Hence it could be thought to introduce an economy of effort and a time-wise efficiency in the yogins' consolidation of the insight of emptiness.

Chandrakirti perceives the relationship between emptiness and action (*karma*) in the same light that he sees emptiness and the perfections. Firstly he notes (6.39-40) that if an action were intrinsically existent it would be permanent, and that the very efficacy of actions in producing results rests on their being empty. These conclusions stem from the consequence that any functional phenomena are necessarily empty for were they intrinsically existent, they could not be affected by other things and hence would have no cause for change. More pointedly he writes (6.42c) that: "One who cognises the non[-intrinsic] existence of what is wholesome (*kusala*) and unwholesome will become liberated."[77] Chandrakirti's commentary does not amplify this line. Even so there seem to be three explanations which would give sense to it.[78]

Firstly there is a sense which seeing the emptiness of unwholesome and wholesome actions would enable yogins to be unattached to their actions and thereby gain a freedom to subsequently follow the behavioural prescriptions that lead to positive paths of action.

Secondly, the reification of action and restriction on action potentials and possibilities that is understood to come from the perception of intrinsic existence, and reversal of it in the cognition of emptiness[79] would, theoretically, enable yogins to modify the intensity or even type of results that their karma would otherwise issue forth in. That is, the cognition of actions as empty could facilitate a re-structuring of *previously* initiated karma path so that they produce soteriologically advantageous fruitions (*vipaka*), either in the form of reducing negative fruitions or amplifying positive ones.

Besides facilitating the transformation of subsequent actions and prior karma that are yet to ripen, there is lastly a sense in which an insight into the emptiness of actions may enable yogins to transcend rather than merely transform the "workings of karma". Thus, it may be that when karma, and the

traces (*vasana*) that code its operation are perceived as insubstantial, they are somehow naturally neutralised and made impotent with respect to their necessarily fruiting in specific or even *any* resultant experiences. In other words the cognition of emptiness may permit the de- and not only re-structuring of action potentials. This would be the sense in which knowing emptiness freed yogins from the bonds of karma.[80]

5.2 THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO REALITIES

Even though the problems involved in the Madhyamika interpretation of the relations between the two realites (*satya-dvaya*) have been teased out[81] and to some extent resolved, notably by Streng[82] and Huntington[83] we cannot avoid some reference to the problem as it crystallises the relation between emptiness and appearances.

As we have introduced them, the two realities; the ultimate (*paramartha*) and conventional (*samvrti*), do present a problem for there is seeming tension between the two *vis-a-vis* their autonomy and dependence on each other, and an even more pronounced one in relation to their mutual identification or differentiation.

The picture in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] follows Nagarjuna. The conventional or inter-personal realm of reality is (6.80a) the means for cognising the ultimate reality, on which count, the two are different and the ultimate depends for its realisation (though perhaps not ontologically) on the conventional realities. They are likewise distinguished on the grounds that conventional truths or realities are predicative where the ultimate reality (assuming the concurrence with the *Introduction to the Two Realities Sutra* (*Satyadvayavatara*) and *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK] is non-predicative and quite ineffable. Here too the ultimate is dependent on the conventional for it can be monstrated.[84] On the other hand the functionality of conventions, i.e. sensory appearances, designations, etc. (included here is the ability for conventional truths to monstrate the ultimate), depend on their having an ultimate aspect, i.e. their being empty. In this case the dependency is reversed and so the two are mutually interdependent. This is consistent with Madhyamika principles which prohibit the positing of asymmetrical dependence relations.

A tension arises when one considers the cognition of buddhas, and arhats also, prior to their post-mortem nirvana, who, on realising an emptiness that is synonymous with both treading the middle way and understanding the full impact and ramifications of relational origination (*pratityasamutpada*), must in some sense be *fusing* their cognitions of the two truths. As the *Perfect Insight in Twenty-five Thousand Stanzas* [PPS] says: "Worldly convention is not one thing and the ultimate truth another. What is the Suchness of worldly convention, is that the Suchness of ultimate reality."[85] In fact, analysis via the logic of

relational origination is designed just to establish "things as being empty", i.e. establish that there are things *and* an emptiness (of these), though the principle (MABh: 228) that all things gain their existence from the mere fact of being conditioned (*rkyen nyid 'di pa tsam, idam pratyaya-matra*), and nothing more. That is to say, the middle view (*madhyama-drsti*) or cognition of phenomena as relationally originated is understood to give saints a unified insight wherein a cognition of emptiness amounts to a cognition of appearances (i.e. of things relationally originated) and a cognition of appearances amounts to cognising an emptiness. Hence, "the true reality is nothing else than the true nature of the empirical reality."[86] As Huntington writes, "the vision of the saint has no object other than this very realm of ordinary existence, which is seen by a sort of "non-seeing".[87]

The middle view fuses the two realities by both rejecting real existence (i.e. establishing *paramartha*) and not rejecting non-existence (i.e. establishing *samvrti*). As Huntington writes, the things of the world "are unreal because they lack any *svabhava* ("intrinsic being"); and yet ... they are real because it is their *svabhava* ("intrinsic nature") to arise and cease in the world through the force of dependent origination."[88] In its practical dimension this means that bodhisattvas tread a path not so much between as pervading the realities defined by the two truths. They avoid at one extreme an *in vacuo* emptiness (or tranquil liberation) and at the other extreme appearances alone (i.e. unaccompanied by a cognition of their emptiness) by extending their knowledge to include the full reaches of both the ultimate (*paramartha*) (= nirvana) and the conventional (*samvrti*) (= samsara). The potential for the conventional reality to cause pain is cancelled by the insight of the ultimate reality.

Hence, at the level of full realisation the two realities, rather than retaining some measure of individual autonomy, seem to reciprocally affirm and establish each other.[89] In terms of the identity of or difference between the two realities, for buddhas and arhats[90] they seem to be identified, whereas prior to this attainment they are clearly different.

This equivocation about the precise relation between the two realities *vis-a-vis* the strength of dependency and identity is not a doctinal inconsistency. Rather it signifies a scope and freedom of expression gained by Madhyamikas, with their notion of emptiness, over and above strictly indeterminant (or determinant) conceptions of reality. The negation of uniformity (oneness) and non-uniformity (plurality) with respect to emptiness enables reality to be interpreted or viewed as neutrally accommodating any variety of bifurcations and relations, including that of the two realities and their identification and differentation from different perspectives. This is to say that emptiness provides a field or matrix which can support determinant (= *samvrti*) and indeterminant (= *paramartha*) interpretations because it is intrinsically neither determinant nor indeterminant. This is a problem confronting metaphysics in which "the ground of being" is one rather than "neither one nor many". Panentheism is a case in

point where, for lack of an overarching notion within which to accommodate polar opposites - such as, oneness and manyness, permanence and change, eternality and temporality etc. deity itself either becomes bifurcated into intrinsically different aspects (the result of which is polytheism) or the notion of deity finds itself to be an intrinsically contradictory one.[91]

Were emptiness intrinsically existent it could, on Madhyamika principles, be seen and viewed in only the one way it existed. Likewise, were it intrinsically uniform or non-uniform it would be blatantly false (and perhaps also impossible) to say it was plural or one, respectively, and a contradiction to say it was both. On this interpretation of the two truths - and here we are moving beyond the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] - the locus of meaning is emptiness (rather than the ultimate truth or reality) and both realities are interpretations and hence relativisations of reality, *qua* reality, as is the relationship between them. A consequence of this view is that ultimate reality is indeterminate, higher, ineffable, etc. only in relation to the conventional reality. In other words, it is relatively unconditioned (*asamskrta*), and relatively non-objectifiable. Ultimately, though it is neither conditioned nor unconditioned.[92] Were it other than relatively nonobjectifiable it could not be monstrated or pointed out by conventional designations nor cognised. This is in tension with the *Introduction to the Two Realities Sutra* (*Satyadvayavatara-sutra*), the *Principal Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK] and the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA], but seems to be the Tibetan dGe lugs' interpretation also.[93] As interpretations, the two realities and way(s) of relating them are determined by valuational criteria. Hence within a path context it is natural and tolerable that the relation between the two realities undergoes a transformation.[94]

5.3 EMPTINESS AND VALID CONVENTIONS

Though the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] does not describe if and how the realisation of emptiness may bear on the acquisition of valid (*tathya*) as opposed to mistaken (*mithya*) cognitions of appearances, it seems clear that they are related. The relation is one of a measure of independence and dependence. Were they *completely* independent each could be developed singly, without the cultivation of the other. Also, there would be no point from a soteriological perspective in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] delineating the criteria (*pramana*) for valid cognition.

From the viewpoint of causes they share a commonality as the development of emptiness and acquisition of valid conventional cognitions both depend on the removal of the emotional reactions and unwholesome mental events (*caitta*) and replacement of these by wholesome ones. The *Perfect Insight in Twenty-five Thousand Stanzas* [PPS] says, a bodhisattva who courses in perfect insight cannot produce wickednesses of body, speech, or mind because they have cleased away such impurities.[95] This must mean its impossible for them to be afflicted by

unwholesome states of mind. To be more precise, the removal of afflications appears to be one among several *causes* for the having of verdical cognitions of appearances (the others are sound sense-organs, etc.), and a necessary *condition* for the development of emptiness (its direct cause being analysis). Hence, though there need not be a causal interaction between the two they may be perceived to arise concomitantly as the same states of mind serve as supporting conditions for both of them. On this count it would be possible to have veridial perceptions and conceptions, as defined in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA], yet without having the insight into emptiness. This, though, needs to be qualified as cognitions of emptiness are asserted to arise in dependence on the means or methods, a part of which is the acquisition of a valid world-view, in which case a valid knowledge of conventions is a genuine *condition* for acquiring insight. Likewise, cognitions of emptiness would appear to assist in the certification of cognitions as valid as they are thought to purify the afflictions by removing the conception of intrinsic-existence, which is the very basis for attachment. On the other hand, were the insight into emptiness in and of itself to ensure the veracity of conventional knowledge, one could again query the necessity in the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] and other Buddhist literature for independently specifying the means of valid conventions (*tathya-samvrti*), sources of error, etc. Yet, that it does not, leaves open the possibility that mis-conceived, mis-perceived and utterly non-existent things may be cognised as empty. In conclusion, cognitions of emptiness would seem to rectify mistaken cognitions of appearances and guarantee their accuracy to whatever *extent* the afflications and wrong-views or fallacious tenet-systems falsify cognition.[96]

6 INSIGHT AND THE FULLY EVOLVED MIND

The foregoing relationships have been applicable to both the individual and universal vehicles, i.e. to the realities thought to be encountered by saints on both the arhat and bodhisattva paths, with the proviso that the methods or techniques (*upaya*) that figure in the relationship between insight and the methods consist mainly in the ethical and meditative practices that were thought to be causally necessary for the arising of insight. The later perfections, i.e. final four, are also classified as method perfections, but figure, with the first of giving (*dana*), much more prominantly in the *bodhisattva-vehicle*. Giving, for example, is said (MABh: 24) to be a cause for the knowledge of all perspectives on reality, the perfection of techniques (*upaya*) signifies in the universal vehicle specifically the perfection of the skills needed for helping others, powerful capacities (*bala*) means (8.4) gaining the capacities needed to influence people, and knowledge (*jnana*) refers to the buddhas' knowledge of all perspectives on reality. Resolution (*pranidhana*), the ninth perfection, although a neutral concept, is crucially tied to the bodhisattvas' higher intentions (*adhyasaya*), as I'll explain.

Three defining features of the fully evolved mind (*bodhi-citta*), which is said to be developed by the bodhisattvas and perfected in the buddhas, are its compassionate attitude, its insight into emptiness, and its knowledge of all facets of the universe. Of these three, compassion and a knowledge of everything are *distinguishing* features of the full evolved mind, for in the universal vehicle it is only the bodhisattvas who develop compassion, or at least the great compassion (*maha- karuna*) that consistently places the welfare of other creatures above the bodhisattvas' own welfare, and only the buddhas who are omniscient. On the other hand, the insight of emptiness is a feature common to the minds generated by both the arhats and buddhas and is the defining characteristic of the former. Given the presence of these three key features in the definition of the fully evolved mind,[97] and the doctrinal differences on this score between the arhats and the buddhas, I now want to briefly look at the relationship between insight and compassion and then at the relationship between insight, the state of full evolution (*bodhi*) and the knowledge of all perspectives on reality. (The relationship between compassion and the knowledge of all perspectives on reality has already been explained: the latter being seen as required by the buddhas' activities (*karitra*) in working *most* skilfully for the liberation of all other creatures.)

6.1 INSIGHT AND COMPASSION

The relationship between insight and compassion has received remarkably little detailed attention[98] considering that the relationship between these two crystalises for universal vehicle Buddhism the tensions between the narrow vehicle ideal of the arhat and their own ideal represented by the figure of the bodhisattva. Also, to the extent that the Madhyamika philosophy holds - as Chandrakirti does - that the individual vehicle saints (*arya*) and arhats have gained the perfect insight, as that is defined and practiced according to Madhyamika tenets, an investigation into the relationship between insight and compassion additionally serves to illuminate the relationship, at the level of doctrine and philosophy, between the Madhyamika and Mahayana Buddhism.

The *Commentary* [MABh: 79] says that buddhahood is approached only through the associated practice of emptiness and compassion. And in commentary to verse 6.225 which says that the sixth level bodhisattvas have compassion and cessation (i.e. insight into emptiness) at the same time, Chandrakirti says (341) that because the higher intention (*adhyasaya*) is included (*rtog pa*) within nirvana their compassion increases for creatures. dGe'dun grub says (RSM: f. 43a2-3) that although the bodhisattvas have entered a cessation they do not forsake the thought of saving creatures. The question is: In what way(s) are the practices associated?

Compassion, according to Chandrakirti (MABh: 7), is the root of both the non-dualistic knowledge and the fully evolved mind, and for that reason it is

regarded as being principal. The relationship implied is causal and the linkage is an indirect one. The sense in which the non-dualistic knowledge or insight into emptiness arises from compassion is that it is only through the compassion of the buddhas that the disciples, etc. come to hear the teachings, put them into practice, and so gain their goal of liberation, which is equivalent to gaining the non-dualistic insight.[99] In the *Commentary* [MABh: 2] Chandrakirti explains that when the buddhas come they show the teachings on relational origination, and from serially hearing, thinking, and meditating about them, immediately or at some future time, saints are inspired to gain nirvana. Hence, the realisations of the arhats into emptiness depends both on the buddhas having the compassion to teach and on the buddhas own practice of compassion as one of the causes from which buddhahood arises. The relationship is thus indirect for Chandrakirti is not saying here that insight arises *within* the one mental continuum on the basis of an earlier generation of compassion, but that the compassion of the buddhas is a cooperative or conditioning cause in the vehicle saints' acquisition of insight. It would be surprising if the relationship were meant as being other than indirect, i.e. a relationship *between* mental continua rather than as a series of mental states indicating a causal evolution within a single continuum, for were it the latter it would mean that saints could only become arhats if they had cultivated the bodhisattvas' compassion and this would cut across the distinction between the individual and universal vehicles. Still, it seems possible that the practices of the bodhisattvas in cultivating compassion may in fact have had a direct bearing on their development of insight. The case in point may be the Mahayana meditations aimed at producing the fully evolved mind which have the universal vehicle practitioner contemplate - in the course of making his or her mind equinimous toward *all* creatures - that the notions of friends, strangers, and enemies are relative notions: friends exist in dependence on enemies and vice versa, and further that such concepts are mere designations for friends can become enemies, strangers and so forth. Such contemplations as these seem closely linked to some contemplations on emptiness and may be thought to to assist such comtemplations or even to give rise to the view that the notions of closeness and separation with respect to creatures are vacuous.[100]

We can reasonably expect that the relationship in the opposite direction, i.e. of compassion on insight, is direct in the sense that the development of insight would have been thought to be a causal precondition, functioning within each saint, for the development of compassion. The reason for this is that a genuine compassion that interacts with creatures would need to be protected and insulated from the pains of samsara, and such an insulation would only be guaranteed by an insight into the emptiness of samsara. Thus, although the bodhisattvas vow to experience the pains of hell for the sake of liberating creatures[101] we must presume that this heroic resolve signifies their *willingness* to experience the pains of samsara, but that in fact it would be inconsistent for

them to experience the sufferings of samsara. So as not to become anesthetised to the suffering of creatures or worse, burdened just by their own problems and pain, the bodhisattvas cultivate the knowledge that creatures and their sufferings are merely illusions that are insubstantial and unreal. As the *Perfect Insight in Twenty-five Thousand Stanzas* [PPS] says, "a Bodhisattva does not course in the perception of difficulties. And why? Because one who has generated in himself the notion of difficulties is unable to work the weal of countless beings."[102]

This explanation can be furthered a little. One way of looking at the liberative path that cultivates the insight into emptiness is to see it as a stabilising process insofar as it is concerned with the saints developing full autonomy over their being and in a sense an immunity from their environments. Their insight into emptiness is meant to free them from being influenced by the mundane world and insulate them from the problems of existence (*dosa*) in samsara by developing an attitude of detachment to the world. Within the development proposed on this path the saints would stabilise psychological perturbations by affectively isolating themselves from the environment through developing in the insight of emptiness; this amounting to a valuational and ontological neutrality with respect to all the things that they cognitively encounter. Hence, they would theoretically become increasingly unmoved by the transitory world and in the extreme case of a solitary peace or non-residual nirvana would, according to doctrine, become *literally* separated from disturbing factors. This type of process is what the systems theorists Ervin Laszlo calls a self-stabilising or homeostatic system.[103]

On the other hand, the development of the bodhisattvas' altruism is in certain respects quite opposite to the development of insight for rather than becoming increasingly isolated from their environments, the development of altruism and its expression in the bodhisattvas' behaviour (*carya*) is a creative *response towards* the woes of other creatures. Hence, with respect to their development as bodhisattvas, the saints are not concerned with their own autonomy and survival but with the welfare of others and in this they must, in theory, try to become increasingly responsive and adaptive to their environment, especially to the ignorance, and sufferings of the creatures in it. Hence, in order to fulfil the needs of others, the bodhisattvas must be willing and able to consciously modify and complexify their behaviour in order to respond more meaningfully and effectively. They would learn to accommodate and manipulate an increasing number of environmental factors. And in this they would be acting in a way contrary to the liberative path in that they would be aiming at an ever increasing involvement with their environment rather than becoming isolated from it. Laszlo would call this an organising or evolving system, where new information and influences are actively sort out rather than resisted.[104]

Now, with respect to relationship between the bodhisattvas' altrusitic attitude and activities, and the gaining of insight it seems that the former depends on the later. According to Laszlo, an adaptive process (such as exemplified in the bodhisattvas' active compassion) is structurally unstable and prone to disorganisation and even decay unless it is balanced by certain stabilising factors.[105] Thus, to the degree that the bodhisattvas seek out the problems and confusions of others in their role as cosmic therapists, they would have to develop insight for otherwise the confusions and sufferings of others that they seek out and assimilate would act to introduce confusion in themselves, and perhaps hinder or at least lessen their ability to help others. Without such an insight, the sufferings of others may paralyze them, thus restricting their abilities to help others, and perhaps also would make the final result of the arhat's vehicle look more attractive than buddhahood. The insight into emptiness would effectively nullify the potential for the problems of others to *personally* affect and disturb the bodhisattvas and thus would fortify their compassion as they would "not review an entity which could make them cowed or despondent, frightened or terrified."[106] That is to say, illusory creatures and sufferings that were viewed as only fictitious would be powerless to adversely affect them. Presumably the third of the three types of compassion mentioned earlier; namely the compassion that focusses on focuslessness, defined as the attention to the emptiness of creatures, is specifically designed to train the bodhisattvas in seeing their disciples and patients as illusory. Thus, it seems that a fully fledged compassion such as the bodhisattvas develop would necessarily need to be underscored by an insight into emptiness.

Even though the cultivation of insight would seem to be a necessary condition for the bodhisattvas to develop an active and fully functioning compassion, their greatest skill and achievement - greater even than their gaining of the insight into emptiness and development of compassion - is their ability to sustain *both* the realisations at the same time. I have earlier referred to the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] as saying that the sixth level bodhisattva is able to do this and presumably the bodhisattvas are thought to become more skilled at fusing the two practices as they approach full evolution (*sambodhi*). The difficulty presented to the bodhisattvas in having to supplement their development of compassion with the view of insubstantiality is that the view of the insubstantial and illusory nature of beings could very easily have the effect of making the bodhisattvas turn their backs on creatures, were not their compassion so great, natural, and automatic. How can compassion be developed and substained in light of the knowledge that the bodhisattvas themselves, those to whom they extend their compassion, and their compassion also, have no substance to them and are nothing more than an illusion? As Subhuti poignantly asks the Buddha in the *Perfect Insight in Twenty-five Thousand Stanzas* [PPS], if the terms 'bodhisattva' and 'perfect insight' don't refer to anything then who is he going to teach and about what?[107] The difficulty here,

of course, is a psychological one for there is nothing logically impossible about extending love towards creatures of fiction. In mounting this psychological hurdle the bodhisattva ideal reaches its highest point and most edifying image, in which the bodhisattvas continue with an ever increasing vigour, dynamism, and devotion to instruct and care for creatures with the utmost concern, sensitivity, and sincerity when they know all the while that their labours and efforts are directed to non-beings and non-events and in reality won't benefit anyone. The *Perfect Insight in Twenty-five Thousand Stanzas* [PPS] likens the bodhisattvas task in this respect to "a man who would wish to plant a tree in space when space can give no ground for its support."[108] In other words, the bodhisattvas cultivate and realise compassion when at the same time the very *raison d'etre* for their compassion (the removal of the suffering of creatures) is known to be nothing more than a verbal denotation. Knowing that ultimately no one will benefit from their efforts and that no one suffers or achieves liberation, still the bodhisattvas spend eons of tireless effort in becoming super-human pedagogues and miracle workers, and *act* as though the sufferings of creatures were every bit real. So easy it would be for them at any stage in their careers to forsake creatures, knowing that in reality they wouldn't have forsaken anyone, yet they labour on without interruption and with no regard for their own welfare. As the *Perfect Insight in Twenty-five Thousand Stanzas* [PPS] says:

> although they have known all dharmas as like a mock show or a dream, the Bodhisattvas, the great beings have set out towards the supreme enlightenment for the benefit and welfare of the world, so that they can become a shelter for the world, a refuge, a place of rest, the final relief, islands, torch bearers, caravan leaders and light bringers, and leaders of the world.[109]

6.2 INSIGHT AND THE FULLY EVOLVED MIND (*BODHICITTA*)

This final section looks at the relationship between insight and the fully evolved mind, with attention to the knowledge of all perspectives [on reality] (*sarvakara-jnata*) that is said to be gained by the buddhas. The fully evolved mind in its fruition state in buddhas is said to cognise's emptiness, be actively compassionate, and to know everything. The question at this point is: how is the buddhas' knowledge of all perspectives on reality related to the insight into emptiness? Unfortunately the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] and other Madhyamika literature has little to say about this relationship.

The first point is that emptiness cannot be equated or identified with knowing all perspectives on reality, for to do so would remove the universal vehicle distinction between arhats and buddhas. This is contrary to the case with emptiness and appearances. As Karel Werner rightly points out, of the

higher knowledge only the knowledge of the destruction of mental defilements (*asavakkhayanana*) can be a necessary condition for gaining nirvana.[110] The reason for this is that the cognition of emptiness is the eradication of ignorance so by definition all the defilements (*asrava*) would have to be destroyed (and known to be such). Further, a knowledge of all perspectives cannot be thought to be a necessary condition for the saints gaining insight, as this would also remove one of the key features that are said to distinguish the buddhas from arhats.[111] What of the converse, is emptiness a necessary condition for acquiring a knowledge of all perspectives on reality? We can only speculate that it is thought to be. Firstly, the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] includes within the emptiness of defining qualities the various qualities of bodhisattvas and buddhas, specifically including (6.214) their knowledge of all perspectives. If as we have suggested, these are meditational subjects then bodhisattvas are meant to meditate on the emptiness of their psychic-powers and subsequent the knowledge of all perspectives on reality. The *Introduction to the Evolved Lifestyle* [BCA: 9.55] says specifically that emptiness is required by those who desire a knowledge of all perspectives, in virtue of its ability to remove the cognitive obstructions. The *Perfect Insight in Twenty-five Thousand Stanzas* [PPS] repeatly says the knowledge of all facets comes as a result of perfecting insight. More specifically it says that the buddhas trained in insight in order to gain the knowledge of all perspectives on reality[112] and that one who courses in the perfect insight "*comes near* to the knowledge of all modes."[113] Even so, one has to be cautionary in reading the *Perfect Insight in Twenty-five Thousand Stanzas* [PPS] for on occasions it seems to use the notion of 'perfect insight' in a wider sense than the single accomplishment of cognising emptiness. On occasions emptiness even seems to be equated with the concept of full evolution (*bodhi*).[114]

As to this seeming necessity of cognising emptiness in order to achieve the cognitive dilation said to end in knowing all perspectives or aspects of reality, it seems that iniversal vehicle Buddhists could have thought that a recognition of the cognitive triad (i.e. ego, cogito and cogitatum) as empty would free a consciousness from a certain restrictiveness in terms of its cognitive capacity. The only verse pointing to something like this is 12.2, which says that:

> Just as a vessel can be divided [into parts] but the space [within it] cannot be divided, no matter how things are artificially divided [these divisions] do not exist. Thus, when you properly come to know [that things] are of equal flavour, your noble omniscience is instantly brought to know all knowables.

The *Commentary* [MABh: 356] does not add anything to this verse except directly relate it to the knowledge that knows everything. dGe 'dun grub (RSM, f. 46a4-5) explains that space is divisionless for divisions can be made only where something can be stopped by contacting an obstructible (*thogs bcas*). Presumably the contact (*reg pa, sparsa*) meant here can be non-physical. What the verse seems

to be saying is that the cognition of reality as devoid of real demarcations or divisions within and between phenomena produces an equanimity and impartiality with respect to percepts and within that equality of experience, consciousness cognises all knowables.

The *Perfect Insight in Twenty-five Thousand Stanzas* [PPS] allows further spectulation. The *Sutra* says that the non-appropriate and the non-letting-go of forms, etc. promotes the knowledge of all perspectives.[115] And further that forms are baseless, like space, in the sense that one cannot ultimately (in the realisation of emptiness) find boundaries to forms.[116] From one angle, if form is infinte in magnitude[117] and realised as such in the insight of emptiness, then there is a sense in which form looses its constriction, its being bounded, with the result that forms would *merge endlessly* into each other. The *Perfect Insight in Twenty-five Thousand Stanzas* [PPS] says that the knowledge of all perspectives "is not two nor divided, on account of all dharmas having conexistence (sic) for their own-being."[118] Thus, perhaps it is that the buddhas' the knowledge of all perspectives on reality cognises all forms because forms are thought to be *literally* insubstantial and so accessible to mental penetration. The said inseparability of forms from emptiness and the fact that emptiness is thought to be uniform and *un*formed may account for this insubstantiality and unfindability of boundaries to forms.[119] A mind penetrating emptiness would thus penetrate forms. Following this idealist turn, the *Sutra* in fact identifies the fully evolved mind (*bodhi-citta*) with reality itself (*dharmata*).[120] Thus, it seems that when mind is shorn of thought and is without out internal modification or discrimination its essential original nature as transparently luminous (*prabhasvara*) is realised, and that the truly unconditioned mind pervades, comprehends, and encompasses, in fact, is reality, the sphere of truth (*dharma-dhatu*).[121] One thing certain in this is that the notion of knowing all perspectives on reality is not an anthropomophised doctrine based on a physiological model of perception, but rather rests on an idealist model of perception where what is cognised, the cogniser, and the cognition itself become inseparably related if not actually identified. Even so, one must be careful about reading too close a relationship between insight and knowing all perspectives on reality, for any *entailment* from insight to the knowledge of all perspectives on reality obscures the doctrinal distinction between the arhats and buddhas. Insight may be have been thought to be a necessary condition for knowing all perspectives on reality but can hardly be identified with it.

One final point worth raising concerns the concept of resolution (*bsnos pa*). The concept of resolution adds an additional factor to the various causal relationships and causal factors that we have been discussing in this chapter. Resolution is the idea that the various practices of the saints, particularly their practices of the perfections, must be resolved in order to bring about the fruit of fully evolution. Thus, although the operations of karma bring about specific results, (for example, giving and good conduct are said produce merits (*punya*)

be a certain degree of indeterminacy and latitude that the saints can consolidate and capitalise on by psychologically directing their practices towards the gaining of buddhahood where, were they not to do this, the practices would presumably result in a less elevated and altruistic attainment. Chandrakirti explains this in the *Commentary* [MABh: 17]. Conduct, he says, and the other qualities mentioned at verse 6.6 such as giving, endurance, and compassion, that are not fully resolved or dedicated for gaining the knowledge of all perspectives on reality are a measureless or uncommitted fruit with respect to the gaining of buddhahood. Such actions become causes for gaining buddhahood by resolving or directing that the roots of the merits accruing from those actions go to the gaining of full evolution for the sake of freeing creatures. Thus, whether the bodhisattvas' actions are actually causes for their evolution depends on their being mentally resolved with the intention of producing that result. This action of the turning over or converting of merits and wholesome roots to the supreme evolutionary state depends, according to the *Perfect Insight in Twenty-five Thousand Stanzas* [PPS] on the dedication being underscored by insight.[122] Such a turning over of merits not only directs, but apparently also magnifies and increases a meritorious accumulation. Chandrakirti is saying that it is incumbent upon the bodhisattvas to resolve their merits to the buddhas' full evolution.

NOTES

1. There seems to be no clear reason why Chandrakirti doesn't refer to any of Asanga's works. I mentioned this anomoly to Geshe Trinlay who said that perhaps it is because Tibetans believe that the Vijnanavada is not Asanga's final position and that for Chandrakirti to write *as though* it were would be to downgrade Asanga's own philosophy. This, though, doesn't explain Chandrakirti's failure to quote the non-philosophical i.e. religious-doctrinal features of Asanga's texts which are neutral vis-a-vis the Madhyamika versus Vijnanavada.

2. *Supra*, p. 38.

3. Authoritative tradition and analogy are categorised as types of inference. See LMS, pp.80-81.

   Prasangika-madhyamikas are unique among Buddhist schools for construing valid instruments (*pramana*) as inclusive of the subsequent cognitions of objects. According to Dharmakirti's system a valid cognition must be fresh or new (*bsar du*), i.e., not known [beforehand] (*ma shes*). This means that moments of re-cognition are not *pramana*. Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 701 writes that "the Prasangikas do not etymologize the syllable *pra* in *pramana* as meaning 'new', but as either 'main' (*gtso bo*) or 'correct' (*yang dag pa*)." Whatever the reasons for this it does not concur with the worldly conventions wherein cognitions are ongoing, and it may just be this concern for perceptions to function simply as a means to valid conventional knowledge that has led them to this view. For Santrantikas perceptions are able to know the ultimate (*paramartha*) reality, the *svalaksana*, as the cognition of point instants. As a point instant can be cognised only momentarily and as the object of veridical perception, the Santrantikas may be forced to hold that only fresh cognitions can be valid.

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4. See MK, Chpt. 1, and MABh, following 6.13. Also AK, 2.61b-64.

5. Cf. *Nyayabindu*, 1.5, which isolates four specific causes that falsify perceptions. N. Gangopadhyaya (tr.) *Vinitadeva's Nyayabindu-tika* (Calcutta: Indian Studies Past & Present, 1971), p. 100, n. 23.

6. See C.W. Huntington, Jr. "The system of the two truths in the *Prasannapada* and the *Madhyamakavatara*: A study in Madhyamika Soteriology." JIP, 11 (1983), pp. 85-88 for another detailed analysis of Chandrakirti's transactional epistemology.

7. The fact that Chandrakirti mentions Dignaga only disparagingly (MABh: 407) does not mean that he rejected the rules of inference propounded by Dignaga for these stand quite separate from Dignaga's Vijnanavada theses.

Certainly the Tibetan Madhyamikas find their philosophy quite compatible with the Dignaga-Dharmakirti theories of inference.

8. See Sprung, *Lucid Exposition*, p. 64 where Chandrakirti accepts the four Nyaya *pramanas*.

9. A compliation from the Tibetan oral tradition by Geshe Rabten, *The Mind and Its Functions* (Switzerland: Tharpa Choeling, 1978), p. 109, n. 9 isolates a common dominant condition (*thun mong bai bdag rkyen*) and an exclusive dominant condition (*thun mong ma yin pai bdag rkyen*). The common dominant condition for a senseperception is the mental-organ (*yid kyi dbang po*) or immediately preceding condition, called 'common' because it is a dominant condition for all five sense modalities. The exclusive dominant condition are the sense-organs. Hence, the sense-modality of mental cognitions is determined by mediation through one of five sense-organs.

10. At MA, 6.85, Chandrakirti also refers to the non-Buddhists' mountain peak of wrong-views that are rectified in the *Lankavatara-sutra*. D.T. Suzuki, *Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970 (1930 reprint), pp. 110-14 locates twelve wrong discriminations (*vikalpa*), perhaps these being what Chandrakirti refers to. In the D.R. Suzuki (tr.) *The Lankavatara Sutra* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973 (1932 reprint) see pp. 156-61.

Also the traditional sixty-two wrong-views (sometimes condensed into fourteen) concerning metaphysical speculation are presumably included here within the tenets of non-Buddhist philosophers. See Bhikkhu Bodhi (tr.) *Discourse of the All-Embracing Net of Views: The Brahmajala Sutta and Its commentorial Exegeses* (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1978).

11. According to the AK 2.25, a mental consciousness is distorted by the presence of any of the six emotional reactions (*klesa*), two unwholesome (*akusala*) bases, and ten minor emotional reactions (*parittaklesa*). From the viewpoint of the cogniser the veracity of the cognitions become progressively ensured by the removal of these mental impurities with an ideal cogniser being a consciousness in which these distortions are absent. Chandrakirti was aware of the AK for he once quotes it in the MABh, 149, (index, p. 462).

12. Also MA, 6.37, 113, and 167.

13. The BCA, 9.84-85 says that the conventional imputation of a body is applied in dependence on the parts having an appropriate shape.

14. This pragmatic and instrumental component to knowledge is clearer still in the Sautrautika epistemology where a criterion of valid cognition is the power to (produce)

purposeful action (*arthakriyasakti*). The criterion amounts to a motor and goal orientated verification of cognitions. See *Nyayabindu*, 1.1 and PVT, 2.8.

15. See, for example, Arthur Waley (tr.) *The Analects of Confucius* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1938), pp. 171-172.

16. See PP (Sprung, p. 181) and MABh: 179.

17. For the establishment of conventions according to Tsong kha pa, see ME, PP.539-547.

18. These non-Madhyamika Buddhist world-views are interpretatively valid for Chandrakirti whereas the non-Buddhist tenets seemingly do not have that status. The preliminary doctrines of bondage, liberation, and action, etc. form the religio-philosophical infrastructure of Indian thought generally, and so in that context tend to be "common notions" in their own right.

19. See Ramanan, *op. cit.*, p. 288 for the differences between the *sravakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*.

20. In the universal vehicle Hinayana arhats attain the *sopadhisesa-nirvana* and the *nirupadhisesa-nirvana*. While the bodhisattva also attains a nirvana, in virtue of realising the nature of reality, this is a non-abiding nirvana (*apratisthita-nirvana*). According to Nagao ("Returns to this World ... p.62) the apratisthita-nirvana, which has the sense of a "non-dwelling" or "non-clinging" nirvana, "is the sole nirvana to be acquired either by Bodhisattras or by Tathagatas." The bodhisattvas do not, then, renounce nirvana, rather they forego a limiting and restricted species of nirvana that would preclude their involvement in the empirical world. As Nagao notes, the *apratisthita-nirvana* involves a two-fold process of gaining nirvana and leaving it. He writes (p.66) that the "two activities of coming from nirvana and going to nirvana are to the understood to be operating simultaneously in the term *apratisthita-nirvana*".

21. See PPS, pp. 75, 124-125, 127, 129, 132, 170, 172, *et passim*.

22. PPS, pp. 115, 343, 393, 402.

23. More commonly the accumulation of knowledge (*jnanasambhara, ye shes kyi tshogs*).

24. Chandrakirti's cue for this idea may be the PPS, p. 525.

25. See Guy Newland *Compassion: a Tibetan Analysis, A Buddhist Monastic Textbook*. London: Wisdom Publications, 1984 for an exposition and translation of a section of rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's textbook exegeting Chandrakirti's opening stanzas in the MA. For the three compassions see pp. 124-143.

26. Cf. PPS, pp. 133-134.27.The ideal here is similar to the Advaita doctrine of the liberation of everyone (*sarva-mukti*) and the idea of select liberated sages (*adhikarika mukta*) whose task is to help others in the quest for freedom. A difference, though, is that for the Madhyamika all people will become buddhas and so have been bodhisattvas.

28. The MA says that a first level bodhisattva can (11.1) see a hundred buddhas and receive their blessings, extend their lives up to a hundred eons, and perceive the past and future for a similar duration. They also (11.2) develop the abilities to enter and rise from collected states in an instant, product manifestations (*rdzu 'phrul, rddhi*) and travel to pure environs (*zin-dag*). On the first level (11.3) they also manifest bodhisattvas from their bodies replete with their own retinues, both to the measure of one hundred. On the second to seventh levels they increase these qualities at roughly the rate of 10^2 per level. On entering the eighth level the qualities become pure, and by the final tenth level the qualities can no longer be described.

29. See Karel Werner, "*Bodhi and Arhattaphala. From early Buddhism to early Mahayana,*" JIABS, 4.1 (1981), 78-84 for a thorough discussion of the development of the bodhi idea and (pp. 78-79) for discussion of the relative differences between the Buddha's knowledge and that of arhats.

30. The higher knowledges (MABh, 56-60) are a psychic power producing manifestations (*rddhi*), divine audition (*divya-srota*), knowing others' minds (*para-citta-jnana*), recall of previous lives (*purvanivasanusmrti*), and divine sight (*divya-caksu*). (Mvy, pp. 202-209, adds a frequently cited sixth, the extinction of defilements (*asrava-ksaya*). Cf. PPS, pp. 79-82. Har Dayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature* (Delhi: Motilal Bararsidass, 1975 reprint), pp. 134 and 227, says they are acquired on the third or eigth *bhumi*. RA, 5.45 (probably Chandrakirti's source) says the third.

These super-sensitive cognitions are gradually developed for the purpose of cognising ever more phenomena. They are direct mental cognitions. (Geshe Loden says that some Tibetan philosphers are of the opinion that divinesight and audition are meant to be mediated by a subtle (*suksma*) organ while others say there is no sense-organ mediation. In either case, though, there is no mediation by a normal sense-organ.) They arise concomitantly (3.11) with the equipoises (*samapatti*) and immeasurables (*apramana*) and in dependence on the four formless equipoises (*arupasamapatti*). According to Bastian, *op. cit.*, pp. 281-305, the first five are obtainable upon reaching any of the four dhyanas, and the sixth *asrava- ksaya* after realising the highest (*rab mtha*) dhyana. Presumably the *abhijnas* presuppose certain levels of concentration and tranquilisation and a freedom from afflications. Cf. also AK, 7.42ff and MSA, 15.15-58.

31. The *MABh* on 4.2 (65) says these bodhisattvas glow from their meditation on the thirty seven directions. These are again mentioned at 6.208ab within the characteristics of the liberated state where they are ascribed a causative role in certainly making liberation arise. For the *bodhipaksa* see Har Dayal, *op. cit.* chpt. 4, pp. 80-164. Also PPS, pp. 290-293, and ME, pp.205-206.32.

32. These are not the same as the ten capacities (*dasa-bala*) that figure in the description of buddhas. The MABh, 347-48 enumerates them as the forces over life (*tshe*), mind (*sems*), necessities (*yo byad*), action (*las*), birth (*skye ba*), resolution (*smon lam*), inclinations (*mos pa*), manifestations (*rdza 'phrul*), knowledge (*ye shes*), and dharma (*chos*).

33. This concurs with the RA, 5.47-48. They are (MABh, 348-49): (1) the knowledge of things (*chos, dharma*), i.e. their characteristics or definitions (*svalaksana*), (AK, 7.37) specifically a knowledge of linguistic atoms, units, and compounds (*nama-pada- vyanjana*), (2) of meanings (*artha*) i.e., all the divisions of things (the nuances, conotations, and meanings of terms), (3) of languages (*nirukti*), or the unmixed presentation of things (this refers to bodhisattvas' knowledge of different languages and modes of speech), and (4) inspirational and intelligible (speech) (*pratibhana*). Cf. also AK, 7.37-40 and MSA, 18-34-37, and their mention at MA, 6.211.

34. Cf. MSA, 10.2, 3, 22; 14.5; 15.46; 21.44, 54, 58.

35. Thus the PPS (p. 519) explains that the sravakas and pratyekabuddhas are alike in forsaking the defilements but only the tathagatas also forsake the residues.

36. The MABh could be read here (394.1-2: *rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa dang sangs rgyas*) as the all-knowers *and* buddhas or the buddhas having all knowledge. The former reading makes for the idea that omniscience is not exclusive to the buddhas.

See LSNP, p.331 for Thurman's translation of the passage.

37. They are described analogically as the aroma of musk left in a bag after the musks' removal.

38. VPTd, p. 294, n. 4 says it is a reference to *jneya-avarana*.

39. See ME, pp.104-109 for the Prasangika path-structure and serial removal of the *klesas* and *jneyavarana*.

40. E. Lamotte, "Passions and Impregnations of the Passions in Buddhism" in L. Cousins *et al.* (ed.), *Buddhist Studies in honour of I.B. Horner* (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1974) notes (p. 100) that the PPS seems to imply the sequential eradication. Also, n. 32.

The *Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra* follows the Prasangika view also, saying that although the *klesas* are extinguished in the seventh level the *vasanas* remain until their removal at buddhahood. See Ramanan, *Nagarjuna's Philosophy...*, p. 309

41. Obermiller, "The Doctrine of the Prajna-paramita..." p. 47, thus correlates the mirror knowledge (*adarsa-jnana*) with the *jnana-dharma-kaya* or buddhas' omniscience, the knowledge of discrimination (*pratyaveksana*) and equanimity (*samata*) with the *sambhoga-kaya*, and the knowledge pursuing actions (*krtya-anusthana*) with the *nirmana-kaya*.

42. K. Ward, *The concept of God* (Oxford: Basil Blackwill, 1974), p. 156.

43. This passage continues in a way I don't really understand saying that: "It is also appropriate [or fitting] that it arises from the *dharmakaya* or through the power of the *rupakaya*. It is thus said that whatever body is different from [the above ones], it has the same cause, arises by the cause which is for taming sentient creatures. These also have special capacities that are mentally inestimable."

44. Cf. BCA, 1.12 on the perpetual fruiting of the bodhicitta and PPS, p. 176, that the bodhisattvas' concentration is a perpetual attainment due to karmas from good deeds of the past.

45. See RA, 2.35. The epistemological criteria of inference and sense-perception would be privately obsolete because of their omniscience.

46. I.e. leaving Tushita, taking rebirth, achieving enlightenment, etc. as described in the *Lalitavistara* and *Buddhacarita*.

47. See BCA, 9.36: that the buddhas appear in dependence on a disciple's merit and the bodhisattva's vow. And MA, 12.7: that the teaching remains in dependence on people's virtues.

48. Har Dayal, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

49. They are described in summary at 12.19-21 and in detail at 12.22-31. Also ME, pp. 108-210.

50. See MABh, 320; and MV, 131-133, p. 10.

51. These are extensively defined in the MABh, 322-323. Briefly they are that buddhas are free from (1) error (*skhalita*) and (2) rash speech (*ravita*), never (3) forgetful (*smrti*) or (4) unconcentrated (*asamahita*), (5) have no discrimination of difference (*nanatva-samjna*), and (6) no misguided equanimity (*apratisamkhyayopeksa*). Their (7) wish [to help] (*chanda*), (8) enthusiasm (*virya*), (9) recall or mindfulness (*smrti*), (10) mental integration (*samadhi*) (11) insight (*prajna*), and (12) liberation (*vimukti*) never degenerate. All their (13) motor (*kaya*), (14) vocal (*vak*) and (15) mental (*manas*) actions are preceded and followed by knowledge (*jnana*); and their knowledge and perception (*darsana*) are unshackled (*asamga*) and unhindered (*apratihata*) with respect to the (16) past (*atita*), (17) future (*anagata*) and (18) present (*pratyutpanna*). See Mvy, 136-153, pp. 10-12.

53. See Garma C.C. Chang, *The Buddhist Teaching of Totality* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1971).

54. MA, 6.97.

55. Also cited in the PP, Sprung, *Lucid Exposition*, p. 45. See LSNP, pp. 248-252 for the full complement of the Madhyamikas' sources for the distinction and pp. 253-259 for Nagarjuna's position. For Tsong kha pa's assignment of statuses and interpretations to the interpretative scripture see pp. 345-363.

56. On definitive and interpretative sutras see ME, pp. 422-428.

57. This seems to be the meaning intended by a distinction between literal and non-literal interpretative scriptures. See Tsong kha pa's *Great Exposition of Secret Mantra* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977) (Hopkin's Supplement), pp. 186-187.

58. Cf. RA, 4.94-96; MABh, 199.

59. Definitive validity, on the other hand, is obtained without the consideration of valuational criteria.

60. According to Tsong kha pa (see Jose Cabezon, "The concepts of Truth and Meaning in the Buddhist Scripture", JIABS, 4.1 (1981), 15-16) a text of interpretative intent must satisfy three criteria. It must have a basis of intention (*dgongs-bzhi*) - this is the interpretative environment. It must be necessary (*dgos pa*) - i.e. some reason whereby it is incumbent for the buddha to teach a particular concept. Lastly it must contradict reality if taken literally.

61. Nor could it be for the antecedent conditions, any of which could change (even radically) a frame of reference, are infinite.

62. Cf. BCA, 9.7 that real entities were taught by the Buddha so as to gradually lead the world to the highest viewpoint.

63. PPS, p. 639.

64. See for example kLong chen pa in the *Rang grol skor gsum*.

65. Ervin Laszlo, *Introduction to Systems Philosophy* (New York: George Braziller, 1972), p. 48.

66. Verse 24.10a, *Emptiness*, p. 213. The MA quotes this verse at 6.35 and 6.80.

67. See MABh, 109.

68. This is problematic depending on how one understands the objectifiability of emptiness.

69. PPS, p. 62.

70. PPS, p. 284. Also, pp. 48, 51-52, 471-473, and 477.

71. PPS, pp. 130 and 134-135.

72. PPS, p. 50.

73. PPS, p. 199.

74. PPS, pp. 198-199. Also pp. 263 and 365.

74. PPS, pp. 198-199. Also pp. 263 and 365.

The PPS also distinguishes (p. 200) between a mundane and supra-mundane insight which the MA doesn't. In mundane insight the bodhisattva develops emptiness but always "basing himself on something." I presume this means that he (the subject), emptiness (to object), and his insight are thought to be real things. Supra-mundane insight, on the other hand, is underscored by "the nonapprehension of self, beings, all dharmas and enlightenment." The cycle of three in the case of insight is a little ambiguous. It is not clear whether the "object" is those for whom the bodhisattva abides in insight (p. 263) or alternatively that which is known by insight.

75. The same device is used in the PPS. See Bastian, *op.cit.*, pp. 136-138, *et passim*.

76. Bastian, *op. cit.*, pp. 286-87 suggests the same in the case where bodhisattvas are enjoined to realize the emptiness of their psychic powers as a way of accelerating their cognitive expansion.

77. Cf. MK, 23.10-11 where purity and impurity are unreal because they are mutually dependent on each other.

78. In the *Siksa-samuccaya* Shantideva quotes the *Tathagatakosa-sutra* to the effect that one who realizes the illusory nature of past evil deeds will not have to reep their miserable results; and the *Karmavaranasuddhi- sutra* that one who (really) sees what is sin and no sin, discipline and no discipline, etc. stops the effects of actions. See C. Bendall and W.H.D. Rouse (trs.), *Siksha- samuccaya - a Compendium of Buddhist Doctrine of Santideva* (Delhi: Motilal Barnarsidass (1st Indian ed.), 1971), p. 168.

79. See MK, 24.14 and VV, 70.

80. In the last line of verse 6.42 and the MABh Chandrakirti thereon adds that karma is unfathomable by the mind, at least with respect to the relationship between specific results and their causes, and so should not be taught or thought about save introducing doubt as to the existence of karma.

81. See the essays by T.R.V. Murti, "Samvrti and Paramartha in Madhyamika and Advaita Vedanta", and M. Sprung, "The Madhyamika Doctrine of Two Realities as a Metaphysic", in Mervyn Sprung (ed.), *Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedanta,* Michael J. Sweet, "Santideva and the Madhyamika: The Prajnaparamita-pariccheda of the Bodhicaryavatara". pp. 20-37, some of which appears in Michael Sweet, "*Bodhicaryavatara* 9:2 as a Focus for Tibetan Interpret- ations of the Two Truths in the Prasangika Madhyamika", JIABS, 2.2 (1979), 79-89; Karl Potter, *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India (Private) Ltd., 1965), pp. 237-40; Chr. Lindner's textual work in "Atisa's Introduction to the Two Truths, and its Sources," JIP, 9 (1981), 161-214; *op. cit.* Also I. Yamada, *op. cit.*

82. F. Streng, "The Significatnce of Pratiyasamutpada...", *op. cit.*, and "The Buddhist Doctrine of Two Truths as Religious Philosophy", JIP, 1.3 (1971), 262-71.

83. C.W. Huntington, Jr. op. cit.

84. Sprung's term.

85. PPS, p. 529.

86. F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, "Nagarjuna's Conception of 'Voidness' (Sunyata)," JIP, 9 (1981), 277.

87. C.W. Huntington, Jr. *op. cit.*, p. 93.

88. *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94.

89. See rGyal tshab Dar ma Rin chen's *Spyod 'jug rnam rgyal sras 'jug ngogs* translated in Michael J. Sweet "Santideva and the Madhyamika..." (p. 176) who writes that the Buddha gnosis "which knows things as they really are also knows them conventionally, and by knowing them conventionally know them as they really are." Also see Obermiller, "Doctrine of the Prajnaparamita...", p. 41.

According to Madhyamikas (from Geshe Loden) the fusion is thought to take place gradually, with a cognition of conventions and ultimate truths at first alternating. At the time of discernment (*vipasyana*) meditation ultimate truths are cognised to the exclusion of conventions and *vice versa* in between meditation sessions. In time these initially disparite modes of cognition come to increasingly pervade each other.

A reciprocal establishment of the two truths seems to present a problem in the case of apparently *in vacuo* realisations of emptiness, such as arhats in *pari-nirvana* may be thought to gain. An explanation (from Geshe Sopa) to account for the non-residual emptiness (*supra*,. p. n.) of Madhyamika bodhisattvas may circumvent this. According to this a basis (i.e., appearance, perhaps one of the twenty bases that differentiate the twenty emptinesses) is necessarily present when yogins concentrate on emptiness (for an emptiness depends on some thing being empty) but they direct their attention just to the emptiness such that the basis, though present, lapses from their cognition. I don't know what the basis for an arhat's post-mortem nirvana would be.

90. The only difference here between buddhas and arhats would be in terms of the extensiveness of their knowledge of phenomena.

91. See MK, 27.15-17 on the bifurication of deity.

92. Cf. PPS, p. 641.

93. See M.J. Sweets, "Santideva and the Madhyamika...", pp. 20-21 and 25-27. See also *infra*, p. . Likewise, any identifications and differences between the two truths are relative and not ultimate.

94. In practice this issue becomes doubly complex for changes in the relations would be necessarily cognized from some position on the yogins' path and likewise could be presented (as a heuristic device) from any point of reference. Hence the *transformation* undergone by the relation connecting the two truths in this course of a yogin's development will itself change in dependence on a "path position". I do not know from what frame of reference the above transformation is intended to be described.

95. PPS, p. 76.

96. There is still the factor of unsound sense-organs. If this is a problem, Madhyamikas may feasibly have resolved it by positing some internal quality to the *manovijnana* such that whenever emptinesses are known the bases of the emptiness are cognised mentally. The MA has nothing to say about this, nor any indigenous literature I know of.

97. *Supra*, p.

98. Two papers that have addressed the problem fail to make any significant discovery. W.C. Beane in "Buddhist Causality and Compassion," *Religious Studies*, 10 (19), 41-56 reached an impasse with the conclusion (p. 456) "that the phenomena of *Dharmatika* and *Karuna* should no longer be regarded as co-inherent aspects of one philosophical world-view". D.W. Mitchell in "The Paradox of Buddhist Wisdom," PEW, 26.1 (Jan. 1976), 55-68 reduces the problem of how (p. 55) the bodhisattva practices compassion on the one hand and courses in wisdom (*prajna*) on the other, to its reconciliation in the two truths,

which, while providing an ontological resolution to *how* the buddhas can function in samsara, doesn't answer *why* they act for other creatures, nor the question of how insight and compassion are related, except that they are compatible within the Prajnaparamita metaphysic. Robert Thurman in "The Emptiness that is Compassion," *Religious Traditions*, 4.2 (Oct-Nov. 1981), 11-34 is much more insightful. He describes insight as a dynamic condition that encompasses a supremely elevated conception of personhood and personal agency. Peter Stater has also written a spirited essay titled "The Relevance of the Bodhisattva Concept for Today", in *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhism* (ed. by Leslie s. Kawamura Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1981, pp. 1-17, see esp. pp. 10-12. An early paper by H.V. Guenther, "The Buddhist Sunyata and Karuna," *Aryan Path*, 22 (1951), 406-410 briefly relates the doctrines of *sunyata-karuna* and *prajna-upaya*.

99. See RSM, f. 265-266.

100. John Makransky brought this possibility to mind. In the Tibetan lineages of universal vehicle Buddhism there are two methods for developing the fully evolved mind (*bodhi-citta*), one called "the seven cause and effect instruction (*rgyu 'bras man ngag bdun*)", which is said to have come from the Buddha to Maitreya Bodhisattva and thence to Asanga. The other is called "equalising and exchanging oneself with others (*bdag gzhan mnyam brje*)" and is said to have be transmitted from Buddha to Manjushri Bodhisattva and thence to

Nagarjuna and Shantideva. Generating an attitude of equanimity or impartiality to all creatures be they emotionally close or distant to one is incorporated within both those methods of comtemplation and also within the meditations that cultivate the four boundless or infinite (*apramana*) thoughts. See Geshe K. Gyatso, *Meaningful to Behold; View, Meditation and Action in Mahayana Buddhism* (Cumbria, England: Wisdom Publications, 1980), pp. 235-237.

101. PPS, p. 124.

102. PPS, p. 196.

103. E. Laszlo, *Introduction to Systems Philosophy*, pp.

104. *Ibid.*,

105. *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44.

106. PPS, p. 245.

107. PPS, p. 99.

108. PPS, p. 524.

109. PPS, p. 367.

110. K. Werner, *op. cit.*, p. 74. This is the tenth of the buddhas' powers, see MA, 12.21 and definition at 12.31. The MA definition includes the traces (*vasana*) and so removes more than is required for the *arhatphala*.

111. Ramanan, *op. cit.*, p. 289 reports that the arhats have an all-knowledge (*sarva-jnata*) but that it is "rough and gross" whereas the buddhas' *sarvakarajnata* is "the thorough and detailed knowledge of everything." The PPS, p. 518 says that the all-knowledge of the sravakas and pratyekabuddhas cognises everything there is "both inner and outer dharmas.... but not all the paths, and not in all respects." Even so, it must be logically possible that saint could gain nirvana without this degree of knowledge. The Nikayas

cite instances of arhats such as Sariputta and Kasyapa who don't appear to have supersensitive faculties, yet other such as Moggallana and Panthaka who have magical powers (*iddhividha*). See T. Rahula, "The Buddhist Arhant: Is his attainment of nirvana as perfect as the Buddha's enlightenment," *Religious Traditions*, 1.1 (April 1978), 38-39.

112. PPS, pp. 112 and 231.

113. PPS, p. 103 (my italics). P. 46 says that "a great being who wants to know fully all dharma in all their modes should stand in Perfect Wisdom." Also see pp. 47, 51-52 and 101.

114. For example, PPS, p. 531 where the two are synonyms.

115. PPS, p. 221.

116. PPS, p. 190.

117. PPS, p. 218.

118. PPS, p. 105.

119. See PPS, p. 297.

120. PPS, pp. 96-97.

121. See Ramanan, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

122. PPS, pp. 271-282, esp. pp. 275-278. The PPS, p. 243 says that insight can be dedicated to all-knowledge and serve as a cause for this due to the non-duality, nonproduction, and non-basis of the psycho-physical organism.

CONCLUSION

This study has attempted to investigate the relationship between reason, insight and full evolution in the Madhyamika system. The relationships have been exposed by focusing on the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] for it is a text that combines the philosophical, transformational and religious features of the Madhyamika. In reconstructing the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA] I've adopted a philosophical and psychological orientation as such a posture hasn't been utilised to date with the Madhyamika system and yet is consonant with the psycho-philosophical subject-matter of that system of thought, and is arguably the best orientation to assume when investigating the specific relationships in question. The first two thirds of the thesis have concentrated on the Madhyamika analytic and its relationship to the perfection of insight (*prajnaparamita*). The final third has linked insight to several features in the *Introduction* [MA] as a leadup to investigating the relationship between insight and full evolution (*bodhi*). The inquiry has been moderately successful in some areas (specificially with respect to the relationship between analysis and insight) and tentative in its conclusions in other aspects (notably in the area of the relationship between insight and valid conventional knowledge and insight and the buddhas' knowledge of all facets). It is useful to summarise the conclusions that have been reached.

Firstly, a relatively cogent case has been presented that Chandrakirti considered consequential analysis to be instrumental in the gaining of insight. This has been achieved by firstly detailing Chandrakirti's expressed opinion and then structually analysing the *Introduction* [MA] in an effort to ascertain *why* Chandrakirti could have thought that analysis was a tool for gaining a liberative insight. That investigation, in chapter three, reveals that the *Introduction* [MA] assumes the logical and psychological validity of four logical principles: the three aristotelian principles of thought and a principle of definition in which designations are defined in terms of logical opposites. This is given a strong interpretation where affirmations logically imply their negations and vice versa. Within the context of these principles consequential analysis can be claimed to reverse the flow of conceptuality and the *Introduction's* [MA] analyses of the person and things can be read so that they conform to the logical structures required for this reversal.

With respect to the relationship between insight and full evolution the investigations are more tentative in their conclusions. Still, it is possible to point out certain dynamic relationships and dependencies that seem to operate (1) between the development on insight and the unfolding of full evolution and (2)

between insight and compassion, which is an essential feature of the awakened mentality. More precisely, it seems that we can *infer* from the *Introduction's* [MA] doctrinal structure that insight is a necessary condition for the bodhisattva to develop an active compassion that responds to the ills of other creatures. Further, it seems that compassion was probably thought to be an instrumental cause, though perhaps not a necessary condition, for the buddhas' supposed knowledge of all facets of things, and that insight was probably thought to be a guarantee of valid conventional knowledge and a requirement for the buddhas' knowledge of all things. Looking at these relationships in the other direction it seem doctrinally inconsistent to maintain that compassion was thought to be necessary for the perfection of insight, and likewise inconsistent to maintain that insight depended on the bodhisattvas' and buddhas' vast knowledge. Any relationship between these two aspects of full evolution and insight in this direction must be a contingent relationship. On the other hand, there seems to be a closer relationship between conventionally valid perceptions and conceptualisations and insight for the same mental facilities that were thought to accompany valid conventional cognitions, viz. an intellect undistorted by the afflictions, would also be a basic requirement for the development of insight, although it is unlikely that insight was thought to just naturally arise given such an intellect, for this would obviate the need for analysis.

These general conclusions have some interesting consequences for the doctrinal distinction that the universal vehicle (*mahayana*) philosophies draw between insight and full evolution (*bodhi*), for the dependency of the fully evolved mind and compassion on insight would appear to make the acquisition of insight a *derivative* goal for the broad vehicle saints. Thus it seems that in the universal vehicle, insight is merely a *means* to an end - namely the goal of full evolution and the altruistic actions entailed by that goal. From this perspective and interpretation, insight and the personal liberation (*moksa, nirvana*) entailed by it, is not viewed as a *lesser goal* than full evolution but rather is a *necessary condition* that is required in order for bodhisattvas to gain full evolution and for buddhas to maximise the breadth and effectiveness of their compassion. This interpretation of insight and *nirvana*, as a condition rather than a goal in its right, is testified to by the philosophy of a single vehicle that Chandrakirti subscribes to. One can speculate for Chandrakirti, that were it not for the fact that insight gave strength and direction to the bodhisattvas' compassion, that the bodhisattvas could hypothetically even forsake developing insight.

Although the links between the Mahayana and Madhyamika aren't spelled out in detail in any of the traditional Buddhist literatures and the intersections between these two systems of thought are few - indeed the *Prajnaparamita-sutras* assume the validity of the Madhyamika *sunyavada* but do not detail the discernment (*vipasyana*) theory and practice and the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA], *Introduction to the Evolved Lifestyle* [BCA], and so forth, though expounding a Mahayana-Madhyamika, do little by way of relation the two - it

seems that certain independencies and dependencies obtain between the two traditions.

With respect to the relationship between the Madhyamika philosophy and the Mahayana ethical and religious doctrines, it seems that the Madhyamika philosophy can stand on its own as an integral expression, for although the doctrine of the single vehicle seems to imply, in fact necessitate, that the Madhyamika insight will be fused with the Mahayana religious aspirations and practices as some point, this is a temporal event and at least for a certain span of time the *sravaka* and *pratyekabuddha* arhats can theoretically exist in isolation from the Mahayana. (There is still the unanswered question of *why* the single vehicle philosophies think that all arhats will necessarily become buddhas.)

In the case of the Mahayana it seems that the practices and goals that it describes must be formally undergirded by a liberative philosophy for the reason that the bodhisattvas' and buddhas' compassion and knowledge structurally depend on the acquisition of insight. Thus, the Mahayana doctrines need *philosophical support* in a *sunyavada*. Whether the liberative philosophy that undergirds the Mahayana *has to be* Chandrakirti's Prasangika account of the *sunyavada* would require an investigation beyond the limits of this study. Certainly there are alternatives, though, for the Svatantrika-madhyamika and Vijnanavada philosophies have also been married to the Mahayana. One may find that an inquiry into this question reveals that each of these liberative philosophies *flavours* the Mahayana religious doctrine in particular ways *due to* their different assumptions and tenets.

APPENDIX ONE

A TRANSLATION OF THE *MADHYAMAKAVATARA*

The following is a translation of the *Madhyamakavatara karika* of Chandrakirti (ca. A.D. 600-650). This is a versified text of 330 *karikas* to which Chandrakirti wrote his own commentary, the *Madhyamakavatara-bhasya* or *Madhyamakavatara-vrtti*. The original Sanskrit version of the text (*karikas* and *bhasya*) does not survive. It does however, exist in Tibetan and Chinese translations. In the Tibetan Tripitaka it is catalogued with the title *dBu ma la 'jug pa zhes bya ba*. According to the Colophon (MABh: 409-410) the translation of the *Madhyamakavatara* and *Bhasya* was completed during the time of King Aryadeva ('Phags pa lha), whose dates are unknown, at the Ratnagupta Vihara in Anupama, Kashmir. The translation was made by the Indian abbott Tilaka-kalasa (Thig le bum pa) and the Tibetan translator Nyi ma grags from a Kashmiri manuscript and later improved on at Ra mo che monastery in Ra sa (Lhasa) by the Indian abbott Kanakavarma and the earlier Tibetan translator using western and eastern manuscripts.

The translation is from the text edited by Louis de la Vallee Poussin, *Madhyamakavatara par Candrakirti* Traduction Tibetaine, Osnabruck: Biblio Verlag, 1970 (first published in *Bibliotheca Buddhica*, IX, 1912). The sDe dge edition is consulted in the *sDe dge Tibetan Tripitaka, bsTan 'gyur* - preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo, edited by J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi and Y. Ejima, Tokyo: 1977-. The transliterated Tibetan text is not a critical edition. I have included only those variants which are significant. For example, orthographic and tense variants are not noted.

INTRODUCTION TO THE MIDDLE WAY (*MADHYAMAKAVATARA*)

CHAPTER ONE: GIVING (*DANA*)

1.1 *nyan thos sangs rgyas 'bring rnams thub dbang skyes/*
sangs rgyas byang chub sems dpa' las 'khrungs shing/
snying rjei sems dang gnyis su med blo dang/
byang chub sems ni rgyal sras rnams kyi rgyu// [1]

Disciples (*sravaka*) and intermediate buddhas are born from the mighty sages. Buddhas are born from bodhisattvas, and the causes of the victors' children (*jina-putra*) are the compassionate mind (*karuna-citta*), a non-dualist intellect (*advaya-mati*), and the fully evolved mind (*bodhi-citta*).

1.2 *gang phyir brtse nyid rgyal bai lo thog phun tshogs 'dii/*
sa bon dang ni spel la chu 'dra yun ring du/
longs spyod gnas la smin pa lta bur 'dod gyur pa/
de phyir bdag gis thog mar snying rje bstod par bgyi// [7]

Real love (*krpa*) is like the seeds of the victors' sublime crop, like the water [that is necessary] for their growth, and is like ripened [fruit] which remains ready for use. Therefore, at the beginning [of this text], I praise compassion (*karuna*).

1.3 *dang por nga zhes bdag la zhen gyur zhing/*
bdag gi 'di zhes dngos la chags bskyed pa/
zo chun 'phyan ltar rang dbang med pa yi/
'gro la snying rjer gyur gang de la 'dud// [9]

Firstly [people] yearn for the self (*atma*), the 'I', and then develop attachment for things, [the idea that] 'This is mine'. I bow to whoever has cultivated compassion for creatures who, like the whirling of a water-mill, have no freedom.

1.4 *'gro ba g.yo bai chu yi nang gi zla ba ltar/*
g.yo dang rang bzhin nyid kyis stong par mthong ba yi/
rgyal bai sras po 'di yi sems gang 'gro ba rnams/
rnam par grol bar bya phyir snying rjei dbang gyur cing// [10-11]

Like the moon's [reflection] appearing in moving waters, creatures move yet are perceived to be empty by their very nature (*svabhavata*). Whoever has the mind of these victors' children generates the power of compassion so as to completely liberate creatures.

1.5 *kun tu bzang poi smon pas rab bsngos dga' ba la/*
rab tu gnas pa de ni dang po zhes byao/
de nas bzung ste de ni de thob gyur pa yis/
byang chub sems dpa' zhes byai sgra nyid kyis bsnyad do// [11-14]

By pure dedication with Samantabhadra's resolve, they fully remain in joy (*mudita*): this [level] is called 'the first'. On gaining this [level] they are then named by the actual term 'bodhisattva'.

1.6 *'di ni de bzhin gshegs pa rnams kyi rigs su'ang skyes pa ste/*
'di yi kun tu sbyor ba gsum po thams cad spangs par yin [VP: *gyur*]/
byang chub sems dpa' de ni dga' ba mchog tu gyur 'chang zhing/
'jig rten khams brgya kun nas g.yo bar nus par gyur pa'ang yin// [16]

These [bodhisattvas] are also born into the Tathagatas' family (*kula*) and they abandon all three fetters (*samyojana*). These bodhisattvas hold supreme joy and can even move around a hundred world-systems.

1.7 *sa nas sar gnon byed cing gong mar rab tu 'gro bar 'gyur/*
de tshe 'di yi ngan 'groi lam rnams mtha' dag 'gag par 'gyur/
de tshe 'di yi so so skyes boi sa rnams thams cad zad/
'di ni 'phags pa brgyad pa ji lta de ltar nye bar bstan// [17]

Pressing on from level to level, they move higher. Already all paths to unfortunate states are blocked and all levels as ordinary people (*prthag-jana*) have been exhausted. It is taught they quite resemble the eighth [level] saint.

1.8 *rdzogs pai byang chub sems lta dang po la gnas kyang/*
thub dbang gsung skyes dang bcas rang sangs rgyas rnams ni/
bsod nams dag gi dbang gis [VP: *gi*] *pham byas rnam par 'phel/*
de ni ring du song bar blo yang lhag par 'gyur// [17-19]

Even while abiding in this first viewing of the perfectly evolved mind (*sambodhicitta*) [the bodhisattvas] - through the force of their positive potentials (*punya*) - increase their preminance over those born from the mighty sage's speech and over self-evolvers. [The bodhisattvas] have gone further [than these others], and thus their minds are much purer.

1.9 *de tse de la rdzogs sangs byang chub rgyu/*
dang po sbyin pa nyid ni lhag par 'gyur/
rang sha ster la'ang gus par byas pa yis/
snang du mi rung dpog pai rgyur yang 'gyur// [23-24]

By now they are become uncommon (*adhika*) due to their generosity (*dana*), which is the first cause for evolution to the perfect buddha. They act courteously even when giving their own flesh and they are also courageous at performing the seemingly unseemly.

1.10 *skye bo 'di kun bde ba mngon 'dod cing/*
mi rnams bde ba'ang longs spyod med min la/
longs spyod kyang ni sbyin las 'byung mkhyen nas/
thub pas dang por sbyin pai gtam mdzad do// [24]

All the creatures long for manifest happiness and for humans there is no happiness without [material] affluence (*bhoga*). Knowing that affluence also comes from giving, the Sage spoke first of generosity.

1.11 *snying rje dman zhing shin tu rtsub sems can/*
rang don lhur len nyid du gyur ba gang/
de dag gi yang 'dod pai longs spyod rnams/
sdug bsngal nyer zhii rgyur gyur sbyin las 'byung// [25]

Those with poor compassion and very crude minds, who are obsessed by their own concerns, have their suffering appeased by longed-for affluence, and this comes from generosity.

1.12 *di yang sbyin pai skabs kyis nam zhig tshe/*
'phags pai skye bo dang phrad myur du 'thob/
de nas srid rgyun yang dag bcad byas te/
de yis rgyu can zhi par 'gro bar 'gyur// [26]

Also, by performing generosity, there will come a time when they will shortly meet a saintly person and on achieving this they can then completely cut the stream of [samsaric] existence. Thus, from this cause they will proceed to serenity (*santi*).

1.13 *'gro la phan par dam bcas yid can rnams/*
sbyin pas ring por mi thogs dga' ba 'thob/
gang phyir brtse bdag brtse bdag ma yin pa/
de phyir sbyin pai gtam nyid gtso bo yin// [27]

By thinking on the promise to benefit creatures [bodhisattvas, the Lords of Love,] gain long lasting joy through giving. Because [it is the cause of goodness for both] the Lords of Love and those who are not, the instruction about giving is singularly important.

1.14 *ji ltar byin zhig ces sgra thos bsams las/*
rgyal sras bde 'byung de ltar thub rnams la/
zhi bar zhugs pas bde ba byed min na/
thams cad btang bas lta zhig smos ci dgos// [28]

Such happiness (*sukha*) arises in victors' children from hearing and thinking the word 'Give!', that not even the sages are made this happy by entering [nirvana's] peace. Need I then explain [the bodhisattvas' happiness] of giving everything away!

1.15 *lus bcad ster zhing bdag gi sdug bsngal gyis/*
gzhan dag rnams kyi dmyal ba la sogs pai/
sdug bsngal rang rig nyid du mthong nas de [D: *ni*]/
de bcad bya phyir myur du brtson 'grus rtsom// [29]

When they multilate and give their bodies, through this suffering they perceive the suffering of others in the hells and so on. Thus, to sever [the miseries of others] they perform [self mutilation] swiftly and with enthusiasm.

1.16 *sbyin pa sbyin bya len po gtong pos stong/*
'jig rten 'das pai pha rol phyin zhes bya/
gsum po dag la chags skyes gyur pas de/
'jig rten pa yi pha rol phyin zhes bstan// [30-31]

They see that giving (*dana*), the gift and the receiver are empty: this is called a transworldly perfection (*lokottaraparamita*). When attachment arises for these three, it is taught to be 'a worldly perfection (*laukika-paramita*)'.

1.17 *de ltar rgyal bai sras kyi yid la rab gnas shing/*
dam pai rten la 'od chags mdzes pa rnyed gyur pai/
dga' ba 'di ni nor bu chu shel ji bzhin du/
mun pa stug po thams cad rnam par bsal nas rgyal// [31]

Hence the minds of these victors' children are highly placed and have achieved a beauteous skein of light in dependence on their sanctity. Like a jewelled water crystal, they dispel all opaque gloom and are victorious.

CHAPTER TWO: GOOD CONDUCT (*SILA*)

2.1 *de tshul phun tshogs yon tan dag ldan phyir/*
rmi lam du yang 'chal khrims dri ma spangs/
lus ngag yid kyi rgyu ba dag gyur pas/
dam pai las lam bcu char sogs par [D: *car sog par*] *byed//* [32-33]

Because their good conduct (*sila*) has the sublime qualities, they have abandoned the stains of immortality even in dreams. Because the movements of their body, speech, and mind have become pure they perform the ten excellent action paths (*dasa-karma-patha*) all at once.

2.2 *dge bai lam 'di lta zhig bcu char yang/*
de la klags te shin tu dag par 'gyur/
ston kai zla ltar rtag tu rnam dag ste/
zhi 'od chags par de dag gis rnam mdzes// [37]

They perform the ten parts of this virtuous path (*kusala-patha*) at a glance, and they become most pure. Like an autumn moon, they are always completely pure and their peaceful light rays lend them utter beauty.

2.3 *gal te de ni khrims dag rang bzhin lta/*
de phyir de ni tshul khrims dag mi 'gyur/
de phyir de ni rtag tu gsum char la'ang/
gnyis bloi rgyu ba yang dag bral bar 'gyur// [37-38]

If this pure conduct were viewed as intrinsically existent (*svabhava*) it would thereby not be pure conduct. Thus they are always perfectly free of the cause of the vacillation of dualistic thought (*advaya-mati*) toward the three.

2.4 *sbyin pas longs spyod dag ni 'gro ngan na'ang/*
skye bo tshul khrims rkang pa nyams la 'byung/
bskyed bcas dngos 'du yongs su zad pas na/
phyin chad de la longs spyod 'byung mi 'gyur// [39]

Affluence from giving may still result in unfortunate states and such befell people if the prop of conduct had declined. If capital and income are quite used up then, thereafter, no more affluence will come.

2.5 *gang tshe rang dbang 'jug cing mthun gnas pas* [D: *pa*]/
gal te 'di dag [VPV: *bdag*] *'dzin par mi byed na/*
g.yang sar lhung bas gzhan dbang 'jug 'gyur ba/
de las phyi nas gang gis slong bar 'gyur// [40]

If whenever one has the freedom and a favourable situation one does not seize on these, then when one falls over the abyss and comes under another's sway [in the lower realms], and who will later extricate one from there?

2.6 *de phyir rgyal bas sbyin pai gtam mdzad nas/*
tshul khrims rjes 'groi gtam nyid mdzad pa yin/
yon tan tshul khrims zhing du rnam 'phel na/
'bras bu nyer spyod chad pa med par 'gyur// [41]

Therefore the Victor, after instructing about giving, followed this with instruction on conduct. If virtues develop in the field of conduct, the resulting affluence will be uninterrupted.

2.7 *so so skye bo rnams dang gsung skyes dang/*
rang byang chub la bdag nyid nges rnams dang/
rgyal sras rnams kyi nges par legs pa dang/
mngon mthoi rgyu ni tshul khrims las gzhan med// [41]

For ordinary people, those borne of speech [i.e. *sravakas*], those certain to be self-evolving [i.e. *pratyekabuddhas*], and the victors' children, the cause of spiritual ascendance (*nihsreyasa*), and final transcendence (*abhyudaya*) is nothing other than good conduct.

2.8 *ji ltar rgya mtsho ro dang lhan cig dang/*
bkra shis rna nag ma dang lhan cig bzhin/
de ltar tshul khrims dbang byas bdag nyid che/
de 'chal ba dang lhan cig gnas mi 'dod// [44-45]

Just as corpses do not remain in the ocean, or good luck and mis-fortune are not [found] together, so too with the conduct of these great beings: we assert it does not coexist with immorality.

2.9 *gang gis gang zhig gang la spong byed pa/*
gsum du dmigs pa yod na tshul khrims de/
'jig rten pa yi pha rol phyin zhes bshad/
gsum la chags pas stong de 'jig rten 'das// [45]

Good conduct is said to be a 'worldly perfection' when directed towards three - abstainer, abstinence, and the abstained. That which is empty of attachment to the three is transworldly.

2.10 *rgyal sras zla ba las byung srid min srid pa yi/*
dpal gyur dri ma dang bral dri ma med 'di yang/
ston kai dus kyi zla bai 'od ni ji bzhin du/
'gro bai yid kyi gdung ba sel bar byed pa yin// [45]

These victors' children, arisen from the moon, are not worldly, [yet] free from stains they become the world's splendour. These stainless (*vimala*) ones are also like the rays of the autumn moon in removing creatures' mental torment.

CHAPTER THREE: PATIENCE (*KSANTI*)

3.1 *shes byai bud shing ma lus sreg pai mei* [VP: *me*]/
'od 'byung phyir na sa ni gsum pa 'di/
'od byed pa ste bde gshegs sras po la/
se tshe nyi ltar zangs 'drai snang ba 'byung// [46]

Because the [wisdom] fire that consumes all knowables as fuel produces light, this third level is [called] the Illuminator. The Sugatas' children receive a coppery vision like the sun.

3.2 *gal te gnas min 'khrugs pa 'ga' yis dei*/
lus las sha ni rus bcas yun ring du/
srang re re nas bcad par gyur kyang dei/
bjod pa gcod par byed la lhag par skye// [47]

Even if someone with a deranged psychosis carves from [a bodhisattva's] body flesh and bone, taking their time and cutting ounce by ounce, yet vivid patience arises in him or her for his or her butcher.

3.3 *bdag med mthong bai byang chub sems dpa' la*/
gang zhig gang gis gang tshe ji ltar gcod/
gang phyir chos kun de yis [VP: *chos kyang de yi*] *gzugs brnyan ltar*/
mthong ba des na de yis bzod par 'gyur// [48]

For the bodhisattvas who perceive non-self (*nairatmya*) how, then, are they cut, by whom, and when, because they see all things as reflections. Thus they are patient.

3.4 *gnod pa byas pas gal te der bkon na*/
de la bkon pas byas zin ldog gam ci/
de phyir dei bkon nges par 'dir don med/
'jig rten pha rol yang ni 'gal bar 'gyur// [49]

If one has animosity with he who harms, could animosity stop that which is already done? Thus this animosity is senseless here, and carries over in one's next [rebirth to] the world.

3.5 *sngon byas pa yi mi dgei las kyi 'bras bu gang/*
zad par byed par brjod par 'dod pa de nyid ko/
gzhan la gnod pa dang ni khro bas sdug bsngal phyir/
sa bon nyid du ji lta bur na khrid par byed// [49]

Those who claim that all the fruits of non-virtuous actions (*akusala karma*) are [now] spent will suffer because they have harmed others and have angered, and these lead to [fruits] just as a seed.

3.6 *gang phyir rgyal sras rnams la khro ba yis/*
sbyin dang khrims byung dge ba bskal pa brgyar/
bsags pa skad cig gis 'joms de yi phyir/
mi bzod las gzhan sdig pa yod ma yin// [50-51]

One moment of anger towards the victors' children destroys the virtues that have arisen from giving and good conduct amassed over one hundred aeons. Therefore there is no more negative fault (*papa*) than a lack of patience.

3.7 *mi sdug gzugs su byed cing dam par min par bkri/*
tshul dang tshul min shes pai rnam dpyod 'phrog byed cing/
mi bzod pa yis myur du ngan 'gror skyur bar byed/
bzod pas bshad zin dang 'gal yon tan rnams byed do// [52]

It gives one an unattractive form, leads to what is corrupt and robs one of knowing good from the unseemly. Lack of patience quickly casts one into the unfortunate states. Patience creates qualities that are the opposite of the above.

3.8 *bzod pas mdzes shing skye bo dam pa la/*
phangs dang lugs dang lugs min shes pa la/
mkhas par 'gyur zhing de yi 'og tu ni/
lha mii skye dang sdig pa zad par 'gyur// [52]

Through patience one becomes beautiful, a holy being, knowledgeable about what is to be abandoned and right and wrong ways, and a scholar. And later one is born as a god or as a human and all one's negative faults will then exhaust.

3.9 *so soi skye bo dang ni rgyal sras kyis/*
khro dang bzod pai skyon yon rig byas te/
mi bzod spangs nas 'phags pai skye bo yis/
bsngags pai bzod pa rtag tu myur bsten bya// [52]

Ordinary people and victors' children should know the defects (*dosa*) of anger and virtues (*guna*) of patience. When abandoning impatience they should always and soon rely on that praised by saintly persons (*arya-pudgala*), [i.e.] patience.

3.10 *rdzogs sangs rgyas kyi byang chub phyir bsngos kyang/*
gsum dmigs yod na de ni 'jig rten pao/
dmigs pa med pa de nyid sangs rgyas kyis/
'jig rten 'das pai pha rol phyin zhes bstan// [53]

Though [patience] be devoted to [achieving] the awakening (*bodhi*) of the perfect buddhas, if it is directed to the three, then it is worldly. The Buddha taught that when not so directed, [patience] is a trans-worldly perfection.

3.11 *sa der rgyal sras bsam gtan mngon shes dang/*
'dod chags zhe sdang yongs su zad par 'gyur/
des kyang rtag tu 'jig rten pa yi ni/
'dod pai 'dod chags 'joms par nus par 'gyur// [53]

On this level the victors' children [possess] the meditations (*dhyana*) and super-sensitive cognitions (*abhijna*) and have ended attachment (*raga*) and anger (*dvesa*). They also can and forever do destroy the sensual attachments of worldly folk.

3.12 *sbyin sogs chos gsum de dag phal mo cher/*
bde bar gshegs pas khyim pa rnams la bsngags/
bsod nams zhes byai tshogs kyang de dag nyid/
sangs rgyas gzugs kyi bdag nyid sku yi rgyu// [62]

Generally, the Sugata commended these three practices (*dharma*) of giving and the rest to lay-people (*grhastha*). These are the collection known as positive potentials (*punya*) [which are] the cause of a lordly buddha's form [i.e. the physical form, *rupa-kaya*].

3.13 *rgyal bai sras po nyi ma la gnas 'od byed 'di/*
rang gtogs mun rnams dang po yang dag gsal byas nas/
'gro bai mun pa rnam par 'joms par mngon par 'dod/
sa 'dir shin tu rno bar gyur kyang khro mi 'gyur// [63]

These Light-Makers - the victors' children who dwell in the sun - first clear away their own darkness and then desire to completely eradicate the darkness of creatures. On this stage they become most sharp but do not become angry.

CHAPTER FOUR: ENTHUSIASM (*VIRYA*)

4.1 *yon tan ma lus brtson 'grus rjes 'gro zhing/*
bsod nams blo gros tshogs ni gnyid kyi rgyu/
brtson 'grus gang du 'bar bar gyur pa yi/
sa de bzhi pa 'od ni 'phro bao// [64]

All the qualities follow enthusiasm (*virya*) and it is cause for two collections - of positive potentials (*punya*) and intelligence (*mati*). The fourth level [bodhisattva], whose enthusiasm blazes everywhere, is the Radiant (*arcismati*).

4.2 *der ni bde gshegs sras la rdzogs pa yi/*
byang chub phyogs lhag bsgoms pa las skyes pai/
snang ba zangs kyi 'od pas lhag 'byung zhing/
rang du lta ba dang 'brel yongs su zad// [64-68]

From their greater meditations on the [thirty seven] directions to the perfect awakening (*sambhodipaksa*) a greater light than the coppery vision arises for these Sugata children, and [wrong] views about the self are completely eradicated.

CHAPTER FIVE: MEDITATION (*DHYANA*)

5.1 *bdag nyid che de bdud rnams kun gyis kyang/*
sbyang dkai sa la pham par nus ma yin/
bsam gtan lhag cing blo bzang bden rang bzhin/
zhib mo rtogs la'ang shin tu mkhas pa thob// [69]

On the level of 'Difficult to Conquer (*sudurjaya*)' even all the psychotic forces (*mara*) cannot defeat these great beings. Pre-eminent in meditation (*dhyana*), they have also gained great skill in detailed comprehension of the realities (*satya*) for those of good intelligence.

CHAPTER SIX: INSIGHT (*PRAJNA*)

6.1 *mngon du phyogs par mnyam gzhag sems gnas te/*
rdzogs pai sangs rgyas chos la mngon phyogs shing/
'di rten 'byung bai de nyid mthong ba des/
shes rab gnas pas 'gog pa 'thob par 'gyur// [73]]

Abiding with a composed mind at [the 'level of] Manifesting (*abhimukhi*)' [the bodhisattvas] manifest [some] qualities of perfected buddhas, and through the perception of the reality of relational origination (*pratityasamutpada*), and by dwelling in insight (*prajna*), they obtain cessations (*nirodha*).

6.2 *ji ltar long bai tshogs kun bde blag tu/*
mig ldan skyes bu gcig gis 'dod pa yi/
yul du khrid pa de bzhin 'dir yang blos/
mig nyams yon tan blangs te rgyal nyid 'gro// [74]

Just as one person with sight easily leads a group of blind people to the place they desire, the intellect (*mati*) here has taken on the manner of eyes and goes toward the victory.

6.3 *ji ltar de yis chos zab chos rtogs pa/*
lung dang gzhan yang rigs pas yin pas na/
de ltar 'phags pa klu sgrub gzhung lugs las/
ji ltar gnas pai lugs bzhin brjod par bya// [75]

Just as these [bodhisattvas] comprehend the highly profound teaching (*gambhira-dharma*) through scriptures (*agama*) and through reason as well (*yukti*), so I will explain from Saint Nagarjuna's texts precisely the mode of existence.

6.4 *so so skye boi dus na'ang stong pa nyid thos nas/*
nang du rab tu dga' ba yang dang yang du 'byung/
rab tu dga' ba las byung mchi mas mig brlan zhing/
lus kyi ba spu ldang bar gyur ba gang yin pa// [78]

For [some] ordinary people, even when just hearing about emptiness, great joy wells up again and again, and due to their great joy, their eyes flood with tears and the hair on their body stands erect.

6.5 *de la rdzogs pai sangs rgyas blo yi sa bon yod/*
de nyid nye bar bstan pai snod ni de yin te/
de la dam pai don gyi bden pa bstan par bya/
de la de yi rjes su 'gro bai yon tan 'byung// [78]

They have the seed of the perfect buddha mind and are receptive students (*bhajana*) for being taught reality. They should be taught ultimate reality (*paramartha-satya*), for they will thereby receive the qualities.

6.6-7a *rtag tu tshul khrims yang dag blangs nas gnas par 'gyur/*
sbyin ba gtong par 'gyur zhing snying rje bsten par byed/
bzod pa sgom byed de yi dge ba byang chub tu/
'gro ba dgrol bar bya phyir yongs su bsngo byed cing//
rdzogs pai byang chub sems dpa' rnams la gus par byed/ [78-79]

They always adopt excellent conduct, they are generous and steadfastly practice compassion. They meditate on patience (*ksanti*), fully resolve the virtues (*subha*) of these [practices] to their awakening in order to liberate creatures, and pay respects to the perfect bodhisattvas.

6.7c-d *zab cing rgya chei tshul la mkhas pai skye bos ni/*
rim gyis rab tu dga' bai sa ni 'thob 'gyur bas/
de ni don du gnyer bas lam 'de mnyan par gyis// [79-80]

People skilled in the profound and extensive ways will, by degrees, gain the level of Great Joy (*pramudita*). Those who so yearn should listen to this path.

THE SELFLESSNESS OF PHENOMENA

6.8 *de nyid de las 'byung min gzhan dag las lta ga la zhig/*
gnyi ga las kyang ma yin rgyu med par ni ga la yod/
de ni de las 'byung na yon tan 'ga' yang yod ma yin/
skyes par gyur pa slar yang skye ba rigs pa'ang ma yin nyid// [82]

Nothing can arise from itself, yet how [can it arise] from another? It does not [arise] from both [itself and another], nor could it be without a cause? There is no point to a thing arising from itself. Moreover, it is wrong for that which is already produced to be produced yet again.

6.9 *skyes zin slar yang skye ba yongs su rtog par 'gyur na ni/*
myu gu la sogs rnams kyi skye ba 'dir rnyed mi 'gyur zhing/
sa bon srid mthar thug par rab tu skye ba nyid du 'gyur/
ji ltar de nyid kyis de rnam par 'jig par byed par 'gyur// [83]

If you conceive that that which is already produced gives rise to further production, then this does not admit of production of the shoots and the rest. Seeds would produce [shoots] in profusion till the end of existence. How would all these [shoots] disintegrate these [seeds]?

6.10 *byed rgyu sa bon gyi las tha dad myu gui dbyibs dang ni/*
kha dog ro nus smin pai tha dad khyod la med par 'gyur/
gal te sngar gyi bdag gi dngos po bsal nas de las gzhan/
ngo bor 'gyur na de tshe de yi de nyid je ltar 'gyur// [84]

For you [Samkhya philosophers] the distinctions of the sprout's shape, colour, taste, capacity, and development would not be distinct from the seed's creative cause. If after the removal of its former self, that thing, it becomes a different entity, how could it be that thing at such a time?

6.11 *gal te khyod kyi sa bon myu gu 'dir gzhan ma yin na/*
sa bon bzhin du myu gu zhes bya de bzung med pa'am/
yang na de dag gcig pas je ltar myu gu 'di bzhin du/
de yang bzung du yod 'gyur de phyir 'di ni khas mi blangs// [85]

If for you the seed and sprout are not different then, like the seed, the so-called 'sprout' would not be apprehended either. Or again, because they are the same, the [seed] would be apprehended when the sprout is. This you cannot assert.

6.12 *gang phyir rgyu zhig na yang de yi 'bras bu mthong bai phyir/*
de dag gcig pa yin zhes 'jig rten gyis kyang khas mi len/
de phyir dngos po bdag las 'byung zhes rab tu brtags pa 'di/
de nyid dang ni 'jig rten du yang rigs pa ma yin no// [86]

Because the effect (*phala*) is seen only if the cause (*hetu*) is destroyed, not even by conventional criteria are they the same. Therefore, to impute that 'things arise from a self' is incorrect, both in reality and conventionally.

6.13 *bdag las skes bar 'dod na bskyed par bya dang skyed byed dang/*
las dang byed pa po yang gcig nyid 'gyur na de dag ni/
gcig nyid ma yin pas na bdag las skye bar khas blang bar/
bya min rgya cher bshad pai nyes par thal bar 'gyur phyir ro// [86]

If self-production were to be asserted then product, producer, object and agent alike would be identical. As they are not identical, do not assert self-production because of the objectional consequences extensively explained [in Nagarjuna's work].

6.14 *gzhan la brten nas gal te gzhan zhig 'byung bar 'gyur na ni/*
'o na me lce las kyang mun pa 'thug po 'byung 'gyur zhing/
thams cad las kyang thams cad skye bar 'gyur te gang gi phyir/
skyed par byed pa ma yin ma lus la yang gzhan nyid mtshungs// [89]

If something were to arise in dependence (*etya*) on something else, well then thick darkness would arise even from flames. And moreover, everything would be produced from everything. Why? Because all non-producers are equally different [from the result].

6.15 *rab tu bya bar nus pa de phyir 'bras bur nges brjod cing/*
gang zhig de bskyed nus pa de ni gzhan na'ang rgyu yin la/
rgyud gcig gtogs dang skyed par byed las skye ba de yi phyir/
sa lui myu gu nas la sogs las de lta min zhe na// [90]

Qualm: Because [something] has been able to carry through an action, [its] product can be stated with certainty. That which is able to produce [an effect] is a cause, even though it is different [from the effect]. They belong to the one continuum (*samtana*), [the effect] was produced from a producer and so it is not the case that a rice sprout is [produced] from barley [seed] and so on.

6.16 *ji ltar nas dang ge sar dang ni keng* [VP: *king*] *shu ka la sogs/*
sa lui myu gu skyed par byed par 'dod min nus ldan min/
rgyud gcig khongs su gtogs min 'dra ba ma yin nyid de bzhin/
sa lui sa bon yang ni de yi min te gzhan nyid phyir// [91-92]

[Madhyamika:] Just as barley, gesar and kinshuka flowers, and so on, are not judged to be producers of rice sprouts [since] they lack the ability [to produce them], do not belong to a common continuum, and are qualitatively dissimilar. Similarly, a rice seed is no [exception] because it is quite different [from a sprout].

6.17 *myu gu sa bon dang ni dus mnyam yod pa ma yin te/*
gzhan nyid med par sa bon gzhan pa nyid du ga la 'gyur/
des na myu gu sa bon las skye 'grub par [D: *pas*] *'gyur min las/*
gzhan las skyes ba yin zhes bya bai phyogs 'di btang bar byos// [92]

Seed and sprout do not exist simultaneously, and if they were not different how could the seed *become* different? Therefore, you will not prove production of a sprout from a seed. Instead relinquish the position that 'there is production from another'.

6.18 *ji ltar srang gi mda' gnyis mtho ba dang ni dma' ba dag/*
dus mnyam ma yin par ni [D: *na*] *min par mthong ba de bzhin du/*
bskyed par bya dang skyed byed dag gi skye 'gag 'gyur zhe na/
gal te gcig tshe yin na 'dir dus gcig med de yod [D: *yang*] *min//* [94]

Qualm: Just as [the movements of] the two beams of a balance, when level, [i.e.] with one higher and the other lower, are seen to be simultaneous, so too the production of a product and ceasation of the producer [are simultaneous].

[Madhyamika:] [The balance beams may] be simultaneous, but [producers and their products] do not exist at the same time.

6.19 *gal te skye bzhin pa de skye la phyogs pas yod min zhing/*
'gag bzhin pa ni yod kyang 'jig la phyogs par 'dod gyur pa/
de tshe 'di ni ji lta bur na srang dang mtshungs pa yin/
skye ba 'di ni byed po med par rigs pai ngo bo'ang min// [95]

You assert that during production, [the product] does not exist because the production phase [is operating] and that during cessation [a product] exists though the cessation phase [is operating]. How then could these instances be equivalent to a balance? Such production has no agent and therefore is not a viable process (*bhava*).

6.20 *gal te mig gi blo la rang gi skyed byed dus gcig pa/*
mig la sogs dang lhan cig 'byung ba 'du shes la sogs las/
gzhan nyid yod na yod la 'byung bas dgos pa ci zhig yod/
ci ste de med ce na 'di la nyes pa bshad zin to// [98]

If the visual consciousness (*caksurdhi*) [1] [arose] simultaneously with its producers - the eye, and so forth - and with its associated discriminations (*samjna*), and so forth, or if [2] it was different from [these], then what need would there be for it to come into existence? [Yet] the faults in saying '[production] does not exist at all' have already been explained.

6.21 *skyed par byed pa bskyed bya gzhan bskyed pa de rgyu yin na/*
yod pa'am 'on te med dang gnyi ga gnyis bral zhig bskyed grang/
yod na skyed byed ci dgos med la'ang des ci zhig [D: *des ni ci zhig*] *bya/*
gnyis nyid la des ci bya gnyis dang bral la'ang des ci bya// [99]

If a producer is a cause (*hetu*) producing another, then the product is counted as an existent (*sat*), or a non-existent, both, or neither. If [the product] exists, then what need is there of a producer? Then, what has the [producer] done if [the product] is non-existent? What was done if it is both or if it was neither?

6.22 *gang gis rang lta la gnas 'jig rten tshad mar 'dod pas na/*
'dir ni rigs pa smras pa nyid kyis lta go [VP: *ko*] *ci zhig bya/*
gzhan las gzhan 'byung ba yang 'jig rten pa yis rtogs 'gyur te/
des na gzhan las skye yod 'dir ni rigs pas ci zhig dgos// [101]

[Qualm:] We maintain that worldly consensus is a valid instrument (*pramana*) within the domain of its own viewpoint. Therefore, of what use are your reasoned explanations in this [context]? Worldly consensus also understands that something different arises from another, and thus that there is production from another. What need of logic here?

THE SYSTEM OF TWO REALITIES (*DRAVYA-SATYA*)

6.23 *dngos kun yang dag rdzun pa mthong pa yis/*
dngos rnyed ngo bo gnyis ni 'dzin par 'gyur/
yang dag mthong yul gang de de nyid de/
mthong ba brdzun pa kun rdzob bden par gsungs// [102]

[Madhyamika:] All things are seen with accurate (*samyak*) or deceptive (*mrsa*) perception; anything can be taken to have a dual nature (*bhava*). Any object of a correct perception is reality (*tattva*) while deceptive perceptions are declared to be conventional reality (*samvrti-satya*).

6.24 *mthong ba rdzun pa'ang rnam pa gnyis 'dod de/*
dbang po gsal dang dbang po skyon ldan no/
skyon ldan dbang can rnams kyi shes pa ni/
dbang po legs gyur shes bltos log par 'dod// [103]

Further, we assert that deceptive perceptions have two modes: one having a clear sense-faculty [the other] a defective sense-faculty. We assert that knowledge from defective sense-faculties is wrong (*mithya*) compared with knowledge derived from good sense faculties.

6.25 *gnod pa med pai dbang po drug rnams kyis/*
bzung ba gang zhig 'jig rten gyis rtogs te/
'jig rten nyid las bden yin lhag ma ni/
'jig rten nyid las log par rnam bar bzhag// [104]

From a conventional standpoint anything which is apprehended through the six undamaged sense-faculties is - for the world - reality (*satya*). Everything else is deemed to be wrong from a conventional standpoint.

6.26 *mi shes gnyid kyis rab bskyod mu stegs can/*
rnams kyis bdag nyid ji bzhin brtags pa dang/
sgyu ma smig rgyu sogs la brtags pa dang/
de dag 'jig rten las kyang yod min nyid// [105]

The non-Buddhist philosophers (*tirthika*) who are much affected by the sleep of ignorance, impute a self. Their imputations are illusions, mirages and the like, since even from a worldly perspective these do not exist.

6.27 *mig ni rab rib can gyis* [VP: *gyi*] *dmigs pa yis/*
rab rib med shes la gnod min ji ltar/
de bzhin dri med ye shes spangs pai blos/
dri med blo la gnod pa yod ma yin [VPV: *yod pa yin*]// [106]

As with eyes, the observations of a victim of opthalmia does not contravert the knowledge of one without opthalmia. Likewise, the intellect that forsakes uncontaminated knowledge does not contravert the uncontaminated intellect [*vimala-jnana*).

6.28 *gti mug rang bzhin sgrib phyir kun rdzob ste/*
des gang bcos ma bden par snang de ni/
kun rdzob bden zhes thub pa des gsungs te/
bcos mar gyur pai dngos ni kun rdzob tuo// [107]

Delusion (*moha*) is conventional (*samvrti*) because its nature is to cover. Whatever appears conventionally is as if an artificial truth, and the Sage has called this a 'conventional reality (*samvrti-satya*)'. The things that are artificialities are conventionalities (*samvrti*).

6.29-30 *rab rib mthu yis skra shad la sogs pai/*
ngo bo log pa gang zhig rnam brtags pa/
de nyid bdag nyid gang du mig dag pas/
mthong de de nyid de bzhin 'dir shes kyis//

gal te 'jig rten tshad ma yin na ni/
'jig rten de nyid mthong bas 'phags gzhan gyis/
ci dgos 'phags pai lam gyis ci zhig bya/
blun po tshad mar rigs pa'ang ma yin no// [109-112]

Delusive (*mitya*) entities [such as] hair-lines, and so on, are projected due to opthalmia. One should know the reality (*tattva*) seen by anyone with pure sight to be accurate reality, for, if worldly [cognition] was the measure of validity (*pramana*), then worldly [cognition] would perceive reality (*tattva*). What need then for others, the saints? What use of a saintly path (*arya-marga*)? Validity for fools, though, is not correct.

6.31 *rnam kun 'jig rten tshad min de yi phyir/*
de nyid skabs su 'jig rten gnod pa med/
'jig rten don ni 'jig rten grags nyid kyis/
gal te sel na 'jig rten gyis gnod 'gyur// [112-113]

Because every worldly aspect is invalid (*apramana*), [the saints'] perspective of reality is not contraverted by the worldly perspective. If worldly matters could be repudiated by worldly consensus, then the worldly is impugned.

6.32 *gang phyir 'jig rten sa bon tsam btab nas/*
bdag gis bu 'di bskyed ces smra byed cing/
shing yang btsugs so snyam du rtog des na/
gzhan las skye ba 'jig rten las kyang med// [114]

[Although] the commoner only impregnates the sperm, he declares: 'I have created this child', but to those who understand 'This is just like planting a tree', there is no production from another, [even] for the worldly.

6.33 *gang phyir myu gu sa bon las gzhan min/*
de phyir myug tshe sa bon zhig pa med/
gang phyir gcig nyid yod min de phyir yang/
myug tshe sa bon yod ces brjod mi bya// [114-115]

So, the sprout is not [intrinsically] different from the seed, and thus the seed is not destroyed when there is a sprout. Hence, because they do not exist as one thing, do not say there exists a seed when there is a sprout.

6.34 *gal te rang gi mtshan nyid brten 'gyur na/*
de la skur bas dngos po 'jig pai phyir/
stong nyid dngos po 'jig pai rgyur 'gyur na/
de ni rigs min de phyir dngos yod min// [117]

If [things] depended on their defining properties (*svalaksana*), then by denying those [properties in the vision of emptiness one] would destroy things, and emptiness would then become a cause for destroying things. But this is not correct and therefore things do not [intrinsically] exist (*sat*).

6.35 *gang phyir dngos po 'di dag rnam dpyad na/*
de nyid bdag can dngos las tshu rol tu/
gnas rnyed ma yin de phyir 'jig rten gyi/
tha snyad bden la rnam bar dpyad mi bya// [120]

If one analyses things in detail, other than their essential reality, they are unlocatable. Therefore, do not make a detailed analysis in terms of worldly interpersonal truth (*laukika-vyavahara-satya*).

6.36 *de nyid skabs su rigs pa gang zhig gis/*
bdag dang gzhan las skye ba rigs min pai/
rigs des tha snyad du yang rigs min pas/
khyod kyi skye ba gang gis yin par 'gyur// [120]

From the perspective of reality, production from self or other is incorrect by any standard of reason. For this reason it is also incorrect conventionally. Therefore, how could your [view of] production be [correct]?

6.37-38 *dnos po stong pa gzugs brnyan la sogs pa/*
tshogs la bltos rnams ma grags pa yang min/
ji ltar der ni gzugs brnyan sogs stong las/
shes pa de yi rnam par skye 'gyur ltar//

de bzhin dngos po thams cad stong na yang/
stong nyid dag las rab tu skye bar 'gyur/
bden pa gnyid su'ang rang bzhin med pai phyir/
de dag rtag pa ma yin chad pa'ang min// [123-124]

Empty things such as reflections, and so on, which depend on a nexus (*samagri*) [of causes] are well established by consensus. And just as an empty reflection, and so on, can give rise to a knowledge of its features, similarly, though all things are empty, they can be entirely produced within pure emptiness. And because neither of the two realities (*dravya-satya*) is intrinsically existent, they are not permanent and nor are they nothingness.

6.39 *gang phyir rang bzhin gyis de mi 'gags pa/*
de phyir kun gzhi med kyang 'di nus phyir/
la lar las 'gags yun ring lon las kyang/
'bras bu yang dag 'byung bar rig par gyis// [126]

Because there is no intrinsic cessation (*nirodha*), [one should] know that it is possible - even without [positing] a source consciousness (*alaya*) - for an action (*karma*) that has long since ceased to give rise to a genuine effect.

6.40 *rmi lam dmigs pai yul dag mthong nas ni/*
sad kyang blun la chags pa skye 'gyur ba/
de bzhin 'gags shing rang bzhin yod min pai/
las las kyang ni 'bras bu yod pa yin// [127]

The fool generates attachment (*raga*) for sensual objects that are seen in a dream or on awakening. Similarly, an action (*karma*) has ceased and had no intrinsic existence, yet the action still has an effect (*phala*).

6.41 *ji ltar yul ni yod nyid min mtshungs kyang/*
rab rib can gyis sgra shad rnam par ni/
mthong gi dngos gzhan rnam par ma yin ltar/
de bzhin smin las slar smin min shes kyis// [130]

With regard to the shape of the hair lines, that are seen by the opthalmic, though the [seen] objects are as equally non-existent [as the horns of a rabbit, and so on] still the opthalmic sees these [hairs] and not the shapes of [these] other [fictitious] objects. Similarly, one should know that the ripening of an action (*karma*) is not arbitrary.

6.42 *de phyir rnam smin mi dge nag poi las/*
rnam smin dge nyid dge las yin mthong zhing/
dge mi dge med blo can thar 'gyur te/
las 'bras rnams la sems pa'ang dgag pa mdzad// [130]

Thus, it can be seen that negative actions maturate in unwholesome (*akusala*) [effects] while wholesome [effects] mature from virtuous actions. One who cognises the non[-intrinsic] existence of what is wholesome and unwholesome will become liberated. Still, [because the specific relationships between actions and their results cannot be comprehended by ordinary people, the Buddha] placed limits on thinking about [specific] actions and results.

6.43 *kun gzhi yod cing gang zag nyid yod la/*
phung po 'di dag 'ba' zhig nyid yod ces/
bstan pa 'di ni de ltar ches zab don/
rig par mi 'gyur gang yin de lao// [132]

The [Buddha's] teachings that 'a source (*alaya*) consciousness exists', 'a personality (*pudgala*) exists', and 'the psycho-physical organism (*skandha*) exists as only this' are meant [as a pedagogical tool (*upaya*)] for those who cannot comprehend the most profound subject [i.e. emptiness].

6.44 *'jig tshogs lta dang bral yang sangs rgyas kyis/*
ji ltar nga dang nga yi bstan pa ltar/
de bzhin dngos rnams rang bzhin med mod kyi/
yod ces drang don nyid du bstan pa yin// [132]

Although the buddhas are free from the view of individuality (*satkayadrsti*) they still teach [and use the concepts of an] 'I' and 'mine'. Similarly, though things have no intrinsic existence, [the buddhas] have taught that they do exist, as a topic for interpretation (*neyartha*).

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6.45 *bzung ba med pas* [D: *par*] *'dzin pa ma mthong zhing/*
srid gsum rnam shes tsam du rab rtogs pas/
shes rab la gnas byang chub sems dpa' des/
rnam shes tsam du de nyid rtogs par 'gyur// [135-136]

[Phenomenalist:] There is no [separate] subjective element (*graha*) for perception because there is no object for apprehension (*grahya*), and the three ranges of existence (*tribhava*) are best conceived to be merely consciousness (*vijnana*). Thus the [sixth level] bodhisattvas abiding in insight (*prajna*) conceive reality (*tattva*) to be merely consciousness.

6.46 *ji lta rlung gis bskul bas rgya mtsho ni/*
che las chu rlabs 'byung ba de bzhin du/
kun gyi sa bon kun gzhi zhes bya las/
rang gi nus pas rnam shes tsam zhig 'byung// [137]

Just as the waves of the ocean become greater through the power of the wind, similarly, a consciousness purely arises through [maturation of] potencies (*sakti*) within the source (*alaya*) [consciousness] - 'the [ground of the] seeds (*bija*) for everything'.

6.47 *de phyir gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo gang/*
dngos po btags par yod pai rgyur 'gyur zhing/
phyi rol gzung ba med par 'byung 'gyur la/
yod dang spros kun yul ming rang bzhin yod// [138]

Therefore, all are dependent (*paratantra*) entities. There are causes for things to be imputedly existent (*prajnaptisat*) and [things] occur without the existence of external objects for apprehension. [Things] exist [imputedly] and have the nature of being objects of conceptual elaboration (*prapanca*).

6.48 *phyi rol med sems dper na* [D: *dpe ni*] *gang du yod/*
rmi lam ji bzhin zhe na de bsam bya/
gang tshe nga la rmi lam na yang sems/
yod min de tshe khyod kyi dpe yod min// [140]

[Madhyamika:] But where is there an analogy of a mind (*citta*) with no external [objects]? If you cite the example of a dream then let us consider it. [If] at such a time, one thinks 'I am dreaming' or if the mind does not exist, then your analogy does not hold.

6.49 *gal te sad tshe rmi lam dran las yid/*
yod na phyi rol yul yang de bzhin 'gyur/
ji ltar khyod kyis [D: *kyi*] *ngos mthong snyam dran pa/*
de 'dra phyi rol la yang yod pa yin// [141]

If the mind recalls the dream when awake, the external objects - if they exist - would exist in the same way [as one's recollection]. Just as you recall that 'I saw [it in my dream]', it would resemble the external existent.

6.50 *gal te gnyid na mig blo mi srid pas/*
yod min yid kyi shes pa kho na yod/
de yi rnam pa phyi rol nyid du zhen/
rmi lam ji bzhin [D: *lta*] *de bzhin 'dir 'dod na//* [141]

[Phenomenalist:] As visual cognition (*caksurdhi*) is impossible in the sleeping state, [for the dreamer] there is only mental cognition (*manas*), whether [the elements in the dream] exist [externally] or not. Here, one can have a craving for [some] external aspect, and its similitude [will appear] in a dream. This is similar to what we assert.

6.51 *ji ltar khyod kyi phyi yul rmi lam du/*
ma skyes de bzhin yid kyang skyes ma yin/
mig dang mig gi yul dang des bskyed sems/
gsum po thams cad kyang ni rdzun pa yin// [142]

[Madhyamika:] Just as for you external objects are not produced in the dream-state, similarly the mind (*manas*) is not [intrinsically] produced either. [In the dream-state] all three [of the components to a cognition], the eye, visual objects, and mind produced by these, are fallacious too.

6.52 *rna sogs gsum po lhag ma'ang* [D: *lhag ma gsum po'ang*] *skye ba med/*
rmi lam ji ltar de bzhin sad 'dir yang/
dngos rnams rdzun yin sems de yod ma yin/
spyod yul med cing dbang po rnams kyang med// [142-143]

The three [components involved] in hearing, and those for the other [senses], are likewise not generated [in the dream-state]. And just as the things [cognised] in the dream-state are illusory (*mithya*), so too are they here [when we are awake]. The mind (*citta*) does not [intrinsically] exist, and neither does the cognitive field (*gocara*) nor the sense- faculties (*indriya*).

6.53 *'di na ji ltar sad bzhin ji srid du/*
ma sad de srid de la gsum po yod/
sad par gyur na gsum char yod min ltar/
gti mug gnyid sad las de de bzhin no// [144-145]

[Knowing] this is to be awake: so long as one does not wake one will have the three [components to cognition]. If one awakens, the three [components of the dream cognitions] will not appear, and so too when one awakes from the sleep of ignorance.

6.54 *dbang po rab rib bcas pas* [D: *pa*] *blo gang gis/*
rab rib mthu las skra rnams gang mthong ba/
de blo la bltos gnyis char bden pa ste/
don gsal mthong la gnyi ga'ang rdzun pa yin// [145]

[Phenomenalist:] Someone whose cognition (*dhi*) is associated with a [visual] faculty with opthalmia sees hair-lines [in front of his eyes] by virtue of the opthalmia. Relative to that cognition, both components [i.e. the cognition and what is cognised - the hair-lines] are real (*satya*), although for someone who sees things clearly, the two are illusory (*mithya*).

6.55 *gal te shes bya med par blo yod na/*
skra dei yul dang mig ni rjes 'brel bai/
rab rib med la'ang skra shad blor 'gyur na/
de ltar ma yin de phyir de yod min// [146]

[Madhyamika:] If a cognition exists without there being objects of cognition (*jneya*), then an object where hair-lines [were seen] would influence the eye. Thus, someone without opthalmia would also cognise hair-lines there [where the person with opthalmia saw hair-lines]. However, this is not the case, and thus there is no [intrinsically] existent [cognition].

6.56 *gang phyir mthong ba dag la blo nus ni/*
smin med de phyir de la blo mi 'byung/
shes bya yod dngos bral bas min zhe na/
nus de med pas 'di ni 'grub ma yin// [146-147]

[Phenomenalist:] What is seen is due to potentials (*sakti*) in the mind: if these do not ripen, there is no cognition. Why not have knowables without [external] things? Because there is no potential [for the person with healthy eyes to see hairs-lines]. Thus, you have not proved [your case].

6.57 *skyes la nus pa srid pa yod ma yid/*
ma skyes ngo bo la'ang nus yod min ni [D: *ngo bo la yang nus yod min*]/
khyad par med par khyad par can yod min/
mo gsham bu la'ang de ni yod par thal// [147-148]

[Madhyamika:] It is impossible that a potential for a yet to be created [cognition] could exist. A yet to be created entity does not have a potential. There can be no distinctions (*visesya*) made for those that have no distinctions [i.e. these potentials are potentials, not potentials associated with minds of the past, minds of the present and of the future]. A consequence [of there being potentials for future cognitions] is that there would be a child of an infertile woman.

6.58 *gal te 'byung bar 'gyur bas bsnyad 'dod na/*
nus pa med par 'di yi 'byung 'gyur med/
phan tshun don la brten pai grub pa ni/
grub min nyid ces dam pa rnams kyis gsungs// [149-150]

You may claim to explain that [a future cognition from a potential] will occur, but they will not occur since [such] a potential does not exist. As for the [intrinsic] establishment of [things] dependent on reciprocal dependence on each other, the pious masters say, '[such things] are not [intrinsically] established'.

6.59 *gal te 'gags pai nus smin las 'gyur na/*
gzhan gyi nus pa las gzhan 'byung bar 'gyur/
rgyun can rnams der phan tshun tha dad yod/
de phyir thams cad kun las 'byung bar 'gyur// [152-153]

If [a cognition] comes from a ripening potential that has already ceased, then another [cognition] would arise from a different potential. [The elements] of a continuum [of a cognition] would become mutually separate. Consequently, [on this view] everything could arise from everything.

6.60 *gal te der ni rgyun can tha dad kyi/*
de dag la rgyun tha dad med dei phyir/
nyes med ce na 'di ni sgrub bya zhig/
tha mi dad rgyun skabs mi rigs phyir ro// [153-154]

[Phenomenalist:] We are not liable to that consequence because, although the elements of a continuum are mutually separate, they do not [form] separate continuua. Therefore, we are not at fault.

[Madhyamika:] Try and prove this, because it is not right that instances of a continuum are not separate.

6.61 *byams pa nyer sbas* [VP: *spras*] *la brten chos rnams ni/*
gzhan nyid phyir na rgyud gcig gtogs min te/
gang dag rang mtshan nyid kyis so so ba/
da dag rgyud gcig gtogs par [D: *pa*] *rigs ma yin//* [154]

The qualities that are ascribed to [two individuals, for example] Maitreya and Upagupta, do not belong to the same [mental] continuum because they are different [individuals]. [Likewise,] it is not logical that things individuated by their own defining properties (*svalaksana*) could belong to the same continuum.

6.62 *mig blo skye ba rang nus gang zhig las/*
de ma thag tu kun nas skye 'gyur zhing/
rang gi rnam shes rten gyi nus de la/
dbang po gzugs can mig ces bya bar rtogs// [155]

[Phenomenalist:] The production of a visual cognition (*caksurdhi*) arises entirely from its own potential and immediately [after the ripening of] that [potential]. [Ordinary people erroneously] understand the basis of the [visual] consciousness to be 'the physical organ, the eye' instead of the potential [in the source consciousness].

6.63 *'di na dbang po las byung rnam par rig/*
phyi bzung med par rang gi sa bon las/
sngo sogs snang nyid 'byung bar ma rtogs nas/
skye bos phyi rol bzung bar sems khas len// [155]

Here, ordinary people accept that the mind apprehends external objects because they do not realise the cognitions that arise through a sense-faculty - of a blue sense-datum, for example - arise from their own seeds (*bija*) [ripening in the source consciousness], and not through apprehending something external.

6.64 *rmi lam na ni gzugs don gzhan med par/*
rang nus smin las de yi rnam can sems/
'byung ba ji ltar de bzhin sad la'ang 'dir/
phyi rol med par yid ni yod ce na// [156]

In a dream, [even though] there are no physical objects (*rupartha*), a mind which bears the appearance (*akara*) [of physical objects] arises from its own ripened potential. And in the same way, the cognitions (*manas*) here, in the waking state, also exist without there being any external objects.

6.65 *ji ltar mig med par ni rmi lam du/*
sngo sogs snang bai yid sems 'byung de ltar/
mig dbang med par rang gi sa bon ni/
smin las long ba la 'dir cis mi skye// [157]

[Madhyamika:] In dreams, mental cognitions (*manovijnana*) of blue sense-data, and the like, arise, [even though] there is no [active] visual faculty. This being so, why isn't it similarly produced in a blind person without a visual faculty, due to the ripening of their own seeds [in their source-consciousness]?

6.66 *gal te khyod ltar rmi lam drug pa yi/*
nus pa smin yod sad par med gyur na/
drug pai nus smin ji ltar 'dir med pa/
de ltar rmi tshe med ces cis mi rig// [158]

If, in your view, [only] the potentials of the sixth [i.e. the mental consciousness] ripen in the dream-state but do not [ripen] in the waking-state, then - when there is no ripening of the potentials of the sixth [i.e. mental consciousness] during this [waking state] - why is it wrong [for us] similarly to say that there is no [ripening of these potentials] in the dream state?

6.67 *ji ltar mig med 'di yi rgyu min ltar/*
rmi lam du yang gnyid ni rgyu ma yin/
di phyir rmi lam du yang de dngos mig/
rdzun pai yul can rtogs pai rgyur khas blang// [158-159]

In the same way, one who has no eyes has no cause [to see]. Similarly, in a dream, too, when one is asleep, one has no cause [for a potential to ripen and produce a mental cognition]. Thus, we accept that there are objects and a [subtle] eye as causes for the perception of illusory subjects.

6.68 *'di yis lan ni gang dang gang btab pa/*
de dang de ni dam bca' mtshungs mthong bas/
rtsod 'di sel byed sangs rgyas rnams kyis ni/
'gar yang dngos po yod ces ma bstan to// [159-160]

Whatever responses you make, we see them as [different formulations of] the same thesis (*pratijna*) [which you originally propounded using the example of the defective vision of the opthalmic]. Therefore, the argument has been dispelled. The buddhas did not teach that there are no things at all.

6.69 *rnal 'byor pa yis bla mai man ngag las/*
keng [VP: *geng*] *rus kyis gang sa gzhi mthong ba gang/*
der yang gsum char skye ba med par mthong/
log pa yid la byed par bstan phyir ro// [163]

[Phenomenalist:] Following the oral instructions of his guru, a yogin visualises the earth [covered] with skeletons. Here also [the image that is visualised] is perceived without the generation of the three components [i.e. the object, organ and consciousness], because [the meditation is quite] demonstrably the workings of a projecting consciousness (*manasikara*).

6.70 *khyod kyi dbang bloi yul rnams ji lta ba/*
de ltar mi sdug yid kyi yang 'gyur na/
de bzhin yul der blo gtad cig shos kyis/
rtogs 'gyur [D: *byung*] *de ni rdzun par yang mi 'gyur//* [164]

[Madhyamika:] If in your [view, the visualised skeletons that are] cognised in the repulsive (*asubha*) [meditations] are of the same [ontological status] as objects of physical sense perception, then when someone else directed their mind toward that object [i.e. looked at where the meditator was facing], they too would perceive [the skeletons]. This, though, is fallacious, [for a cognition like this] is not produced.

6.71 *rab rib dang ldan dbang po can mtshungs pa/*
chu 'bab klung [D: *rlung*] *la yi dwags rnag blo yang/*
mdor na ji ltar shes bya med de bzhin/
blo yang med ces don 'di shes par gyis// [164]

Spirits (*preta*) perceive pus [when viewing] the water of a running river: this too is no different from [the example of] the person who has the opthalmic sense-faculty. To summarise, you should understand the topic thus: just as there are no [intrinsically] existent objects of cognition (*jneya*), similarly there is no [intrinsically] existent consciousness (*dhi*) either.

6.72 *gal te bzung med 'dzin pa nyid bral zhing/*
gnyis kyis stong pai gzhan dbang dngos yod na/
'di yi yod par [D: *pa*] *gang gis shes par 'gyur/*
ma bzung bar yang yod ces byar mi rung// [166]

[You say] there are no [external] objects (*grahya*) and no subject (*graha*), yet if dependent things (*paratantra-bhava*) which are empty of both exist, then [in the absence of a subject-object dichotomy], *who* can [be said to] know the existence of these [dependent phenomena?] It is inadmissible to say they exist [if they] are not apprehended.

6.73 *de nyid kyis de myong bar grub ma yin /*
gal te phyi dus dran pa las 'grub na /
ma grub bsgrub par bya phyir brjod pa yi /
ma grub 'di ni bsgrub par byed pa min / / [169]

The [existence of a self-reflexive consciousness (*svasamvedana*)] cannot be established by [arguing that one] experiences in this way: [one sees something and remembers the experience of seeing it]. If [you suggest that a self-reflexive consciousness] is established on the [basis of the fact that one can] remember something at a later time, saying this only proves [that a self-reflexive consciousness] is not established, so by not establishing this you have not furnished a proof.

6.74 *rang rig pa ni grub la rag mod kyi /*
de lta'ang dran pai [VPV: *pas*] *dran pa rigs min te /*
gzhan phyir ma shes rgyud la skyes pa bzhin /
gtan tshigs 'dis ni khyad par dag kyang 'joms / / [170]

[You say that] a self-reflexive consciousness is established, and that [memory] is the outcome [of this consciousness], but surely it is still incorrect [to posit] a memory that remembers like this because [you assert that the consciousness which experienced the object and the memory consciousness] are different. This would be like the production [of a memory] in the mental continuum of someone who never knew [the object in the first place]. This argument also eliminates the distinctions [between cause and effect].

6.75 *gang phyir gang gis yul myong gyur de las /*
dran pa 'di gzhan nga la yod min pa /
de phyir nga yis mthong snyam dran gyur te /
'di yang 'jig rten tha snyad tshul lugs yin / / [171]

So, I do not have another [consciousness] which remembers instead of [the consciousness] that experienced the object. Thus I recall: 'I saw it'. This is also common convention.

6.76 *dei phyir rang rig yod pa ma yin na /*
khyod kyi gzhan dbang gang gis 'dzin par 'gyur /
byed po las dang bya ba gcig min pas /
de nyid kyis de 'dzin par rigs ma yin / / [172]

Therefore if a self-reflexive consciousness does not exist, what will apprehend the dependent (*paratantra*) [phenomena] that you [posit]? Because the agent, action and acted upon, are not the one [thing], it is incorrect that [consciousness] can apprehend itself.

6.77 *gal te skye ba med cing ma shes pai/*
bdag can gzhan dbang ngo boi dngos yod na/
gang gis na 'di yod par mi rigs pa/
gzhan la mo gsham bus gnod ci zhig bskyal// [173]

If there were [such] things as dependent entities (*paratantra-rupa*) that were, in and of themselves, unproduced and unknowable [as they would be if they were intrinsically existent], then [being like] the child of an infertile woman - whose existence [is utterly] illogical - how could [these dependent phenomena] in any way influence other [Phenomenalists].

6.78 *gang tshe gzhan dbang cung zad yod min na/*
kun rdzob pa yi rgyur ni gang zhig 'gyur/
gzhan gyi ltar na rdzas la chags pa yis/
'jig rten grags pai rnam bzhag kun kyang brlag// [173-174]

[Phenomenalist:] If dependent [phenomena] are not even in the slightest degree [intrinsically] existent then what can be the cause [i.e. provide a substratum] for the conventional [reality]?

[Madhyamika:] Through your attachment to a substance (*dravya*) [view of reality], you too forsake the entire structure of the consensual world-view, just like the other [Phenomenalists].

6.79 *slob dpon klu sgrub zhabs kyi lam las ni/*
phyi rol gyur la zhi bai thabs med do/
de dag kun rdzob de nyid bden las nyams/
de las nyams pas thar pa grub yod min// [174]

Those who are outside of the path (*marga*) [taught] by the revered master Nagarjuna, have no technique (*upaya*) for [achieving] serenity (*santi*). They have reverted from conventional (*samvrti*) and genuine reality (*tattva-satya*), and thereby do not achieve liberation (*moksa*).

6.80 *tha snyad bden pa thabs su gyur pa dang/*
don dam bden pa thabs byung gyur pa ste/
de gnyis rnam dbye gang gis mi shes pa/
de ni rnam rtog log pas lam ngan zhugs// [179]

The social truths (*vyavahara-satya*) become the spiritual techniques (*upaya*) and the ultimate reality (*paramartha-satya*) [is what] arises from [practising those] spiritual techniques (*upeya*). Those who do not understand the separation between the two [realities] and thus enter an unfortunate path because of that misconception.

6.81 *ji ltar khyod kyis gzhan dbang dngos 'dod ltar/*
kin rdzob kyang ni bdag gis khas ma blangs/
'bras phyir 'di dag med kyang yod do zhes/
'jig rten ngor [D: *dor*] *byas bdag ni smra bar byed//* [179]

We do not accept the dependent things (*paratantra-bhava*) that you affirm, even as a conventional [reality]. Thus, the result is that though [things] do not exist we say they do. We affirm [things] from the worldly side.

6.82 *ji ltar phung po spangs nas zhir zhugs pa/*
dgra bcom rnams la yod pa min de ltar/
'jig rten la yang med na de bzhin 'di/
'jig rten las kyang yod ces bdag mi smra// [180]

If [hypothetically, the conventional sense-world] did not exist for the common [person], in the same way that it does not exist for arhats who have abandoned the psycho-physical organism (*skandha*) and entered into serenity, then we *would not* state that it also exists from a conventional [view-point], in just the same way [that we would be compelled to deny its existence for the arhat].

6.83 *gal te khyod la 'jig rten mi gnod na/*
'jig rten nyid bltos 'di ni dgag par gyis/
khyod dang 'jig rten 'dir ni rtsod gyis dang/
phyi nas stobs ldan bdag gis brten par bya// [180]

If [the common conventions of] the world do not contravert your [philosophy], then [go ahead and] refute the common-everyday perceptions. You and the world debate the [theory of mind-only (*cittamatra*)] and after this we will side with whoever is the more powerful!

6.84 *mngon gyur mngon phyogs byang chub sems dpa' yis/*
srid gsum rnam shes tsam du gang rtogs pa/
bdag rtag [D: *rtag bdag*] *byed po bkag pa rtogs phyir des/*
byed pa po ni sems tsam yin par rtogs// [182]

The bodhisattvas [at the sixth level called] Manifesting or Revealing [the sphere of truth (*dharmadhatu*)] perceive the three ranges of existence [i.e. the spheres of desire, form and without form] as nothing but consciousness (*vijnana*). They refute [the theory of an] eternal self and the creator [of the world] and due to their understanding they conceive that the creator is merely the mind (*cittamatra*).

6.85 *dei phyir blo ldan blo ni 'phel byai phyir/*
langkar gshegs mdo de las kun mkhyen gyis/
mu stegs spo mthon ri 'joms ngag rang bzhin/
rdo rje 'di ni dgongs pa bcad phyir gsungs// [183]

Therefore, with the intention of raising the consciousness of the intelligent, the Omniscient [Buddha], whose diamond-like speech is meant to sever [all wrong] thoughts, taught [the mind-only theory of reality] in the *Descent into Lanka Sutra* [LS] in order to dispel the high mountain peaks of the non-Buddhist philosophers.

6.86 *ji bzhin rang gi bstan bcos* [VP: *chos*] *de de las/*
mu stegs rnams kyis gang zag sogs de dag/
smras pa de dag byed por ma gzigs nas/
rgyal bas sems tsam 'jig rten byed por gsungs// [183-184]

In [some] of their own texts the non-Buddhist philosophers expound, among other [theories, that of a cosmic] person (*pudgala*) [who is the creator of psycho-physical individuals]. Because he could not see a creator of these [things], the Victor proclaimed that that mind alone creates the universe.

6.87 *de nyid rgyas la sangs rgyas bsnyad ji bzhin/*
de bzhin sems tsam gtsor gyur 'jig rten la/
mdo las sems tsam zhes gsungs gzugs ni 'dir/
'gog pa de ltar mdo yi don ma yin// [185]

Just as [the term] 'buddha' is explained as the expansion (*vistara*) [of consciousness] into reality (*tattva*), similarly the mind alone is paramount. [Buddhas] in their sutras told the world, 'the mind only'; [and though] the sutras that expound 'mind-only' seem to refute [the existence] of physical forms, this is not the intention (*artha*) of those sutras.

6.88 *gal te 'di dag sems tsam zhes mkhyen nas/*
de las gzugs nyid dgag par mdzad na ni/
slar yang de las bdag nyid chen pos sems/
gti mug las las skyes par chi phyir gsungs// [186]

If [it *was* the case that] in the [*Ten Levels* (DS)] *Sutra* [the Buddha] did deny [the existence] of physical forms, through comprehending the [three ranges of existence] as only the mind, then why in that [very same sutra] does the Great-minded One also say that the mind is produced due to confusion (moha) and [contaminated] actions (karma)?

6.89 *sems nyid kyis ni sems can 'jig rten dang/*
snod kyi 'jig rten shin tu sna tshogs 'god/
'gro ba ma lus las las skyes par gsungs/
sems spangs nas ni las kyang yod ma yin// [190]

[The meaning implied in the sutra is that] the mind itself constructs the great variety of life-forms in the world and their environment. It teaches that each and every creature is produced from [contaminated] actions (karma) and that were the [contaminated] mind terminated, there would also be no [contaminated] actions.

6.90 *gal te gzugs yod mod kyi de la ni/*
sems bzhin byed pa po nyid yod ma yin/
des na sems las gzhan pai byed pa po/
bzlog gi gzugs ni bkag pa ma yin no// [191]

There is, to be sure, a physical reality (*rupa*), but unlike the mind [it is not a principle factor in the construction of the life-world] for it does not have the creative capacity [that the mind has]. Thus, while denying that there is any other creator than the mind, we do not reject [the existence of] a physical reality.

6.91 *'jig rten pa yi de nyid la gnas la/*
phung po 'jig rten grags te lnga char yod/
de nyid ye shes 'char bar 'dod pa na/
rnal 'byor pa la de lnga 'byung mi 'gyur// [192]

For those who reside in the common-sense view of reality the five primary constituents of the psycho-physical organism (skandha) exist through common consensus. But for the yogin who yearns for the dawning knowledge of reality, these five [psycho-physical constituents] do not arise.

6.92 *gzugs med na ni sems yod ma 'dzin zhig/*
sems yod nyid na'ang gzugs med ma 'dzin zhig/
de dag shes rab tshul mdor sangs rgyas kyis/
mtshungs par spangs shing mngon pai chos las gsungs//
[192-193]

If there were no physical forms, then one should not maintain that the mind exists, and alternatively, if the mind exists one should not maintain the non-existence of physical form. In the *Insight Series of Sutra* (*Prajna-Paramita*) the Buddha equally rejected the [intrinsic existence of each of the five constituents of the psycho-physical organism, and hence of both the mind (*citta*) and physical forms (*rupa*)], but in the Metapsychology (*abhidharma*) he equally proclaimed [that each of the five constituents have their own generic properties].

6.93 *bden gnyis rim pa 'di dag bshig nas kyang/*
khyod kyis rdzas ni bkag pas 'grub mi 'gyur/
de phyir de ltai rim pas dngos gdod nas/
de nyid ma skyes 'jig rten skyes rig bya// [193]

Even were the seriation (*krama*) of the two realities (*dravya-satya*) to be destroyed, still the substantially existent things that you [posit] would not be established, since we have [already] refuted [your theories]. Therefore, due to this seriation you should know that from the [very] beginning [of existence], things are, in reality, unproduced, [although from] a worldly [perspective] they are produced.

6.94 *mdo sde gang las phyi rol snang yod min/*
sems ni sna tshogs snang ngo zhes gsungs pa/
gzugs la shin tu chags gang de dag la/
gzugs bzlog pa ste de yang drang don nyid// [194]

A set of some sutras [for example, the *Ten Levels Sutra* (DS) and the *Decent into Lanka Sutra* (LS)] state that there are no external appearances, and that [the world's] variety is but the mind. [Buddha] denied there was physical form to those who are very attached to physical form, and the meaning [of such statements] needs to be interpreted (*neyartha*).

6.95 *'di ni ston pas* [VP: *pai*] *drang don nyid gsungs shing/*
'di ni drang don nyid du rigs pas 'thad/
rnam pa de ltai mdo sde gzhan yang ni/
drang don nyid du lung 'dis gsal bar byed// [195]

Our teacher [the Buddha] said things which require interpretation, and that this interpretative status can be assigned by logic. This instruction (*agama*) clearly shows that other sets of sutras [such as the *Elucidation of the Thought* (*Samdhinirmocana*) and *Decent into Lanka* (LS)] [which propound doctrines such as the three natures (*trisvabhava*), the source-consciousness (*alaya-vijnana*), and the (*tathagatagarbha*)] also require an interpretation.

6.96 *shes bya med na shes pa gsal* [D: *bsal*] *ba ni/*
bde blag rnyed byed sangs [D: *ces*] *rgyas rnams kyis gsungs/*
shes bya med na shes pa bkag 'grub pas/
dang por shes bya dgag pa mdzad pa yin// [198]

The buddhas have stated that if [they teach that] there are no objects of cognition (*jneya*), the understanding [of their disciples] will become clearer, and then they will easily discover [reality]. If there are no [intrinsically] existent objects of cognition then the negation of an [intrinsically existent] consciousness is established [quite automatically]. Thus, [the buddhas] start by negating the [intrinsic existence of] cognisables (*jneya*).

6.97 *de ltar lung gi lo rgyus shes byas te/*
mdo gang de nyid ma yin bshad don can/
drang don gsungs pa'ang rtogs nas drang bya zhing/
stong nyid don can nges don shes par gyis// [199]

One should understand the account [given] of the texts (*agama*) like this. Sutras that expound subject matters that are not [directly about] reality (*tattva*) [i.e. emptiness] are said to have an interpretable meaning (*neyartha*), and on understanding this one should interpret them [appropriately]. [Those sutras that] have emptiness as their subject should be understood as having a definitive meaning (*nitartha*).

REFUTATION OF PRODUCTION FROM BOTH SELF AND OTHER

6.98 *gnyis las skye ba'ang rigs pai ngo bo ma yin gang gi phyir /*
bshad zin nyes pa de dag thog tu 'bab pa yin phyir ro /
'di ni 'jig rten las min de nyid du yang 'dod min te /
gang phyir re re las ni skye ba grub pa yod ma yin / / [202-205]

Production from both [self and other] is not a logically [defensible] entity because it falls within the fallacies (*dosa*) that were explained earlier [for production from self and other considered separately]. [Production from both self and other] cannot be maintained either from a worldly [viewpoint] or from [ultimate] reality, for then individuality in production cannot be established [i.e. sesame plants are produced from sesame seeds and not from grains of sand, and peacocks give birth to peacocks and not partridges].

REFUTATION OF CAUSELESS PRODUCTION

6.99 *gal te rgyu med kho nar skye bar lta zhig 'gyur na ni /*
de tshe mtha' dag rtag tu thams cad las kyang skye 'byung zhing /
'bras 'byung ched du 'jig rten 'di yis [D: *yi*] *sa bon la sogs ni /*
brgya phrag dag gi sgo nas sdud par byed par yang mi 'gyur / / [206]

If there was production without any cause (*hetu*) at all, then all things can always be produced from anything else. [If this was the case, then] people would not even [bother] collecting seeds by the hundreds in order to grow rice.

6.100 *gal te 'gro ba rgyu yis stong par 'gyur na nam mkha' yi /*
utpala yi dri mdog ji bzhin bzung du med nyid na /
shin tu ches bkrai 'jig rten 'dzin pa'ang yin pa de yi hyir /
rang gi blo bzhin 'jig rten rgyu las yin par shes par gyis / / [207]

If creatures [were empty] of any causes, then [being outside of the sphere of causation] they would be quite unapprehendible - just like the fragrance and hues of a sky-flower. But the universe is apprehended, in its manifold variations, and therefore one should know that, like one's own mind, the universe is dependent on causes.

6.101 *'byung ba de dag bdag nyid gang zhig gis ni khyod kyi bloi/*
yul du 'gyur ba de yi bdag nyid can ni ma yin na/
gang la yid kyi mun pa 'thug po 'di nyid du yod pa/
des ni [VP: *na*] *ji ltar 'jig rten pha rol yang dag rtogs par 'gyur//* [210]

If the basic constituents (*bhuta*) [of the material universe] do not have the essential nature that you [Charvakas claim to] objectively cognise, then how can you [claim to] correctly comprehend the next world, when you have an obscured mental opacity [even in regard] to the very nature [of this world]?

6.102 *'jig rten pha rol 'gog par byed pai dus su bdag nyid ni/*
shes byai rang bzhin phyin ci log tu lta bar rtogs bya ste/
de yi lta bai rnam pai brten mtshungs lus dang ldan nyid phyir/
gang tshe 'byung bai bdag nyid yod nyid khas len de tshe bzhin// [211]

When one rejects [the existence] of a next world you should understand that this is a distorted opinion about the nature of cognisables, because such an opinion holds that possessing a body is equally the basis [of existence]. Then whenever [you make such an assertion] you also assert an essential nature [composed of] the basic material constituents (*bhuta*).

6.103 *'byung ba de dag ji ltar yod min de ltar bshad zin te/*
gang gi phyir na gong du rang gzhan las dang gnyi ga las/
skye dang rgyu med thun mong du ni bkag zin de yi phyir/
ma bshad 'byung ba 'di dag lta zhig yod pa ma yin no// [212]

The way in which the basic constituents of matter (*bhuta*) are not [intrinsically] existent, has already been explained. Thus in the foregoing we have already made a general refutation of production from self, other, both and causelessly. How, then, could the basic constituents of matter - though not discussed - [intrinsically] exist.

CONCLUSION TO THE SELFLESSNESS OF PHENOMENA

6.104 *gang gi phyir na bdag dang gzhan dang gnyi ga las skye dang/*
rgyu la ma bltos yod pa min pas dngos rnams rang bzhin bral/
gang gis sprin tshogs dang mtshungs gti mug stug po 'jig rten la/
yod pa des na yul rnams log ba dag tu snang bar 'gyur// [215-216]

[All] things lack an intrinsic existence (*svabhava*), since nothing is produced from itself, another, both or unrelated to a cause. The world is [under the influence of] a dense confusion that resembles a mass of clouds. Hence, objects appear in a completely distorted [manner].

6.105 *ji lta rab rib mthu yis 'ga' zhig skra shad zla gnyid dang/*
rma byai mdongs dang sbrang ma la sogs log par 'dzin byed pa/
de bzhin du ni gti mug skyon gyi dbang gis mi mkhas pas/
'dus byas lta zhig sna tshogs blo gros kyis ni rtogs par 'gyur// [216]

Some people who are under the influence of opthalmia mistakenly apprehend hair-lines, or two moons [where there is one], or peacocks' feathers or bees, etc. [when there are none]. Likewise, due to the faulty influence of confusion, the unschooled see conditioned phenomena while the discerning understand [the non-intrinsic existence] of the variety [of the world].

6.106 *gal te gti mug brten nas las 'byung gti mug med par de/*
mi 'byung zhes byar mi mkhas kho nas rtogs par gor ma chag/
blo bzang nyi mas mun pa stug po rnam par bsal ba yi/
mkhas pa dag ni stong nyid khong du chud cing grol bar 'gyur [217]

[The Buddha] said that [contaminated] actions (*karma*) arise in dependence on confusion (*moha*) and that in the absence of confusion such [actions] do not arise. Certainly only those of learning understand this. Scholars, whose sun-like intellect clears away [all] dense confusion, penetrate emptiness [through this teaching], and thereby become liberated.

6.107 *gal te dngos po rnams de nyid du med na/*
tha snyad du yang mo gsham bu ji bzhin/
de dag med pa nyid 'gyur de yi phyir/
de dag rang bzhin gyis ni yod pa nyid// [218]

[Qualm:] If things are *really* non-existent, even conventionally, then they could be like the child of an infertile woman. Because they could [otherwise] be non-existent, they [must have] an intrinsic (*svabhava*) existence.

6.108 *gang dag rab rib can sogs yul 'gyur ba/*
skra shad la sogs de dag ma skyes pas/
re zhig de dag nyid la brtsad bya ste/
phyi nas ma rig rab rib rjes 'brel lao// [218]

[Madhyamika:] Any object - the hair-lines and the rest - [viewed] by the opthalmic, and the like, is not produced [in fact]. You now dispute these; later you will be quite without your opthalmia.

6.109 *gal te rmi lam dri zai grong khyer bcas/*
smig rgyui chu dang mig 'phrul gzugs brnyan sogs/
skye med mthong na yod nyid min mtshungs kyang/
khyod la ji ltar der 'gyur de mi rigs// [219-220]

If one can see unproduced things - such as the city of the Heavenly Musicians, a mirage, [the magician's] visual creations, a reflection - even though they equally do not exist, then what [in our argument] is illogical for you?

6.110 *de nyid du 'di ji ltar skye med kyang/*
mo gsham bu ltar gang phyir 'jig rten gyi/
mthong bai yul du mi 'gyur ma yin pa/
de yi phyir na smras [D: *sa*] *'di ma nges pao//* [220]

Although, in reality [forms] are unproduced, how are they like the child of the infertile woman? It is not the case that [physical things] are not the objects of worldly perception. Therefore, [your line of] exposition is unjustified.

6.111 *mo gsham bu la rang gi bdag nyid kyis/*
skye ba de nyid du med 'jig rten du'ang/
yod min de bzhin dngos 'di kun ngo bo/
nyid kyis 'jig rten de nyid du ma skyes// [221-222]

There is no production in its own right of the child of the infertile woman, either in reality or as a worldly [convention]. And likewise, everything [in the universe] is not essentially produced, both in worldly [convention] or in reality.

6.112 *de phyir 'di ltar ston pas chos rnams kun/*
gdod nas zhi zhing skye bral rang bzhin gyis/
yongs su mya ngan 'das pa gsungs gyur pa/
de phyir rtag tu skye ba yod ma yin// [222]

Therefore, in this way, the Teacher declared that all phenomena are primordially at peace, lack production, and by nature have quite transcended misery (*nirvana*). Hence, there is never any [intrinsic] production.

6.113 *bum sogs 'di dag de nyid du med cing/*
'jig rten rab tu grags par yod ji bzhin/
de bzhin dngos po thams cad 'gyur bas na/
mo gsham bu dang mtshungs bar thal mi 'gyur// [223]

Just as vases, and so on, do not in reality exist, but exist through common consensus, all things are similarly like [the vase], and as a consequence they are not equivalent to the child of an infertile woman.

6.114 *gang phyir rgyu med pa dang dbang phyug gi/*
rgyu la sogs dang bdag gzhan gnyi ga las/
dngos rnams skye bar 'gyur ba ma yin pa/
de phyir rten nas rab tu skye bar 'gyur// [226]

Because things (*bhava*) are not produced without a cause (*hetu*), from a creator God (*isvara*), from themselves, another or both, they are produced in profusion through their relations [with the things].

6.115 *gang phyir dngos po brten nas rab 'byung bas/*
rtog pa 'di dag brtag par mi nus pa/
de phyir rten 'byung rigs pa 'di yis ni/
lta ngan dra ba mtha' dag gcod par byed// [228]

And because things arise through their relations [with other things], [extreme] conceptions (*kalpana*) are unable [to withstand a close] examination. Therefore, the reasoning of relational origination (*pratityasamutpada*) cuts through the entire web of harmful opinions.

6.116 *rtog rnams dngos po yod na 'gyur ba ste/*
dngos po ji ltar med par yongs dpyad zin/
dngos po med par 'di rnams mi 'byung dper/
bud shing med par me [D: *mi*] *yod min de bzhin//* [229]

When things are [conceived to intrinsically] exist, then conceptuality (*kalpana*) is produced. But a thorough analysis shows how things are [in fact] not [intrinsically] existent. [When it is realised that] there are no [intrinsically] existent things, the conceptualisations do not arise, just as for example, there is no fire without fuel.

6.117 *so soi skye bo rnams ni rtog pas bcings/*
mi rtog rnal 'byor pa ni grol 'gyur bas/
rtog rnams log par 'gyur ba gang yin te/
rnam par dpyod pai 'bras bur mkhas rnams gsung// [230]

Ordinary people are bound by their concepts, but non-conceptualising yogins [who realise the nature of things (*dharmata*)] become liberated. The learned have said that the result of analysis (*vicara*) is the reversal of conceptualisation.

6.118 *bstan bcos las dpyad rtsod la chags pai phyir/*
ma mdzad rnam grol phyir ni de nyid bstan/
gal te de nyid rnam par bshad pa na/
gzhan gzhung 'jig par 'gyur na nyes pa med// [231]

The analysis in the *Fundamental Stanzas on the Middle Way* [MK] is not undertaken out of an attachment to debate. [Rather, Nagarjuna] taught on reality (*tattva*) with a view to [showing others the way to] complete liberation (*vimukti*). And there is no shortcoming if, when fully explaining reality, the philosophical systems of others are destroyed.

6.119 *rang gi lta ba chags dang de bzhin du/*
gzhan gyi lta la 'khrug gang rtog pa nyid/
dei phyir 'dod chags khong khro rnam bsal te/
rnam dpyod pa na [*D: ni*] *myur du grol bar 'gyur//* [232]

Being attached to one's own view, while angering over the views of others, is per se to conceptualise [even though one's views may be correct]. Therefore, if one analyses quite without anger and attachment, one will quickly become liberated.

THE SELFLESSNESS OF THE PERSONALITY (6.121-165)

6.120 *nyon mongs skyon rnams ma lus 'jig tshogs la/*
lta las byung bar blo yis mthong gyur zhing/
bdag ni 'di yi yul du rtogs byas nas/
rnal 'byor pa yis bdag ni 'gog par byed// [233]

Having intellectually perceived that all the emotional reactions (*klesa*) and problems of existence (*dosa*) arise from our view of the individual (*satkaya-drsti*), and having understood the self as the object of [the egocentricity] of this [view], yogins negate the self.

6.121 *za po rtag dngos byed po min pai bdag/*
yon tan bya med mu stegs rnams kyis brtags/
dei dbye cung zad cung zad la brten nas/
mu stegs can rnams lugs ni tha dad 'gyur// [235]

The non-Buddhist [Samkhya] philosophers understand the self (*atman*) to be an experiencer [of pleasurable and painful sensations], a permanent thing, not a creator, not to have the qualities (*guna*) [of being energised (*sattva*), de-energised (*tamas*) or vacillating (*rajas*)] and to be inactive. The philosophical systems [such as the Vaisheshika and Vedavada] of these non-Buddhists evolved into different sub-schools through very slight distinctions [made with respect to the characteristics of the self].

6.122 *mo gsham bu ltar skye ba dang bral phyir/*
de ltar gyur pai bdag ni yod min zhing/
'di ni ngar 'dzin rten du'ang mi rigs la/
'di ni kun rdzob tu yang yod mi 'dod// [240]

Such a self could not exist, because it is unproduced, like the child of an infertile woman. It is also incorrect that this [self] is the basis (*asraya*) for egocentricity (*ahamkara*), and even in the conventional [everyday reality such a self] is considered to be non-existent.

6.123 *gang phyir bstan bcos bstan bcos las dei khyad/*
mu stegs rnams kyis gang bstan de kun la/
rang grags ma skyes gtan tshigs kyis gnod pa/
de phyir de khyad kun kyang yod ma yin// [241]

All the characteristics (*visesa*) which are ascribed [to the self] by non-Buddhist philosophers in their various texts, are all [equally] contraverted by the argument that [the self they posit] is not produced, [which is a characteristic of the self] that they themselves admit. Thus [the self] also does not have any characteristics [as it does not exist]. [241]

6.124 *dei phyir phung po las gzhan bdag med de/*
phung po ma gtogs de 'dzin ma grub phyir/
'jig rten ngar 'dzin blo yi rten du yang/
mi 'dod de rig min pa'ang bdag ltai phyir// [242]

A self that is [intrinsically] different from the psycho-physical organism (*skandha*) cannot exist because the apprehension [of a self] cannot be established independently of [i.e. without reference to] the psycho-physical organism. We do not assert [the self] as the basis of worldly, egocentric cognitions, because [such] views are totally inappropriate.

6.125 *gang dag dud 'gror* [D: *gro*] *bskal mang brgyal gyur pa/*
des kyang ma skyes rtag 'di ma mthong la/
ngar 'dzin de dag la yang 'jug mthong ste/
des na phung po las gzhan bdag 'ga' med// [243]

And, similarly, an unproduced and permanent [self] is not perceived even by those who, as animals, have become stupified for many aeons. But [animals] clearly do still have a sense of egoism, and therefore the self is not different from the psycho-physical organism.

REFUTATION OF THE VIEW HELD BY SOME BUDDHIST SCHOOLS THAT THE SELF IS THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL ORGANISM

6.126 *phung po las gzhan bdag grub med pai phyir/*
bdag ltai dmigs pa phung po kho nao/
kha cig bdag ltai rten du phung po ni/
lnga char yang 'dod kha cig sems gcig 'dod// [244]

[The Vaibhashika Buddhist:] Because the self cannot be established as something different from the psycho-physical organism, the self is only the psycho-physical organism, the referential-support (*alambana*) for the view [of individuality]. Some [of the Sammitiya Buddhists] maintain that [all] five divisions of the psycho-physical organism [namely, the body, feelings, perceptions, drives, and consciousness, constitute] the basis for our view of the self, while others maintain that the mind (*citta*) alone [provides the basis].

6.127 *gal te phung po bdag na de phyir de/*
mang bas bdag de dag kyang mang por [D: *par*] *'gyur/*
bdag ni rdzas su 'gyur zhing der lta ba/
rdzas la 'jug pas phyin ci log mi 'gyur// [245]

If the psycho-physical organism is the self, then because [the psycho-physical organism is composed of] many [parts, i.e. the body, feelings, and so on] there would also be many selves. [Also] the self would be substantial, and thus, the view of [individuality] would take a substantial thing [as its object] and would not be mistaken [given the Vaibhashika definition of the veridicalness of substance-based sense perception].

6.128 *mya ngan 'das tshe nges par bdag chad 'gyur/*
mya ngan 'das sngon skad cig dag la ni/
skye 'jig byed po med pas de 'bras med/
gzhan gyis bsags la gzhan gyis za bar 'gyur// [247]

[Further consequences of the Vaibhashika identity thesis] between the self and psycho-physical organism are: (1) that when one passed beyond misery [into the arhats non-residual nirvana at death] the self would certainly be annihilated. (2) There would be, for [the self and the components of the psycho-physical organism] in the moment preceding nirvana, no decay, production or an agent, and hence no result. (3) And [karma] accumulated would be experienced by another [as the self would cease after the last pre-nirvana moment].

6.129 *de nyid du rgyud yod na skyon med na/*
sngar rnam dpyad tshe rgyud la nyes bshad zin/
dei phyir phung po dang sems bdag mi rigs/
'jig rten mtha' ldan la sogs med phyir ro// [249-250]

If [you claim] there is no fault, as these form a continuum, the fallacies [involved in positing such] a continuum were explained in an earlier analysis (6.61). Therefore it is incorrect that the psycho-physical organism or [just] the mind is the self, though this is [one of the fourteen questions] such as whether the world comes to an end or not [that Buddha refused to answer].

6.130 *khyod kyi rnal 'byor bdag med mthong ba la/*
de tshe nges par dngos rnams med par 'gyur/
rtag bdag spong na de tshe de yi phyir/
khyod kyi sems sam phung po bdag mi 'gyur// [252]

[If the mind or psycho-physical organism were the self] then when your yogins perceive the non-existence of a self, without question they would [also perceive] the non-existence of things. If they abandon a permanent self, then at such a time [they would see] your mind or psycho-physical organism become the self no longer.

6.131 *khyod kyi rnal 'byor bdag med mthong ba yis/*
gzugs sogs de nyid rtogs par mi 'gyur zhing/
gzugs la dmigs nas 'jug phyir 'dod chags sogs/
skye 'gyur de yi ngo bo rtogs med phyir// [253]

Because your yogins perceive selflessness, they would not understand the reality (*tattva*) of forms and so forth, and when they direct [their attention] to forms, they would generate attachment to them, and thus not understanding their nature.

6.132 *gang phyir ston pas phung po bdag go zhes/*
gsungs pa de phyir phung po bdag 'dod na/
de ni phung las gzhan bdag 'gog pa ste/
gzugs bdag min sogs mdo gzhan gsungs phyir ro// [254-255]

If you maintain that the psycho-physical organism is the self because our Teacher has said so, this [sutra] rejects [the thesis] that the self is different from the psycho-physical organism, for other sutras say the body, and so forth, are not the self.

6.133 *gang phyir gzugs tshor bdag min 'du shes kyang/*
ma yin 'du byed rnams min rnam shes kyang/
min par mdo gzhan las gsungs de yi phyir/
mdor bstan phung po bdag ces bzhed ma yin// [255]

Since other sutras state that the body and feelings are not the self, nor perceptions, drives or even consciousness, the teaching in this sutra does not say 'the psycho-physical organism is self'.

6.134 *phung po bdag ces brjod tshe phung rnams kyi/*
tshogs pa yin gyi phung poi ngo bo min/
mgon min 'dul ba'am dpang po kyang min [D: *dbang po nyid kyang*]/
de med phyir de tshogs pa ma yin no// [256]

[Vaibhashika:] When we say 'psycho-physical organism' [we mean] the collection of the psycho-physical constituents, not the entities of the psycho-physical organism.

[Madhyamika: The Buddha said that the self is a master, discipliner and witness, but the *collection* of the psychophysical constituents] is not a master, discipliner or witness [because parts or constituents cannot bear these agential and unifying characteristics]. Therefore, being none of these, the collection [of the psycho-physical constituents] is not [the self].

6.135 *de tshe de yi yan lag tshogs gnas rnams/*
shing rta nyid 'gyur shing rta dang bdag mtshungs/
mdo las phung po brten nas yin gsungs pa/
de phyir phung po 'dus tsam bdag ma yin// [257-258]

When a carriage becomes the collection of its parts, the carriage would be equivalent to the self. The sutras say [the self is designated] in dependence on the psycho-physical organism. Therefore, the mere assembly of the psycho-physical constituents is *not* the self.

6.136 *dbyibs she na de gzugs can la yod phyir/*
khyod la de dag nyid bdag ces 'gyur gyi/
sems sogs tshogs ni bdag nyid 'gyur min te/
gang phyir de dag la dbyibs yod ma yin// [259]

[Vaibhashika:] If you claim that [the self] is the shape (*samsthana*) [of the psycho-physical organism], [the self] would have form and thus for you the [physical constituents] would be 'the self', so that the collection [of non-physical constituents] - the mind and so forth - would not be the self for these do not have any shape.

6.137 *len po rang nyer len gcig rigs dngos min/*
de lta na las byed po gcig nyid 'gyur/
byed po med las yod snyam blo yin na/
ma yin gang phyir byed po med las med// [259-260]

It is incorrect for the acquirer (*upadatar*) [i.e. the self], and the acquisition [the psycho-physical organism] (*upadana*) to be the same. If it were so, then the doer and the deed would be the same. If you think there can be a deed without the doer, this is not so. With no doer there is no deed.

6.138 *gang phyir thub pas bdag de sa chu me/*
rlung dang rnam shes nam mkha' zhes bya ba/
khams drug dang ni mig sogs reg pa yi/
rten drug dag la brten nas nyer bstan zhing// [262]

[In the *Meeting of Father and Son Sutra* (*Pitaputrasamagamasutra*)] the Sage taught that the self is dependently [designated] on the six basic constituents of the universe (*dhatu*), i.e. earth, water, fire, air, consciousness and space, and on the six bases of contact (*sparsa-ayatana*), i.e. the eye and other [sense organs including the mind].

6.139 *sems dang sems 'byung chos rnams nyer bzung nas/*
des gsungs de phyir de ni de rnams dang/
de nyid ma yin tshogs tsam nyid min te/
de phyir ngar 'dzin blo de rnams la min// [262]

And he said [the self is designated] in dependence on the apprehension of the [mental] phenomena of primary and secondary minds (*citta* and *caitta*). Thus the [self] is not these [mental phenomena] nor their mere collection. Thus it is not correct to have the egocentric mind [in relation to] these [primary and secondary minds].

6.140 *bdag med rtogs tshe rtag pai bdag spong zhing/*
'di ni ngar 'dzin rten du'ang mi 'dod pa/
de phyir bdag med shes pas bdag lta ba/
cis [D: *dpyis*] *kyang 'byin zhes smra ba shing tu mtshar//* [264]

Some Vaibhashika philosophers hold that] when one realises selflessness [only the conception of a] permanent self is abandoned [cf. vs. 6.130], yet they do not also maintain that [a permanent self] is the basis for egoism. Thus, how strange [to find these Vaibhashika] philosophers saying that by knowing selflessness one repudiates all [wrong] views about the self.

6.141 *rang khyim rtsig phug sbrul gnas mthong bzhin du/*
'di na glang chen med ces dogs bsal te/
sbrul gyi 'jigs pa'ang spong bar byed pa ni/
kye ma gzhan gyi gnam por 'gyur nyid do// [264]

[It is as though], on seeing a snake dwelling in a crevice in the wall of one's own home, one were to dispel one's anxiety by saying 'there is no elephant there', and this makes one abandon one's fear of the snake. Really! The credulity of others!

6.142 *phung por bdag yod ma yin bdag la yang/*
phung po de rnams yod min gang phyir 'dir/
gzhan nyid yod na rtog pa 'dir 'gyur na/
gzhan nyid de med de phyir 'di rtog pao// [265]

The self is not within the psycho-physical organism, nor is the psycho-physical organism within the self because they could only be conceived as [one within the other] if they were different. They are not different and so they should be conceived [as has been explained].

6.143 *bdag ni gzugs ldan mi 'dod gang phyir bdag/*
yod min de phyir ldan don sbyor ba med/
gzhan na gnag ldan gzhan min gzugs ldan na/
bdag ni gzugs las de nyid gzhan nyid med// [266]

It cannot be maintained that the self [intrinsically] possesses the physical body (*rupa*) since the self does not exist [as either identified with or different from the physical component of the psycho-physical organism]. As such, the notion of 'possessing' cannot be applied [to the relationship between the self and the physical component]. Further, since [the self's] possession of form is not like possessing [something different like] cattle or something not different [like one's body], the self doesn't exist as either identical or different from the physical body.

6.144 *gzugs bdag ma yin bdag ni gzugs ldan min/*
gzugs la bdag mad bdag la'ang gzugs yod min/
de ltar rnam bzhir phung kun shes bya ste/
de dag bdag tu lta ba nyi shur 'dod// [266]

[In summary,] the physical body is not the self, and nor does the self possess the physical body. The self is not within the physical body and neither is the physical body within the self. All of the [other] psycho-physical constituents [i.e. feelings, perceptions, drives and consciousness] should similarly be understood in terms of these four types [of relationships]. [Thus, altogether] we maintain that there are twenty [wrong] opinions about the self.

6.145 *lta ri bdag med rtogs pai rdo rje yis/*
bcom bdag gang dang lhan cig 'jig 'gyur ba/
'jig tshogs lta ri lhun stug la gnas pai/
rtse mo mtho bar gyur pa 'di dag go// [276]

The diamond[-hard] realisation of selflessless destroys the mountain [of innate and errant] views (*drsti*) [concerning the self]. The view of individuality rests on a massive Sumeru, but [this realisation destroys] this highest of peaks.

REFUTING THE SAMMITIYA'S SUBSTANTIVE CONCEPT OF THE PERSON THAT IS NEITHER IDENTICAL TO OR DIFFERENT FROM THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL ORGANISM

6.146 *kha cig de nyid gzhan nyid rtag mi rtag/*
la sogs brjod med gang zag rdzas yod 'dod/
rnam shes drug gi shes byar de 'dod cing/
de ni ngar 'dzin gzhir yang 'dod pa yin// [268]

Some [specifically the Vatsiputriyas] maintain that the person (*pudgala*) cannot be expressed as identical or different [from the psycho-physical organism], as permanent or impermanent; [yet] they maintain that the personality is substantially existent (*dravya-sat*). [These philosophers] maintain that [the self] is an object that can be cognised by the six [types of] consciousness (*vijnana*), and that it is also the [genetic] basis for egoism.

6.147 *gang phyir gzugs las sems brjod med mi rtogs/*
dngos yod brjod med rtogs pa ma yin nyid/
gal te bdag 'ga' dngos por grub gyur na/
sems ltar grub dngos brjod du med mi 'gyur// [269]

[For them, the self] is [supposedly] mind rather than form, inexpressible, incomprehensible. [For them, the self] is an existent thing that is inexpressible and not to be comprehended. If the self were established in any way as a thing, then it would be just as established as the mind is and would no longer be inexpressible.

6.148 *gang phyir khyod bum dngos por ma grub pai/*
ngo bo gzugs sogs las brjod med 'gyur bas/
bdag gang phung po las brjod med 'gyur te/
rang gis yod par grub par rtogs mi bya// [269]

So, for you a vase is not established as a thing and so it is inexpressibly beyond the entity of form and so forth. Hence any self becomes inexpressible - beyond the psycho-physical organism - and [yet] you believe that you have established [that the self] exists.

6.149 *khyod kyi rnam shes rang bdag las gzhan ni/*
mi 'dod gzugs sogs las gzhan dngos 'dod cing/
dngos la rnam pa de gnyis mthong 'gyur ba/
de phyir bdag med dngos chos dang bral phyir// [270]

For you, one does not maintain that consciousness (*vijnana*) is different from one's own self. You maintain it is a different thing from the physical body, and so forth. [Thus, you do in fact] see these two aspects (*akara*) [of identity and difference] to the thing. Thus [such] a self does not exist because it is not related to the phenomena of things.

6.150 *de phyir ngar 'dzin rten ni dngos po min/*
phung las gzhan min phung poi ngo bo min/
phung po rten min 'di ni de ldan min/
'di ni phung po rnams brten 'grub par 'gyur//
[270-271]

Thus, the [object which serves as the] basis of egoism is not a [substantially existent] thing. The [self] is not different from the psycho-physical organism, and nor is it the nature of the psycho-physical organism. It is not the basis of the psycho-physical organism, and nor does it possess the [psycho-physical constituents]. It is established in dependence on the psycho-physical organism.

6.151 *shing rta rang yan lag las gzhan 'dod min/*
gzhan min ma yin de ldan yang min zhing/
yan lag la min yan lag dag der min/
'dus pa tsam min dbyibs min ji bzhin no// [271-272]

[The relationship between the self and the psycho-physical constituents] is like [the relationship between a carriage and its constituent parts in which] it cannot be maintained that: [1] a carriage is different from its constituent parts, nor [2] that it is not different [from its constituent parts], or [3] that it does not possess [its constituent parts], or [4] that it is not within its constituent parts, or [5] that the constituent parts are in the [carriage], or [6] that the [carriage] is not simply the collection of the constituent parts, or [7] that it is not the shape of the [constituent parts].

6.152 *gal te tshogs tsam shing rtar 'gyur na ni/*
sil bur gnas la shing rta nyid yod 'gyur/
gang phyir yan lag can med yan lag dag/
med pas dbyibs tsam shing rtar rigs pa'ang min//
[272]

If the carriage was simply the collection [of the parts], one would have carriage *qua* carriage, [when the carriage was] in the disassembled [parts]. And, further, when there is no bearer of parts, there can be no parts. Thus it is illogical that [the carriage] is simply the shape [or configuration of the parts].

6.153-154 *khyod dbyibs yan lag re re sngar yod gyur/*
ji bzhin shing rtar gtogs la'ang de bzhin no/
bye bar gyur pa de dag la ji ltar/
de lta yang ni shing rta yod ma yin//

da lta gal te shing rta nyid dus 'dir/
'phang lo sogs la dbyibs tha dad yod na/
'di gzung 'gyur na de yang yod min te/
de phyir dbyibs tsam shing rtar yod ma yin// [273-274]

For you, just as each part has a shape prior [to their assembly as a carriage], so [their disassembled state] also contains the carriage. Just as when they are disassembled, there is also no carriage [likewise when they are assembled, there would be no carriage], for if, when the carriage [is assembled] the axel and so on had a different shape [from their dissasembled state] it would be apprehended, but it is not. Therefore, the carriage is not the mere shape [of the carriage parts].

6.155 *gang phyir khyod kyi tshogs pa cang med pas/*
dbyibs de yan lag tshogs kyi ma yin na/
gang zhig ci yang ma yin de brten nas/
'dir ni dbyibs su lta zhig ji ltar 'gyur// [274]

When for you, the collection [of parts] does not exist at all, while the shape is not a collection of parts, then [the shape] depends on something entirely non-existent. Thus, how could there be something like a shape when it depends on something that doesn't even exist.

6.156 *khyod kyis 'di ni ji ltar 'dod de ltar/*
mi bden pa yi rgyu la brten byas nas/
'bras bui rnam pa mi bden rang bzhin can/
thams cad kyang ni skye bar shes par gyis// [275]

While you maintain this to be the case you should know that all results have an unreal nature and are all produced in dependence on unreal causes.

6.157 *'dis ni gzugs sogs de ltar gnas rnams la/*
bum blo zhes bya ang rigs pa ma yin nyid/
skye ba med pas gzugs sogs kyang yod min/
de yi phyir yang de dag dbyibs mi rigs// [275-276]

This [argument, based on the illustrative example of the carriage and its parts], [shows, *pari passu*] that the mental [response] of 'a vase' to appropriately configured materials is also incorrect. [Also] because there is no [intrinsic] production, material forms, and so forth, are also not [intrinsically] existent. And as such, it is incorrect [that material forms] could have [self or identity due to their different] shapes.

6.158 *de ni de nyid du'am 'jig rten du/*
rnam pa bdun gyis 'grub 'gyur min mod kyi/
rnam dpyad med par 'jig rten nyid las 'dir/
rang gi yan lag brten nas 'dogs pa yin// [277]

Through the seven-sectioned [analysis], the [carriage] cannot be established - either in reality (*tattva*) or in the [conventional] world - yet from the uncritical worldly perspective, the [carriage] is designated in dependence upon its constituent parts.

6.159 *de nyid yan lag can de cha shas can/*
shing rta de nyid byed po zhes 'gror bsnyad/
skye bo rnams la len po nyid du'ang grub/
'jig rten grags pai kun rdzob ma brlag cig// [278]

Thus [the carriage] has parts and pieces and so the carriage can be called an 'agent'. For ordinary people, this proves that there is an acquirer (*updatar*). Do not destroy the conventions of the consensually established world.

6.160 *rnam bdun gyis med gang de ji lta bur/*
yod ces rnal 'byor pas 'dii yod mi rnyed/
des de nyid la'ang bde blag 'jug 'gyur bas/
'dir dei grub pa de bzhin 'dod par bya// [279]

Anything [found] not to exist after the seven-sectioned [analysis] may be said to exist, but yogins do not find its existence. Because these [yogins] easily penetrate even reality, one should maintain these proofs of theirs.

6.161 *shing rta yod nyid min na de yi tshe/*
yan lag can med dei yan lag kyang med/
shing rta tshig na yan lag med dpe bzhin/
blo mes yan lag can bsregs yan lag go// [280]

If the carriage does not exist, then there is no possessor of the constituent parts and nor are there any constituent parts. As in the analogy that there are constituent parts which remain when the carriage has been burnt up [in a fire], so [there are no] parts [when] the possessor of the constituent parts is consumed by the fire of the intellect.

6.162 *de bzhin 'jig rten grags pas phung po dang/*
khams dang de bzhin skye mched drug brten nas/
bdag kyang nye bar len po nyid du 'dod/
nyer len las yin 'di ni byed po'ang yin// [281-282]

Likewise, worldly consensus also maintains that [there is] a self [designated] in dependence on the psycho-physical organism, the basic constituents (*dhatu*) and the six sense-bases (*ayatana*), and that it also is an acquirer. [There is a presentation in our system that says:] acquisition is thus, action is thus, and the agent is thus.

6.163 *dngos yod min phyir 'di ni brtan min zhing/*
mi brtan nyid min 'di ni skye 'jig min/
'di la rtag pa nyid la sogs pa yang/
yod min de nyid dang ni gzhan nyid med// [282]

Because [the self] is not [an intrinsically] existing thing, it is neither stable (*adrdha*) nor unstable. It is neither [intrinsically] produced nor [intrinsically] destroyed. Nor is it [intrinsically] permanent and so on, nor is it identical to or different from [the psycho-physical organism].

6.164 *gang la rtag tu 'gro rnams ngar 'dzin blo/*
rab tu 'byung zhing de yi gang yin der/
nga yir 'dzin blo 'byung bai bdag de ni/
ma brtags grags par gti mug las yin no// [286]

So, egotistical thoughts are continually arising in creatures, and that which these egotistical thoughts take to be the I is the self. This [self] is known by an uncritical concensus and arises through confusion.

6.165 *gang phyir byed po med can las med pa/*
de phyir bdag gi bdag med par yod min/
de phyir bdag dang bdag gi stong lta zhing/
rnal 'byor pa de rnam par grol bar 'gyur// [287]

And because, there are no [intrinsically existent] agents, there are no [intrinsically existent] actions (*karma*) [either]. And further, there is no [intrinsically] existent 'mine' since there is no [intrinsically] existent self. Through the view that the self and 'mine' are empty [of an intrinsic existence] the yogins thus become completely liberated.

6.166 *bum pa snam bu re lde dmag dang nag tshal phreng ba ljon shing dang/*
khang khyim shing rta phran dang 'gron gnas la sogs dngos rnams gang dag dang/
de bzhin gang dag sgo nas skye 'dis bsnyad pa de rnams rtogs bya ste/
gang phyir thub dbang de ni 'jig rten lhan cig rtsod mi mdzad phyir ro// [288]

Anything - vases, blankets, tents, armies, forests, garlands, trees, houses, small carriages, hostels, and so on, should be understood as people describe them, since the mighty Lord [Buddha] has no quarrel with the world.

6.167 *yon tan yan lag* [D: *yan lag yon tan*] *'dod chags mtshan nyid dang ṇi bud shing la sogs dang/*
yon tan can yan lag can chags dang mtshan gzhi me la sogs don dag/
de rnams shing rtai rnam dpyad byas pas rnam bdun yod pa ma yin zhing/
de las gzhan du gyur par 'jig rten grags pai sgo nas yod pa yin// [289]

Such referent objects (*artha*) as qualities, constituent parts, desires, characteristics, firewood, etc. [and the correlative] qualificand, constituent-part possessor, the [object of] desire, the characterised, and so forth, [can also be shown], via the analysis of the carriage, not to exist [in any] of the seven modes. Thus it follows that they exist in some other way: they exist in virtue of the common consensus.

6.168 *gal te rgyu yis bskyed par bya skyed de lta na de rgyu yin zhing/*
gal te 'bras bu mi skyed na ni de med rgyu med can du 'gyur/
'bras bu yang ni rgyu yod gyur na skye bar 'gyur ba de yi phyir/
gang las gang zhig 'gyur ba gang zhig las sngar gang zhig 'gyur de [D: *ba*] *smros//* [290]

A cause (*hetu*) is a cause only if it produces a product. If an effect is not produced, then in the absence [of any production], there can be no cause. And likewise, effects can only be produced if there are causes. Therefore, one must say that whatever comes from something is temporally preceded by it.

6.169 *gal te khyod kyi rgyu yis phrad nas 'bras skyed byed na de yi tshe/*
de dag nus pa gcig pas skyed byed 'bras bu tha dad med 'gyur zhing/
so sor na ni rgyu 'di rgyu min rnams dang khyad par med 'gyur la/
gnyis po 'di dag spangs nas rtog pa gzhan yang yod par 'gyur ma yin// [290-291]

If the cause [that you posit] produces an effect due to a contact (*prapya*) [between the two], then at the time [of contact] they would be a single potential (*sakyatra*), and therefore the producer would not be different from the effect. Or, if [cause and effect] are separate, then the cause would be no different from non-causes. And once these two [alternatives] have been relinquished there is no [other] alternative [left] to consider.

6.170 *ci ste khyod kyi rgyu yis 'bras bu skyed par mi byed de phyir 'bras/*
zhes bya yod min 'bras bral rgyu ni rgyu med can 'gyur yod pa'ang min/
gang phyir 'di dag gnyis char yang ni sgyu ma dang 'dra de yi phyir/
bdag la skyon du mi 'gyur 'jig rten pa yi dngos po rnams kyang yod// [291-292]

For you a cause will not produce an effect. Thus, as there is no so-called 'effect', the effectless cause becomes a non-cause, and so it would not exist. Because [we Madhyamikas assert that] both components of the [causal nexus, i.e. the cause and effect] are like an illusion, for us [the meeting or failure to meet of the cause and effect] do not become flaws of logic. The things [experienced] by worldly folk [continue] to exist.

6.171 *sun 'byin 'dis sun dbyung bya phrad nas 'byin nam ma phrad par/*
yin zhes nyes pa 'di ni khyod la'ang 'gyur ba ma yin nam/
gang tshe de skad smra zhing rang phyogs kho na rnam 'joms pa/
de tshe khyod kyis [VP: *kyi*] *sun dbyung sun ni 'byin par nus ma yin//* [292-293]

[Qualm:] In your refutation, you refute the objects being repudiated [i.e. the cause and effect] if they contact, yet if [one says] 'they do not contact', this is also a fallacy. Doesn't [the fallacy] apply to you as well? When you say these things, you only demolish your own position. And then your refutation is unable to refute [our thesis].

6.172 *gang phyir rang gi tshig la'ang thal ba mtshungs pai ltag ltag chod kyis/*
rigs pa med par dngos mtha' dag la skur 'debs de yi phyir/
khyod ni skye bo dam pas bzhed mi 'gyur zhing gang gi phyir/
khyod la rang phyogs med pas sun ci phyin du rgol ba'ang yin// [293]

You illogically disparage the existence of everything with your deviant arguments (*jati*) the consequences (*prasanga*) of which [apply] equally to your own words. Therefore, you alienate yourself from holy people. And since you have no position of your own, what do you refute? - you are simply engaging in polemics.

6.173 *sun 'byin pas sun dbyung bya ma phrad sun ni 'byin byed dam/*
'on te phrad nas yin zhes smras zin nyes pa 'dir gang la/
nges par phyogs yod de la 'gyur gyi bdag la phyogs 'di ni/
yod pa min pas thal bar 'gyur ba 'di ni srid ma yin// [294]

[Madhyamika:] In the refutation, [does the case that] the objects being repudiated not contact make for a refutation? Or, if one says that they do contact, where is the fallacy? This [fallacy] applies for those whose fixed position is [intrinsic] existence. Our own position is that there is no [intrinsic] existence, and so it is impossible that the [above] consequences apply [to us].

6.174 *ji ltar khyod kyis nyi mai dkyil 'khor la yod khyad par rnams/
gzugs brnyan la yang gzas gzung la sogs rnam [D: rnams] 'tshe mthong 'gyur la/
nyi ma dang ni gzugs brnyan rnam par phrad dang ma phrad par/
mi rigs mod kyi brten nas tha snyad tsam zhig 'byung 'gyur zhing//* [296]

For you, the orb of the sun exists [intrinsically]. Yet the differences [in the sun's orb] also [appear] in its reflection, as can be seen during an eclipse, and so forth. Whether that sun and its reflection make contact or not is not a [correct] reason. By this [line of logic] they occur by mere convention.

6.175 *mi bden bzhin du'ang rnag gi byad bzhin mdzes par bsgrub byai phyir/
de ni yod pa ji ltar de bzhin 'dir yang shes rab gdong/
sbyang bar bya la nus pa mthong bar gyur pai gtan tshigs ni/
'thad pa dang bral las kyang bsgrub bya rtogs shes shes par bya//* [296]

Just as the unreal [image in a mirror] is used in order to beautify the face, our syllogisms on the sort of existence [that things have] can similarly cleanse the face of insight. They are not straightforward, but understand and know what is being proved.

6.176 *gal te rang gi bsgrub bya go byed gtan tshigs dngos grub dang/
dngos su go bya nyid 'gyur bsgrub byai ngo bo'ang yod gyur na/
phrad pa la sogs rigs pa nye bar sbyor bar 'gyur zhig na/
de yang yod pa min pas khyod kyi yi chad 'ba' zhig yin//* [298]

If [you] had actually established what our syllogisms prove and what is to be understood by them, and if you [understood] the nature of what we are proving, you would not be applying these reasonings of contact and so forth, for these are quite futile.

6.177 *dngos rnams mtha' dag dngos po med par rtogs su gzhugs par ni/
nus pa ches sla ji lta de ltar rang bzhin gzhan dag la/
khong du chud par bde blag tu ni nus pa ma yin no/
rtog ge ngan pai dra bas 'jig rten ci ste 'dir bcol byed//* [299]

The ability to induce the realisation that everything has no [intrinsic] thingness is very easy for us, whereas others [who maintain] the intrinsic existence [of things] cannot easily come to [this realisation]. You confound the world with your web of destructive concepts.

6.178 *sun 'byin lhag ma gong du bstan pa yang ni shes byas nas/*
phrad pa la sogs phyogs kyi lan gyi ched du 'dir gtang bya/
sun ci phyin du rgol ba po yang ji ltar yod min pa/
de skad sngar bshad lhag ma phyogs 'di nyid kyis rtogs par bya// [300]

Understand well [our] above refutation [in vv. 6.168-170]. When we reply [in vv. 6.173-178] to the position [concerned] with contact, and so on, [as put forward by our opponents in vv. 671-172] we are not polemisists who repudiate everything, no matter what. [Thus] you should realise through our position the rest of the [arguments] explained above.

THE DIVISIONS OF EMPTINESS

6.179 *bdag med 'di ni 'gro ba rnam dgrol phyir/*
chos dang gang zag dbye bas rnam gnyis gsungs/
de ltar ston pas slar yang 'di nyid ni/
gdul bya rnams la phye ste rnam mang gsungs// [301-302]

For the purpose of liberating creatures, [the Buddha] said that selflessness (*nairatmya*) is divided into two types, [namely, the selflessness of] phenomena (*dharma*) and the person (*pudgala*). Thus, the Teacher has further said there are many aspects to this [selflessness], for he differentiated between his disciples.

6.180 *spros dang bcas par stong pa nyid/*
bcu drug bshad nas mdor bsdus te/
slar yang bzhir bshad de dag ni
theg chen du yang bzhed pa yin// [302-303]

In the elaborated [version] he explained sixteen emptinesses [in dependence on different phenomenal and noumenal bases]. He further explained a condensed version of these in four [types]. All the same, these are universal vehicle presentations.

6.181 *gang phyir de yi rang bzhin de/*
yin phyir mig ni mig gis stong/
de bzhin rna ba sna dang lce/
lus dang yid kyang bsnyad par bya// [304]

[1] The eyes are empty of being because that is their nature (*prakrti*). The ears, nose, tongue, body and mind should also be described in the same way.

6.182-183 *ther zug gnas pa ma yin dang/*
'jig pa ma yin nyid kyi phyir/
mig la sogs pa drug po yi/
rang bzhin med nyid gang yin pa//

de ni nang stong nyid du 'dod/
gang phyir de yi rang bzhin de/
yin phyir gzugs ni gzugs kyis stong/
sgra dang [VP: *dad*] *dri ro reg bya dang/*
chos rnams nyid kyang de bzhin no// [304-309]

Because [these things] neither remain unchanging nor decay, the eyes and so forth - the six [sense organs] - have a non-intrinsic existence. These are considered to be the 'emptiness of the internal (*adhyatma-sunyata*)'.

[2] Material forms (*rupa*) are empty of being material forms, because that is their nature. Sounds, smell, tastes, objects of touch, and [mental] phenomena also [should be understood] in the same way.

6.184 *gzugs sogs ngo bo* [D: *rang bzhin*] *med pa nyid/*
phyi rol stong pa nyid du 'dod/
gnyis char rang bzhin med nyid ni/
phyi nang stong pa nyid yin no// [309]

The essencelessness of material forms, etc. is considered to be the 'emptiness of externals (*bahirdha-sunyata*)'.

[3] The non-intrinsic existence of both components [of the above] is the 'emptiness of the internal and external (*adhyatma-bahirdha-sunyata*)'.

6.185 *chos rnams rang bzhin med pa nyid/*
mkhas pas stong pa nyid ces bsnyad/
stong nyid de yang stong nyid kyi/
ngo bos stong par 'dod pa yin// [309-310]

[4] The learned call the non-intrinsic existence of phenomena 'emptiness'. That emptiness is also considered to be empty of the entity of emptiness.

6.186 *stong nyid ces byai stong nyid gang/*
stong nyid stong nyid du 'dod de/
stong nyid dngos poi blo can gyi/
'dzin pa bzlog phyir gsungs pa yin// [310]

That which is the emptiness of what is called 'emptiness' is considered to be the 'emptiness of emptiness (*sunyata-sunyata*)'. It is taught with the intention of stopping the intellectual apprehension of emptiness as a thing (*bhava*).

6.187 *sems can snod kyi 'jig rten ni/*
ma lus khyab byed nyid phyir dang/
tshad med dpe yis mu mtha' ni/
med phyir phyogs rnams chen po nyid// [310]

The directions are 'the greatness' because they encompass every living creature and their environment, and because [the directions] exemplify boundless (*apramana*) [love, etc.] by being infinite.

6.188 *'di dag bcu char phyogs rnams kyis/*
stong pa nyid ni gang yin de/
chen po stong pa nyid yin te/
chen por 'dzin pa bzlog phyir gsungs// [311]

That which is the emptiness of the ten directions is the 'great emptiness (*maha-sunyata*)'. It is taught with the intention of stopping the apprehension [of the directions, as intrinsically] 'great'.

6.189 *de ni dgos pa mchog yin pas/*
don dam mya ngan 'das pa yin/
de ni de yis stong nyid gang/
de ni don dam stong nyid de// [311]

[6] Nirvana, the ultimate, is the supreme aim. That which is the emptiness of nirvana is the 'emptiness of the ultimate (*paramartha-sunyata*)'.

6.190 *mya* [D: *myang*] *'das dngos poi blo can gyi/*
'dzin pa bzlog par bya bai phyir/
don dam mkhyen pas don dam pa/
stong pa nyid ni bstan par mdzad// [311-312]

The one who knows the ultimate taught the 'emptiness of the ultimate, (*paramartha-sunyata*)' with the intention of stopping the intellectual apprehension of nirvana to be a thing (*bhava*).

6.191 *rkyen las byung phyir khams gsum po/*
'dus byas yin par nges par bsnyad/
de ni de yis stong nyid gang/
de ni 'dus byas stong nyid gsungs// [312]

[7] The three ranges of existence (*dhatu*) are definitely stated to be conditioned (*samskrta*) because they arise from conditions (*pratyaya*). That which is the emptiness of these is said to be the 'emptiness of the conditioned (*samskrta-sunyata*)'.

6.192 *gang la skye gnas mi rtag nyid/*
de dag med pa 'dus ma byas/
de ni de yis stong nyis gang/
de ni 'dus ma byas stong nyid// [312]

Those things produced or which abide are impermanent. Those which are not these [things] are unconditioned. Therefore the emptiness of these [later] is the 'emptiness of the unconditioned (*asamskrta-sunyata*)'.

6.193 *gang la mtha' ni yod min pa/*
de ni mtha' las 'das par brjod/
de de kho nas stong pa nyid/
mtha' las 'das pa stong nyid bsnyad// [313]

[9] That which is without the extreme [of eternality or nihilism] is listed as 'transcending the extremes'. The emptiness of these is called the 'emptiness of that which has transcended boundaries (*atyanta-sunyata*)'.

6.194-195 *thog ma dang po tha ma mtha'/*
de dag med pas 'khor ba ni/
thog ma tha ma med par brjod/
'gro 'ong bral phyir rmi lam ltai//

srid 'di de yis dben nyid gang/
de ni thog ma dang tha ma/
med pa stong pa nyid do zhes/
bstan bcos las ni nges bar bsnyad// [313-314]

[10] Cyclic existence (*samsara*) is described as that which is without a beginning or an end since it has neither an initial beginning nor an end. Because it is without coming or going, it is like a dream; thus, that which is the desolateness of existence of these, is said to be the 'emptiness without a beginning or an end' (*anavaragra-sunyata*)' - as can be ascertained from the [*Perfect Insight* (*Prajnaparamita*)] texts.

6.196 *dor ba zhes bya 'thor ba dang/*
'bor pa la ni nges par brjod/
dor med gtong pa med pa ste/
'ga' yang dor [VP: *'bor*] *med gang yin pao//* [314]

[11] That which is rejected (*avakara*), is clearly defined as what is thrown aside and forsaken. To not reject something is to not let go of it and not forsake it.

6.197 *dor ba med pa de nyid kyis/*
de nyid stong pa nyid gang yin/
de dei phyir na dor med pa/
stong pa nyid ces bya bar brjod// [314]

The emptiness of that which is not rejected is described as the 'emptiness of that which is not rejected (*anavakara-sunyata*)'.

6.198-199 *'dus byas la sogs ngo bo nyid/*
gang phyir slob ma rang sangs rgyas/
rgyal sras de bzhin gshegs rnams kyis/
ma mdzad dei phyir 'dul byas la/
sogs pa rnams kyi ngo bo nyid/
rang bzhin nyid du bsnyad pa ste/
de nyid kyis de stong nyid gang/
de ni rang bzhin stong pa nyid// [315]

[12] The very essence of the conditioned, etc. is not manufactured by disciples, self-awakeners, the victors' children or the Tathagatas; thus, the essence of the conditioned, etc. is described as their 'nature (*svabhava*)'. That which is the emptiness of this is the 'emptiness of a thing's own nature (*prakrti-sunyata*)'.

6.200-201 *khams bco brgyad dang reg drug dang/*
de las byung bai tshor drug dang/
gzugs can gzugs can min de bzhin/
'dus byas 'dus ma byas chos rnams//

chos de dag ni thams cad kyi/
de dag gis dben stong nyid gang/
gzugs rung la sogs dngos med gang/
de ni rang mtshan stong pa nyid// [315-316]

The eighteen basic constituents (*dhatu*), the six sense contacts (*sparsa*) and the six [types of] feeling - (*vedana*) that arise from them, the material (*rupa*) and the non-material, and similarly the conditioned (*samskrta*) and unconditioned phenomena [compromise] all phenomena, that which is the emptiness of all phenomena [is the 'emptiness] of all phenomena (*sarvadharma-sunyata*)'.

[14] That which is the nothingness of [defining properties such as] "fitness to be a material form, etc." is the 'emptiness of a thing's defining properties (*svalaksana-sunyata*)'.

6.202 *gzugs ni gzugs rang mtshan nyid can/*
tshor ba myong bai bdag nyid can/
'du shes mtshan mar 'dzin pa ste/
'du byed mngon par 'du byed pao// [316]

[The defining properties of phenomena that are basic to the spiritual path are these (6.202-204):] Material form (*rupa*) has the defining property of fitness to [be] a material form. Feeling (*vedana*) has the nature of experience (*anubhava*). Perception (*samjna*) apprehends properties (*laksana*) and drives (*samskara*) are the formative influences (*abhisamskara*).

6.203 *yul la so sor rnam rig pa/*
rnam shes rang gi mtshan nyid do/
phung poi sdug bsngal rang mtshan nyid/
khams kyi bdag nyid sbrul gdug 'dod// [316]

The defining property of consciousness (*vijnana*) is understanding the individual features that objects have. The psycho-physical organism (*skandha*) has the defining property of suffering (*duhkha*). And [we] consider essence of the basic material constituents (*dhatu*) [to be like] a poisonous snake.

6.204 *skye mched rnams ni sangs rgyas kyis/*
skyes bai sgor gyur nyid du gsungs/
rten cing 'brel par 'byung gang/
de ni 'du 'phrod mtshan nyid do// [317]

The Buddha said that the sense-bases (*ayatana*) are the gateway to birth. And that which has a relational origination (*pratityasamutpada*) has the property of conditionality (*samagri*).

6.205 *gtong ba sbyin pai pha rol phyin/*
tshul khrims gdung med mtshan nyid bzod/
khro med mtshan nyid brtson 'grus kyi/
kha na ma tho med nyid do// [317]

[The defining properties of phenomena that occur while on the path are these (6.205-209):] Perfect giving (*dana*) is [defined as] giving away. The property of good conduct (*sila*) is not tormenting [others]. The property of endurance (*ksanti*) is the absence of anger and enthusiasm (*virya*) is the absence of negativity.

6.206 *bsam gtan sdud pai mtshan nyid can/*
shes rab chags med mtshan nyid do/
pha rol phyin pa drug rnams kyi/
mtshan nyid 'di dag yin par brjod// [318]

Meditation (*dhyana*) has the property of integration, and the property of insight (*prajna*) is a lack of attachment. These are explained as the properties of the six perfections.

6.207 *bsam gtan rnams dang tshad med dang/*
de bzhin gzhan gang gzugs med pa/
de dag yang dag mkhyen pa yis/
mi 'khrug tshan nyid can du gsungs// [318]

The meditative absorptions (*dhyana*), the [four] infinitudes (*apramana*) and the other formless [absorptions] are said by the most learned [Buddha] to have the property of non-disturbance [by conflicting emotions and thoughts].

6.208 *byang chub phyogs chos sum cu bdun/*
nges par 'byung byed rang mtshan nyid/
stong pa nyid kyi tshan nyid ni/
dmigs pa med pas rnam dben nyid// [318]

The thirty-seven phenomena of the directions to full evolution (*bodhipaksadharma*) have the defining property of certain liberation. The definition of emptiness [the first of the three doors to complete liberation] is a complete absence, [of conceptuality] due to right perception.

6.209 *mtshan ma med pa zhi nyid de/*
gsum pai mtshan nyid sdug bsngal dang/
gti mug med rnam thar rnams kyi/
mtshan nyid rnam par grol byed pao// [319]

[The second door, called] signlessless (*animitta*) has [the property of] serenity (*santata*), and the property of the third [aspirationlessness (*apranihita*)] is the absence of suffering and confusion. The property of [the eight] full liberations is 'giving complete release'.

6.210 *stobs rnams shin tu rnam par ni/*
gtan la 'bebs pai rang bzhin gsungs/
skyobs pai mi 'jigs pa rnams ni/
shin tu brtan pai ngo bo yin// [320]

[The defining properties of phenomena at the fruition of the path are these (6.210-214):] The [ten] capacities (*bala*) are said to have the nature of certitude (*suniscita*). The essence of the Protector's [four] certitudes (*vaisaradya*) is absolute steadfastness. [320]

6.211 *so sor yang dag rig rnams ni/*
spobs sogs chad med mtshan nyid can/
'gro la phan pa nyer sgrub pa/
byams pa chen po zhes byao// [321]

The superlative individuating knowledges (*pratisamvid*), have the property of uninterrupted confidence and so forth. That which brings much benefit to creatures is called great love (*mahamaitri*).

6.212 *sdug bsngal can rnams yongs skyob pa/*
thugs rje chen poo dga' ba ni/
rab dgai mtshan nyid btang snyoms ni/
ma 'dres mtshan nyid can zhes bya// [322]

Great compassion (*mahakaruna*) completely protects those who suffer. Rejoicing (*mudita*) has the property of extreme delight, and equanimity (*upeksa*) has the property of being unmixed [with hatred, etc.].

6.213 *sangs rgyas chos ni ma 'dres pa/*
bcu dang brgyad du gang 'dod dag/
gang phyir ston des mi 'phrogs pa/
de phyir mi 'phrogs rang mtshan nyid// [322]

The Teacher [taught that] what he considered to be the eighteen unique qualities of the buddhas (*avenikabuddhaguna*) and because of these he cannot be disturbed. Therefore they are the defining property of being undisturbed (*asamharya*).

6.214 *rnam kun mkhyen nyid ye shes ni/*
mngon sum mtshan nyid can du 'dod/
gzhan ni nyi tshe ba nyid kyis/
mngon sum zhes byar mi 'dod do// [337]

The property of the knowledge that knows all perspectives [on reality] (*sarvakarajnata-jnana*) is considered to be the direct [mental] perception (*pratyaksa*) [of all phenomena]. Other [cognitions] due to being limited in their scope are not considered to be a so-called 'direct perception'.

6.215 *gang zhig 'dus byas mtshan nyid dang/*
'dus ma byas pai mtshan nyid gang/
de de kho nas stong pa nyid/
de ni rang mtshan stong pa nyid// [337]

The emptiness of any [defining] properties of conditioned (*samskrta*) and unconditioned [*phenomena*] is the emptiness of defining properties (*svalaksana-sunyata*).

6.216 *de ltar ba 'di mi gnas shin/*
'das dang ma 'ongs yod ma yin/
gang du de dag mi dmigs pa/
de la mi dmigs pa zhes brjod// [337]

[15] The present does not remain, and the past and future do not exist. None of these [three times] can be observed [and thus] they are listed as the so-called 'unobservable (*anupalambha*)'.

6.217 *mi dmigs pa de rang ngo bo/*
de yis dben pa nyid gang de/
ther zug gnas min 'jig min pas/
mi dmigs zhes byai stong nyid do// [337]

The unobservable is completely without an essence of its own. And because it neither lasts for ever nor decays, this emptiness is called the 'unobservable (*anupalambha*)'.

6.218 *rkyen las byung phyir dngos rnams la/*
'dus pa pa yi ngo bo med/
'dus pa pa ni de nyid kyis/
stong nyid dngos med stong nyid do// [338]

[16] Because things arise from conditions (*pratyaya*) they do not have the nature of being compounded. The emptiness of these things of being compounded is the 'emptiness of non-things (*abhava-sunyata*)'.

6.219 *dngos poi sgras ni mdor bsdus na/*
phung po lna rnams brjod pa yin/
de rnams de yis stong nyid gang/
de dngos stong pa nyid du bshad// [338]

[The condensed version of four types of emptiness are these (6.219-223):] [1] In short, the term 'thing' is declared to be the five primary constituents of the psycho-physical organism (*skandha*). That which is the emptiness of these is explained as the 'emptiness of things (*abhava-sunyata*)'.

6.220 *mdor bsdus na ni dngos med pa/*
'dus ma byas chos rnams la brjod/
de nyid [VP: *ni*] *dngos med des stong nyid/*
dngos po med pa stong nyid do// [339]

[2] In short, 'non-things' are declared to be unconditioned phenomena (*samskrta-dharma*). The emptiness of these non-things themselves is the 'emptiness of non-things (*abhava-sunyata*)'.

6.221 *rang bzhin ngo bo nyid med ni/*
rang bzhin zhes byai' stong nyid do/
'di ltar rang bzhin ma byas pas/
rang bzhin zhes ni bya bar bsnyad// [339]

[3] Not having a nature or entity is the emptiness called "[the emptiness of] nature". Therefore [we] say that such a non-artificial nature is "the nature [of being empty of a nature]".

6.222 *sangs rgyas rnams ni byung ba'am/*
ma byung yang rung dngos su na/
dngos po kun gyi stong pa nyid/
gzhan gyi dngos por rab tu bsgrags// [339-340]

[4] Whether the buddhas appear in person, or not, all things are empty. [Yet] they much proclaimed about the other thing [i.e. the reality limit, nirvana, so that people would transcend samsara].

6.223 *yang dag mtha' dang de bzhin nyid/*
de gzhan [D: *bzhin*] *dngos poi stong nyid do/*
shes rab pha rol phyin tshul las/
de dag de skad rab tu bsgrags// [340]

The emptiness of the other thing is the reality limit (*bhutakoti*) and its suchness (*tathata*). These [above] explanations I have proclaimed well and in accordance with the *Perfect Insight* [*Sutras*, i.e. *Prajnaparamita-sutras*.]

FINAL SUMMARY TO THIS CHAPTER

6.224 *de ltar blo gros zer gyis snang ba gsal byas pai* [D: *pa*]/
rang gi lag na gnas pai skyu ru ra bzhin du/
srid gsum 'di dag ma lus gdod nas skye med par/
rtogs de tha snyad bden pai stobs kyis 'gog par 'gro// [340-341]

With rays of intelligence [the bodhisattvas of the sixth level] illuminate appearances [and see clearly as they would] a clean olive sitting in their own hand; so they understand all three ranges of existence were primordially unproduced. By the power of the social reality [these bodhisattvas] enter into a [contempletative] cessation (*nirodha*).

6.225 *rtag tu 'gog par gtogs pai bsam ldan yin mod kyi/*
'gro ba mgon med pa la snying rje'ang skyed par byed/
de gong bde gshegs gsung skyes sangs rgyas 'bring bcas ni/
ma lus pa rnams blo yis pham par byed pa'ang yin// [341]

Though they are always in concentration on the cessation they generate compassion (*karuna*) for protectorless creatures. Their intellect outpaces all those [disciples] born of the Sugatas speech, and the intermediate buddhas as well.

6.226 *kun rdzob de nyid gshog yangs dkar po rgyas gyur pa/*
ngang pai rgyal po de ni skye poi ngang pa yis/
mdun du bdar nas dge bai rlung gi shugs stobs kyis/
rgyal bai yon tan rgya mtshoi pha rol mchog tu 'gro// [342]

Spreading the broad white wings of the conventional and [ultimate] realities, the king of the swans flies before the ordinary swans, and through the immense power of the winds of virtue, he goes perfectly to the far side of the ocean of the victor's qualities.

CHAPTER SEVEN: [THERAPEUTIC] SKILL (*UPAYA*)

7.1a-c *ring du song bai 'dir ni skad cig dang/*
kad cig la ni 'gog par 'jug 'gyur zhing/
thabs kyi pha rol phyin legs 'bar ba'ang 'thob/ [342]

[The bodhisattvas] at the [level of] Gone Far (*duramgama*) can enter [and rise from equipose] into cessation (*nirodha*), from one instant to another, and the perfection of [therapeutic] skill (*upaya*) they attain also blossoms excellently.

CHAPTER EIGHT: CAPACITY (*BALA*)

8.1d-2 *yang yang sngar dge las lhag thob bya' phyir//*

gang du phyir mi ldog pa nyid 'gyur ba/
mi g.yo de la bdag nyid che de 'jug/
'di yi smon lam shin tu dag 'gyur zhing/
rgyal ba rnams kyis [VP: *kyi*] *'gog las slong bar mdzad//* [343-344]

Because they gain more and more virtue than before, they will not revert. These great beings enter the [level of the] Immovable (*acala*). Their resolution (*pranidhana*) has become very pure and the victors cause them to rise from their cessation.

8.3 *chags pa med pai blo ni skyon rnams dag dang lhan cig mi gnas phyir/*
sa brgyad pa la dri ma de dag rtsa bcas nye bar zhi 'gyur zhing/
nyon mongs zad cig khams gsum [D: *cing sa gsum*] *bla mar gyur kyang sangs rgyas rnams kyi ni/*
'byor pa mkha' ltar bras [D: *ltar mtha' bral*] *ma lus 'thob par nus ma yin//* [346]

Their minds, being without greed (*raga*), do not remain at one with the problems of existence (*dosa*) and therefore at the eighth level both stains (*mala*) and their roots (*mula*) are thoroughly pacified. The emotional reactions (*klesa*) are exhausted and although [these bodhisattvas] have become spiritual masters (*guru*) to [creatures in] the three ranges of existence they are not [yet] able to gain all the buddhas' treasures, which are as limitless as space.

8.4ab *'khor ba 'gags kyang dbang rnams bcu po thob par 'gyur zhing de dag gis/*
srid pai 'gro bar rang gi bdag nyid sna tshogs ston par byed par 'gyur/ [347]

Even though cyclic existence has stopped [for these bodhisattvas], they acquire the ten capacities and through these they show themselves variously to creatures in worldly existence.

CHAPTER NINE: RESOLUTION (*PRANIDANA*)

9.1cd *dgu pa la ni dei stobs lta zhig mtha' dag rdzogs par dag 'gyur zhing/*
de bzhin yang dag rig chos rang gi yon tan yongs su dag pa'ang 'thob// [348]

On the ninth [level] all aspects of their capacities (*bala*) become perfectly pure and accordingly they also acquire the completely pure qualities of the superlative [individuating] knowledges (*samvid*).

CHAPTER TEN: KNOWLEDGE (*JNANA*)

10.1 *bcu pai sa la de yis kun nas sangs gyas rnams las dbang bskyur ba/*
dam pa thob cing ye shes lhag par mchog tu 'byung bar 'gyur ba'ang yin/
char sprin rnams las chu char 'babs pa ji ltar de bzhin 'gro rnams kyi/
dge bai lo thog ched du rgyal sras las kyang lhun grub chos char 'bab// [349]

On the tenth level the [bodhisattvas] acquire holy initiations (*abhiseka*) from the buddhas everywhere, and their knowledge (*jnana*) becomes especially superior. As rain showers down from rain-clouds, so from these victors' children, teachings (*dharma*) spontaneously shower down to [produce] a crop of wholesome attributes in creatures.

CHAPTER ELEVEN: THE BODHISATTVAS' QUALITIES (*GUNA*)

11.1 *de tshe 'dis ni sangs rgyas bgya mthong zhing/*
de dag byin gyis [D: *gyi*] *brlabs kyang 'di yis rtogs/*
de nyid tshe na bskal pa brgyar gnas shing/
sngon dang phyi mai mthar yang yang dag 'jug// [350-351]

By the time [of the first level] they can see hundreds of buddhas and also realise the blessings (*adhisthana*) [granted] by them. They remain for hundreds of aeons in the very one life, and [their cognition] fully penetrates to the limit of [hundreds of aeons in] the past and future.

11.2 *blo ldan ting 'dzin brgya phrag snyoms par 'jug cing gtong byed de/*
'jig rten khams brgya 'di yis kun nas g.yo zhing snang bar nus/
de bzhin rdzu 'phrul gyis de sems can brgya phrag smin byed cing/
brgya phrag grangs dang rjes 'brel zhing dag tu yang 'gro bar 'gyur// [351]

They possess a mind that can enter equipose and rise from hundreds of mental integrations (*samadhi*) [in an instant] and they illuminate and move anywhere in hundreds of world systems. Likewise, with their psychic powers (*rddhi*) they bring hundreds of living creature to maturity and travel to hundreds of pure environments (*ksetra*).

11.3 *des ni chos kyi sgo rnams yang dag 'byed byed thub dbang sras/*
rang gi lus la lus rnams kun nas ston par byed pa'ang yin/
rang gi 'khor dang bcas pas mdzes 'byor lus ni re re zhing/
rgyal bai sras po brgya phrag dag dang rjes su 'brel ba'ang ston// [351]

At this [level] they open wide [a hundred] truth-doors. Within their own bodies the children of mighty sages also display their forms everywhere; and each of these beautifully endowed bodies has its own retinue, for with each body comes hundreds of the victor's children.

11.4-5 *blo ldan rab tu dga' bar gnas pas yon tan de dag ni/*
thob par gyur nas de bzhin kho nar dri ma med gnas pas/
de dag stong ni yang dag 'thob par 'gyur te sa lnga pao/
'di dag rnams la byang chub sems dpa' yis ni 'bum phrag dang//

bye ba phrag brgya 'thob cing de yis bye ba stong 'gyur 'thob/
de nas bye ba brgya phrag stong 'gyur yang 'thob bye ba phrag/
khrag khrig phrag brgyar rdzogs par bsgyur [D: *bsgrub*] *dang slar yang stong phrag tu/*
yang dag par ni bsgyur ba mtha' dag rab tu 'thob par 'gyur// [352]

The qualities acquired by these discerning ones abiding at the Joyful (*pramudita*) [level] are acquired by the thousand by [bodhisattvas] abiding at the Stainless (*vimala*) [level]. And on the [next] five levels the bodhisattvas acquire hundreds of thousands [of the qualities], and then thousands of millions, and then ten thousands of millions. And after that they gain millions of millions, and then thousands of million million millions. Thereafter they acquire all these, many thousands of times over.

11.6 *mi g.yoi sar gnas rnam rtog med pa des/*
stong gsum brgya phrag stong bsdoms 'jig rten na/
rdul tshad ji snyed yod pa de rnams dang/
grangs mnyam yon tan dag ni 'thob par 'gyur// [353]

The [bodhisattvas] staying on the Immovable level (*acala-bhumi*), due to their lack of conceptualisation (*vikalpana*), acquire pure qualities equal in number to the quantity of atoms to be found a hundred thousand times the thousand million worlds.

11.7 *legs pai blo gros sa la gnas pa yi/*
byang chub sems des sngar bstan yon tan dag/
grangs med brgya phrag stong du yang dag par/
bsdoms pa phrag bcui rdul tshad thob par 'gyur// [353]

The bodhisattvas who stay at the level of Good Intelligence (*sadhumati-bhumi*) acquire the above-taught qualities times the measure of atoms in one countless million [times a thousand million worlds].

11.8 *re zhig bcu pa 'dir dei yon tan dag/*
ngag gi spyod yul las chas [VP: *ches*] *'das 'gyur zhing/*
ngag gi spyod yul ma yin bsdoms rnams na/
rdul dag je snyed yod pa de snyed 'gyur// [353-354]

The qualities of someone at the tenth [level] transcend the jurisdiction of speech. [They acquire qualities] to the number of as many atoms as are found in a total [number of worlds] beyond the capacity of speech.

11.9 *ba spui khung bur byang chub sems dpa'* [D: *rnams*] *dang/*
lhan cig rdzogs sangs rgyas sku bgrang 'das dang/
de bzhin lha dang lha min mi dag kyang/
skad cig skad cig la ni ston par nus// [354]

In each of their hair-pores are countless perfect buddha-forms accompanied by bodhisattvas, and moment by moment they are able to show [within their pores] the gods, demigods, and humans.

CHAPTER TWELVE: THE BUDDHAS' QUALITIES (*GUNA*)

12.1 *gang phyir nam mkha' dri ma med la zla snang gsal bar ba' phyir/*
sngon tshe stobs bcu bskyed pai sa la khyod kyis slar yang 'bad gyur zhing/
'og min du ni gang gi don du 'bad gyur go 'phang mchog zhi ba/
yon tan mtha' dag mthar thug mtshungs pa med pa de ni khyod kyis brnyes//
[355]

In order to be a brightly illuminating moon in a cloudless sky, in past lives you once strove in the [bodhisattva] levels to develop the ten capacities; then strove in the highest pure land (*akanistha*) for the good of all and achieved the peaceful, supreme state, whose qualities are all without peer.

12.2 *ji ltar snod kyi dbye bas mkha' la dbye ba med de ltar/*
dngos byas dbye ba 'ga' yang de nyid la med de yi phyir/
ro mnyam nyid du yang dag thugs su chud par mdzad gyur na/
mkhyen bzang khyod kyis skad cig gis ni shes bya thugs su chud// [356]

Just as a vessel can be divided [into parts] but the space [within it] cannot be divided, no matter how things are artificially divided [these divisions] do not exist. Thus, when you properly come to know [that things] are of equal flavour, your noble omniscience is instantly brought to know all knowables.

12.3 *gang tshe zhi ba de nyid yin na de la blo gros 'jug mi 'gyur/*
blo ma zhugs par shes byai yul can nges par rig [D: *rigs*] *pa'ang ma yin la/*
kun nas shes med pa ni shes par ji ltar 'gyur te 'gal bar 'gyur/
mkhyen po med par khyod kyis gzhan la 'di ltao zhes su zhig ston// [356-357]

[Qualm:] If this peace is reality (*tattva*), then the intellect would not engage itself [with anything]. With the intellect unengaged, it certainly could not cognise a knowable as a subject. So this is inconsistent: how could this knowing of nothing be knowing? Without having omniscience, you teach "it is like this" to others.

12.4 *gang tshe skye med de nyid yin zhing blo yang skye ba dang 'bral ba/*
de tshe de rnam rten [D: rnams sten] las de yis de nyid rtogs pa lta bu ste/
ji ltar sems ni gang gi rnam pa can du 'gyur ba de yis yul/
de yongs shes pa de bzhin tha snyad nye bar rten nas rig pa yin// [357-358]

[Madhyamika: In our system] where neither reality nor the mind [which cognises it] are [intrinsically] produced, it follows that reality can be realised in dependence on [cognising] its aspect (akara). Just as the mind by turning into whatever aspect [can] properly know a subject, understand [omniscience] by relying on this conventional (analogy).

12.5 *de yi longs spyod rdzogs sku bsod nams kyis/*
zin dang sprul pa mkha' gzhan las dei mthus/
sgra gang chos kyi de nyid ston 'byung ba/
de las 'jig rten gyis kyang de nyid rig// [359]

By virtue of the [buddhas's] enjoyment form (*sambhoya kaya*) formed from positive energy and by other space[-like] emanations, all the words that teach of the philosophy of reality have come about.

12.6-7 ji ltar rdza mkhan stobs chen ldan pas 'dir/
yun ring ches 'bad pas bskor 'khor lo ni/
dei rtsol da ltar skyes pa med bzhin du'ang/
'khor zhing bum pa la sogs rgyur mthong ltar//

de bzhin da lta skyes rtsol med bzhin du/
chos kyi bdag can sku nyid la bzhugs dei/
'jug pa skye boi dge [D: dag] dang smon lam gyi/
khyad par gyis 'phangs las ches bsam mi khyab// [360]

Just as we see how a strong potter has labored long to put his wheel in motion and now it spins, without his further effort, to produce a vase and so on, without any effort now to produce it, the essential form of the truth [i.e. the *dharmakaya*] continues to exist. It is projected to the people it engages [to teach] through their various virtues (*kusala*) and aspirations - and as such it is inconceivable.

12.8 *shes byai bud shing skam po ma lus pa/*
bsregs pas zhi ste rgyal rnams chos sku ste/
de tshe skye ba med cing 'gag pa med/
sems 'gags pas de sku yis mngon sum mdzad// [361]

Because the dry kindling of the objects of cognition (*jneya*) has all been burnt away, there is serenity - the truth form (*dharmakaya*) of the victors. At such a time there is no production or cessation, thoughts stop, and thus the [truth] form manifests.

12.9 *zhi sku dpag bsam shing ltar gsal gyur zhing/*
yid bzhin nor bu ji bzhin rnam mi rtog/
'gro grol bar du 'jig rten 'byor slad rtag/
'di ni spros dang bral la snang bar 'gyur// [362]

I shall clarify how their serene form is like a wish granting tree: [this form] is as without conceptual [thought] as a wish granting jewel (*cintamani*), [yet], until all creatures are liberated, it effortlessly enriches the world and appears without [any dualistic] elaboration (*prapanca*).

12.10 *thub dbang dus gcig kho nar dei rgyu mthun/*
gzugs sku gcig la rang gi skye gnas skabs/
sngar 'gags gsal dang ma 'chol byung tshul ni/
ma lus kyis bkra mtha' dag ston par mdzad// [363]

The mighty sage [appears] at a [particular] time in a [particular] physical form that corresponds to its cause [i.e. a particular disciple], and teaches on the circumstances of his now finished lives with clarity, without digression, and all with brilliancy.

12.11-12 *sangs rgyas zhing ci 'dra der thub dbang dang* [D: *ji 'drar thub dbang de dang*]/
de dag sku spyod mthu stobs ci 'dra dang/
nyan thos dge 'dun ji snyed ci lta dang/
byang chub sems rnams der gzugs ci 'dra dang//

ci 'drai chos dang de [D: *der*] *bdag ci 'dra dang/*
chos thos spyod pa gang la spyad pa dang/
sbyin gang ji tsam de dag la phul ba/
de ni ma lus sku gcig la ston mdzad// [364]

What a buddha-environment (*ksetra*) is like, what are its mighty sage's form, his deeds and his capacities, what sort of disciples and community does he have, what forms do his bodhisattvas have, what is his philosophy, what are those that listen to it like and what do they practise, what do they give in generosity, and what do they receive? - all these are taught [when a buddha] takes a [particular] form.

12.13 *de bzhin tshul khrims bzod brtson ting 'dzin dang/*
shes rab spyod tshe sngar gyi gnas skabs gang/
ma tshang med de dag nyid spyod pa kun/
sku yi ba spui khung bu'ang gsal bar ston// [366]

Likewise, the pores of his body clearly show his [past] practices - conduct, endurance, enthusiasm, mental integration, insight - the circumstances of his past lives, and absolutely every deed.

12.14 *sangs rgyas gang dag 'das dang 'byung 'gyur gang/*
gang dag da ltar nam mkhai mthar thug par/
gdangs mthon chos ston sdug bsngal gyis bzung bai/
'gro dbugs 'byin zhing 'jig rten bzhugs pa dang// [366]

The buddhas of the past and future, and those of the present - reaching to the limits of space - enter the world and teach the teachings in a firm voice, giving inspiration to creatures seized by suffering.

12.15 *dang poi thugs bzung byang chub snying poi bar/*
de dag spyod kun dngos rnams mig 'phrul gyi/
rang bzhin mkhyen nas bdag bzhin ba spu yi/
khung bur dus gcig la ni gsal bar ston// [366-367]

They know that all their deeds, from their first taking compassion to heart until [they receive] the essence of full evolution have the nature of illusions. Thus they display [their deeds] all at the one time within their pores.

12.16 *de bzhin dus gsum byang chub sems dpa' dang/*
rang rgyal 'phags pa nyan thos ma lus kyi/
spyod dang de lhag skye boi gnas skabs ni/
thams cad ba spui khung bur gcig tshe ston// [367]

Likewise, within a hair-pore and simultaneously they present the deeds of the bodhisattvas of the three times, the self [evolved] victors, the saintly disciples, and, moreover, all the circumstances of ordinary people.

12.17 *dag pa 'di ni bzhed par* [D: *pa*] *'jug pa yis/*
rdul gcig yul la mkha' gtugs 'jig rten dang/
'jig rten mtha' yas phyogs khyab rdul ston mod/
rdul rags mi 'gyur 'jig rten phra mi 'gyur// [367-368]

Just by [merely] entertaining a wish, these pure ones can display the world reaching through space in the space of a single atom, or they can display an atom that pervades the directions of the limitless worlds, yet the atom grows not coarser and nor do the worlds become finer.

12.18 *rnam rtog mi mnga' khyod kyis srid mthai bar/*
skad cig de re re la spyod sna tshogs/
ji snyed ston pa de snyed dzambui gling/
ma lus rdul gang de dag [D: *snyed*] *la grang med//* [368]

Without any ambiguity, in each moment up to the end of empirical existence you display various deeds that are equal in number to all the countless atoms in all of the continents of Jambu.

12.19-21 *gnas dang gnas min mkhyen stobs dang/*
de bzhin las rnam smin blo dang/
mos pa sna tshogs thugs chud dang/
sna tshogs khams ni mkhyen stobs dang//

de bzhin dbang mchog mchog ma yin/
mkhyen dang thams cad du 'gro dang/
bsam gtan rnam thar ting 'dzin dang/
snyoms par 'jug sogs mkhyen [D: *blo*] *stobs dang//*

sngon gnas dran pa mkhyen pa dang/
de bzhin 'chi 'pho skye blo dang/
zag rnams zad pa mkhyen stobs te/
stobs ni bcu po 'di dag go// [369]

[Briefly,] the capacities (*bala*) [that are exclusive to the buddhas] are: [1] the knowledge of the appropriate and inappropriate (*sthanasthana*) [rebirth situations], [2] the intellectual [comprehension] of actions and their fruitions (*karmavipaka*), [3] bearing in mind [people's] various dispositions (*adhimukti*), [4] the capacity to know the various elements (*dhatu*), [5] the knowledge of superior and inferior faculties (*indriya*), [6] [a knowledge of where] all [paths] lead, [7] the capacity to know the meditations (*dhyana*), the liberations (*vimoksa*), the [levels of] mental integration (*samadhi*), the meditative trances (*samapatti*), etc. [8] the knowledge that recalls previous places [of rebirth], [9] the comprehension of death-transference to [new] rebirth, and [10] the capacity to know the eradication of the defilements (*asravaksaya*). These are the ten capacities.

12.22 *rgyu gang zhig las gang zhig nges par skye 'gyur ba/*
de ni de yi gnas su de mkhyen rnams kyis gsungs/
bshad pa las bzlog gnas min shes bya mtha' *yas pa/*
mkhyen pa thogs pa spangs pa de ni stobs su bshad// [369]

[Buddhas] know and will say what form a particular cause will be definitely produced and what [therefore] is appropriate. They speak about the opposite: they know the infinite numbers of that which is called "inappropriate". The [first] capacity is said to be [their knowing] what is to be adopted and abandoned.

12.23 *'dod dang mi 'dod de las bzlog dang zad dngos kyi/*
las dang de yi rnam smin shin tu sna tshogs la'ang/
mkhyen pa nus mthu thogs med so sor 'jug 'gyur ba/
dus gsum shes bya khab mdzad de ni stobs su 'dod// [372]

The [second] capacity is considered to be that, by the power of knowing actions (*karma*) [that result is] the desirable, the undesirable, their opposite - the exhaustion [of action] - and the many variations of fruition [of these actions], their [omniscience] detects each of these without obstruction and pervades [all] knowables in [all] three times.

12.24 *'dod chags sogs kyi* [D: *kyis*] *'byung bai stobs kyis 'dod pa ni/*
shin tu sna tshogs sman [D: *dman*] *'bring gang yang khyad 'phags 'dod/*
de las gzhan rnams kyis g.yogs mos la'ang mkhyen pa ni/
dus gsum 'gro ba ma lus kyab pa stobs shes bya// [374]

By the [third] capacity [buddhas] know the wishes that arise through attachment and so on, even those many various wishes - the lower, the middling and supreme - which are concealed from others. Know that this capacity embraces every creature in [all] three times.

12.25 *sangs rgyas khams kyi rnam par dbye la mkhas rnams kyis/*
mig sogs rnams kyi rang bzhin gang de khams su gsungs/
rdzogs pai sangs rgyas rnams kyi mkhyen pa mtha' yas shing/
rnam kun khams kyi khyad par la 'jug stobs su 'dod// [376]

Because buddhas are skilled at classifying the elements and realms (*dhatu*), they [can] say what is the nature of the elements of the eye and so on. The omniscience of the fully evolved buddhas is infinite, and the [third] capacity is considered to penetrate all the distinctions of all aspects of the elements and realms.

12.26 *kun tu rtog sogs ches rno nyid mchog bzhed la/*
'bring gnas skabs dang brtul nyid mchog min par bshad dang/
mig la sogs dang phan tshun sgrub nus chub pa la/
rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa chags med stobs su gsungs// [378]

[Buddhas can] declare that [someone's] completely conceptual [virtuous thoughts, such as faith], and so on, are most sharp and superior. [Buddhas] say [that another's] are of mediocre condition or dull and inferior. [The fourth capacity] is being able to establish the mutual [nature] of the eye and so forth. This capacity is said to know, without limitations, all aspects.

12.27 *lam 'ga' rgyal ba nyid dang 'ga' zhig rang rgyal gyi/*
byang chub dang ni nyan thos byang chub yi dwags dang/
dud 'gro lha mi rnams dang dmyal la sogs 'gro ba/
de la mkhyen pa chags med mtha' yas stobs su 'dod// [381]

Some paths [lead to] the victorious state, some to full self-evolution, or to a disciple's evolution; some lead to the spirits (*preta*), to animals, gods, humans, the hells, and so on. The [sixth] capacity is claimed to be boundless knowledge, without limitation, into [where paths lead].

12.28 *'jig rten mtha' yas rnal 'byor bye brag las* [D: *la*] *tha dad/*
bsam gtan rnam thar brgyad gang zhi gnas gang dag dang/
snyoms 'jug khyad par gang dag gcig dang [D: *par*] *brgyad gyur pa/*
de la mkhyen pa thogs med 'di ni stobs su bshad// [384]

[Buddhas] have enumerated the various yogas in the infinite universe: the meditational states (*dhyana*), the eight liberations, the serenities (*samatha*), the special trance and the other eight [trances]. [The seventh] capacity is said to be their knowing these without obstruction.

12.29 *ji srid gti mug de srid srid* [VP: -] *gnas 'das bdag dang/*
sems can gzhan re re yi srid pai [D: *pa*] *sems can ni/*
ji snyed de snyed mtha' yas gzhir bcas yul phyogs dang/
rnam pa dang bcas mkhyen pa gang yin stobs su bshad [D: *bcas rnam la blo gang dang gang yin stobs su bshad*]*//* [388]

[Buddhas] know the basic [causes], the places, directions and aspects of however many existences as living creatures that the lords - who have transcended the existence [that continues] so long as there is confusion - have taken, and that each other living being has taken. Such [knowing] is declared to be the [eighth] capacity.

12.30 *sems can rnams kyi sems can re rei 'chi 'pho dang/*
skye gang 'jig rten la gnas nam mkhai mthar thug dang/
bkra mang de la mkhyen pa dus der 'jug pa yis/
ma chags rnam kun yongs dag mtha' yas stobs su 'dod// [390]

[Buddhas] know each living creature's passing into death, and where living creatures are reborn into the worlds located in limitless space, and the many variations. [This knowledge is] being instantaneous, unlimited, all encompassing, infinite and is asserted to be the [ninth] capacity.

12.31 *rnam kun mkhyen pai stobs kyis myur du rgyal rnams kyi/*
nyon mongs dag ni bag chags dang bcas 'jig 'gyur dang/
slob ma la sogs nyon mongs blo yis 'gog pa gang/
de la mkhyen pa chags med mtha' yas stobs su 'dod// [393]

Through the capacity of omniscience, the victors' emotional disturbances (*klesa*) [have been] quickly purified and, together with their habits (*vasana*), have been destroyed; [they know how to] mentally bring the delusions of disciples and so on to cessation. This unlimited, infinite knowledge is asserted to be the [tenth] capacity.

12.32 *nam mkha' med pas 'dab chags ldog par mi 'gyur gyi/*
'dir [D: *di*] *ni rang mthu zad pas ldog par 'gyur de bzhin/*
slob ma dang bcas sangs rgyas sras rnams sangs rgyas kyi/
yon tan mkha' ltar mtha' yas ma brjod ldog par 'gyur// [396-397]

A bird does not stop flapping its wings [not] because there is no more space: rather it stops because its strength is expended. Likewise the buddhas' children and the students as well, will stop describing the buddhas' qualities which are as limitless as space.

12.33 *dei phyir bdag 'dras khyod yon 'di dag ci/*
shes pa dang ni brjod par nus 'gyur ram/
'ong kyang de dag 'phags pa klu sgrub kyis/
bshad phyir dogs spangs cung zad tsam zhig smras// [397-398]

Therefore how would such like me be able to know and describe these, your qualities? However because these have been explained by Saint Nagarjuna, and forsaking my apprehension, I will say just a little.

12.34 *zab mo stong pa nyid yin te/*
yon tan gzhan rnams rgya che bao/
zab dang rgya chei tshul shes pas/
yon tan 'di dag 'thob par 'gyur// [398]

Emptiness is the profound; the other qualities are the extensive. By knowing the system of the profound and extensive, one will gain these [above] qualities.

12.35 *slar yang mi g.yoi sku mnga' khyod kyis srid gsum byon nas sprul rnams kyis/*
gshegs pa dang ni bltams dang byang chub zhi bai 'khor lo'ang ston par mdzad/
de ltar khyod kyis 'jig rten g.yo bag spyod can re bai zhags pa ni/
mang pos bcings pa ma lus thugs rjes mya ngan 'das par bkri bar mdzad// [398-399]

Further, you who possess the immovable form, in order to come to the three ranges of existence, came through your manifestations, took birth, and turned the wheel of teachings [leading to] the fully evolved state. In this way you compassionately lead to nirvana everyone in the world who is agitated by trivial activity and bound by the many nooses of expectation.

12.36 *gang phyir 'di ni* [D: *na*] *de nyid shes las dri ma mtha' dag sel ba ni/*
lhur byed gzhan med chos rnams de nyid rnam 'gyur dbye ba'ang [D: *la'ang*] *bsten min zhing/*
de nyid yul can blo gros 'di yang tha dad 'gyur ba ma yin pa/
de yi phyir na khyod kyis 'gro la theg pa mi mnyam dbyer med bstan// [399]

There is no way of effectively clearing away all impurities (*mala*) other than by cognising the reality [of things]. The reality of phenomena is not divisible into aspects, nor dependent [on the aspects]. The discerning, who take reality as their referent, are not to be categorised either. You therefore taught the [one] vehicle (*yana*) to beings equally, without distinction.

12.37-38 *gang phyir 'gro la nyes pa skyed byed snyigs ma 'di dag yod gyur pa/*
de phyir 'jig rten sangs rgyas spyod yul gting zab la 'jug mi 'gyur zhing/
bde gshegs gang phyir khyod la mkhyen rab thugs rjei [D: *rje*] *thabs dang lhan cig pa/*
mnga' dang gang phyir bdag gis sems can dgrol zhes khyod kyis zhal bzhes te//

dei phyir mkhas pas [D: *pa*] *rin po che yi gling du chas pai skye tshogs kyi/*
ngal ba nyer sel grong khyer yid 'ong bar du rnam par bkod pa ltar/
khyod kyis theg pa 'di ni slob ma nye bar zhi bai tshul la yid/
sbyar bar mdzad cing rnam par dben la blo [D: *sbyar zhing rnam par dpen pa la'ang blo*] *sbyangs rnams la logs su gsungs//* [401-402]

Thus beings commit wrong doings, [for] the [five] degenerations are current. Thus the world does not engage in the profound - the domain (*gocara*) of the buddhas. Yet, because you have gone to bliss, you simultaneously have complete omniscience and compassionate methods. Thus you promised, "I will free living creatures". Just as the skilled [captain of a ship] will, until [his ship] reaches the land of jewels, produce [a mirage] likeness of a beautiful city to rid the group [of passengers] of their despondency, you adapted this vehicle to suit the minds [of your] disciples as a way to completely satisfy them. And separately you speak to the intellects to be trained [about] the strictly single [vehicle].

12.39 *bde bar gshegs pa ma lus phyogs cing sangs rgyas yul dag na/*
phra rab rdul gyi rdul rnams bdog par gyur pa ji snyed pa/
byang chub mchog rab dam par gshegs pai bskal pa'ang [D: *pa*] *de snyed de/*
'on kyang khyod kyi gsang ba 'di ni bsnyad bgyis [D: *bgyi*] *ma lags so//* [403]

There are as many Sugatas [in the ten] directions and as many candidates [of the teachings of those] buddhas as there are sub-atomic particles. However, although the aeons wherein Sugatas [show] the most excellent and holy awakening are just as many [as these], you did not relate this secret [doctrine of the single vehicle to everybody].

12.40 *rgyal ba ji srid 'jig rten mtha' dag mchog tu rab zhi bar/*
'gro ba min zhing nam mkha' rnam 'jig 'gyur min de srid du/
shes rab yum gyis bskyed pa khyod la thugs brtse ma ma yis/
tshul lugs byed pas rab tu zhi bar 'gyur ba ga la mnga'// [403-404]

For as long as all the world has not gone to the most supreme serenity and space has not decayed, you who were borne of the mother of insight will act like a wet nurse [to all beings] through your love. Therefore how [can it be thought that you] have risen to the thorough [or isolated] serenity [i.e. a non-abiding nirvana].

12.41 *gti mug skyon gyis 'jig rten kha zas dug* [VP: *dag*] *bcas za ba yi/*
skye bo nyid kyi nang mi de la khyod brtse ji lta ba/
de ltar [VP: *dag*] *zos nyen pai bu la ma yis sdug bsngal min/*
des na mgon po mchog tu rab zhir gshegs par 'gyur ma lags// [404]

The suffering a mother has when her child is in danger from eating poisoned food is not like your love for the family of ordinary people who, through the fault of confusion, have eaten the poisoned food of the world. Therefore the protectors have not departed to the most supreme serenity [of a non-abiding nirvana].

12.42 *gang gi phyir na mi mkhas dngos dang dngos med par zhen pa yi blo can gyis/*
skye dang 'jig gnas skabs dang sdug dang mi sdug bral phrad kyis bskyed sdug bsngal dang/
sdig can 'gro ba 'thob pa de phyir 'jig rten thugs brtse' yul du rab dong bas/
bcom ldan thugs rjes khyod thugs zhi las bzlog pas khyod la mya ngan 'das mi mnga'// [405]

Because the unschooled have intellects that yearn for things (*bhava*) and non-things, [they experience] the conditions of birth and decay, the suffering produced by separation from the desirable and meeting with the undesirable, and obtain the unfortunate migrations. For this reason the world is the object of your love and, O Conqueror, this averts you from [selfish,] mental serenity. As such you do not possess [the non-abiding] nirvana.

CONCLUDING VERSES

C.1 *lugs 'di dge slong zla grags kyis/*
dbu ma' bstan bcos las btus nas/
lung ji bzhin dang man ngag ni/
ji lta ba bzhin brjod pa yin// [406]

The monk, Chandrakirti, extracted this system from the Madhyamika treatise [of Nagarjuna] and he described in accordance with that scripture and likewise according to the oral instructions (*upadesa*).

C.2 *'di las gzhan na chos 'di ni/*
ji ltar med pa de bzhin du/
'dir 'byung lugs kyang gzhan na ni/
med ces mkhas rnams nges par mdzod// [406]

Scholars should definitely accept that this teaching [about emptiness] is unlike any other and that this system is unlike any other.

C.3 *klu sgrub blo mtsho shin tu rgya chei kha dog gis 'jigs pas/*
skye bos lugs bzang gang dag rgyang ring spangs pas de yi tshig/
le'ur byas pai kha 'bus ku mu da kha phye bai chus/
da lta zla ba grags pa re rnams rab tu skong bar byed// [407]

Because they are frightened off by the colour of the huge ocean of Nagarjuna's intellect, those ordinary people [keeping their] distance have forsaken this good system, [but] now [like the] water of the blossoming of the kumuda buds, the creation of these verses entirely fulfills the hopes of Chandrakirti.

C.4 *de nyid bshad zin zab mo 'jigs rung 'di ni sngon goms nyid las skye bo yis/*
nges par rtogs 'gyur 'di ni gsan rgya che yang gzhan gyis thugs su chud mi 'gyur/
de phyir tshul lugs rang blos sbyar ba de [D: *'di*] *dag mthong nas bdag tu brjod pa yi/*
gzhung lugs rnams ltar gzhan lugs bzhed gzhung 'di las gzhan la dga' blo dor bar bya// [407-408]

The reality that has been [here] explained is profound and terrifying. Ordinary people, due to their meditations on it in past [lives] will certainly comprehend it, yet there are others who listen extensively but do not keep it in their minds. Therefore, use one's own intellect to compare philosophical systems and, after looking at them, happily cast from your mind those other doctrines that speak of a self and those other systems not in this treatise.

C.5 *slob dpon klu sgrub lugs bzang bsnyad las blag gi* [D: *gis*] *bsod rnams phyogs kyi mthar/*
khyabs cing yid mkha' nyon mongs kyis sngor stan kai rgyu dkar ltar dkar ba'am/
sems kyi sbrul la gdengs kai nor bu dang 'dra gang zhig thob pa des/
'jig rten ma lus de nyid rtogs nas myur du bde gshegs sar bgrod shog// [409]

The positive energy which I have gained by explaining the noble system of the teacher Nagarjuna pervades [space] to the boundaries of the directions, my mental sky [is clear of] delusions as the autumn sky [is as clear it] is whitened by stars, my mind is [as beautiful] as the jewelled hood of a snake. By whatever I have achieved, may all the world understand reality and quickly travel to the level of a Sugata.

APPENDIX TWO

TSONG KHA PA'S SECTION HEADINGS IN THE *DBU MA DGONGS PA RAB GSAL*

This appendix presents a translation of the section headings (*sa bcad*) of Tsong kha pa's *Commentary* to the *Introduction to the Middle Way* [MA]. The full title of the work is *dBu ma la 'jug pai rgya cher bshad dgongs pa rab gsal*. In preparing this translation we have used the Sarnath edition of the text. The numbers that appear in square brackets refer to this edition. An absence of verse numbers from the Introduction indicates that the subject matter is not referred to by Chandrakirti in the verses.

1 The meaning of the title [*The Introduction to the Middle Way* (MA)] [2]

2 The translator's salutation [to Manjushri] [4]

3 The meaning of the text [4] 1.1-C.5

_.1 Expression of worship as the means of beginning the composition of the text [5] 1.1-4b

__.1 Praise to the great compassion (*mahakaruna*) that is undifferentiated with respect to its type [5] 1.1-2

___.1 Showing that compassion is the main cause of bodhisattvas [5] 1.1

____.1 How disciples (*sravaka*) and self-evolvers (*pratyekabuddha*) are born from the king of victors [5] 1.1a

____.2 How buddhas are born from bodhisattvas [10] 1.1b

____.3 The three main causes of bodhisattvas [13] 1.1cd

3.1.1.2 [Compassion] is also the root of the two other causes of bodhisattvas [16] 1.2

3.1.2 Homage to great compassion within differentiating its types [18] 1.3-4b

__.1 Homage to the compassion that focuses on living creatures [18] 1.3

____.2 Homage to the compassion that focuses on phenomena and the unapprehendible [22] 1.4ab

3.2 The actual body of the composition [27] 1.4c-12.42

_.1 The causal levels [i.e. the ten bodhisattva levels] [28] 1.4c-11.9

__.1 The general method on the way to practise this system [28] 1.4c-11.9

__.2 An explanation of the way to practise at the level of common people in particular [30]

__.3 Teaching the presentation of the levels of saintly bodhisattvas [32]

____.1 A general presentation of the ten levels (*bhumi*) [32]

____.2 A presentation of the levels individually [36] 1.4c-10.1

_____.1 An explanation of the [first] five levels, Great Joy (*pramudita*), etc. [36] 1.4c-5.1

3.2.1.3.2.1.1 The first level - of Great Joy [36] 1.4c-17

_.1 A brief presentation of the essence of the level that is being distinquished [36] 1.4c-5b

_.2 A detailed explanation of the qualities of this level's characteristics [38] 1.5c-16

_.1 The qualities that act to beautify one's own mental continuum [38] 1.5c-7

__.1 An explanation of the individual qualities [38] 1.5-7c

__.1 The quality of obtaining a meaningful name [38] 1.5cd

__.2 The four qualities: being born in the lineage, etc. [39] 1.6

__.3 The three qualities: advancing to the higher levels, etc. [40] 1.7a-c

_.2.1.2 The qualities in brief summary [41] 1.7d

_.2.2 The quality of outshining the mental continua of others [41] 1.8

__.1 On this level they outshine the disciples and self-evolvers, by way of lineage [41] 1.8a-c

____.2 On the seventh level they outshine disciples and self-evolvers by way of intelligence [43] 1.8d

__.3 An explanation of the meaning as this is established in the teachings [46]

______.1 The *Ten Levels Sutra* (DS) [teaching that] disciples and self-evolvers realise the non-intrinsic existence of phenomena [46]

____.1 A clarificatory explanation of the thought in the *Commentary* (MABh) [46]

____.2 This is also the system in the *Introduction to the Fully Evolved Lifestyle* (BCA) [50]

_.2.2.3.2 Showing the textual sources that establish this [55]

_____.1 Consulting the Mahayana sutras [55]

_____.2 Consulting the treatises and Hinayana sutras [59]

_.2.2.3.3 Logical objections to this teaching [that disciples and self-evolvers realise the non-intrinsic existence of phenomena]

_____.1 Refuting objections discussed in the *Commentary* (MABh) [65]

_____.2 Refuting objections not discussed there [68]

_.2.3 An explanation of the superlative qualities on the first level [73] 1.9-15

___.1 An explanation of the generosity (*dana*) of those situated on the first level [73] 1.9

___.2 An explanation of the generosity of those at a lower foundation [74] 1.10-12

____.1 Attaining happiness within cyclic existence through generosity [74] 1.10-11

____.2 Showing the attainment of the happiness of nirvana through generosity [75] 1.12

_.2.3.3 An explanation of the generosity of bodhisattvas [76] 1.13-15

____.1 Showing the extraordinary benefits of the bodhisattvas' generosity [76] 1.13ab

_____.2 Showing the importance of discoursing on generosity for the foundation of both [those who are and are not compassionate] [76] 1.13cd

____.3 Showing the sort of joy that is obtained by the bodhisattva when giving [76] 1.14

____.4 Showing whether the bodhisattvas suffer or not in giving away their body [77] 1.15

_.2.4 Showing the divisions of perfect generosity [78] 1.16

_.3 Conclusion by way of elucidating the qualities of the [first] level [81] 1.17

CHAPTER TWO

3.2.1.3.2.1.2 An explanation of the second level - the Stainless (*vimala*) [82] 2.1-10

_.1 Showing the complete purity of the good conduct (*sila*) at this level [82] 2.1-3

_.1 The excellence of the good conduct at this level [82]2.1ab

_.2 Showing the complete purification of the qualities through dependence on [perfect conduct] [83] 2.1cd

_.3 The superiority of the conduct [at this level] when compared with the first level [83] 2.2

_.4 Showing the other cause, i.e. for the complete purification of conduct [84] 2.3

_.2 Showing the praise of good conduct [85]2.4-7

__.1 Enjoying a happy migration, [which is] the result of giving, depends on good conduct [86] 2.4ab

__.2 Enjoying the results of generosity in continuous lives depends on good conduct [86] 2.4cd

__.3 Showing the great difficulty in becoming free from bad migrations if one abandons good conduct [87] 2.5

__.4 The reason for discoursing on good conduct after the discourse on generosity [87] 2.6

___.5 In praise of good conduct as the cause of both spiritual ascendance and the final transcendence [87] 2.7

_.3 Showing the example of the non-mixture with what is the antithesis of good conduct [91] 2.8

_.4 Showing the divisions of perfect conduct [91]2.9

_.5 Conclusion by way of elucidating the qualities of the level [91] 2.10

CHAPTER THREE

3.2.1.3.2.1.3 An explanation of the third level - the Light Maker (*prabhakari*) [92] 3.1-13

_.1 The actual description of the level - the basis of its distinction [92] 3.1

_.2 Qualities of the level - the distinquishing features [93]3.2-11

__.1 Showing the superlative patience (*ksanti*) of this level [93] 3.2-3

__.2 The way in which one attends to the patience of others [94] 3.4-9

___.1 The inappropriatness of anger [95] 3.4-7c

____.1 The inappropriateness of anger due to its being senseless and having great drawbacks [95] 3.4

_____.2 Showing the two contradictions of not wanting future suffering and making a harmful response [95] 3.5

_____.3 The inappropriateness of anger due to its destroying the virtue accumulated over a long time in the past [96] 3.6-7c

_____.1 The meaning of the text [96] 3.6

_____.2 An explanation of the ancilliary meanings [100]

_.2.2.1.4 Stopping anger by pondering the many faults of impatience [104] 3.7a-c

_.2.2.2 The suitability of attending to patience [104] 3.7d-9

____.1 Thinking about the many qualities of patience [104] 3.7d-8

____.2 The abridged meaning of the advice to attend to patience [104] 3.9

_.2.3 The divisions of perfect patience [105] 3.10

__.4 Showing the other pure qualities that arise at this level [105] 3.11

_.3 The distinctive feature of the first three perfections [107] 3.12

_.4 Conclusion by way of elucidating the qualities of this level [108] 3.13

CHAPTER FOUR

3.2.1.3.2.1.4 An explanation of the fourth level - the Radiant (*arcismati*)[108] 4.1-2

_.1 The superlative endurance (*virya*) at this level [109]4.1

_.2 The actual description of this level [109]4.2a-c

_.3 The distinctive abandonments [111]4.2d

CHAPTER FIVE

3.2.1.3.2.1.5 An explanation of the fifth level - the Difficult to Conquer (*sudurjaya*) [111] 5.1

_.1 An explanation giving the actual description of the fifth level [111] 5.1ab

_.2 The superlative meditation (*dhyana*) and expertise in the realities [111] 5.1cd

CHAPTER SIX

3.2.1.3.2.2 An explanation of the sixth level - Becoming Manifest (*abhimukhi*) [114] 6.1-226

_.1 Showing the actual description of this level and its superlative perfection of insight (*prajna*) [114] 6.1

_.2 In praise of perfect insight (*prajna*) [116]6.2

_.3 An explanation of reality (*tattva*) - seeing the profound relational origins (*pratityasamatpada*) [116] 6.3-223

__.1 The promise to explain the profound topic [117] 6.3

__.2 Recognising receptive students to whom to explain the profound topic [119] 6.4-5c

__.3 How the qualities arise when it is explained to these [students] [121] 6.5d-7a

__.4 Enjoining those individuals who are [potentially receptive, to listen [to the teaching] [124] 6.5d-7a

__.5 The method of explaining the final reality, in conformity with [the concept of] relational origination [127] 6.8-223

___.1 How one demonstrates the correct meaning through the texts [127]

____.1 The plan: the method of citing texts [127]

____.2 Recognising positions that do not accord with the insight into reality [128]

______.1 Recognising the apprehension of reality (*satya*) in the Svatantrika-madhyamika system [130]

________.1 Recognising the established reality (*satya-siddhi*) and [naively] apprehended reality (*satya-graha*) [130]

______.2 Demonstrating, through the example of an illusion, that the reality relied on by worldly folk is fallacious [132]

______.3 Explaining the meaning of that example through its application [134]

_.3.5.1.2.2 Recognising the apprehension of reality in the Prasangika-madhyamika system [136]

______.1 How one posits phenomena through the force of conceptual thought (*kalpana*) [137]

________.2 Showing that the [naively] apprehended reality [of the Svatantrika] contradicts this [principle, that phenomena are posited through the force of conceptual thought] [140]

_.3.5.2 Logically establishing that this is the meaning of the quotations [144] 6.8-178

___.1 Logically establishing the selflessness of phenomena (*dharmanairatmya*) [145] 6.8-119

_____.1 Refuting the four possibilities for production on both the levels of reality [145] 6.8-104b

______.1 Propounding the thesis that there is no intrinsically real production [145] 6.8ab

______.2 The proof for logically establishing this [150] 6.8c-103

_______.1 Refuting production from self [150] 6.8c-13

________.1 Refutation via the proofs used in [Chandrakirti's] *Commentary* [150] 6.8c-12

__________.1 Refuting the postulates of the senior [Samkhya] philosophers who want to realise reality [150] 6.8c-11

_________.1 Refutation of production from a cause within the one entity itself [151] 6.8c-9

_____________.1 The consequence that production from a cause within the one entity would be pointless [151] 6.8c

__________.2 That production from the one entity is logically contradictory [152] 6.8d-9c

__________.3 Refuting the response offered in defense of these [logical] flaws [152] 6.9d

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.1.1.2 Refuting that the one entity can be both a cause and an effect [153] 6.10-11

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.1.1.2.1 A refutation via the consequences that there would be no difference in the shape, etc. of a seed and a sprout [153] 6.10ab

__________.2 Refuting the response offered in defense of this flaw. [154] 6.10cd

_____________.3 A refutation via the consequence that both [seed and sprout] would equally be apprehended or not apprehended during each of the two conditions [i.e. at the time of the seed or the time of the sprout] [154] 6.11

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.1.1.2 Showing that for those whose intellects are uninfluenced by [philosophical] postulates, this is not even conventionally so [155] 6.12ab

_________.3 A summary of the [foregoing] refutations [155] 6.12cd

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.1.2 Refutation via the proofs in [Nagarjuna's] *Treatise* [*on the Middle Way* (MK)] [156] 6.13

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2 Refuting production from another [157] 6.14-97

________.1 Stating earlier positions [157]

________.2 Refuting that system [159] 6.14-97

_________.1 A general refutation of the position that asserts production from another [159] 6.14-44

__________.1 The actual refutation of production from another [159] 6.14-21

___________.1 A general refutation of production from another [159] 6.14-19

____________.1 Refutation via the most [logically absurd] consequence [159] 6.14

_____________.1 The most [logically absurd] consequence itself [159] 6.14

_____________.2 An analysis of these [160]

_________________.1 The reason production from another entails this most [absurd] consequence [160]

______________.2 Contradicting the assertions that run contrary to the consequence [163]

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.1.1.1.2 Refuting the response offered in defence of the problems [164] 6.15-16

_____________.1 The response offered in defense of the problems [164] 6.15

_____________.2 Refuting the response offered in defense [165] 6.16

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.1.1.2 A particular refutation [of the thesis of] birth from another [166] 6.17-20

________________.1 Refuting production from another when cause and effect are temporarily displaced [lit. earlier and later] [166] 6.17-19

_____________.1 The actual meaning [166] 6.17

_____________.2 Countering the arguments against this refutation [166] 6.18-19

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.1.1.2.2 Refuting production from another where there is a simultaneity between cause and effect [170] 6.20

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.1.1.3 Refuting production from another by analysing four possibilities [in relationship to the ontological status of the product] [171] 6.21

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.1.2 Countering the conventionalist's critique of the refutation [of production from another] [171] 6.22-31

_________________.1 Countering the conventionalist's critique which presumes that there is production from another in virtue of common consensus [to this fact] [171] 6.22-31

____________.1 Objections to that critique of the conventionalists [171] 6.22

____________.2 Showing their reply: that [the critique] has not been invalidated. [172] 6.23-31

____________.1 A general presentation of the two realities (*satya*) [173] 6.23-26

_________________.1 Detailing that there are two realities which are divided by virtue of there being a dual nature to phenomena [173] 6.23

______________.2 Alternative presentations of the two realities [176]

___________________.3 Explaining the division of the conventional [reality] from the worldly perspective [179] 6.24-25

________________.4 In [the case of] fictitious objects, mistaken fictitious objects don't exist even conventionally [183] 6.26

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.1.2.1.2.2 Application to the topic in hand [184] 6.27

_____________.3 An explanation of the separate natures of the two realities [185] 6.28-29

_____________.1 An explanation of the conventional reality (*samvrti-satya*) [185] 6.28

_________________.1 From what perspective is the conventional [reality] real, and from what perspective is it unreal[185] 6.28

_______________.1 The actual meaning [185] 6.28

_______________.2 An explanation that it is not the usual presentation of the afflictions [190]

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.1.2.1.2.3.1.2 The way of both appearance and non-appearance to the three persons in mere conventional [reality] [195]

___________________.3 The way [things] become conventional or ultimate [reality] from the viewpoint of ordinary people or of saints [197]

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.1.2.1.2.3.2 An explanation of the ultimate reality (*paramartha-satya*) [198] 6.29

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.1.2.1.2.3.2.1 Explaining the meaning of the root verse [*Mulamadhyamakakarika:*] [198] 6.29

______________.2 Countering the arguments against that [200]

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.1.2.1.2.4 Show how to invalidate the conventionalists' criticism of the refutation [205] 6.30-31ab

____________.5 Showing how to invalidate the conventionalists' criticism [206] 6.31cd

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.1.2.2 Countering the conventionalists' criticism: there is no production from another even as in worldly transactions [207] 6.32

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.1.3 Showing the good features of the refutation just advanced [209] 6.33

_________.4 Showing that there is no intrinsic production at all [211] 6.34-38b

______________.1 Refuting the assertion that existence is established by virtue of [something having] its own defining characteristics (*svalaksana*) [211] 6.34-36

_____________.1 Refutation via the consequence that a saint's contemplation would cause the destruction of functional things [211] 6.34

_______________.2 Refutation via the consequence that the social reality would resist being logically analysed [214] 6.35

_____________.3 Refutation via the consequence that intrinsic production is unhindered [218] 6.36

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.1.4.2 Countering the argument against this [220] 6.37-38b

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.1.5 Showing the good features of refuting intrinsic production for both types of reality [224] 6.38c-44

__________.1 The feature of easily avoiding the views of permanence and nihilism [224] 6.38cd

__________.2 The feature of agreeing with the connection between action and result [225] 6.44

______________.1 Showing that when one doesn't assert intrinsic existence it is not necessary to accept a source- consciousness (*alayavijnana*)[225] 6.39

_____________.1 Explanation of the related scriptures [225]

_____________.2 Explanation of the meaning of the root verse [228] 6.39

_____________.3 An explanation that elaborates further on the topic [231]

_______________.1 The way non-intrinsic cessation becomes a reason for not accepting a source-consciousness [231]

_______________.2 Establishing the source of imprints (*vasana*) even without accepting a source-consciousness [223]

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.1.5.2.2 Showing the example of the arising of an effect from a completed action [235] 6.40

____________.3 Countering the arguments against such a teaching [239] 6.41-44

_____________.1 Countering the argument of an endlessly recurring ripened result [239] 6.41-42

_____________.2 Countering the opposing arguments [which use sutra] quotations that speak of the existence of a source-consciousness [240] 6.43-44

______________.1 The actual meaning being countered in these contrary quotations [240] 6.43

______________.2 The way the source-consciousness has been mentioned and not mentioned as a separate entity within the mind [243]

______________.3 Exemplification of what is said as being due to [the intention of the Buddha's] thought [246] 6.44

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.2 Refuting the Phenomenalist (*cittamatra*) system in particular [248] 6.45-97

__________.1 Refuting the existence of an intrinsic consciousness without externals [248] 6.45-71

___________.1 Stating the other system [248] 6.45-47

___________.2 And refuting this system [254] 6.48-71d

____________.1 Furnishing an extensive refutation [254] 6.48-71b

_______________.1 Refuting the examples that [purport] to establish an intrinsic consciousness without externals [254] 6.48-55

______________.1 Refuting the example of the dream [254] 6.48-53

________________________.1 Disproving that the example of a dream establishes an intrinsic consciousness [254] 6.48-49

_______________.2 The example of a dream doesn't prove that there are no externals when one is awake [257] 6.50-52b

_______________.3 The example of a dream proves the fictitiousness of all things [260] 6.52c-53

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.2.1.2.1.1.2 Refuting the example of seeing falling hair [261] 6.54-55

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.2.1.2.1.2 Refuting objects as products arising from the [ripened] potential of instincts (*vasana*) of a mind that is empty of objects [262] 6.56-68

_______________.1 Refuting that the appearance to consciousness of an object is produced or not in dependence on the ripening or not of these instincts [262] 6.56-61

_______________.1 Stating this other system [263]

_______________.2 Refuting this system [263] 6.56-61

________________.1 Refuting intrinsically existent potentials (*sakti*) in the present [263] 6.56-57b

________________.2 Refuting [that they can exist] subsequent [to their ripening] [264] 6.57c-58

________________.3 Refuting [that they exist] prior [to their ripening] [266] 6.59-61

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.2.1.2.1.2.2 A further refutation of consciousness existing without externals [268] 6.62-68b

_______________.1 Stating this other system [268] 6.62-64

_______________.2 Refuting this system [270] 6.65-68b

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.2.1.2.1.2.3 Showing that scripture doesn't invalidate the refutation to the Phenomenalists [272] 6.68cd

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.2.1.2.1.3 Showing there is no contradiction between the two: the refutation and the repulsive contemplations [276] 6.69-71b

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.2.1.2.2 Conclusion to the refutation [280] 6.71cd

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.2.2 Refuting criteria that establish the existence of intrinsically dependent (*paratantra*) phenomena [281] 6.72-83

__________________.1 Refuting self-reflexive consciousness (*svasamvedana*) as establishing the dependent phenomena [281] 6.72-77

_____________.1 Showing the inconsistency in the writings that establish dependent phenomena [281] 6.72

_____________.2 Refuting another's reply that they are consistent [283] 6.73-75

_____________.1 Stating this other system [283]

_____________.2 Refuting this system [287]

_____________.1 The actual refutation of the system [287] 6.73-74

______________________.2 How in our system memories arise even without a self-reflexive consciousness [289] 6.75

______________.1 The system explained in authentic texts [289] 6.75

______________.2 The system explained in other texts [291]

_.3.5.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.2.2.1.2.2.3 Countering the arguments that refute this [292]

__________________.1 Countering the argument concerning inference (*anumana*) and the other epistemological criterion, i.e. perception (*pratyaksa*).[293]

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INDEX

The Ontology of the Middle Way

by

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The Ontology of the Middle Way addresses two questions, namely: (1) What is the relationship between reason and insight and (2) how are the Mahāyāna religious doctrines of universal compassion and therapeutic skill related to the Mādhyamika concept of emptiness?

The author raises the first question by a thorough examination of the logical structures in Chandrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra and relates these to the psychological effects of logical analysis. The second question is addressed by a detailed examination of the relationship between emptiness, phenomenal reality and Mādhyamika expressions of the Mahāyāna philosophy.

The study significantly advances our understanding of the relationships between logical analysis, insight and the Mahāyāna religious goal of awakening. A translation of the Madhyamakāvatāra appears as an Appendix.

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